

W0;^ii^;^ 


''!■!•':'' '''''^ 










Class ?-^-T/ 
Bonk 



Digitized by the Internet Archive 
in 2011 with funding from 
The Library of Congress 



http://www.archive.org/details/outlinesofpsycho01wund 



OUTLINES 



OF 



PSYCHOLOGY 

BY 

WILHELM WUNDT 

TRANSLATED WITH THE COOPERATION OF THE AUTHOR 

BY 
CHARLES HUBBARD JUDD, Ph. D. (LEIPZIG) 

INSTEUCTOE OF PSYCHOLOGY, YALE TJNIVEESITY 



SECOND REVISED ENGLISH EDITION 
FROM THE FOURTH REVISED GERMAN EDITION 



LEIPZIG 

PUBLISHED BY WILHELM ENGELMANN 
LONDON I NEW YORK 

WILLIAMS & NOEGATE | GTJSTAV E. STECHEET 

1902. 






fofU-z. 



J? 



q^ 



TKANSLATOE'S PEEFACE 

TO FIEST ENGLISH EDITION. 



IhIS translation lias been made with the cooperation 
of the author, who has not only contributed many valuable 
criticisms and suggestions in regard to terminology, but has 
read all the proof-sheets as they were being prepared for 
the press. A few verbal changes have been introduced into 
the text with a view to making the discussion somewhat 
clearer. 

The difficulties that arise in choosing English equivalents 
for many German words, are too familiar to require detailed 
discussion. The translator has derived assistance in this 
respect from a comparison of other standard translations, 
especially the English versions of Falokenberg's "History 
of Modern Philosophy", Wundt's "Lectures on Human and 
Animal Psychology", and KIjlpe's "Outlines of Psychology". 
The terminology here employed differs, however, at many 
points from that used in the works mentioned. A glossary 
of the principal terms has been added for the benefit of 
those familiar with the German. The translation of the 
word ''Perceptions^ is unusual. If it were translated 'per- 
ception' it would be easily confused, especially in its verbal 
forms, with the only possible equivalent of " Wahrnehmung^^ 
'' wahrnehmen''\ and '' Anschauung'^\ Since the process re- 



IV Translator's Preface to first English Translation. 

f erred to by '^Perception'''' is so entirely different from that 
indicated by the English word perception, it seemed best to 
employ a word whose signification is not so fixed. Apprehen- 
sion was, accordingly, used, and the danger of confusing it 
with the translation of "Auffassung" was for the most part 
avoided by using other equivalents for the latter. 

The thanks of the translator are due to the author for 
his courtesy throughout the progress of the work. Mr. Gr. H. 
Stempel has kindly aided in the task of preparing the proof- 
sheets for the press. 

Middletown, September, 1896. 

C. H. J. 



AUTHOE'S PEEFACE 

TO THE FIRST GEEIAN EDITION. 



i HIS book has been written primarily for the purpose 
of furnishing my students with a brief manual to supplement 
the lectures on Psychology. At the same time it aims to 
give the wider circle of scientific scholars who are interested 
in psychology, either for its own sake or for the sake of its 
application^, (a systematic survey' 'of the fundamentally im- 
portant results and doctrines of modern psychologyj In view" 
of this double purpose, I have limited myself in detailing 
facts to that which is most important, or to the examples 
that serve most directly the ends of illustration, and have 
omitted entirely those aids to demonstration and experiment 
which are properly made use of in the lecture-room. The 
fact that I have based this treatise on the doctrines that 
I have come to hold as valid after long years of labor in 
this field, needs no special justification. Still, I have not 
neglected to point out both in a general characterization 
(Introduction § 2), and with references in detail, the chief 
theories that differ from the one here presented. 

The relation in which this book stands to my earlier 
psychological works will be apparent after what has been 
said. The " Orundzilge der physiologischen Psychologies^ aims 
to bring the means employed by the natural sciences, 



yi Author's Preface to the first German Edition 

especially by physiology, into the service of psychology, and 
to give a critical presentation of the experimental methods 
of psychology, which have developed in the last few decades, 
together with their chief results. This special problem ren- 
dered necessary a relative subordination of the general psy- 
chological points of view. The second, revised edition of 
the '' Vorlesungen uber die Menschen- und ThierseeW'' ^) (the 
first edition has long been out of date) seeks to give a more 
popular account of the character and purpose of experimental 
psychology, and to discuss from the position thus defined 
those psychological questions which are also of more general 
philosophical importance. While the treatment in the " Orund- 
zilge'^ is, accordingly, determined, in the main, by the rela- 
tions of psychology to physiology, and the treatment in the 
^''Vorlesungen^^ by philosophical interests, this Outlines aims 
to present psychology in its own proper coherency, and in 
the systematic order that the nature of the subject-matter 
seems to me to require. In doing this, however, it takes up 
only what is most important and essential. It is my hope 
that this book will not be an entirely unwelcome addition 
even for those readers who are familiar with my earlier works 
as well as with the discussion of the ''Logik der Psychologie'"' 
in my '^Logik der Geisteswissenschaften'^ (Logik, 2. Aufl., 11^ 
2. Abtk.). 

1 have not thought it necessary to repeat here the refer- 
ences to psychological works, in view of the fact that I have 
given such references very fully under the various heads in 
my '^ Grundzilge^\ The reader who wishes to make a more 



1) Translated by Prof. J. E. Creighton and Prof. E. B. Titchener: 
'^Lectures on Human and Animal Psychology''^ Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 
1894. 



Author's Preface to the first German Edition. VII 

thorough study of any particular question will turn in any 
case to the more elaborate work. For the literature that 
has appeared in this department since the fourth edition of 
the '' Orundzuge'^ (1893), the reader has but to refer to the 
last volumes of the various periodicals devoted to psychology : 
to the ''Philosophische Studien^\ the '^ Zeitschrift fiir Psy- 
chologie und Physiologie der 8innesorgane^\ the '^Americmi 
Journal of Psychology ^\ and the '' Psychological Review ^\ 
The last three contain also reviews of the current literature 
in psychology. As a recent addition to these the ^'Psycho- 
logische Arheiten^'' edited by E. Kraepelin and devoted especi- 
ally to individual characterology and practical psychology, 
may be mentioned. 

Leipzig, January, 1896. 

W. Wundt. 



AUTHOE'S PEEFACE 

TO THE FOURTH GEEIAN EDITIOI!^. 



IHIS fourth edition contains more additions and minor 
revisions than do the second and third editions. The chief 
change is one which I have introduced in compHance with 
a request that has frequently been made; this change con- 
sists in the addition of brief lists of reading references at 
the end of each of the sections and chief divisions. These 
references, in keeping with the general character of the 
book, must of course be limited to the most important con- 
tributions to the discussions in question; and not all the 
important references can be given, but those must be selected 
which will furnish the reader who wishes to go into the 
subject more thoroughly with easy means of finding further 
references for his study. Sections of my '^Grundzuge der 
psysiologischen Psychologie^\ and my '^Vorlesungen uher die 
Menschen- und Thierseele", which have been included in 
these lists of references are cited from the fourth and third 
editions respectively, and are referred to by abbreviated 
titles n. 



1) In the English edition the titles have been given in full, 
that of the Grundziige in its German form, that of the Vorlesungen 
in the form adopted by the translators, '^Lectures on Human and 
Psychology^\ Tr. 



Author's Preface to the fourth German Edition. IX 

The '^Lectures'^ may serve in a certain sense as a supple- 
ment to the '•^Outlines^\ for the Lectures contain a more 
complete elementary discussion of the experimental methods 
of psychology and also certain diagrammatic figures. For the 
benefit of readers of the Outlines who are not otherwise 
supplied with these aids, I have given page and number ref- 
erences to the figures in the Lectures. 

Leipzig, March, 1901. 

W. Wundt. 



TKANSLATOE'S PKEFACE 

TO THE SECOND ENGLISH EDITION. 



iHIS second edition includes all tliat the author has 
incorporated in the fourth German edition. The most ex- 
tended additions to the text are to be found on the following 
pages of this edition: 18—20, 50, 78—79, 94, 97—99, 108, 
110—113, 127, 138, 184-185, 192—193, 221—222, 232 
—233, 248—251, 271—274, 285—286, 306—307, 330, 341 
— 345, 346 — 349. There are also a number of lesser revi- 
sions. The reading references which the author inserted in 
his fourth edition are repeated without change !of any kind 
except the substitution of English titles for German titles 
wherever this was possible. Since the references are pre- 
sented by the author as a selected bibliography, it did not 
seem wise to make any additions. The pages on which these 
referenes appear in this edition are given in the index under 
"References". 

Changes have been freely introduced in the phraseology 
of the English translation. It has not been necessary to 
make any signii&cant changes in the terminology adopted for 
the earlier edition. The translator is under obligations to 
the reviewers of his work, and to a number of those who 
have used the book as a class text-book for suggestions of 
which he has taken advantage in his work of revision. It is 



Translator'' s Preface to the Second English Edition. XI 

hoped that these friendly critics will find the present form 
of the translation improved at points where the earlier edition 
may have been open to objection. Finally, the translator 
wishes to acknowledge his obhgations to the publisher who 
has spared no pains in effort to make as easy as possible 
the difficult task of putting an English book through a 
German press. 

New Haven, 1902. 

C. H. J. 



CONTENTS. 



INTEODUCTION. 



§ 1. Problem of Psychology 1 

1. Older definitions. 2. Psychology as the science of 
immediate experience. 3. Relation to the mental and to 
the natural sciences. 3 a. Knowledge as gained through 
the natural sciences mediate and conceptual, that gained 
in psychology immediate and perceptual. 

§ 2. GrENERAL FORMS OF PSYCHOLOGY 6 

1. Metaphysical psychology: spiritualistic and material- 
istic, dualistic and monistic systems. 2. Empirical psy- 
chology: two principles for the classification of its varieties. 
3. Psychology of the inner sense. 4. Psychology as the 
science of immediate experience. 5, Descriptive psychol- 
ogy: faculty-psychology. 6. Explanatory psychology: in- 
tellectualistic and voluntaristic psychology. 7. Intellec- 
tualistic forms: logical theory and association psychology. 
8. Erroneous intellectualistic attribution of the nature of 
things to ideas. 9. Voluntaristic psychology. 10. Govern- 
ing principles of the following treatise. 10a. Tabular sum- 
mary of chief forms. Their historical development. 

§ 3. Methods of Psychology . . . „ 23 

1. Relation of experiment and observation in general. 
2. Application to psychology: particular significance of ex- 
perimental methods for psychology. 3. Pure observation 
in psychology. Analysis of mental products: social psy- 
chology. 



XIV Contents. 

page 
§ 4. GrENERAL SURVEY OF THE SUBJECT 29 

1. Analytic and synthetic problem of psychology. Psy- 
chical elements. 2. The various synthetic problems in order: 
psychical compounds, interconnections, and developments. 
3. Laws of psychical phenomena and their causality. 

I. PSYCHICAL ELEMENTS. 

§ 5. Chief Forms and Gteneral Attributes of Psy- 
chical Elements 32 

1. Discovery of psychical elements through abstrac- 
tion. 2. Two kinds of psychical elements: sensations and 
feelings. 3. Elementary nature and specific character of 
psychical processes not identical. 4. Common attributes of 
psychical elements : quality and intensity. 5. Homogeneous 
and complex, one-dimensional, two-dimensional, and many- 
dimensional systems of quality. 6. Distinguishing charac- 
teristics of sensational and affective elements. 6a. Remarks 
on the history of the concepts sensation and feeling. 

§ 6. Pure Sensations 42 

1. The concept pure sensation. 2. Rise of sensations. 
Sense-stimuli, 3. Physiological substrata of the sensational 
systems. Mechanical and chemical senses. 4. The so-called 
law of specific energy of nerves. 5. The law of parallelism 
of changes in sensation and physiological stimulation. 
5 a. On the history of the concept "specific energy". 

A. Sensations of the general sense 51 

6. Definition of the general sense. Sensational systems 
of this sense. 7. Attributes and differences of the various 
parts of the organ of the general sense. 8. The four systems 
of the general sense in detail. 

B. Sensations of sound 55 

9. Simple noise sensations. 10. Tone sensations. 11. The 
system of tone sensations. 

C. Sensations of smell and taste 59 

12. Sensations of smell. 12 a. Classes of olfactory 
qualities. Reciprocal neutralization of odors. 13. Sensa- 
tions of taste. The four primary qualities. 13a. Mixture 
and neutralization of gustatory stimuli. 



INTRODUCTION. 



§ 1. PEOBLEM OF PSYCHOLOGY. 

1. Two definitions of psychology have been the most 
prominent in the history of this science. According to one, 
psychology is the "science of mind": psychical processes are 
regarded as phenomena from which it is possible to infer 
the nature of an underlying metaphysical mind-substance. 
According to the other, psychology is the "science of inner 
experience": psychical processes are here looked upon as 
belonging to a specific form of experience, which is readily 
distinguished by the fact that its contents are known through 
"introspection", or through the "inner sense", as it is called, 
if one uses the phrase which has been employed to distin- 
guish introspection from sense-perception through the outer 
senses. 

Neither of these definitions, however, is satisfactory to 
the psychology of to-day. The first, or metaphysical, defini- 
tion belongs to a period of development that lasted longer 
in this science than in others, but is here too forever left 
behind, since psychology has developed into an empirical 
discipline, operating with methods of its own; and since the 
"mental sciences" have gained recognition as a great de- 
partment of scientific investigation, distinct from the sphere 
of the natural sciences, and requiring as a general ground- 

Wdndt, Psychology. 2. edit. 1 



2 Introduction. 

work an independent psychology, free from all metaphysical 
theories. 

The second, or empirical, definition, which sees in psychol- 
ogy a "science of inner experience", is inadequate because 
it may give rise to the misunderstanding that psychology has 
to do with objects totally different from the objects of so- 
called "outer experience". It is, indeed, true that there are 
certain contents of experience which belong in the sphere of 
psychological investigation, and are not to be found among 
the objects and processes studied by natural science: such 
are our feelings, emotions, and decisions. On the other hand, 
there is not a single natural phenomenon that may not, 
from a different point of view, become an object of psychol- 
ogy. A stone, a plant, a tone, a ray of light, are, when 
treated as natural phenomena, objects of mineralogy, botany, 
physics, etc. In so far, however, as they are at the same 
time ideas., they are objects of psychology, for psychology 
seeks to account for the genesis of these ideas, and for their 
relations, both to other ideas and to those psychical proc- 
esses, such as feelings, volitions, etc., which are not referred 
to external objects. There is, then, no such thing as an 
"inner sense" which can be regarded as an organ of intro- 
spection, and as distinct from the outer senses, or organs 
of objective perception. The ideas of which psychology seeks 
to investigate the attributes, are identical with those upon 
which natural science is based; while the subjective activities 
of feeling, emotion, and volition, which are neglected in 
natural science, are not known through special organs, but 
are directly and inseparably connected with the ideas referred 
to external objects. 

2. It follows, then, that the expressions outer and inner 
experience do not indicate different objects, but different 
^points of view from which we take up the consideration and 



§ 1. Problem of Psychology. 3 

scientific treatment of a unitary experience. We are natu- 
rally led to these points of view, because every concrete ex- 
perience immediately divides into two factors: into a content 
presented to us, and our apprehension of tliis content. We 
call tlie first of these factors objects of experience^ the second, 
experiencing subject. This division indicates two directions 
for the treatment of experience. One is that of the natural 
scie7ices, which concern themselves with the objects of ex- 
perience, thought of as independent of the subject. {The other 
is that of psychology^ which investigates the whole content of 
experience in its relations to the subject and also in regard 
to the attributes which this content derives directly from the 
subject. The point of view of natural science may, accord- 
ingly, be designated as that of mediate experience^ since it 
is possible only after abstracting from the subjective factor 
present in all actual experience; the point of view of psy- 
chology, on the other hand, may be designated as that of 
immediate experience, since it purposely does away with this 
abstraction and all its consequences. 

3. The assignment of this problem to psychology, making 
it a general, empirical science coordinate with the natural 
sciences, and supplementary to them, is justified by the method 
of all the mental sciences^ for which psychology furnishes 
the basis. All of these sciences: philology, history and 
political and social science, have as their subject-matter, 
immediate experience as determined by the interaction of 
objects with knowing and acting subjects. None of the 
mental sciences employs the abstractions and hypothetical 
supplementary concepts of natural science; quite otherwise, 
they all accept ideas and the accompanying subjective 
activities as immediate reality. The effort is then made 
to explain the single components of this reality through 
their mutual interconnections. This method of psychological 

1* 



4 Introduction. 

interpretation employed in each of the special mental 
sciences, must also be the mode of procedure in psychol- 
ogy itself. 

3 a. Since natural science investigates the content of ex- 
perience after abstracting from the experiencing subject, its 
problem is usually stated as that of acquiring "knowledge of 
the outer world". By the expression outer world is meant the 
sum total of all the objects presented in experience. The problem 
of psychology has sometimes been correspondingly defined as 
"self-knowledge of the subject". This definition is, however, 
inadequate, because the interaction of the subject with the outer 
world and with other similar subjects is just as much a part 
of the problem of psychology as are the attributes of the single 
subject. Furthermore, the expression can easily be interpreted 
to mean that the outer world and the subject are separate 
components of experience, or, at least, components which can be 
distinguished as independent contents of experience, whereas, in 
truth, outer experience is always connected with the apprehending 
and knowing functions of the subject, and inner experience always 
contains ideas from the outer world as indispensable components. 
This interconnection is the necessary result of the fact that in 
reality experience is not a mere juxtaposition of different elements, 
but a single organized whole which requires in each of its 
components the subject that apprehends the content, and the 
objects that are presented as content. For this reason natural 
science can not abstract from the knowing subject entirely, but 
only from those attributes of the subject which either disappear 
entirely when we remove the subject in thought, as, for example, 
the feelings, or from those attributes which, on the ground of 
physical researches, must be regarded as belonging to the subject, 
as, for example, the qualities of sensations. Psychology, on the 
contrary, has as its subject of treatment the total content of 
experience in its immediate character. 

The only ground, then, for the division between natural 
science on the one hand, and psychology and the mental sciences 
on the other, is to be found in the fact that all experience 
contains as its factors a content objectively presented, and an 
experiencing subject. It is to be noted, however, that it is by 



§ 1. Problem of Psychology. 5 

no means necessary that logical definitions of these two factors 
should precede the separation of the sciences from one another, 
for it is obvious that such definitions are possible only after 
they have a basis in the investigations of natural science and 
of psychology, they can never precede these investigations. All 
that it is necessary to presuppose at first, is the conscious- 
ness which accompanies all experience, that in this experi- 
ence objects are being presented to a subject. There can, at 
this early stage, be no knowledge of the conditions upon 
which the distinction is based, or of the definite characteristics 
by which one factor is to be distinguished from the other. Even 
the use of the terms object and subject in this connection must 
be regarded as the application to the first stage of experience, 
of distinctions which are reached only through developed logical 
reflection. 

The forms of interpretation in natural science and psychol- 
ogy are supplementary, not only in the sense that the first 
considers objects after abstracting, as far as possible, from the 
subject, while the second has to do with the part which the 
subject plays in the rise of experience; but they are also sup- 
plementary in the sense that each takes a different point of 
view in considering any single content of experience. Natural 
science seeks to discover the nature of objects without ref- 
erence to the subject. The knowledge that it produces is 
therefore mediate or conceptual. In place of the immediate ob- 
jects of experience, it sets concepts gained from these objects 
by abstracting from the subjective components of our, ideas. 
This abstraction makes it necessary, continually to supplement 
reality with hypothetical elements. Scientific analysis shows that 
many components of experience — as, for example, sensations 
— are subjective effects of objective processes. These objective 
processes in their objective character, independent of the subject, 
can therefore never be a part of experience. Science makes up 
for this lack of direct contact with the objective processes by 
forming supplementary hypothetical concepts of the objective 
properties of matter. Psychology, on the other hand, investigates 
the contents of experience in their complete and actual form, 
both the ideas that are referred to objects, and also the sub- 
jective processes that cluster about these ideas. The knowledge 



6 Introduction. 

thus gained in psychology is, therefore, immediate B,nd j^erceptual: 
perceptual in the broad sense of the term in which, not only 
sense-perceptions, but all concrete reality is distinguished from 
all that is abstract and conceptual in thought. Psychology can 
exhibit the interconnection of the contents of experience, as 
these interconnections are actually presented to the subject, only 
by avoiding entirely the abstractions and supplementary concepts 
of natural science. Thus, while natural science and psychology 
are both empirical sciences in the sense that they aim to explain 
the contents of experience, though from different points of view, 
it is obvious that, in consequence of the special character of its 
problem, psychology is the more strictly empirical. 



§ 2. GENERAL FOEMS OF PSYCHOLOaY. 

1. The view that psychology is an empirical science which 
deals, not with a limited group of specific contents of ex- 
perience, but with the immediate contents of all experience, 
is of recent origin. It encounters even in the science of to- 
day hostile views, which are to be looked upon, in general, 
as the survivals of earlier stages of development, and which 
are in turn arrayed against one another according to their 
attitudes on the question of the relations of psychology to 
philosophy and to the other sciences. On the basis of the 
two definitions mentioned above (§ 1, 1) as being the most 
widely accepted, two chief forms of psychology may be dis- 
tinguished: iTietaphysical psychology and empirical psychology. 
Each is further divided into a number of special tendencies. 

Metaphysical psychology generally values very little the 
empirical analysis and causal interpretation of psychical 
processes. Regarding psychology as a part of philosophical 
metaphysics, its chief effort is directed toward the discovery 
of a definition of the "nature of mind" that shall be in ac- 
cord with the metaphysical system to which the particular 



§ 2. General Forms of Psychology. 7 

form of psychology belongs. After a metaphysical concept 
of mind has thus been established, the attempt is made to 
deduce from it the actual content of psychical experience. 
The characteristic that distinguishes metaphysical psychology 
from empirical psychology is, then, to be found in the attempt 
of metaphysical psychology to deduce psychical processes , not 
from other psychical processes, but from some substratum 
entirely unhke these processes themselves: either from the 
manifestations of a special mind-substance, or from the at- 
tributes and processes of matter. According as the sub- 
stratum of psychical processes is defined in the one way or 
the other, metaphysical psychology branches off in tiw di- 
rections. In the first place, it may become spiritualistic 
psychology^ in which case it considers psychical processes as 
the manifestations of a specific mind-substance and regards 
this mind-substance either as essentially different from matter 
[dualism], or as related in nature to matter (monism or 
monadology). The metaphysical tendency of spiritualistic 
psychology is expressed in the assumption of the supersensible 
nature of mind, and in connection with this, the assumption 
of the immortality of the mind. Sometimes the further notion 
of preexistence is also added. In the second place met^^ 
physical psychology may become materialistic psychology. It 
then refers psychical processes to the same material sub- 
stratum as that which natural science employs for the hypo- 
thetical explanation of natural phenomena. According to this 
view, psychical processes, like physical vital processes, are 
connected with certain organizations of material particles which 
are formed during the life of the individual and broken up 
at the end of that life. The metaphysical character of this 
form of psychology is determined by its denial that the mind 
is supersensible in its nature as is asserted by spiritualistic 
psychology. In order to make good its position such a 



8 Introduction. 

materialistic form of psychology resorts to one of the two 
following devices. It may explain the content of psycho- 
logical experience by means of a vague and inexact theory 
of molecular processes in the brain [mechanical materiaHsm) ; 
or it may regard sensation as a necessary attribute, either 
of all material particles, or else of brain molecules in par- 
ticular, in which case it treats all complex mental processes 
as combinations of such sensations, and explains their rise 
as the result of various combinations of physical brain proc- 
esses [psycho-physical materialism). Materialism in its various 
forms and spiritualistic psychology in its various forms, agree 
in this: they do not seek to interpret psychical experience, 
by experience itself, but rather attempt to derive this ex- 
perience from some kind of presuppositions in regard to 
hypothetical processes which are assumed to take place in 
some metaphysical substratum. 

2. From the strife that followed these attempts at meta- 
physical explanation, empirical psychology arose. Wherever 
empirical psychology is consistently carried out, it either 
strives to arrange psychical processes under general concepts 
derived directly from the interconnection of these processes 
themselves, or it begins with certain of these processes, as a 
rule with the simpler ones, and then explains the more com- 
plicated processes as the results of the interaction of those 
with which it began. There may be various fundamental 
principles upon which to base such an empirical interpreta- 
tion, and thus it becomes possible to distinguish several 
varieties of empirical psychology. In general, these may be 
classified according to two principles of division. The first 
principle has reference to the relation of inner and outer 
experience, and to the attitude which the two branches of 
empirical science, namely, natural science and psychology, 
take toward each other. The second principle refers to the 



<^ 2. General Forms of Psychology. 9 

facts themselves, or to the derived concepts v^hich are em- 
ployed in the interpretation of mental processes. Every 
system of empirical psychology takes its place under both of 
these principles of classification. 

3. On the general question as to the nature of psychical 
expedience there stand over against each other the two forms 
of psychology already mentioned (§ 1) on account of their 
decisive significance in determining the problem of psychol- 
ogy: psychology of the inner sense ^ and psychology as the 
science of immediate experience. The first treats psychical 
processes as contents of a special sphere of experience coor- 
dinate with the sphere of experiences which are derived 
through the outer senses, and are assigned to the natural 
sciences. It also holds that the two spheres of experience 
though coordinate are totally different from each other. The 
second form of psychology, namely, psychology as the science 
of immediate experience, recognizes no real difference between 
inner and outer experience, but finds the distinction only in 
the different points of view from which unitary experience 
is considered in the two cases. 

The first of these two varieties of empirical psychology is 
the older. It arose primarily through the effort to establish the 
independence of psychological observation, in the face of the 
encroachments of natural philosophy. In thus coordinating 
natural science and psychology, it sees the justification for the 
equal recognition of both spheres of science in the fact that they 
have entirely different objects and modes of perceiving these 
objects. This view has influenced empirical psychology in two 
ways. First, it favored the opinion that psychology should 
employ empirical methods, at the same time holding that these 
methods, like psychological experience, should be fundamen- 
tally different from those of natural science. Secondly, it gave 
rise to the necessity of showing some connection or other 



10 Introduction. 

between these two kinds of experience, which were supposed 
to be different. In response to the first demand, it was chiefly 
the psychology of the inner sense that developed the method of 
pure introspection (§ 3, 2). In attempting to solve the second 
problem, this psychology was necessarily driven back to a 
metaphysical basis, because of its assumption of a difference 
between the physical and the psychical contents of experience. 
For, from the very nature of the case, it is impossible, from 
the position here taken, to explain the relations of inner to 
outer experience, or the so-called "interaction between body 
and mind", except through metaphysical presuppositions. 
These presuppositions must then, in turn, affect the psycho- 
logical investigation itself in such a way as to result in the 
importation of metaphysical hypotheses into it. 

4. Essentially distinct from the psychology of the inner 
sense is the form of psychology which defines itself as "the 
science of immediate experience". Eegarding, as it does, 
outer and inner experience, not as different paxts of experience, 
but as different ways of looking at one and the same ex- 
perience, this form of psychology cannot admit any funda- 
mental difference between the methods of psychology and 
those of natural science. It has, therefore, sought above all 
to cultivate experimental methods wliich shall lead to just 
such an exact analysis of psychical processes as that which 
the explanatory natural sciences undertake in the case of 
natural phenomena, the only differences being those which 
arise from the diverse points of view. This form of psychol- 
ogy holds, furthermore, that the special mental sciences 
which have to do with concrete mental processes and cre- 
ations, stand on the same basis as itself, that is, on the 
basis of a scientific consideration of the immediate contents 
of experience and of their relations to acting subjects. It 
follows, then, that psychological analysis of the most general 



§ 2. General Forms of Psychology. 11 

mental products, such as language, mythological ideas, and 
laws of custom, is to be regarded as an aid to the under- 
standing of all the more complicated psychical processes. In 
its methods, accordingly, this form of psychology stands in 
close relation to other sciences: as experimental psychology, 
to the natural sciences ; as social psychology^ to the special 
mental sciences. 

Finally, from this point of view, the question of the rela- 
tion between psychical and physical objects disappears en- 
tirely. They are not different objects at all, but one and 
the same content of experience. This content is examined 
in the one case, that is, in the natural sciences, after ab- 
stracting from the subject. In the other case, that is, in 
psychology, it is examined with a view to discovering its 
immediate character and its complete relation to the subject. 
All metaphysical hypotheses as to the relation of psychical 
and physical objects are, when viewed from this position, 
attempts to solve a problem that never would have existed 
if the case had been correctly stated. Psychology must then 
dispense with metaphysical supplementary hypotheses in re- 
gard to the interconnection of psychical processes, because 
these processes are the immediate contents of experience. 
Another method of pfocedure, however, is open since inner 
and outer experience are supplementary points of view. 
Wherever breaks appear in the interconnection of psychical 
processes, it is allowable to carry on the investigation ac- 
cording to the physical methods of considering these same 
processes, in order to discover whether the absent link can 
be thus supplied. The same holds for the reserve method 
of filling up the breaks in the continuity of our physiological 
knowledge, by means of elements derived from psychological 
investigation. Only on the basis of such a view, which sets 
the two forms of knowledge in their true relation, is it 



12 Tntroduetion. 

possible for psychology to become in the fullest sense an em- 
pirical science. Only in this way, too, can physiology become 
the true supplementary science of psychology, and psychol- 
ogy, on the other hand, the auxiliary of physiology. 

5. Under the second principle of classification mentioned 
above (2), that is, the 'principle based on the facts or concepts 
luitli which the hivestigation of psychical processes begins^ 
there are two varieties of empirical psychology to be distin- 
guished. They are, furthermore, successive stages in the 
development of psychological interpretation. The first cor- 
responds to a descriptive^ the second to an explanatory stage. 
The attempt to present a discriminating description of the 
different psychical processes, gave rise to the need of an 
appropriate classification. Class-concepts were formed, under 
which the various processes were grouped; and the attempt 
was made to satisfy the need of an interpretation in each 
particular case, by subsuming the components of a given 
compound process under their proper class-concepts. Such 
concepts are, for example, sensation, knowledge, attention, 
memory, imagination, understanding, and will. They correspond 
to the general concepts of physics which are derived from 
the immediate perception of natural phenomena, such as 
weight, heat, sound, and light. Like those concepts of 
physics, the derived psychical concepts mentioned may serve 
as a first means of grouping the facts, but they contribute 
nothing whatever to the explanation of these facts. Empirical 
psychology has, however, often been guilty of confounding 
this description with explanation. Thus, the faculty-psychol- 
ogy considered these class-concepts as psychical forces or 
faculties, and referred psychical processes to their separate 
or united activity. 

6. Opposed to this method of treatment found in de- 
scriptive faculty-psychology, is that of explanatory psychol- 



§ 2. General Forms of Psychology. 13 

ogy. When consistently empirical, the latter must base its 
interpretations on certain facts which themselves belong to 
psychical experience. These facts may, however, be taken 
from different spheres of psychical activity, and so it comes 
that explanatory treatment may be further divided into two 
varieties that correspond respectively to the two factors, ob- 
jects and subject, which go to make up immediate experience. 
When the chief emphasis is laid on the objects of immediate 
experience, intellectualistic psychology results. This attempts 
to derive all psychical processes, especially the subjective 
feelings, impulses, and volitions, from ideas ^ or intellectual 
processes as they may be called on account of their impor- 
tance for knowledge of the objective world. If, on the con- 
trary, the chief emphasis is laid on the way in which imme- 
diate experience arises in the subject, there results a variety 
of explanatory psychology which attributes to those subjec- 
tive activities which are not referred to external objects, a 
position as independent as that assigned to ideas. This 
variety has been called voluntaristic psychology^ because of 
the importance that must be conceded to vohtional processes 
in comparison with other subjective processes. 

Of the two varieties of psychology which result from the 
different general attitudes on the question of the nature of 
inner experience (3), that form which we have called psychol- 
ogy of the inner sense commonly tends towards intellec- 
tualism. This is due to the fact that, when the inner sense 
is coordinated with the outer senses, the contents of psychical 
experience which first attract consideration are those which 
are presented as objects to this inner sense, in a manner 
analogous to that in which natural objects are presented 
to the outer senses. It is assumed, accordingly, that the 
character of objects can be attributed to ideas alone of 
all the contents of psychical experience, because ideas are 



14 Introduction. 

regarded as images of the external objects presented to the 
outer senses. Ideas are, thus, looked upon as the only real 
objects of the inner sense, while all processes not referred 
to external objects, as, for example, the feelings, are inter- 
preted as obscure ideas, or ideas related to one's own body, 
or^ finally, as effects arising from combinations of ideas. 

The psychology of immediate experience (4), on the other 
hand, tends toward voluntarism. It is obvious that here, 
where the chief problem of psychology is held to be the 
investigation of the subjective rise of all experience, special 
attention will be devoted to those factors from which natural 
science abstracts. 

7. Intellectualistic psychology has in the course of its 
development separated into two forms. In one, the logical 
processes of judgment and reasoning are regarded as the 
typical forms of all psychoses; in the other, certain combi- 
nations of successive memory ideas distinguished by their 
frequency, the so-called associations of ideas ^ are accepted 
as typical. The logical theory is most clearly related to the 
popular method of psychological interpretation and is, there- 
fore, the older. It finds some acceptance even in modern 
times. The association theory arose from the philosophical 
empiricism of the last century. The two theories stand, to 
a certain extent, in antithesis, since the first attempts to 
reduce the totahty of psychical processes to higher processes, 
while the latter seeks to reduce this same totality of proc- 
esses to lower and, as it is assumed, simpler forms of in- 
tellectual activity. Both are one-sided, and not only fail to 
explain affective and volitional processes on the basis of the 
assumption with which they start, but are not able to give 
a complete interpretation even of the intellectual processes. 

8. The union of psychology of the inner sense with the 
intellectuahstic view has led to a peculiar assumption that 



§ 2. General Forms of Psychology. 15 

has been in many cases fatal to psychological theory. We 
may define this assumption briefly as the erroneous and in- 
tellectualistic attribution of the nature of things., to ideas. 
Not only was an analogy assumed between the objects of the 
so-called inner sense and those of the outer senses, but the 
former were regarded as the images of the latter; and so 
it came that the attributes which natural science ascribes to 
external objects, were transferred to the immediate objects 
of the "inner sense", that is, to ideas. The assumption was 
made, accordingly, that ideas are themselves permanent things, 
just as much as the external objects to which we refer them; 
that these ideas disappear from consciousness and come back 
into it; that they may, indeed, be more or less intensely 
and clearly perceived, according as the inner sense is stimu- 
lated through the outer senses or not, and according to the 
degree of attention concentrated upon them, but that on the 
whole they remain unchanged in qualitative character. 

9. In all these respects voluntaristic psychology is opposed 
to intellectualism. While the latter assumes an inner sense 
and specific objects of inner experience, voluntarism is related 
to the view that inner experience is identical with imme- 
diate experience. According to this doctrine, the content of 
psychological experience does not consist of a sum of objects, 
presented to the subject, but it consists of all that which 
makes up the process of experience, that is, of all the ex- 
periences of the subject in their immediate character, un- 
modified by abstraction or reflection. It follows of necessity 
that the contents of psychological experience are here re- 
garded as an interconnection of processes. Psychical facts 
are occurrences^ not objects ; they take place, like all occur- 
rences, in time and are never the same at a given point in 
time as they were the preceding moment. In this sense 
volitions are typical of all psychical processes. Voluntaristic 



16 Introduction. 

psychology does not by any means assert that volition is the 
only real form of psychosis, but merely that, with its closely 
related feehngs and emotions, volition is just as essential a 
component of psychological experience as are sensations and 
ideas. It holds, further, that all other psychical processes 
are to be thought of after the analogy of volitions, they too 
being a series of continuous changes in time, not a sum of 
permanent objects, as intellectualism generally assumes in 
consequence of its erroneous attribution to ideas of those 
properties which we attribute to external objects. The rec- 
ognition of the immediate reality of psychological experience 
renders impossible any attempt to derive the particular com- 
ponents of psychical phenomena from processes specifically 
different from the experiences themselves. The analogous 
attempts of metaphysical psychology to derive all conscious 
processes from imaginary processes of an hypothetical substra- 
tum, are for the same reason inconsistent with the real 
problem of psychology. "While psychology concerns itself, 
accordingly, with immediate experience, it nevertheless as- 
sumes from the first that all psychical contents contain ob- 
jective as well as subjective factors. These are to be dis- 
tinguished only through deliberate abstraction, and can never 
appear as really separate processes. In fact, observation 
teaches that there are no ideas which do not arouse in us 
feelings and impulses of different intensities, and also that 
a feehng or a volition which does not refer to some ideated 
object is altogether impossible. 

10. The governing principles of the psychological position 
maintained in the following chapters may be summed up in 
three general statements. 

1) Inner, or psychological, experience is not a special 
sphere of experience apart from others, but is iminediate 
experience in its totality. 



§ 2. General Forms of Psychology. 17 

2) This immediate experience is not made up of unchang- 
ing contents, but of an interconnected system of occurrences'^ 
not of objects, but of processes^ of universal human experi- 
ences and their relations in accordance with certain laws. 

3) Each of these processes contains an objective content 
and a subjective process., thus including the general con- 
ditions both of all knowledge and of all practical human 
activity. 

Corresponding to these three general principles, we have 
a threefold relation of psychology to the other sciences. 

1) As the science of immediate experience, it is supple- 
mentary to the natural sciences^ which, in consequence of 
their abstraction from the subject, have to do only with the 
objective', mediate contents of experience. Any particular 
fact can, strictly speaking, be understood in its full sig- 
nificance only after it has been subjected to the analyses of 
both natural science and psychology. In this sense, then, 
physics and physiology are auxiliary to psychology, and the 
latter is, in turn, supplementary to the natural sciences. 

2) As the science of the universal forms of immediate 
human experience and their combination in accordance with 
certain laws, it is the foundation of the mental sciences. These 
sciences treat in all cases of the activities issuing from im- 
mediate human experiences, and of the effects of such activities. 
Since psychology has for its problem the investigation of the 
forms and laws of these activities, it is at once the most 
general mental science, and the foundation of all the others, 
that is, of philology, history, political economy, jurispru- 
dence, etc. 

3) Since psychology pays equal attention to both the 
subjective and objective conditions which underlie not only 
theoretical knowledge, but practical activity as well, and since 
it seeks to determine the interrelation of these subjective 

WcNDT, Psychology. 2. edit. 2 



Ig Introduction. 

and objective conditions, it is the empirical discipline the 
results of which are most immediately useful in the investi- 
gation of the general problems of the theory of knowledge 
and ethics^ the two foundations of philosophy. Thus, psy- 
chology is, in relation to the natural sciences, the supple- 
7nenta7y science; in relation to the mental sciences it is the 
fundamental science; and in relation to philosophy it is the 
propaedeutic empirical science. 

10 a. The following tabular summary presents in their sys- 
tematic relation, the chief forms of psychology above described 

(1-3). 

METAPHYSICAL PSYCHOLOGY. 



Spiritualistic psycliology. Materialistic psychology. 

Dualistic Monastic Mechanical Psycho-physical 

psychology. psychology. materiaHsm. materialism. 

(Monadological 
systems) 

EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY. 



Psychology of inner sense. 
(Pure introspection) 



Psychology as science of immediate 

experience. 
(Experimental and Social psychology) 



Pescriptive psychology. Explanatory psychology. 

(Faculty-psychology) ,' ,. ,. ' —, — . . .. 

Intellectualistic Voluntaristic 

psychology. psychology. 

Logical Association 

psychology. psychology. 

In their historical development many of these forms of 
psychology have grown up together. One may, however, mark 
off certain general sequences. Thus, metaphysical forms have 
generally preceded empirical forms; descriptive forms have pre- 
ceded explanatory; and finally, intellectualism has preceded 
voluntarism. The oldest work which treated of psychology as 



§ 2. General Forms of Psychology. 19 

an independent science was Aristotle's work entitled "On the 
Soul". This work is to be classified as belonging to the dualistic 
grbup in its metaphysics, and to the group of faculty-psychol- 
ogies on the side of its empirical explanations. (The soul was 
treated as the living principle in the body. There were three 
fundamental faculties^..^ namely, alimentation, sensation, and 
thought.) Modern spiritualistic psychology begins with Des- 
CART|:s' dualism which recognizes two distinct forms of reality, 
first, the soul as a thinking and unextended entity, and second, 
matter as an extended and nonthinking reality. The Cartesian 
system found the point of contact between these two forms of 
reality in a particular region of the human brain, namely, the 
pineal gland. The founder of modern materialism is Thomas 
HoBBES (1588 — 1679). (The ancient materialistic dualism of 
Democrates had not yet differentiated itself from spiritualistic 
dualism). Hobbes, together with La Mettrie and Holbach, 
developed in the 18th century a mechanical materialism, while 
Diderot and Helvetius developed a psycho-physical materialism 
which has representatives even in present times. Spiritualistic 
monism first arose in the monadology of Leibniz. In modern 
times this has been taken up by Herbart and his school, by 
LOTZE, and oth^s. The establishment of the psychology of the 
inner sense may be properly attributed to John Locke (1632 
— 1704). This form of psychology has been defended in modern 
times, to some extent by Kant, and with special emphasis by 
Eduard Beneke (1798 — 1854), K. Fortlage, and others. 
Modern faculty-psychology arose with the work of Christian 
Wolff (1679 — 1754), who distinguished as the chief faculties, 
knowledge and desire. Since the time of Tetens (1736 — 1805) 
three faculties have been more commonly accepted than "Wolff's 
two. Plato named these three, ^s did also Kant. They are 
knowledge, feeling and desire. Logical intellectualism is the 
oldest of the explanatory forms of psychology. This corresponds 
directly to the popular interpretation of psychical processes. 
The earlier empiricists, as for example, Locke, and even 
Berkeley (1648—1753) who in his "Essay towards a New Theory 
of Vision" anticipates modern experimental psychology, are to 
be classed as representatives of logical intellectualism. This 
view is at the present time to be found in the psychological 

2* 



20 Introduction. 

discussions indulged in by physiological writers, when, for 
example, they treat of sense perception. Among the philo- 
sophical representatives of this logical intellectualism in our day, 
one must mention especially Frakz Brentano and his school. 
Association psychology is first found in the works of two writers 
who appear at about the same time, namely, David Hartley 
(1704—1757) and David Hume (1711—1776). These two writers 
represent, however, two different tendencies which continue 
even in present-day psychology. Hartley's association psychology 
refers the association processes to certain physiological con- 
ditions, while Hume's regards the association process as a psy- 
chological process. The first form allies itself, accordingly, to 
psycho-physical materialism, this is found in the works of such 
a modern writer as Herbert Spencer. Closely related to Hume's 
psychological associationism is the psychology of Herbart. Her- 
bart's doctrine of the statics and mechanics of ideas is a purely 
intellectualistic doctrine. (Feeling and volition are here recognized 
only as certain phases of ideas). It is in agreement with as- 
sociationism in its fundamental mechanical view of mental life. 
This similarity is not to be overlooked merely because Herbart 
sought through certain hypothetical assumptions to give his 
psychological discussions an exact mathematical form. There 
are many anticipations of voluntaristic psychology in the works 
of psychologists of the "pure introspection" school, and of the 
association schools. The first thoroughgoing exposition of this 
form of psychology was the work of the author of this Outlines 
of Psychology in his psychological treatises. It is to be noted 
that this psychological voluntarism, as, indeed, one can see 
from the description which has already been given, is to be 
clearly distinguished from metaphysical voluntarism as devel-^ 
oped by such a writer as Schopenhauer. Metaphysical volun- 
tarism seeks to reduce everything to an original transcendental 
will, which lies back of the phenomenal world as its substratum. 
Psychological voluntarism, on the other hand, looks upon em- 
pirical volitional processes, with their constituent feelings, sen- 
sations, and ideas, as the types of all conscious processes. 
For such a voluntarism even volition is a complex phenomenon 
which owes its typical significance to this very fact that it in- 
cludes in itself the different kinds of psychical elements. 



§ 2. General Forms of Psychology. 21 

Beferences. Psychology of the inner sense: Locke, An Essay con- 
cerning Human Understanding, 1690. Eduard Beneke, Psychologische 
Skizzen, 2 vols., 1825—1827, and Lehrbuch der Psychologic als Natur- 
wissenschaft, 1833, 4th. ed. 1877. K. Fortlage, System der Psycho- 
logic, 2 vols., 1855. 

Faculty -psychology: Christian Wolff, Psychologia empirica, 
1732, Psychologia rationalis, 1734; and Verniinftige Gedanken von 
Gott, der "Welt, der Seele des Menschen etc., 1719. Tetens, Philo- 
sophische Versuche liber die menschliche Natur, 1776 — 1777. Kant, 
Anthropologic, 1798 (a practical psychology, well worth reading even 
at this late date because of its many nice observations). 

Association psychology: Hartley, Observations on Man, 1749. 
Priestly, Hartley's Theory of the Human Mind, 1775. Hume, Treatise 
on Human Nature, 1739—1740; and Enquiry concerning Human Un- 
derstanding, 1748. James Mill, Analysis of the Phenomena of the 
Human Mind, 1829, later edited with notes by Alexander Bain, John 
Stuart Mill and others, 2d. ed. 1878. Alexander Bain, The Senses 
and the Intellect, 1855, 4th. ed. 1894; and The Emotions and the 
Will, 1859, 3rd. ed. 1875. Herbert Spencer, Principles of Psychology, 
1855, 5th. ed. 1890. Herbart, Psychologie als Wissenschaft, 2 vols., 
1824—1825; and (English trans, by M. K. Smith 1891] Text-book of 
Psychology, 1816. 

Works which prepared the way for experimental psychology: 
Lotze, Medicinische Psychologie, 1852. G. T. Fechner, Elemente der 
Psychophysik, 2 vols., 1860. 

More extended modern treatises. Of the Herbartian School: 
W. F. VoLKMANN, Lehrbuch der Psychologie, 2 vols., 4th. ed., 1894. 
M. Lazarus, Leben der Seele in Monographien, 3 vols., 3rd. ed. 1883. 
Of the Association School (generally with a tendency toward psycho- 
physical materialism): Euelpe, (English trans, by E. B. Titchener, 
1901) Outlines of Psychology, 1893. Ebbinghaus, Grundziige der Psy- 
chologie, 1st. half-vol. only as yet, 1897. Ziehen, (English trans, by 
*VAN LiEvv and Beyer 1899) Introduction to the Study of Physiological 
Psychology, 5th. Ger. ed. 1900. Munsterberg, Grundziige der Psychol- 
ogie, 1st. vol. only as yet, 1900. Works standing between association 
psychology and voluntaristic psychology : Hoeffding, (English trans, 
by Lowndes, 1891, from the German trans. 1887) Outlines of Psychol- 
ogy, 2nd. Danish ed. 1893. W. Jerusalem, Lehrbuch der empirischen 
Psychologie, 2nd. ed. 1890. Works representing a form of intellec- 
tualism related in method to scholasticism: Brentano, Psychologie 
vom empirischen Standpunkte, 1st. vol. only, 1874. Meinong, Psy- 
chologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Werththeorie, 1894. Works 
emphasizing the independence of psychology and based on an empirical 



22 Introduction. 

analysis of conscious processes: Lipps, Grundthatsachen des Seelen- 
lebens, 1883. Jodl, Lehrbucli der Psyclaologie, 1896. The same em- 
pirical analysis, and on the basis of this analysis voluntaristic psy- 
chology in the sense above described, are presented by the author 
of this Outlines of Phychology in his other works also, namely, Grund- 
ziige der physiologischen Psychologie, 2 vols., 4th. ed., 1893 (English 
trans, in preparation by E. B. Titchener) ; and (English trans, by E. 
B. Creighton and E. B. Titchener, 1894) Lectures on Human and 
Animal Psychology, 3rd. Ger. ed. 1897. Works treating chiefly of 
the philosophical character of fundamental psychological concepts: 
XJPHUES, Psychologie des Erkennens, 1893. J. Rehmke, Lehrbuch 
der allgemeinen Psychologie, 1894. Natorp, Einleitung in die Psy- 
chologie, 1888. American, English and French works all follow in 
the path of associationalism. Furthermore, they tend for the most 
part toward psycho-physical materialism or toward dualistic spiri- 
tualism, less frequently toward voluntarism. From among the nu- 
merous American works, the following are to be mentioned: James, 
Principles of Psychology, 2 vols., 1890. Ladd, Psychology De- 
scriptive and Explanatory, 1894. Baldwin, Handbook of Psychol- 
ogy, 1889. Scripture, The New Psychology, 1897. Titchener, An 
Outline of Psychology, 1896. French works are as follows: Ribot's 
monographs on various psychological subjects are to be mentioned. 
)A11 translated into English: Attention, The Diseases of Memory, 
The Diseases of the Will, The Diseases of Personality, General Ideas, 
The Creative Imagination). Also, the works of Fouillee, which are 
related to German voluntarism, but contain at the same time a great 
deal of metaphysics and are somewhat influenced by the Platonic 
doctrine of ideas (L'evolutionisme des idees-forces, 1890, and Psycho- 
logie des idees-forces, 1893). 

Works on the history of psychology especially worthy of men- 
tion: Siebeck, Geschichte der Psychologie, Pt. 1st., 1880—1884, and 
also articles in the first three vols, of Arch. f. Gesch. d. Phil, (these 
cover the ancient and medieval periods). Lange, History of Materialism. 
Dessoir, Geschichte der neueren deutschen Psychologie, 2nd. ed. 1897 
(including as yet only 1st. half-vol.). Sommer, Grundziige einer Ge- 
schichte der deutschen Psychologie und Aesthetik von Wolf-Baum- 
garten bis Kant-Schiller, 1892. Ribot, (Englisch trans, by Baldwin) 
German Psychology of To-day, Fr. ed. 1885, Eng. ed. 1886. 



§ 3. Methods of Psychology, 23 

§ 3. METHODS OF PSYCHOLOGY. 

1. Since psychology has for its object, not specific con- 
tents of experience, but general experience in its immediate 
character, it can make use of no methods except such as 
the empirical sciences in general employ for the deter- 
mination, analysis, and causal interpretation of facts. The 
fact that natural science abstracts from the subject, while 
psychology does not, can be no ground for modifications in 
the essential character of the methods employed in the two 
fields, though this fact does modify the way in which the 
methods are applied. 

The natural sciences, which may serve as an example for 
psychology in this respect, since they were developed earlier, 
make use of two chief methods, namely, experiment and ob- 
servation. Experiment is observation under the condition of 
purposive control by the observer, of the rise and course 
of the phenomena observed. Observation j in the narrower 
sense of the term, is the investigation of phenomena without 
such control, the occurrences being accepted just as they are 
naturally presented to the observer in the course of experi- 
ence. Wherever experiment is possible, it is always used in 
the natural sciences ; for under all circumstances, even when 
the phenomena in themselves present the conditions for suf- 
ficiently exact observation, it is an advantage to be able to 
control at will the rise and progress of these phenomena, or 
to isolate the various components of a composite phenomenon. 
Yet, even in the natural sciences the two methods have been 
distinguished according to their spheres of application. It is 
held that the experimental methods are indispensable for 
certain problems, while in others the desired end may not 
infrequently be reached through mere observation. If we 
neglect a few exceptional cases due to special relations, 



24 Introduction. 

these two classes of problems correspond to the general 
division of natural phenomena into processes and objects. 

Experimental control is required in the exact determina- 
tion of the course, and in the analysis of the components, 
of any natural process, such for example, as light vibration, 
sound vibration, an electric discharge, or the contraction of 
a muscle. As a rule such control is desirable because exact 
observation is possible only when the observer can determine 
the moment at which the process shall commence. It is 
also indispensable in separating the various components of- 
a complex phenomenon from one another. As a rule, this 
is possible only through the addition or substraction of certain 
conditions, or through a quantitative variation of them. The 
case is different with objects of nature. They are relatively 
constant and are always at the observer's disposal and ready 
for examination. Here, then, experimental investigation is 
really necessary only when the production and modification 
of the objects are the subjects to be investigated. When, 
on the contrary, the only question is the actual nature of 
these objects, mere observation is generally enough. Thus, 
mineralogy, botany, zoology, anatomy, and geography, are 
pure sciences of observation so long as they are kept free 
from the physical, chemical, and physiological problems which 
are, indeed, frequently brought into them, but which have 
to do with processes of nature, not with the objects in 
themselves. 

2. If we apply these considerations to psychology, it is 
obvious at once, from the very nature of its subject-matter, 
that exact observation is here possible only in the form of 
experimental observation. The contents of this science are 
exclusively processes, not permanent objects. In order to 
investigate with exactness the rise and progress of these 
processes, their composition out of various components, and 



§ 3. Methods of Psychology. 25 

the interrelations of these components, we must be able first 
of all to bring about their beginning at will, and we must 
also be able to vary the conditions at will. This is possible 
here, as in all cases, only through experiment, not through 
observation. Besides this general reason there is another 
reason which is peculiar to psychology, and does not apply 
at all to natural phenomena. In the case of the natural 
sciences we purposely abstract from the perceiving subject, 
and under circumstances, especially when favored by the 
phenomena, as in astronomy, mere observation may succeed 
in determining with adequate certainty the objective contents 
of the processes. Psychology, on the contrary, is debarred 
from this abstraction by its fundamental principles, and 
proper conditions for chance observation can appear only 
when the same objective components of immediate experience 
are frequently repeated in connection with the same subjec- 
tive states. It is hardly to be expected, in view of the great 
complexity of psychical processes, that this will ever be the 
case. Such chance coincidence is especially improbable since 
the very intention to observe^ which is a necessary condition 
of all observation, modifies essentially the rise and progress 
of psychical processes. The chief problem of psychology, 
however, is the exact investigation of the rise and progress 
of subjective processes, and it can readily be seen that in 
such investigations the intention to observe either essentially 
modifies the facts to be observed, or completely suppresses 
them, at least, if the observation is of the ordinary intro- 
spective type, unaided by experimental devices of any sort. 
If, on the other hand, we consider the experimental methods, 
we see that psychology is led, through the very nature of 
the origin of the processes with which it deals, to employ, 
just as do physics and physiology, the experimental mode of 
procedure A sensation arises in us under the most favor- 



26 Introduction. 

able conditions for observation when it is aroused by an 
external sense stimulus. The idea of an object is always 
produced originally by the more or less complicated cooper- 
ation of sense stimuli. If we wish to study the way in 
which an idea is formed, we can choose no method other 
than that of imitating this natural way in which an idea 
arises. In doing this, we have at the same time the great 
advantage of being able to modify the idea itself by chang- 
ing at will the combination of the impressions that cooperate 
to form it, and of thus learning what influence each single 
condition exercises on the product. Memory images, it is 
true, can not be directly aroused through external sense im- 
pressions, but follow these impressions after a longer or shorter 
interval. Yet, it is obvious that the attributes even of memory 
images can be most accurately learned, not by waiting for 
their chance arrival, but by using such memory ideas as may 
be aroused in a systematic, experimental way, through imme- 
diately preceding impressions. The same is true of feehngs 
and volitions; they will be presented in the form best adapted 
to exact investigation when those impressions are purposely 
produced which experience has shown to be regularly con- 
nected with affective and volitional reactions. There is, then, 
no fundamental psychical process to which experimental 
methods can not be applied, and therefore none in the in- 
vestigation of which such methods are not logically required. 
3. Pure observation^ such as is possible in many depart- 
ments of natural science, is, from the very character of psy- 
chical phenomena, impossible in individual psychology. The 
possibility of pure observation would be conceivable only under 
the condition that there existed permanent psychical objects, 
independent of our attention, similar to the relatively perma- 
nent objects of nature, which remain unchanged by our obser- 
vation. There are, however, certain facts at the disposal of 



§ 3. Methods of Psychology. 27 

psychology, which, although they are not real objects, never- 
theless, have the character of psychical objects, inasmuch 
as they possess the attributes of relative permanence and 
independence of the observer, and are unapproachable by 
means of experiment in the common acceptance of the term. 
These facts are the mental products which have developed 
in the course of history, such as language, mythological 
ideas, and customs. The origin and development of these 
products depend in every case on general psychical condi- 
tions which may be inferred from the objective attributes of 
the products. All such mental products of a general character 
presuppose as their condition the existence of a mental co7i%- 
munity composed of many individuals, though, of course, 
their deepest sources are the psychical attributes of the in- 
dividual. Because of this dependence on the community, in 
particular on the social community, the whole department 
of psychological investigation here involved is designated as 
social psychology., and is distinguished from individual psy- 
chology, or as it may be called because of its predominat- 
ing method, experimental psychology. In the present stage 
of the science these two branches of psychology are generally 
taken up in different treatises, although they are not so 
much different departments as different methods. So-called 
social psychology corresponds to the method of pure obser- 
vation, the objects of observation in this case being the mental 
products. The necessary connection of these products with 
social communities, which has given to social psychology its 
name, is due to the fact that the mental products of the in- 
dividual are of too variable a character to be the subjects of 
objective observation. The phenomena gain the necessary 
degree of constancy only when they become collective. 

Thus psychology has, like natural science, two exact 
methods: the experimental method, serving for the analysis 



28 Introduction. 

of simpler psychical processes, and the observation of general 
mental products, serving for the investigation of the higher 
psychical processes and developments. 

3a. The introduction of the experimental method into psy- 
chology was originally due to the modes of procedure in phy- 
siology, especially in the physiology of the sense-organs and the 
nervous system. For this reason experimental psychology is 
also commonly called "physiological psychology" ; and works 
treating it under this title regularly contain those supplemen- 
tary facts from the physiology of the nervous system and of 
the sense-organs, which require special discussion with a view 
to the interests of psychology, though in themselves these facts 
belong to physiology alone. "Physiological psychology" is, ac- 
cordingly, an intermediate discipline which is, however, as the 
name indicates, primarily psychology ^ and is, apart from the 
supplementary physiological facts that it presents, just the same 
as "experimental psychology" in the sense above defined. The 
attempt sometimes made, to distinguish psychology proper from 
physiological psychology, by assigning to the first the psycho- 
logical interpretation of inner experience, and to the second the 
derivation of this experience from physiological processes, is to 
be rejected as inadmissible. There is only one kind of causal 
explanation in psychology, and that is the derivation of more 
complex psychical processes from simpler ones. In this method 
of interpretation, physiological elements can be used only as 
supplementary aids, because of the relation between natural 
science and psychology as above defined (§ 2, 4). 

Eeferences. For a general discussion of the methodology of psychol- 
ogy, see chapter on "Logik der Psychologie" [in the author's Logik, 
2nd. ed., 1895. On methods of experimentation see Philosophische 
Studien, vol. I. Also, Stanford, A Course in Experimental Psychol- 
ogy, 1897 — 1898. SoMMER, Lehrbuch der psychopatholog. Unter- 
suchungsmethoden, 1899, 



§ 4. General Survey of the Subject 29 

§ 4. GENERAL SUEVEY OF THE SUBJECT. 

1. The immediate contents of experience which constitute 
the suhject-matter of psychology, are in all cases processes 
of a composite character. Sense perceptions of external ob- 
jects, memories of such sense perceptions, feelings, emotions, 
and volitional acts, are not only continually united in the 
most various ways, hut each of these processes is itself a 
more or less composite whole. The idea of an external 
body, for example, is made up of partial ideas of its parts. 
A tone may be ever so simple, but we localize it in some 
direction, thus bringing it into connection with the idea of 
external space which is highly composite. Every feeling 
is referred to some sensation that aroused the feeling, and 
every volition is referred to an object willed. In dealing 
with a complex fact of this kind, scientific investigation has 
three problems to be solved in succession. The first is 
the analysis of composite processes; the second is the dem- 
onstration of the combinations into which the elements 
discovered by analysis enter; the third is the investigation 
of the laws that are operative in the formation of such com- 
binations. 

2. The second^ or synthetic, problem is made up of 
several partial problems. In the first place, the psychical 
elements unite to form composite psychical compounds which 
are separate and relatively independent of one another in 
the continual flow of psychical processes. One group of 
examples of such compounds is to be found in ideas, whether 
referred directly to external impressions or objects, or inter- 
preted by us as memories of impressions and objects perceived 
before. Other examples are composite feelings, emotions, 
or voHtions. Then again, these psychical compounds stand 
in the most various interconnections with one another. Thus, 



30 Introduction. 

ideas unite to form larger simultaneous ideational complexes 
or regular successions, while affective and volitional processes 
form a variety of combinations with one another and with 
ideational processes. In this way we have the interconnection 
of psychical compounds as a class of synthetical processes of 
the second order, consisting of a union between the simpler 
combinations that have arisen from the earlier combinations 
of elements into psychical compounds. The separate psychical 
interconnection of the second order unite in turn to form still 
more comprehensive combinations, which also show a certain 
regularity in the arrangement of their components. In this 
way, combinations of a third order arise, which we desig- 
nate by the general name psychical developments. These 
may be divided into developments of different scope. Devel- 
opments of a more limited sort are such as relate to a single 
phase of mental activity, for example, the development of 
the intellectual functions, of the will, or of the feelings, or 
of merely one special branch of these functions, such as the 
aesthetic or moral feelings. From a number of such partial 
series arises the total development of a psychical personality. 
Finally, since animals, and in a still higher degree human 
individuals, are in continual interrelation with their fellow 
beings, there arise above these individual forms, general 
psychical developments. These various branches of the study 
of psychical development are in part the psychological foun- 
dations of other sciences, such as the theory of knowledge, 
pedagogy, aesthetics, and ethics, and are, accordingly, treated 
more appropriately in connection with those subjects. In part 
they have become special psychological sciences, such a child- 
psychology, animal psychology and social psychology. "We 
shall, therefore, in this treatise discuss only those results 
from the last mentioned departments which are of the most 
importance to general psychology. 



§ 4. General Survey of the Subject 31 

3. The solution of the last and most general psycholog- 
ical problem, namely, the problem of discovering the laws 
of psychical phenomena, depends upon the investigation of 
all the combinations of different orders, the combination of 
elements into compounds, of compounds into interconnections, 
and of interconnections into developments. And as this in- 
vestigation is the only means by which we can learn the 
actual composition of psychical processes, so also the only 
means of discovering the attributes of psychical causality, 
which finds expression in these processes, is in the investi- 
gation of the laws followed by the contents of experience 
and their components in their various combinations. 

We have, accordingly, to consider in the following 
chapters : 

1) Psychical Elements, 

2) Psychical Compounds, 

3) Interconnection of Psychical Compounds, 

4) Psychical Developments, 

5) Psychical Causality and its Laws. 



L PSYCHICAL ELEMENTS. 



§ 5. CHIEF FOEMS AND GENERAL ATTRIBUTES 
OF PSYCHICAL ELEMENTS. 

1. All the contents of psychical experience are of a com- 
posite character. It follows, therefore, that psychical elements y 
or the absolutely simple and irreducible components of psy- 
chical phenomena are the products of analysis and abstraction. 
This abstraction is rendered possible by the fact that the 
elements are in reality united in different ways. If an ele- 
ment, a, is connected in one case with the elements b, c, d . . .j 
and in another case with b\ c', d' . . ., it is possible to ab- 
stract it from all the other elements, because none of them 
is always united with it. If, for example, we hear a simple 
tone of a certain pitch and intensity, it may be located now 
in this direction, now in that, and may be heard at different 
times in connection with various other tones. But since 
the direction is not constant, or the accompanying tone 
in all cases the same, it is possible to abstract from these 
variable elements, and we have the single tone as a psy- 
chical element. 

2. As a result of psychical analysis, we find that there 
are psychical elements of tivo kinds ^ corresponding to the 
two factors contained in immediate experience (§ 1, 2), 
namely, to the objective contents of experience and to the 
experiencing subject. The elements of the objective contents 
we call sensational elements^ or simply sensations: such are 



<^ 5. Chief Forms and General Attributes of Psychical Elements. 33 

a tone, or a particular sensation of heat, cold, or light, if 
in each case we neglect for the moment all the connections 
of these sensations with others, and also all their spacial 
and temporal relations. The subjective elements, on the 
other hand, are designated as affective elements^ or simple 
feelings. We may mention as examples, the feelings ac- 
companying sensations of light, sound, taste, smell, heat, cold, 
or pain, the feelings aroused by the sight of an agreeable or 
disagreeable object, and the feehngs arising in a state of 
attention or at the moment of a volitional act. Such simple 
feelings are in a double sense products of abstraction: every 
such feehng is connected in reality with an ideational ele- 
ment, and is furthermore a V^omponent of a psychical process 
which occurs in time, during which the feehng itself is con- 
tinually changing. '"^ 

3. The actual contents of psychical experience always 
consist of various combinations of sensational and affective 
elements, so that the specific character of a given psychical 
process depends for the most part, not on the nature of 
its elements, so much as on their union into a composite 
psychical compound. Thus, the idea of an extended body 
or of a rhythm, an emotion, and a volition, are all specific 
forms of psychical experience. But their character as such 
is as Httle determined by their sensational and affective 
elements as are the chemical properties of a compound body 
by the properties of its chemical elements. Specific character 
and elementary nature of psychical processes are, accordingly, 
two entirely different concepts. Every psychical element is 
a specific content of experience, but not every specific con- 
tent is at the same time a psychical element. Thus, spacial 
and temporal ideas, emotions, and volitional acts, are spe- 
cific, but not elementary processes. 

4. Sensations and simple feeHngs exhibit certain common 

Wtjndt, Psychology. 2. edit. 3 



34 ^' Psychical Elements. 

attributes and also certain characteristic differences. They 
have in common two determinants^ namely, quality and in- 
tensity. Every simple sensation and every simple feeling has 
a definite qualitative character that marks it off from all 
other sensations and feelings; and this quality must always 
have some degree of intensity. Our designations of psychical 
elements are based entirely upon their qualities; thus, we 
distinguish such sensations as blue, grey, yellow, warmth and 
cold, or such feelings as grave, cheerful, sad, gloomy, and 
sorrowful. On the other hand, we always express the dif- 
ferences in the intensity of psychical elements by the same 
quantitative designations, as weak, strong, medium strong, 
and very strong. These expressions are in both cases class- 
concepts which serve for a first superficial arrangement of 
the elements, and each expression embraces an unlimitedly 
large number of concrete elements. Language has developed 
a relatively complete stock of names for the qualities of 
simple sensations, especially for colors and tones. Names for 
the qualities of feelings and for degrees of intensity are far 
behind in number and precision. Certain attributes other 
than quality and intensity, such as distinctness and indistinct- 
ness, are sometimes classed with quality and intensity as 
fundamental attributes. But since clearness, obscurity, etc., 
as will appear later (§ 15, 4), always arise from the inter- 
connection of psychical compounds, they can not be regarded 
as determinants of psychical elements. 

5. Made up, as it is, of the tivo determinants, quality 
and intensity, every psychical element must have a certain 
degree of intensity from which it is possible to pass, by 
continual gradations, to every other degree of intensity in 
the same quality. Such gradations can be made in only two 
directions : one we call increase in intensity, the other decrease. 
The degrees of intensity of every qualitative element, form 



§ 5. Chief Forms and General Attributes of Psychieal Elements. 35 

in this way a single dimension, in which, from a given point, 
we may move in two opposite directions, just as from any 
point in a straight line. This fact in regard to intensity 
may be expressed in the general statement: The various in- 
tensities of every psychical element form a continuity of one 
dimension. The extremities of such a continuity we call the 
minimal and m^oximal sensations., or the minimal or maximal 
feelings^ as the case may be. 

In contrast with this uniformity in intensities, qualities 
have more variable attributes. Every quahty may, indeed, be 
assigned a place in a definite continuity of similar qualities in 
such a way that it is possible to pass uninterruptedly from a 
given point in this continuous series to any other point. But 
the various continuities of different qualities, which we may call 
systems of quality^ exhibit differences both in the variety of 
possible gradations, and in the number of directions of gra- 
dation. With reference to these two kinds of variations in 
systems of quality, we may distinguish, on the one hand, 
homogeneous and complex systems, and on the other hand, 
one - dimensional , two - dimensional , and many - dimensional 
systems of quality. Within a homogeneous system, only such 
small differences are possible, that generally there has never 
arisen any practical need of distinguishing them by different 
names. Thus, we distinguish only one quality of pressure, of 
heat, of cold, or of pain, only one feeling of pleasure or of 
excitement, although, in intensity, each of these qualities may 
Jiave many different grades.) It is not to be inferred from 
this fact that in each of these systems there is really only 
one quality. The truth is that in these cases the number 
of different qualities is merely very limited; if we were to 
represent the system geometrically, we should probably never 
reduce it to a single point.) Thus, for example, sensations 
of pressure from different regions of the skin show, beyond 

3* 



36 I' Psychical Elements. 

question, small qualitative differences which are great enough 
to make it possible for us to distinguish clearly any point 
of the skin from others at some distance from it. Such 
differences, however, as arise from contact with a sharp or 
dull point, or from a rough or smooth body, are not to be 
regarded as different qualities. They Always depend on a 
large number of simultaneous sensations, and without the 
various combinations of these sensations into composite psy- 
chical compounds, the impressions mentioned would be im- 
possible. 

Complex systems of quality differ from those we have 
been discussing, in that they embrace a large number of 
clearly distinguishable elements between which all possible 
intermediate forms exist. In this class we must include the 
tonal system and color system, the systems of smells and 
tastes; and among the complex feeling systems we must in- 
clude those which form the subjective complements of these 
sensational systems, such as the systems of tonal feelings, 
color feelings, etc. It is probable also that many systems 
of feelings belongs here, which are objectively connected with 
composite impressions, but are as feelings, simple in character; 
such are the various feeHngs of harmony or discord which 
correspond to various combinations of tones. The differences 
in the number of dimensions have been determined with cer- 
tainty only in the case of two or three sensational systems. 
Thus, the tonal system is one-dimensional. The ordinary 
color system, which includes the colors and their transitional 
qualities to white, is two-dimensional; while the complete 
system of light sensations, which includes also the dark 
color-tones and the transitional qualities to black, is three- 
dimensional. 

6. In regard to the relations discussed thus far, sensa- 
tional elements and affective elements agree in general. They 



§ 5. Chief Forms and General Attributes of Psychical Elements. 37 

differ, on the other hand, in certain essential attributes 
which are connected with the fact that sensations are im- 
mediately related to objects, while feelings are immediately 
related to the subject. 

1) When varied in a single dimension, sensational ele- 
ments exhibit pure qualitative differences^ which are always 
in the same direction until they reach the possible limits of 
variation, where they become inaximal differences. Thus, in 
the color system, red and green, blue and yellow, or in the 
tonal system, the lowest and highest audible tones, are the 
maximal differences and are at the same time purely quali- 
tative differences. Every affective element, on the contrary, 
when continuously varied in the proper direction of quality, 
passes gradually into a feeling of opposite quality. This is 
most obvious in the case of those affective elements which 
are regularly connected with certain sensational elements, as 
for example, tonal feelings or color feelings. \ As sensations, 
a high and low tone present differences that approach more 
or less the maximal differences of tonal sensation; the cor- 
responding tonal feelings are opposites. |In general, then, 
series of sensational qualities are hounded at their extremes 
hy maximal differences; series of affective qualities are hounded 
by maximal opposites. Between affective opposites is a middle 
zone, where the feeling is not noticeable at all. j It is, how- 
ever, frequently impossible to demonstrate this indifference- 
zone, because, while certain simple feelings disappear, other 
affective qualities remain, or new ones may arise. The 
latter case appears most commonly when the passing of the 
feeling into the indifference -zone depends on a change in 
sensations. Thus, in the middle of the musical scale, those 
feelings disappear which correspond to the high and low 
tones, but the middle tones have independent affective qual- 
ities of their own which appear clearly only when the other 



38 I- Psychical Elements. 

complicating factors are eliminated. This is to be explained 
by the fact that a feeling which corresponds to a certain 
sensational quality is, as a rule, a component of a complex 
affective system, in which it belongs at the same time to 
various dimensions. Thus, the affective quality of a tone of 
given pitch belongs not only to the dimension of pitch feelings, 
but also to that of feelings of intensity, and finally to the 
different dimensions in which the clang character of tones 
may be arranged. A tone of middle pitch and intensity 
may, in this way, lie in the indifference-zone so far as feelings 
of pitch and intensity are concerned, and yet have a very 
marked clang feeling. The passage of affective elements 
through the indifference-zone can be directly observed only 
when care is taken to abstract from other accompanying 
affective elements. The cases most favorable for this obser- 
vation are those in which the accompanying elements disap- 
pear entirely or almost entirely. Wherever such an indif- 
ference-zone appears without complication with other affective 
elements, we speak of the state as /"ree from feelings, and of 
the sensations and ideas present in such a state, as indifferent 
~ 2) Feelings which have specific, and at the same time simple 
and irreducible quality, appear not only as the subjective com- 
plements of simple sensations, but also as the characteristic 
attendants of composite ideas or even of complex ideational 
processes. Thus, there is a simple tonal feeling which varies 
with the pitch and intensity of tones, and there is also a 
feehng of harmony which, regarded as a feeling, is just as 
irreducible as the tonal feeling, but varies with the character 
of compound clangs. Still other feelings, which may in turn be 
of the most various kinds, arise from melodious series of clangs. 
Here, again, each single feeling taken by itself at a given 
moment, appears as an irreducible unit. Simple feelings are, 
then, much more various and numerous than simple sensations. 



§ 5. Chief Forms and General Attributes of Psychical Elements. 39 

3) The various pure sensations may be arranged in a 
number of separate systems, between the elements of which 
there is no quahtative relation whatever. Sensations belonging 
to different systems are called disparate. Thus, a tone and a 
color, a sensation of heat and one of pressure, or, in general, 
any two sensations between which there are no intermediate 
qualities, are disparate. According to this criterion, each of 
the four special senses (smell, taste, hearing, and sight) has 
a closed, complex sensational system, disparate from that 
of the other senses; while the general sense (touch) contains 
four homogeneous sensational systems (sensations of pressure, 
heat, cold, and pain), i All simple feelings, on the other hand," 
form a single interconnected manifold, for there is no feeling 
from which it is not possible to pass to any other, through 
intermediate forms or through indifference-zones. But here 
too we may distinguish certain systems the elements of which 
are more closely related, as, for example, feelings from colors, 
tones, harmonies and rhythms. These are, however, not ab- 
solutely closed systems, for there are everywhere relations 
either of likeness or of opposition to other systems. PThus, 
feelings such as those from sensations of moderate warmth, 
from tonal harmony, and from satisfied expectation, however 
great their qualitative differences may be, are all related in 
that they belong to the general class of "pleasurable feelings". 
Even closer relations exist between certain single affective 
systems, as for example, between tonal feelings and color 
feelings, where the feelings from deep tones seem to be 
related to those from dark colors, and feelings from bright 
colors to those from high tones. When in such cases a 
certain relationship is ascribed to the sensations themselves, 
it is probably due entirely to a confusion of the accompany- 
ing feelings with the sensations. 

This third distinguishing characteristic shows conclusively 



40 1- Psychical Elements. 

that the source of the feelings is unitary while that of the 
sensations, which depend on a number of different, and in 
part distinguishable, conditions, is not unitary. Probably 
this difference in the character of the sources of feeling and 
sensations is directly connected, on the one hand, with the 
relation of the feelings to the unitary subject, and, on the 
other hand, with the relation of sensations to the great 
variety of objects. 

6a. It is only in modern psychology that the terms "sen- 
sation" and "feeling" have gained the meanings assigned to them 
in the definitions above given. In older psychological literature 
these terms were sometimes used indiscriminatingly, sometimes 
interchanged. Even yet sensations of touch and sensations from 
the internal organs are called feelings by physiologists, and the 
sense of touch itself is known as the "sense of feeling". This 
corresponds, it is true, to the original significance of the word, 
where feeling is the same as touching, and yet, after the dif- 
ferentiation has once been made, a confusion of the two terms 
should be avoided. Then again, the word "sensation" is used 
even by psychologists to mean not only simple, but also com- 
posite qualities, such as compound clangs and spacial and tem- 
poral ideas. But since we have the entirely adequate word 
"idea" for such compounds, it is more advantageous to limit the 
word sensation to sense qualities which are psychologically simple. 
Finally the term "sensation" has sometimes been restricted so 
as to mean only those impressions which come directly from 
external sense stimuli. For the psychological attributes of a 
sensation, however, this circumstance is entirely indifferent, and 
therefore, such a definition of the term is unjustifiable. 

The discrimination between sensational elements and affective 
elements in any concrete case is very much facilitated by the 
existence of indifference-zones in the feelings. Then again it 
follows from the fact that feelings range between opposites 
rather than mere differences, that feelings are much the more 
variable elements of our immediate experience. This changeable 
character, which renders it almost impossible to hold an affective 



§ 5. Chief Forms and General Attributes of Psychical Elements. 41 

state constant in quality and intensity, is the cause of the great 
difficulties that stand in the way of the exact investigation of 
feelings. 

Sensations are present in all immediate experiences, but 
feelings may disappear in certain special cases, because of their 
oscillation through an indifference -zone. Obviously, then, we 
can, in the case of sensations, abstract from the accompanying 
feelings, but we can never abstract from sensations in the case 
of feelings. In this way two false views may easily arise, either 
that sensations are the causes of feelings, or that feelings are 
a particular species of sensations. The first of these opinions is 
false because affective elements can never be derived from sen- 
sations as such, but only from the attitude of the subject, so 
that under different subjective conditions the same sensation 
may be accompanied by different feelings. The second view, 
that feelings are a particular species of sensations, is untenable 
because the two classes of elements are distinguished, on the one 
hand by the immediate relation of sensations to objects and of 
feelings to the subject, and on the other hand, by the fact that 
the former range between maximal differences, the latter between 
maximal opposites. Because of the objective and subjective factors 
belonging to all psychical experience, sensations and feelings are 
to be looked upon as real and equally essential, though every- 
where interrelated, elements of psychical phenomena. In the inter- 
relation of the two groups of elements, the sensational elements 
appear as the more constant ; they alone can be isolated through 
abstraction, by referring them to external objects. It follows, 
therefore, of necessity that in investigating the attributes of both 
kinds of elements, we must start with the sensations. Simple 
sensations, in the consideration of which we abstract from the 
accompanying affective elements, are called pure sensations. 

Eeferenees. Kant, Anthropologie, 2nd. Bk. Herbart, Text-book 
of Psychology, § 68 and 95. (Differentiation of the concepts sensation 
and feeling in the present-day sense.) HoRWicz, Psychologische 
Analysen auf physiolog. Grundlage, 2 vols., 1872—1878. Wundt, 
Ueber das Verhaltniss der Gefiihle zu den Vorstellungen, Viertel- 
jahrsschr. f. wiss. Philos., Ill, 1879. (Also in Essays, 1885.) 



42 I- Psychical Elements. 

§ 6. PUEE SENSATIONS. 

1. The concept "pure sensation" as shown in § 5 is the 
product of a twofold abstraction: 1) from the ideas in which 
the sensation appears, and 2) from the simple feelings with 
which such a sensation is united. "We find that pure sensations, 
defined in this way, form a number of disparate systems of 
quality; each of these systems, such as that of sensations 
of pressure, of tone, or of light, either is homogeneous or it 
is a complex continuity (§ 5, 5) from which no transition to 
any other system can be found. 

2. The rise of sensations^ as physiology teaches us, is 
regularly dependent on certain physical processes that have 
their origin partly in the external world surrounding us, 
partly in certain bodily organs. We designate these con- 
ditioning processes by a name borrowed from physiology, 
as sense stimuli or sensation stimuli. If the stimulus is a 
process in the outer world we call it a physical stimulus ; if 
it is a process in our own body we call it a ^physiological 
stimulus. Physiological stimuli may be divided, in turn, into 
peripheral and central^ according as they are processes in 
the various bodily organs outside of the brain, or processes 
in the brain itself. In many cases a sensation is attended 
by all three forms of stimuli. Thus, an external impression 
of light acts as a physical stimulus on the eye; in the 
eye and optic nerve there arises a peripheral physiological 
stimulation; finally a central physiological stimulation takes 
place in the corpora quadrigemina and in the occipital regions 
of the cerebral cortex, where the optic nerve terminates. 
In many cases the physical stimulus may be wanting, while 
both forms of physiological stimuli are present; as, when 
we perceive a flash of light in consequence of a violent 
ocular movement. In still other cases the central stimulus 



§ 6. Pure Sensations. 43 

alone is present; as, when we recall a light impression pre- 
viously experienced. The central stimulus is, accordingly, 
the only one that always accompanies sensation. When a 
peripheral stimulus causes a sensation, it must be connected 
with a central stimulus, and when a physical stimulus causes 
a sensation it must be connected with both a peripheral and 
a central stimulus. 

3. The physiological study of development renders it 
probable that the differentiation of the various sensational 
systems has been effected in part in the course of general 
development. The original organ of sense is the outer skin 
with the sensitive inner organs adjoining it. The organs of 
taste, smell, hearing, and sight, on the other hand, are later 
differentiations of the skin structure. It may, therefore, be 
surmised that the sensational systems corresponding to these 
special sense-organs, have also gradually arisen through dif- 
ferentiation from the sensational systems of the general sense, 
that is, from sensations of pressure, heat and cold. It is 
possible, too, that in lower animals some of the systems now 
so widely differentiated in human beings are more alike. 
From a physiological standpoint the primordial character of 
the general sense is also apparent in the fact that it has 
either very simple organs or none at all for the transfer of 
sense stimuli to the nerves. Pressure stimuli, temperature 
stimuli, and pain stimuli, can produce sensations at points 
in the skin where, in spite of the most careful investigation, 
no special end-organs can be found. There are, indeed, 
special receiving organs in the regions most sensitive to pres- 
sure (touch-corpuscles, end-bulbs, and corpuscles of Yater), 
but the structure of these organs renders it probable that 
they merely favor the mechanical transfer of the stimulus 
to the nerve-endings. Special end-organs for heat, cold, and 
pain have not been found at all. 



44 I- Psychical Elements. 

In the special sense-organs which are of later origin we find, 
on the other hand, elaborate structures which not only effect 
the suitable transfer of the stimuli to the sensory nerves, but 
generally bring about a physiological transformation of the 
stimulation, which transformation seems to be indispensable 
for the rise of the particular sensational qualities. But even 
among the special senses there are differences in this respect. 

The receiving organ in the ear, in particular, appears to 
be of a character different from that of the organs of smell, 
taste, and sight. In its most primitive forms the ear consists 
of a vesicle filled with one or more solid particles (otoliths), 
and supplied with nerve-bundles distributed in its walls. 
The solid particles are set in motion through sound vibrations, 
and must cause by their motion a rapid succession of weak 
pressure stimulations in the fibres of the nerve-bundles. The 
auditory organ of the higher animals shows an extraordinary 
complexity, but in its essential structure it recalls this prim- 
itive type. In the cochlea of man and the higher animals 
the auditory nerve passes at first through the axis, which is 
pierced by a large number of fine canals, and then emerges 
through the pores which open into the cavity of the cochlea. 
Here the branches are distributed on a tightly stretched 
membrane, which extends through the spiral windings of the 
cochlea and is weighted with special rigid arches (arches of 
Corti). This membrane — the basilar membrane, as it is 
called — m.ust, according to the laws of acoustics, be thrown 
into sympathetic vibrations whenever sound waves strike the 
ear. It seems, therefore, to play the same part here as the 
otoliths do in the lower forms of the auditory organ. At the 
same time, one other change has taken place which accounts 
for the enormous differentiation of the sensational system. 
The basilar membrane has a different breath in its different 
parts, for it grows continually wider from the base to the 



§ 6. Pure Sensations. 45 

apex of the cochlea. In this way it acts like a system of 
stretched cords of different lengths. And just as in such a 
system, other conditions remaining the same, the longer cords 
are tuned to lower, and the shorter to higher tones, so we 
may assume the same to be true for the different parts of 
the basilar membrane. We may surmise that the simplest 
auditory organs with their otoliths have a homogeneous sen- 
sational system, analogous perhaps to our system of sensations 
of pressure. The special development of the organ as seen 
in the cochlea of higher animals explains the evolution of 
an extraordinarily complex sensational system from this orig- 
inally homogeneous system. In spite of all these changes 
the structure remains the same in this respect, that it seems 
adapted, in the latter case as in the former, to the best 
possible transfer of the physical stimulus to the sensory nerve 
rather than to any transformation of the stimulus. "^This 
view agrees with the observed fact that, just as sensations 
of pressure may be perceived on regions of the skin not 
supplied with special receiving organs, so, in the case of 
certain animals, such as birds, where the conditions are 
specially favorable for their transmission, sound vibrations 
are transferred to the auditory nerve and sensed even after 
the removal of the whole auditory organ with its special 
receiving structure. 

With smelly taste^ and sight the case is essentially different. 
Organs are present which render impossible direct action of 
the stimuli on the sensory nerves. The external stimuli are 
here received through special organs and modified before 
they excite the nerves. These organs are specially metamor- 
phosed epithelial cells with one end exposed to the stimu- 
lus and the other passing into a nerve -fibre. Everything 
goes to show that the receiving organs here are not merely 
for the transfer of the stimuli, but are rather for the trans- 



46 I- Psychical Elements. 

formation of the stimuli. In the three cases under discus- 
sion it is probable that the transformation is a chemical 
process. In smell and taste we have external chemical 
agencies, in sight we have light, as the causes of chemical 
disintegrations in the sensory cells. The processes in the 
cells then serve as the real stimuh. 

These three senses may be distinguished as che?mcal senses, 
from the inechanical senses of pressure and sound. It is im- 
possible to say with any degree of certainty, to which of these 
two classes sensations of cold and heat belong. One indication 
of the direct relation between stimuli and sensation in me- 
chanical senses, as contrasted with the indirect relation in 
chemical senses, is that in the case of the mechanical senses, 
the sensation lasts only a very little longer than-the external 
stimulus, while in the case of the chemical senses, the sensation 
persists very much longer. Thus, in a quick succession of 
pressures and more especially in a quick succession of sounds, 
it is possible to distinguish clearly the single stimuli from one 
another; lights, tastes and smells, on the other hand, run 
together even when given at a very moderate rate of succession. 

4. Since peripheral and central stimuli are regular phys- 
cal concomitants of elementary sensational processes, the 
attempt to determine the relation between stimuli and sen- 
sations is very natural. In attempting . to determine this 
relation, physiology generally considers sensations as the re- 
sult of physiological stimuli, but assumes at the same time 
that in this case any proper explanation of the effect from 
its cause is impossible, and that all that can be undertaken 
is to determine the constancy of the relations between par- 
ticular stimuli and the resulting sensations. Now, it is found 
in many cases that different stimuli acting on the same end- 
organ produce the same sensations; thus, for example, me- 
chanical and electrical stimulations of the eye produce light 



§ 6. Pure Sensations. 47 

sensations. This result was generalized in tlie principle, that 
every receiving element of a sense-organ and every simple 
sensory nerve-fibre together with its central terminus, is capable 
of only a single sensation of fixed quality; that the various 
qualities of sensation are, therefore, due to the various 
physiological elements with their different specific energies. 
This principle, generally called the "law of specific energy 
of nerves", is untenable for three reasons, even if we neglect 
for the moment the fact that it simply refers the causes of 
the various differences in sensations to a qualitas occulta of 
sensory and nervous elements. 

1) It is contradictory to the physiological doctrine of the 
development of the senses. If, as we must assume according 
to this doctrine, the complex sensational systems are derived 
from systems originally simpler and more homogeneous, the 
physiological sensory elements must also have undergone a 
change. Such a change is, however, possible only under the 
condition that organs may be modified by the stimuli which 
act upon them. That is to say, the sensory organs deter- 
mine the qualities of sensations only secondarily, as a result 
of the properties which they acquire through the processes 
of stimulation aroused in them. If, then, these sensory organs 
have undergone, in the course of time, radical changes due 
to the nature of the stimuli acting upon them, such changes 
could have been possible only under the condition that the 
physiological stimulations in the organs themselves varied to 
some extent with the quality of the stimulus. 

2) The principle of specific energy is contradictory to 
the fact that in many senses there are no distinct sensory 
elements corresponding to the different sensational qualities. 
Thus, from a single point in the retina we can receive all 
possible sensations of brightness and color; in the organs of 
smell and taste, we find no clearly distinguishable forms of 



48 I- Psychical Elements. 

the sensory elements, while even a limited area of the sen- 
sory surfaces in both these senses can - receive a variety of 
sensations, which, especially in the case of the olfactory 
organ, is very large. Where we have every reason to as- 
sume that qualitatively different sensations actually do arise 
in different sensory elements, as in the auditory organ, the 
structure of the organ shows that this difference is not due 
to any attribute of the nerve-fibres or of other sensory ele- 
ments, but that it comes originally from the way in which 
these elements are arranged. Different fibres of the auditory 
nerve will, of course, be stimulated by different tone-vibra- 
tions, because the different parts of the basilar membrane 
are tuned to different tones, but this is not due to some 
original and inexplicable attribute of the single auditory 
nerve-fibres. It is due to the way in which the single nerve- 
fibres are connected with the end-organ. 

3) Finally, the sensory nerves and central elements can 
have no original specific energy, because the peripheral sense- 
organ must be exposed to the appropriate stimuli for a suf- 
ficient interval, or at least must have been so exposed at 
some previous period, before the corresponding sensations 
can arise through the excitation of the central organs. Persons 
congenitally blind and deaf do not have any sensations of 
light or tone whatever, so far as we know, even when the 
sensory nerves and centres were originally present. 

Everything goes to show that the differences in the qual- 
ities of sensations are conditioned by the differences in the 
processes of stimulation that arise in the sense-organs. These 
processes [are dependent primarily on the character of the 
'physical stimuli, and only secondarily on the peculiarities of 
the receiving organ. And even then peculiarities are due to 
the adaptation of the sense-organs to the physical stimuli. As 
a result of this adaptation, however, it may come to be true 



§ 6. Pure Sensations. 49 

that even wlien some stimulus other than that which has 
effected the original adaptation of the sensory elements, that 
is, when an inadequate stimulus acts, a sensation may arise 
which corresponds to the adequate stimulus. This does not 
hold, however, for all stimuH, or for all sensory elements. 
Thus, heat and cold stimulations can not cause cutaneous 
sensations of pressure or sensations in the special sense- 
organs; chemical and electrical stimuli produce sensations of 
light only when they act upon the retina, not when they act 
on the optic nerve ;j and, finally, mechanical and electrical 
stimuli can not arouse sensations of smell or taste. When 
an electric current causes chemical disintegration, it may, 
indeed, arouse such sensations, but it is through the ade- 
quate chemical stimuli produced. 

5. From the very nature of the case, it is impossible to 
explain the character of sensations from the character of 
physical and physiological stimuli. Stimuli and sensations can 
not be compared with one another at all; the first belong 
to the mediate experience of the natural sciences, the second 
to the immediate experience of psychology. An interrelation 
between sensations and physiological stimuli must necessarily 
exist, however, in the sense that different kinds of stimulation 
always correspond to different sensations. This p7'inciple of 
the parallelism of changes in sensation and in physiological 
stimulation is an important supplementary principle in both 
the psychological and physiological doctrines of sensation. 
In psychology it is used in producing definite changes in the 
sensation, by means of intentional variation of the stimulus. 
In physiology it is used in inferring the identity or non- 
identity of physiological stimulations from the identity or 
non-identity of the sensations. Furthermore, the same prin- 
ciple is the basis of our practical life and of our theoretical 
knowledge of the external world. 

WuNDT, Psycliology. 2. edit. 4 



50 ^- Psychical Elements. 

5 a. The principle of "specific energy" appears as the im- 
plicit assumption in many of the earlier physiological discussions, 
but it remained for Johannes Muller to give it a definite 
formulation. The principle was later employed, especially by 
Helmholtz in his theories of hearing and vision. In the later 
expositions the form of the principle has been somewhat modi- 
fied. As a rule the nerve fibres themselves are no longer con- 
sidered as the seats of the specific energy; they are looked upon 
rather as indifferent conductors. It is the peripheral sensory 
elements (rods and cones of the retina, the endings of the audi- 
tory fibres in the cochlea etc.) or sometimes the nerve cells in 
the central sensory centres, or both of these, which are regarded 
as the seats of specific energy. Such views are, however, en- 
tirely hypothetical. Our knowledge of the processes in either the 
peripheral sensory cells, or in the central nerve cells, and even 
the greater part of our knowledge of the anatomy of these cells, 
is so very incomplete that we are not able to base any conclusions 
upon such knowledge. The only ground for the principle is, there- 
fore, to be found in the phenomena, of like sensations arising from 
different stimuli, and these phenomena, as already remarked, do 
not give the principle any adequate ground for general acceptance. 
Indeed, in many cases the facts are capable of a very much simpler 
explanation on the basis of the conditions which surround the per- 
ipheral nerve endings. For example, the discrimination of the diff- 
erent tones in accordance with the law of sympathetic resonance, 
requires no reference to the principle of specific energy to show 
how each auditory fibre is affected by a particular sound wave, 
because the corresponding part of the basilar membrane is tuned 
to the particular sound wave in question. To be sure, the reson- 
ance hypothesis thus stated by Helmholtz has been the subject 
of many attacks. No one has succeeded, however, in finding any 
hypothesis to replace it which agrees better with the laws of 
acoustics and with the structural relations in the organ of hearing. 

References. J. Muller, Lehrbuch der Physiologic des Menschen, 
4th. ed. 1844, vol. I, p. 667. Helmholtz, Physiol ogische Optik, 2nd. 
ed., p. 233, and (Engl, trans, by Ellis) Sensations of Tone, Sect. 3 and 
4. GoLDSCHEiDER, Gos. Abhandlungon, I, 1, 1898. Schwarz, Das 
Wahrnehmungsproblem, Pt. 2, 1892. Wundt, Grundziige der phys. 
Psych., vol. I, chapter 7, § 4. 



§ 6. Pure Sensations. 51 

A. SENSATIONS OF THE GENERAL SENSE. 

6. The definition of the "general sense" includes a spa- 
cial and a temporal factor. In point of time the general 
sense is that which precedes all others and therefore belongs 
to all beings endowed with mind. In point of spacial attri- 
butes, the general sense has the most extensive sensory sur- 
face exposed to stimuli. This surface includes not only the 
whole external skin and the adjoining areas of the mucous 
membrane, but also a large number of internal organs sup- 
pHed with sensory nerves, such as joints, muscles, tendons, 
and bones, which are accessible to stimuli either regularly, 
or at least at certain times, and under special conditions, as 
is the case with bones. 

The general sense includes four specific, distinct sensa- 
tional systems: sensations of pressure, heat, cold, and pain. 
Not infrequently a single stimulus arouses more than one 
of these sensations. The sensation is then immediately rec- 
ognized as made up of a mixture of components from the 
different systems. For example, we may have together sen- 
sations of pressure and pain, or sensations of heat and pain. 
In a similar manner, as a result of the extension of the 
sense-organ, we may often have mixtures of the various 
qualities of one and the same system, for example, we may 
have qualitatively different sensations of pressure, when an 
extended region of the skin is touched. 

The four systems of general sense are all homogeneous 
systems (§ 5, 5). This shows that the sense is genetically 
earlier than the others, the systems of which are all complex. 
The sensations of pressure from the external skin, and those 
due to the tensions and movements of the muscles, joints, and 
tendons, are generally grouped together under the name touch 
sensations., and distinguished from the common sensations., 

4* 



52 I- Psychical Elements. 

which include sensations of heat, cold and pain, and the 
sensations of pressure which sometimes arise in the other 
internal organs (stomach, intestines, lungs, etc.). Touch sen- 
sations may in turn be divided into external touch sensations 
and internal touch sensations. The first include the external 
skin impressions of pressure, the second, the impressions 
arising in the joints, muscles and tendons during movement. 
The internal touch sensations are again subdivided, with 
reference to the physiological organs from which they rise, 
as joint sensations and muscle sensations; with reference to 
the conditions which produce them, as sensations of move- 
ment or contraction, and as sensations of tension or effort. 
7. The ability of the different parts of the general sense- 
organ to receive stimulations and give rise to sensations, can 
be tested with adequate exactness only on the external skin. 
The only facts that can be determined in regard to the 
internal parts, are that the joints are in a high degree sen- 
sitive to pressures, while the muscles and tendons are much 
less so, and that sensations of heat, cold, and pain, in the 
internal organs are exceptional and rise to a noticeable 
intensity only under abnormal conditions. On the other 
hand, there is no point of the external skin, or of the im- 
mediately adjoining parts of the mucous membrane, which 
is not sensitive to stimulations of pressure, heat, cold and 
pain. The degree of sensitivity may, indeed, vary at different 
points, in such a way that the points most sensitive to 
pressure, to heat, and to cold, do not, in general, coincide. 
Sensitivity to pain is everywhere about the same, varying at 
most in such a way that in some places the pain stimulus 
acts on the surface, and in others not until it has penetrated 
deeper. On the other hand, certain regions of the skin 
appear to be most favorable for stimulations of pressure, 
heat and cold. These points are called respectively, pressure- 



§ 6. Pure Sensations. 53 

spots, heat-spots and cold-spots. They are distributed in 
different parts of the skin in varying numbers. Spots of 
different modahty never coincide; yet, temperature-spots al- 
ways receive sensations of pressure and pain as well; and 
a pointed hot stimulus applied to a cold-spot as a rule 
causes a sensation of heat, while heat-spots do not seem to 
be stimulated by pointed cold stimuli. Furthermore, heat- 
spots and cold-spots may give rise to their usual sensations 
in response to properly applied mechanical and electrical 
stimuli. It is to be noted also that the pressure-spots lie 
relatively near to each other. This, together with the fact 
that the skin itself tends to distribute any pressure stimu- 
lation, explains why it is that sensitivity for absolute pres- 
sures, and especially for pressure differences, when tested 
by weights of a limited area and of a somewhat diffuse 
character, is found to be nearly uniform for all parts of the 
skin, except in those areas which are covered with a very 
heavy layer of epidermis (soles of feet, etc.). The degree 
of this sensitivity is seen in the fact that one can distinguish 
clearly weights which differ in quantity by only 1/12 of their 
intensity, and this ratio remains about constant for all such 
cases ("Weber's Law § 17, 10). 

8. Of the four qualities mentioned, sensations of pressure 
and those of pain form closed systems which show no relations 
either to each other or to the two systems of temperature sen- 
sations. The temperature qualities, on the other hand, stand 
in the relation of opposites; we apprehend heat and cold, not 
merely as different, but also as contrasted sensations. It is, 
however, very probable that this is not due to the original 
nature of the sensations themselves, but partly to the con- 
ditions of their rise, and partly to the accompanying feelings. 
For, while the other qualities may be united without limitation 
to form mixed sensations — as, for example, pressure with 



54 I' Psychical Elements. 

pain, cold with pain — heat, and cold exclude each other, be- 
cause under the conditions of their rise, the only possibilities 
for a given cutaneous region are either a sensation of heat, 
or one of cold, or else an absence of both. When one of 
these sensations passes continuously into the other, the change 
regularly takes place in such a way, that either the sensation 
of heat gradually disappears and a continuously increasing 
sensation of cold arises, or conversely, the sensation of cold 
disappears and that of heat gradually arises. Then, too, 
elementary feeHngs of opposite character are connected with 
heat and cold, the point where both sensations are absent 
corresponding to their indifference-zone. 

In still another respect the two systems of temperature 
sensations are peculiar. They are to a great extent depen- 
dent on the varying conditions under which the stimuK act 
upon the sense-organ. A considerable increase above the 
temperature of the skin is perceived as heat, while a con- 
siderable decrease below the temperature of the skin is per- 
ceived as cold. The temperature of the skin itself, which 
is thus the indifference-zone between the two forms of sen- 
sation can, within fairly wide limits, adapt itself rapidly to 
the existing external temperature. The fact that in this 
respect too, both systems are alike, favors the view that 
they are interconnected and also antagonistic. 

References. E. H. Weber, Tastsinn und Gemeingefuhl , Hand- 
worterb. der Physiol. Ill, 2. Blix, Zeitschr. f. Biologie 20, 21. 
GoLDSCHEiDER, Archiv f. Physiol., 1885, 1886, and 1887, and also 
Ges. Abhandlungen 1898, I (pressure-spots, heat-spots, and cold-spots), 
and Ges. Abhandl. II (muscle sense). Dessoir, Archiv f. Physiol., 
1882. KiESOW, Philos. Studien vol. 6. von Frey, Ber. der sachs. 
Ges. der Wiss, vols. 46 and 47, and Abhandl. der math.-phys. CI. 
vol. 23. WuNDT, Grundziige der phys. Psych., vol. I, chap. 9 § 1, 
and Lectures on Hum. and Anim. Psych, lecture 5. 



§ 6. Pure Sensations. 55 



B. SENSATIONS OF SOUND. 



9. We possess two independent systems of simple auditory 
sensations, which are, however, generally connected with 
each other as a result of the mixture of the two kinds of 
impressions. The two systems are, the homogeneous system 
of simple noise sensations, and the complex system of simple 
tone sensations. 

Simple noise sensations can be produced only under con- 
ditions that exclude the simultaneous rise of tone sensations. 
Such conditions are presented, for example, when air vi- 
brations are produced at a rate too rapid or too slow for 
tone sensations to arise, or when the sound waves act upon 
the ear for too short a period. Simple sensations of noise, 
thus produced, may vary in intensity and duration, but apart 
from these differences they appear to be qualitatively alike. 
It is possible that small qualitative differences exist among 
them, due to the conditions of their rise, but such differences 
are too small to be marked by distinguishing names. The 
noises, commonly so called, are compound ideas made up 
of such simple noise sensations and of a great many irreg- 
ular tonal sensations (cf. § 9, 7). The homogeneous system 
of simple noise sensations is probably the first to develop. 
The auditory vesicles of the lower animals, with their simple 
otoliths, could hardly produce anything but simple noise 
sensations. In the case of a man and the higher animals 
it may be surmised that the structures found in the vestibule 
of the labyrinth receive only homogeneous stimulations, cor- 
responding to simple sensations of noise. Finally, experiments 
with animals deprived of their labyrinths, make it probable 
that even direct stimulations of the auditory nerve can pro- 
duce such sensations (p. 45). In the embryonic development 
of the higher animals, the cochlea develops from an original 



56 I- Psychical Elements. 

vestibular vesicle, which corresponds exactly to a primitive 
auditory organ. We are, therefore, justified in supposing 
that the complex system of tone sensations is a product of 
the differentiation of the homogeneous system of simple noise 
sensations, but that in every case where this development 
has taken place, the simple system has remained along with 
the higher. 

10. The system of simple tone sensations is a continuity 
of one dimension. We call the quality of a single simple 
tone its jpitch. The one-dimensional character of the system 
shows itself in the fact that, starting with a given pitch, we 
can vary the quality only in two opposite directions : change 
in one of these directions we call raising the pitch, change 
in the other we call lowering the pitch. In actual experience 
simple sensations of tone are never presented alone, but al- 
ways united with other tone sensations and with accompany- 
ing simple sensations of noise. But since, according to the 
scheme given above (p. 32), these concomitant elements can 
be varied indefinitely, and since in many cases they are 
relatively weak in comparison with one of the tones, the 
abstraction of simple tones was early reached through the 
practical use of tone sensations in the art of music. The 
names c, c^, c?^, and d stand for simple tones, though the 
clangs of musical instruments or of the human voice by 
means of which we produce these different pitches, are al- 
ways accompanied by other, weaker tones, and often too, 
by noises. But since the conditions for the rise of such 
concomitant tones can be so varied that these concomitants 
become very weak, it has been possible to produce really 
simple tones of nearly perfect purity. The simplest means 
of doing this is by using a tuning-fork, and a resonator 
tuned to its fundamental tone. Since the resonator increases 
the intensity of the fundamental only, the other, accompany- 



§ 6. Pure Sensations. 57 

ing tones are so weak when the fork sounds, that the sen- 
sation is generally apprehended as simple and irreducible. 
If the sound vibrations corresponding to such a tone sen- 
sation are examined, they will be found to correspond to 
the simplest possible form of vibration, namely, to the so- 
called pendulum oscillation. This name is used because the 
vibrations of the atmospheric particles follow the same laws 
as a pendulum oscillating in a very small amplitude i). That 
these relatively simple sound vibrations correspond to sen- 
sations of simple tones, and that we can even distinguish 
the separate tones in compounds, can be explained according 
to the above-mentioned (p. 44) resonance hypothesis, from 
the structure of the organs in the cochlea, as an application 
of the law of sympathetic vibration. The basilar membrane 
in the cochlea is, in its different parts, tuned to tones of 
different pitch, so that when a simple oscillatory sound- 
vibration strikes the ear, only the part tuned to that par- 
ticular pitch will vibrate in sympathy. If the same rate of 
oscillation comes in a compound sound-vibration, again only 
the part of the membrane tuned to that particular rate of 
vibration will be affected by it, while the other components 
of the wave will set in vibration other sections of the mem- 
brane, which correspond in the same way to their pitch. 
(Compare § 9, 7a.). 

11. The system of tone sensations shows its character 
as a continuous series in the fact that it is always possible 
to pass from a given pitch to any other through continuous 
changes in sensation. Music has selected at option from 
this continuity, single sensations separated by considerable 



1) Pendulum-oscillations may be represented by a sine-curve be- 
cause the distance from the position of rest is always proportional 
to the sine of the time required to swing to the point in question. 



58 I- Psychical Elements. 

intervals, thus substituting a tonal scale for the tonal line. 
This selection, however, is based on the relations of tone 
sensations themselves. We shall return to the discussion of 
these relations later, in taking up the ideational compounds 
arising from these sensations (§ 9}. The natural tonal Kne 
has two extremities, which are conditioned by the physio- 
logical capacity of the ear for receiving sounds. These ex- 
tremities are the lowest and highest tones; the former cor- 
responds to 10 — 16 double vibrations per second, the latter 
to 30,000, 40,000 or even 50,000. The limit defined by 
these latter figures is, however, doubtful, since both the sub- 
jective recognition of intervals and the objective determination 
of the rate of vibration of the sounding body (tuning-fork 
or pipe) are very uncertain for these high pitches. For tones 
of medium pitch (from 200 to 1000 vibrations) we can dis- 
tinguish differences in the pitch of tones which are given in 
succession, even when these tones differ only about one fifth 
of a vibration per second; and the difference thus necessary 
for discrimination remains in this part of the scale an ab- 
solute, fixed quantity, even though the pitch of the tone 
varies. Another fact which stands in full accord with that 
just described is "the fact that if, depending entirely upon 
our recognition of tonal intervals, we bisect a certain tonal 
interval, say that which lies between the tones a and c, by 
determining upon a third tone, 5, which shall stand half 
way between the two with which we began, then this third 
tone, &, will, in all cases, even when the interval is entirely 
unharmonious , lie in point of the number of its objective 
vibrations half way between a and c. In the case of very 
low tones, and much more in the case of very high tones, 
the sensitivity for qualitative differences becomes decidedly 
less and less. The sensitivity for quantitative differences of 
both tones and noises is also very deficient. Another fact 



§ 6. Pure Sensations. 59 

also appears in this connection, which differentiates the sen- 
sitivity for quantitative differences from that which was found 
in the case of medium tonal qualities. Like the sensitivity 
of the skin for pressures (p. 53), the sensitivity for sound 
intensities is constant, not for absolute differences in inten- 
sity, but for relative differences only. The ratio of just 
noticeable differences between successive sound impressions 
is Ys of the objective intensity of the original impression. 

References. Helmholtz, (Engl, trans.) Sensations of Tone, Sects. 
1, 4, and 9. Hensen, Physiol, des Gehors, in Hermann's Hand- 
bucli der Physiol., vol. Ill, Pt. 2 (1880). Stumpf, Tonpsychologie, 
vol. II, § 28 on noise and clangs (1890). Wundt, Grundzuge der 
phys. Psych., vol. I, chap. 9 § 3, and Lect. on Hum. and Anim. 
Psych., lecture 5 (for tone vibrations and beats see fig. 6 and 7). 
PnEYER, Die Grenzen der Tonwahrnehmung , 1876. LuFT, Unter- 
scheidung von Tonhohen, Philos. Studien, vol. 4. Lorenz, Einthei- 
lung von Tonstrecken, Philos. Studien, vol 6. For a discussion of 
sensitivity for differences in sound intensity see also § 17, 10. For 
a discussion of the limit of high pitches see in addition to the text, 
the inconclusive discussion between Appunn, Melde, Stumpf and 
E. KoNiG, in vols. 64, 65, 67, and 68 of Wiedemann's Annalen der 
Physik, New Series. For further references on tone perception see 
§ 9 below. 

C. SENSATIONS OF SMELL AND TASTE. 

12. Sensations of smell form a complex system the ar- 
rangement of which is still unknown. All we know is that 
there are a great many different olfactory qualities, between 
which there are all possible transitional forms. There can, 
then, be no doubt that the system is a continuity of many 
dimensions. 

12a. Olfactory qualities may be grouped in certain classes^ 
each of which contains those sensations which are more or less 
related. This fact may be regarded as an indication of how 
these sensations may perhaps be reduced to a small number of 
principal qualities. Such classes are, for example. 



60 ^- Psychical Elements. 

like those from ether, balsam, musk, benzine, those known as 
aromatic, etc. It has been observed in a few cases that certain 
olfactory sensations which come from definite substances, can 
also be produced by mixing other substances. But these obser- 
vations are still insufficient to reduce the great number of simple 
qualities contained in each of the classes mentioned, to a limited 
number of primary qualities and theii mixtures. Finally, it 
has been observed that many odors neutralize each other, so 
far as the sensation is concerned, when they are mixed in the 
proper intensities. This is true not only of substances that 
neutralize each other chemically, as acetic acid and ammonia, 
but also of others, such as caoutchouc and wax or tolu-balsam, 
which do not act on each other chemically outside of the ol- 
factory cells. Since this neutralization takes place when the 
two stimuli act on entirely different olfactory surfaces, one on 
the right and the other on the left mucous membrane of the 
nose, it is probable that we are dealing, not with phenomena 
analogous to those exhibited by complementary colors (22), but 
with a reciprocal central inhibition of sensations. Another ob- 
served fact tells against the notion that such neutt'alizing qual- 
ities are complementary. One and the same olfactory quality 
can neutralize several entirely different qualities, sometimes even 
those which in turn neutralize one another, while among colors 
it is always two fixed qualities, and only two, that are in each 
case complementary. 

13. Sensations of taste have been somev^hat more thor- 
ougly investigated than those of smell, and we can here dis- 
tinguish four distinct primary qualities. Between these 
primary qualities there are all possible transitional tastes, 
which are to be regarded as mixed sensations. The primary 
qualities are sour^ sweety hitter^ and saline. Besides these, 
alkaline and metallic are sometimes regarded as independent 
qualities. But alkaline qualities show an unmistakable re- 
lationship to saline, and metallic to sour, so that both are 
probably mixed sensations (alkaline made up perhaps of 
saline and sweet, metallic of sour and saline). Sweet and 



§ 6. Pure Sensations. 61 

saline are opposite qualities. When these two sensations 
are united in proper intensities, the result is a neutral mixed 
sensation (commonly known as "insipid"), even though the 
stimuli that here reciprocally neutralize each other do not 
enter into a chemical combination. The system of taste 
sensations is, accordingly, in all probability to be regarded 
as a two-dimensional continuity, which may be geometrically 
represented by a circular surface on the circumference of which 
the four primary, and their intermediate, qualities are ar- 
ranged, while the neutral mixed sensation is in the middle, 
and the other transitional taste qualities are on the surface, 
between this middle point and the saturated qualities on 
the circumference. 

13a. In these attributes of taste qualities, we seem to have 
the fundamental type of a chemical sense. In this respect taste 
is perhaps the antecedent of sight. The obvious relation to the 
chemical nature of the stimulation, makes it probable even here 
that the reciprocal neutralization of certain sensations, with which 
the two-dimensional character of the sensational' system is per- 
haps connected, depends, not on the sensations in themselves, 
but on the relations between the physiological stimulations, just 
as in the case of sensations of heat and cold {p. 54). It is well 
known that very commonly the chemical effect of certain sub- 
stances can be neutralized through the action of certain other 
substances. We do not know what the chemical changes are 
which are produced by the gustatory stimuli in the taste-cells, 
but from the neutralization of sensations of sweet and saline 
we may conclude, in accordance with the principle of the paral- 
lelism of changes in sensation and in stimuli (p. 49), that the 
chemical reactions which sweet and saline substances produce in 
the sensory cells, also counteract each other. The same would 
hold for other sensations for which similar relations could be 
demonstrated. In regard to the physiological conditions for 
gustatory stimulations, we can draw only this one conclusion 
from the facts mentioned, namely the conclusion that the chemical 



62 ^- Psychical Elements. 

processes of stimulation corresponding to the sensations which 
neutralize each other in this way, probably take place in the 
same cells. Of course, the possibility is not excluded that sev- 
eral different processes subject to neutralization through op- 
posite reactions, could arise in the same cells. The known 
anatomical facts and the experiments of physiology in stimula- 
ting single papillae separately, give no certain conclusion in 
this matter. "Whether we are here dealing with phenomena that 
are really analogous to those exhibited by complementary colors 
(v. inf. 22) is still an open question. 

References. On smell : Zwaardemaker, Physiologie des Geruchs, 
1895. On taste, W. Nagel, in Bibl. zool., 18, 1894, and in Pfliiger's 
Archiv f. Physiol, vol. 54. Oehrwall, Skand. Archiv f. Physiol, vol. 2. 
KiESOW, Philos. Studien vols. 9, 10, and 12. 



D. SENSATIONS OF LIGHT. 

14. The system of light sensations is made up of two 
partial systems: that of sensations of achromatic light and 
that of sensations of chromatic light. Between the qualities 
in these two systems, all possible transitional forms exist. 

Sensations of achromatic light., when considered alone, 
form a system of one dimension, which extends, like the 
tonal line, between two limiting qualities. The sensations in 
the neighborhood of one of these limits we call hlack., those 
in the neighborhood of the other we call white., while between 
the two we insert grey in its different shades (dark grey, 
grey, and light grey). This one-dimensional system of achro- 
matic sensations differs from that of tones in being at once 
a system of quality and of intensity., since every qualitative 
change in the direction from black to white is seen at the 
same time as an increase in intensity, and every qualitative 
change in the direction from white to black is seen as a 
decrease in intensity. Each point in the series, which thus 
has a definite quality and intensity, is called a degree of 



§ 6. Pure Sensations. 63 

brightness. The whole system may, accordingly, be designated 
as that of sensations of 'pure brightness. The use of the 
the word "pure" indicates the absence of all sensations of 
color. The system of pure brightness is absolutely one- 
dimensional; both the variations in quality and those in 
intensity belong to one and the same dimension. This 
system differs essentially, in this respect, from the tonal 
line, in which each point is merely a degree of quality, and 
has by itself a whole series of gradations in intensity. 
Simple tone sensations thus form a two-dimensional con- 
tinuity so soon as we take into account both determinants, 
quality and intensity, while the system of pure brightness 
is always one- dimensional^ even when we attend to both 
determinants. The whole system may, therefore, be regarded 
as a continuous series of gi^ades of brightness^ in which the 
lower grades are designated black so far as quality is con- 
cerned, and weak so far as intensity is concerned, while the 
higher grades are called white and strong. Our sensitivity 
for differences in brightness is, especially for medium inten- 
sities, very great. The ratio is from Yioo to Y150 of the 
brightness with which we start in the comparison of two 
intensities. Like the ratios of pressure intensities and sound 
intensities (p. 59), this ratio of brightness intensities is con- 
stant in its relative magnitude. (Weber's Law 17, 10.) 

15. Sensations of color also form a one-dimensional system 
when their qualities alone are taken into account. Unlike 
the system of sensations of pure brightness, this system 
returns upon itself from whatever point we start, for at first, 
after leaving a given quality, we pass gradually to a quality 
that shows the greatest difference, and going still further 
we find that the qualitative differences become smaller again, 
until finally we reach the starting point once more. The 
color spectrum obtained by refracting sunlight through a prism. 



64 L Psychical Elements. 

or that found in the rainbow, shows this characteristic, 
though not completely. If in these cases we start from the 
red end of the spectrum, we come first to orange, then 
to yellow, yellow-green, green-blue, blue, indigo-blue, and 
finally to violet, which last is more like red than any of 
the other colors except orange, which lies next to red. 
The Kne of colors in the spectrum does not return quite 
to its starting-point, because it does not contain all of 
the colors that we have in sensation. Purple shades, which 
can be obtained by the objective mixture of red and violet 
rays, are wanting in the spectrum. Only when we fill out 
the spectrum series with purple, is the system of actual 
color sensations complete, and then the system is a closed 
circle. This characteristic of the color series is not to be 
attributed to the fact that we are accustomed to seeing the 
spectrum always arranged in this order. Even children who 
have never observed attentively a solar spectrum or a rain- 
bow, and can, therefore, begin the series with any other 
color just as well as with red, always arrange the series in 
the same order when called on to arrange a promiscuous 
group of colored objects in the order of their subjective 
relations. 

The system of pure colors is, accordingly, to be defined 
as oncrdimensional. It does not extend in a straight hne but 
returns upon itself. Its simplest geometrical representation 
would be a circle. From a given point in this system we pass, 
when the sensation is gradually varied, first to similar sen- 
sations, then to those most markedly different, and finally to 
others similar to the first quality, but lying on the opposite 
side. Every color must, accordingly, be related to one maxi- 
mum of difference in sensation. This different sensation may 
be called the opposite colo?% and in the representation of the 
color system by a circle, two opposite colors are to be placed 



§ 6. Pure Sensations. 65 

at the two extremities of the diameter. Thus, for example, 
parple and green, yellow and blue, light green and violet, 
are pairs of opposite colors, that is, colors which exhibit 
the greatest qualitative differences. Sensitivity for either 
absolute or relative objective color differences as expressed 
in the number of vibrations, is entirely irregular, changing 
constantly from point to point on the color line. Sensitivity 
is generally at its maximum in yellow and blue, at its mini- 
mum in red and violet. It has a third relatively low point 
between yellow and blue, that is, in green. A regularity 
such as is to be found in the case of tonal qualities (p. 58)^ 
or in the case of different degrees of brightness (p. 63), is 
entirely wanting here. 

The quality determined by the position of a sensation in 
the color system, as distinguished from other qualitative deter- 
minations is called color-tone, a figurative term borrowed from 
tone sensations. In this sense the simple names of colors, 
such as red, orange, yellow, etc., denote merely color-tones. 
The color circle is a representation of the system of color- 
tones considered without reference to the other attributes 
belonging to the sensations. In reality, every color sensation 
has two other attributes, one we call saturation of the color, 
the other its brightness. Of these two attributes saturation 
is peculiar to chromatic or color sensations, while brightness 
belongs to both chromatic and achromatic sensations. 

16. By saturation we mean the attribute of color sensa- 
tions by virtue of which they appear in all possible stages 
of transition to sensations of pure brightness, so that a con- 
tinuous passage is possible from every color to any point in 
the series of whites, greys, and blacks. The term "satura- 
tion" is borrowed from the common method of producing 
these transitional colors objectively, that is, by the saturation 
of some colorless soluble with color-pigment. Since the end of 

WuNDT, Psychology. 2. edit. 5 



QQ I. Psychical Elements. 

every series of diminisliing grades of saturation of any color 
quality is thus an achromatic sensation, the degree of satura- 
tion may be thought of as an attribute of all color sensa- 
tions, and, at the same time, as the attribute by which the 
system of color sensations is directly united with the system 
of sensations of pure brightness. If, now, we represent 
some particular sensation of white, grey, or black by the 
central point of the color circle, all the grades of color 
saturation that can arise as transitional stages from any 
particular color to this particular sensation of pure bright- 
ness, will obviously be represented by that radius of the circle 
which connects the centre with the color in question. If 
the grades of color saturation corresponding to the continuous 
transitional stages from all the colors to a particular sensa- 
tion of pure brightness, are thus geometrically represented, 
we have the system of saturation-grades as a circular surface^ 
the circumference of which is the system of simple color- 
tones and the centre of which is the sensation of pure 
brightness, corresponding to the absence of all saturation. 
For the formation of such a system of saturation-grades any 
point whatever in the series of sensations of pure brightness 
may be chosen, so long as the condition is fulfilled that the 
white is not too bright, or the black too dark, for in such 
extreme cases differences in both saturation and color dis- 
appear. When such systems are made for all possible points, 
the system of saturation will be supplemented by that of 
grades of brightness. 

17. Brightness is just as necessary an attribute of a color- 
sensation as it is of achromatic sensations, and is in the case 
of color sensations also, both a quality and a degree of in- 
tensity. Starting from a given grade, if the brightness in- 
creases, every color approaches white in quality, while at 
the same time the intensity increases; if the brightness de- 



§ 6. Pure Sensations. 67 

creases, the colors approach black in quality, and the inten- 
sity diminishes. The grades of brightness for any single 
color thus form a system of intensive qualities, analogous to 
the system of pure brightnesses, only in place of the achro- 
matic gradations between white and black, we have the cor- 
responding grades of saturation. From the point of greatest 
saturation there are two opposite directions for variation in 
saturation: one positive^ towards white, accompanied by an 
increase in the intensity of the sensation, and the other 
negative^ towards black, with a corresponding decrease in 
intensity. As limits for these two directions we have, on 
the one hand, the pure sensation white, on the other, the 
pure sensation black; the first is at the same time the 
maximum, the second the minimum of intensity. It follows 
obviously that there is a certain medium brightness for 
every color, at which its saturation is greatest. From this 
point, the saturation decreases in the positive direction, 
that is, towards white, when the brightness increases; and 
in the negative direction, that is, towards black when the 
brightness decreases. The grade of brightness most fa- 
vorable for the saturation is not the same for all colors, 
but varies from red to blue, in such a way that it is most 
intense for red and least intense for blue. This accounts 
for the fact that in twilight, when the degree of brightness 
is small, the blue color-tones — of paintings, for example 
— are still clearly visible, while the red color-tones appear 
black (Purkinje's phenomenon). 

18. If we neglect for the moment the somewhat different 
relations of the maximal saturations of the various colors 
with respect to the line of brightness, we may represent the 
general relation which exists by virtue of the gradual tran- 
sition of colors into white and black, that is, we may re- 
present the general relation between sensations of chromatic 

5* 



68 ^' Psychical Elements. 

brightness and sensations of pure, or achromatic, brightness 
in the simplest manner by the following figure. First, we 
may represent the system of pure color-tones, that is, of the 
colors at their maximal saturation, by a circle, as above. 
Then we may draw through the centre of this circle, per- 
pendicular to its plane, the straight line of pure brightness, 
in such a way that where it cuts the plane of the circular 
surface, it represents the sensation of pure brightness cor- 
responding to the minimum of saturation of the colors with 
which we started. In Kke manner, the other color circles 
for increasing and decreasing grades of brightness, may be 
arranged at right angles along this line, above and below 
the circle of greatest saturation. But the decreasing satura- 
tion of the colors in these latter circles must also be ex- 
pressed, and this can be done by the shortening of their 
radii; just as in the first circle, the shorter the distance 
from the centre, the less the saturation. The radii in suc- 
cessive circles grow continually shorter, until finally, at the 
two extremities of the line of brightness the circles disappear 
entirely. This corresponds to the fact that for every color 
the maximum of brightness passes into the sensation white, 
while its minimum passes into black i). 

19. The whole system of sensations of chromatic bright- 
ness may, accordingly, be most simply represented by a 
spherical surface the equator of which represents the system 
of pure color-tones, or colors of greatest saturation, while 
the two poles correspond to white and black, the extreme 
sensations of chromatic brightness. Of course, any other 



1) It must be observed, however, that the actual coincidence of 
these sensations can be empirically proved only for the minimum 
of brightness. Grades of brightness which approach the maximum 
are so injurious to the eye that the general demonstration of the 
approach to white must be accepted as sufficient. 



§ 6. Pure Sensations. 69 

geometrical figure with similar attributes, as, for example, 
two cones with a common base and with apexes pointing in 
different directions, would serve the same purpose. The 
only thing essential for the representation, is the gradual 
transition to white and black, and the corresponding decrease 
in the variety of the color-tones, which finds its expression 
in the continual decrease in the length of the radii of the 
color circles. Now, as above shown, the system of sensations 
corresponding to a particular sensation of pure brightness, 
may be represented by a circular surface which contains all 
the sensations of light belonging to one grade of brightness. 
"When we unite grades of saturation and brightness into a 
single system, the total system of all light sensations may be 
represented by a solid sphere. The equator is the system 
of pure color-tones; the polar axis is the system of pure 
brightnesses; the surface represents the system of chromatic 
brightnesses, and finally, every circular plane at right angles 
to the polar axis, corresponds to a system of saturations of 
equal brightness. The total system of light-sensations is, ac- 
cordingly, a closed continuity of three dimensions. The three- 
dimensional character of the system arises from the fact 
that every concrete sensation of light has three determinants: 
color-tone, saturation, and brightness. Pure, or achromatic, 
brightness on the one hand, and pure, or saturated colors, 
on the other hand, are to be regarded as the two extreme 
qualities in the series of saturations. The closed form of the 
system comes from the circular character of the color-line, 
and from the fact that the system of chromatic brightness 
terminates in the extremes of pure brightness. A special 
characteristic of the system is, that only the changes in two 
dimensions, namely, in color-tones and saturations, are pure 
changes in quality, while every movement in the third di- 
mension, namely, in the direction of brightness, is at once a 



70 I- Psychical Elements. 

modification of both quality and intensity. As a consequence 
of this fact the whole three-dimensional system is required 
to represent fully the qualities of light sensations, though it 
includes also the intensities of these sensations. 

20. Certain principal sensations are prominent in this 
system, because we use them as points of reference for the 
arrangement of all the others. These are tvhite and blacky 
in the achromatic series, and in the chromatic, the four 
principal colors: red^ yellotVy green and blue. This group of 
four colors was first pointed out as important by Leonardo 
DA Vinci. Only these six sensations have clearly distinguished 
names in the early development of language. All other sen- 
sations are then named either with reference to these or 
even with modifications of the names themselves. Thus, we 
regard grey as a stage in the achromatic series lying between 
white and black. We designate the different grades of 
saturation according to their brightness, as whitish or blackish, 
light or dark color-tones; and we generally choose compound 
names for the colors between the four principal ones, as, 
for example, purple -red, orange -yellow, yellow -green, etc. 
These all show their relatively late origin by their very 
composition. 

20 a. From the early origin of the names for the six qualities 
mentioned, the conclusion has been drawn that they are funda- 
mental qualities of vision, and that the others are compounded 
from them. Grey is declared to be a mixture of black and 
white, violet and purple |to be mixtures of blue and red, etc. 
Psychologically there [is no justification for calling any light 
sensations compound in comparison with others. Grrey is a simple 
sensation just as much as white or black; such colors as orange 
and purple are just as much simple colors as red and yellow; 
and any grade of saturation which we have placed in the system 
between a pure color and white, is by no means, for that reason, 
a compound sensation. The closed, continuous character of the 



§ 6. Pure Sensations. 71 

system makes it necessary for language to pick out certain 
especially marked differences in reference to which all other 
sensations are then arranged, for the simple reason that it is 
impossible to have an unlimited number of names. It is most 
natural that white and black should be chosen as such points 
of reference for the achromatic series, since they designate the 
greatest differences. "When once these two are given, all other 
achromatic sensations will be considered as transitional sensations 
between them, since the extreme differences are connected by a 
series of all possible grades of brightness. The case of color 
sensations is similar; only here, on account of the circular form 
of the color line, it is impossible to choose directly two abso- 
lutely greatest differences. Other motives besides the necessary 
qualitative difference, are decisive in the choice of the principal 
colors. We may regard as such motives, the frequency and af- 
fective intensity of certain light impressions, due to the natural 
conditions of human existence. The red color of blood, the 
green of vegetation, the blue of the sky, and the yellow of the 
heavenly bodies in contrast with the blue of the sky, may well 
have furnished the earliest occasions for the choice of certain 
colors as those to receive names. Language generally names the 
sensation from the object that produced it, not the object from 
the sensation. In this case too, when certain principal qualities 
were once determined, all others must, on account of the con- 
tinuity of the series of sensations, seem to be intermediate 
color-tones. The difference between principal colors and tran- 
sitional colors is, therefore, very probably due entirely to external 
conditions. If these conditions had been other, red might have 
been regarded as a transitional color between purple and orange, 
just as orange is now placed between red and yellow^). 

1) The same false reasoning from the names of sensations, has 
even led to the assumption that the sensation blue developed later 
than other color sensations, because, for example, even in Homer 
the word for blue is the same as that for "dark" (L. Geiger, Zur 
Entwicklungsgeschichte der Menschheit, 1871.). Tests of the color 
sensations of uncivilized peoples whose languages are much more 
deficient in names for colors than that of the Greeks at the time of 
Homer, have given us a superabundance of evidence that this as- 
sumption is utterly without ground (Grant Allen, On Color, 1880.). 



72 I' Psyehical Elements. 

Eeferences. Purkinje, Beobaclitungen und Yersuclie zur Physio- 
logie der Sinne, 2 vols., 1819—1823. Helmholtz, Physiol. Optik, 
§ 19—21. Hering, Zur Lehre vom Lichtsinn, 5 and 6, 1874—1878. 
(Hering holds to the view that the naming of the colors is due to 
their subjective characters and then proceeds to draw conclusions 
from this view for the theory of light sensations.) Wundt, Die Em- 
pfindung des Lichts und der Farben, Philos. Studien, vol. 4, also, 
Grundziige der Phys. Psych., vol. I, chap. 9, § 4., also, Lectures on 
Hum. and Anim. Psych., lecture 6. (Figures 10 — 13 give the geo- 
metrical representations of the system of light sensations.) On sen- 
sitivity for color-differences : A. Konig and Dieterici, Archiv f. Oph- 
thalm., vol. 30, no. 2. Konig, Zeitschr. f. Psychol, u. Phys. d. Sinnesorg., 
vol. 3. Mentz, Philos. Studien, vol. 13. 

21. The attributes of the system of light sensations above 
described, are so peculiar that they lead us to expect a priori 
that the relation between these psychological attributes and 
the objective processes of stimulation, is essentially different 
from that which we inferred in the cases of the sensational 
systems discussed before, especially in the case of the general 
sense and auditory sense. Most striking in this respect, 
is the difference between the system of colors and that of 
tones. In the case of tones the principle of paralleHsm 
between sensation and stimulus (p. 49), holds, not only for 
the physiological processes of stimulation, but to a great 
extent for the physical processes as well. A simple sensa- 
tion corresponds to a simple form of sound vibration, and 
a plurality of simple sensations corresponds to a compound 
form of vibration. Furthermore, the intensity of the sensa- 
tion varies in proportion to the amplitude of the vibrations, 
and its quality varies with the form, so that in both directions 
the subjective difference between sensations increases with 
the growing difference between the objective physical stimuli. 
The relation in the case of light sensations is entirely different. 
Like objective sound, objective light also consists of vibrations 
of a certain medium. To be sure, the actual form of these 



§ 6. Pure Sensations. 73 

vibrations is still a question, but from physical experiments 
on the phenomena of interference we know that they consist 
of very short and rapid waves. Those seen as light vary in 
wave-length from 688 to 393 millionths of a millimetre, and 
in rate from 450 to 790 billion vibrations per second. For 
light, as for sound, simple sensations correspond to simple 
vibrations, that is, to vibrations of like wave-length; and the 
quality of the sensation varies continuously with the wave 
length and with the rate of vibration ; thus, red corresponds to 
the longest and slowest waves, and violet to the shortest and 
most rapid, while the other color-tones form a series between 
these, varying with the changes in wave-length. Even here, 
however, an essential difference appears, for the colors red 
and violet, which are the most different in wave-length, are 
more similar in sensation than are most of the colors which lie 
between 1). There are also other differences. 1) Every change 
in the amplitude of the physical vibrations corresponds, as 
we noted above in the discussion of sensations of brightness, 
to a subjective change in both intensity and quality. 2) All 
light, even though it be made up of all the different kinds 
of vibration, is simple in sensation, just as much as ob- 
jectively simple light, which is made up of only one kind of 
waves. This is immediately apparent if we make a subjective 
comparison of sensations of chromatic light with those of 
achromatic light. From the first of these facts it follows 
that light which is physically simple may produce not only 



1) Many physicists, to be sure, believe that an analogous relation 
is to be found between tones of different pitch, in the fact that every 
tone has in its octave a similar tone. But this similarity, as we 
shall see (§ 9), does not exist between simple tones, but depends on 
the actual sympathetic vibration of the octave in all compound 
clangs. Attempts to support this supposed analogy by finding in 
the color line intervals corresponding to the various tonal intervals, 
third, fourth, fifth, etc., have all been entirely futile. 



74 I' Psychical Elements. 

chromatic, but also achromatic sensations, for the sensation 
from such simple light approaches white when the amplitu de 
of its vibrations increases, and black when the amplitude 
decreases. The quality of an achromatic sensation does not, 
therefore, determine unequivocally its source ; such a sensation 
may be produced either through a change in the amplitude of 
objective light vibrations or through a mixture of simple vi- 
brations of different wave-lengths. In the first case, however, 
there is always connected with the change in amplitude a 
change in the grade of brightness, which does not neces- 
sarily take place when a mixture is made. 

22. Even when the grade of brightness remains constant, 
an achromatic sensation may have one of several sources. 
A sensation of pure brightness of a given intensity may re- 
sult not only from a mixture of all the rates of vibration 
contained in solar light, as, for example, in ordinary day- 
light, but it may also result when only tivo kinds of light- 
waves are mixed in proper proportions. The kinds of Hght 
necessary to thus produce a sensation of pure brightness are 
those which correspond to sensations subjectively the most 
different, that is, to opposite colors^ or at least to colors 
very nearly opposite in quality. "Whenever the objective 
mixture of two colors produces white, these colors are called 
complementary colors. As examples of such complementary 
colors, we may mention spectral red and green-blue, orange 
and sky-blue, yellow and indigo-blue. 

Each of the color sensations may, like achromatic sen- 
sations, though to more limited extent, have one of several 
sources. When two objective colors which lie nearer each 
other in the color-circle than opposites, are mixed, the mixture 
appears, not white, but of a color which in the series of 
objectively simple qualities lies between the two with which 
we started. The saturation of the resulting color is, indeed. 



§ 6. Pure Sensations. 75 

very much diminislied when the components of the mixture 
approach complementary colors; but when the component 
colors are near each other, the diminution in saturation is 
no longer perceptible, and the mixture and the corresponding 
simple color are generally subjectively alike. Thus the orange 
of the spectrum is absolutely indistinguishable from a mixture 
of red and yellow rays. In this way, all the colors in the 
color-circle between red and green can be obtained by mix- 
ing red and green, all between green and violet by mixing 
green and violet, and, finally, purple, which is not in the 
solar spectrum, can be produced by mixing red and violet. 
The whole series of color-tones possible in sensation can, 
accordingly, be obtained from the three objective colors, red, 
green and violet. By means of the same three colors we 
can also produce white with its intermediate stages. The 
mixture of red and violet gives purple, and this is the 
complementary color of green, and, finally, the white secured 
by mixing purple and green gives, when mixed in different 
proportions with the various colors, the different grades of 
saturation. 

23. The three objective colors that may be used *in this 
way to produce the whole system of light sensations, are 
called fundamental colors. In order to indicate their signif- 
icance, a triangular surface is chosen to represent the system 
of saturations, rather than the circular surface which is de- 
rived from the psychological relations alone. The special 
significance of the fundamental colors is then expressed by 
placing them at the angles of the triangle. Along the sides 
are arranged the color -tones in their maximal saturation, 
just as on the circumference of the color circle, while on the 
triangular surface are the other grades of saturation in their 
transitions to white, the white lying, as in the circle, in the 
centre. Theoretically any set of three colors could be chosen 



76 I- Psychical Elements. 

as fundamental colors, provided they were suitably distant 
from one another. Practically, those mentioned, namely, red, 
green and violet, are preferable because at the two ends of 
the spectrum sensations vary most slowly in proportion to 
the period of vibration, so that when the extreme colors of 
the spectrum are used as fundamental colors, the result ob- 
tained by mixing two neighboring ones is most like the inter- 
mediate, objectively simple color i). 

24. These phenomena show that in the system of light 
sensations a simple relation does not exist between the 
physical stimuli and the sensations. This can be understood 
from what has been said above (3) as to the character of 
the ][)hysiological stimulation. The visual sense is to be 
reckoned among the chemical senses, and we can expect a 
simple relation only between the photochemical processes in 
the retina and the sensations. Now, we know from experience 
that different kinds of physical light produce like chemical 
disintegrations, and this explains in general the possibility 
mentioned above, of having the same sensation from many 
different kinds of objective light. According to the principle 
of parallelism between changes in sensation and in the physio- 
logical stimulation (p. 49), it may be assumed that the various 
physical stimuli which cause the same sensation, all produce 
the same photochemical stimulation in the retina, and that 
altogether there are just as many kinds and varieties of the 
photochemical processes as kinds and varieties of distin- 



1) In the neighborhood of green this advantage does not exist, 
and the mixtures always appear less saturated than the intermediate 
simple colors. This is a clear proof that the choice of the three 
fundamental colors mentioned is indeed the most practical, but 
nevertheless arbitrary, and at bottom due to the familiar geometrical 
principle that a triangle is the simplest figure that can enclose a 
finite number of points in the same plane. 



§ 6. Pure Sensations, 77 

guishable sensations. In fact, all that we know, up to the 
present time, about the physiological substratum of light 
sensations is based upon this assumption. The investigation 
of the physiological processes of light stimulation, has not 
yet given any further result than that the stimulation is in 
all probability a chemical process. 

25. The relatively long persistence of the sensatioji after 
the stimulation that originated it, is explicable on the as- 
sumption that the light stimulations are due to chemical 
processes in the retina (p. 46). Such persistence of the sen- 
sation is called, with reference to the object used as stimulus, 
the after-image of the impression. At first this after-image 
appears in the same brightness and color as the object: 
white when the object is white, black when the object is 
black, and if the object is colored, the after-image appears 
in the same color. These are the positive and like-colored 
after-images. After a short time the after-image passes, in 
the case of achromatic impressions, into the opposite grade 
of brightness, white into black, or black into white; in the 
case of colors, it passes into the opposite or complementary 
color. These are the negative and complementary after- 
images. If light stimuli of short duration act upon the eye 
in darkness, this transition from positive to negative after- 
images may be repeated several times. A second positive 
after-image follows the negative, and so on, so that an os- 
cillation between the two phases takes place. The positive 
after-image may be readily explained by the fact that the 
photochemical disintegration caused by any kind of light, 
lasts a short time after the action of the light. The nega- 
tive and complementary after-images can be explained by 
the fact that disintegration in a given direction causes a 
partial consumption of the photochemical substance most 
directly concerned, and this results in a corresponding modi- 



78 I- Psychical Elements. 

fication of the photochemical processes when the stimulation 
of the retina continues. 

26. The phenomena of color induction and light induction 
are probably very closely related to positive and negative 
after-images. These phenomena consist in the appearance of 
simultaneous sensations of opposite brightness and color in 
the neighborhood of any light impression. Positive light in- 
duction is the less common of these two kinds of phenomena. 
It appears most noticeably in those cases in which one part 
of the retina is intensely stimulated and a contiguous region 
is left entirely unstimulated. In such a case the positive 
light stimulation, or color stimulation seems to spread out 
over the unstimulated area. In all other cases the opposite 
form of induction, namely, negative induction, appears. In 
consequence of such negative induction a white surface ap- 
pears to be surrounded by a dark margin, a black surface 
by a bright margin, and a colored surface by a margin of 
the complementary color. These phenomena are, further- 
more, accompanied by psychological contrast phenomena which 
belong under the general principle to be explained later 
(§ 17, 11), namely, the principle of emphasis of opposites. 
Indeed, the term "contrast" is, as a rule, applied to the total 
effects of such combined physiological and psychological influ- 
ences. Such a use of the term is justified to a certain degree 
by the impossibility of separating the two kinds of influences 
from each other, but it would be much more appropriate to use 
the term induced excitation only for the physiological factor, 
and to reserve the term contrast for the psychological factor. 
For this psychological factor corresponds fully to the psycho- 
logical emphasizing of opposites which can be demonstrated 
in other spheres, especially among spacial and temporal ideas, 
and among the feelings. Light induction and color induction, 
in this purely physiological sense, consist probably in a kind 



§ 6. Pure Sensations. 79 

of negative irradiation of the stimulation, in which the stimu- 
lation is not carried over directly to contiguous regions in 
its own proper quality as it is in the case of positive in- 
duction, but rather excites in these neighboring regions a 
stimulation process of opposite character. Such negative ir- 
radiation may possibly be due to the fact that the photo- 
chemical substances which are used up in the stimulation of 
a certain region of the retina, are replaced in part through 
an influx of other similiar substances from the surrounding 
regions. If, then, a light impression is applied to these im- 
poverished neighboring regions, the result would be the same 
as that which would appear in the case of an after-image 
on the originally stimulated area (p. 77). Evidence in favor 
of assuming this connection between the facts of induction 
and after-images, appears in the fact that in both cases the 
effects are heightened by an increase in the intensity of the 
light impressions. But just at this point there shows itself 
a very fundamental difference between these physiological 
processes of light induction and the psychological processes 
of contrast with which they are usually erroneously classified. 
To this fundamental difference we shall return when we 
come to the general treatment of contrasts (§ 17, 10). 

26 a. If we take the principle of parallelism between sen- 
sation and physiological stimulation as the basis of our sup- 
positions in regard to the processes that occur in the retina, we 
may conclude that the photochemical processes corresponding to 
chromatic and achromatic sensations, are relatively independent 
of each other, in a way analogous to that in which the cor- 
responding sensations are relatively independent. Two facts, 
one belonging to the subjective sensational system, the other 
to the objective phenomena of color-mixing, can be very natur- 
ally explained on this basis. The first is the fact that every 
color sensation tends to pass into one of pure brightness as the 
grade of its brightness decreases or increases. This fact is most 



80 I' Psychical Elements. 

simply interpreted on the assumption that every color stimulation 
is made up of two physiological components, one corresponding 
to the chromatic, the other to the achromatic stimulation. To 
this assumption we must add the further condition, that for 
certain medium intensities of the stimuli the chromatic com- 
ponents are relatively the strongest, while for greater and smaller 
intensities the achromatic components predominate more and 
more. The second fact is, that there are complementary colors. 
This fact is most easily understood when we assume that op- 
posite colors, which are subjectively the greatest possible differ- 
ences in sensation, depend upon objective photochemical proc- 
esses that neutralize each other. The fact that as a result of 
this neutralization an achromatic stimulation arises, is very 
readily explained by the presupposition that such an achromatic 
stimulation accompanies every chromatic stimulation from the 
first, and is, therefore, all that is left when antagonistic chro- 
matic stimulations counteract each other. This assumption of a 
relative independence between the chromatic and achromatic 
photochemical processes, is supported by the- existence of an 
abnormality of vision, sometimes congenital^ sometimes acquired 
through pathological changes in the retina, namely total color- 
blindness. In such cases all stimulations are seen, either on the 
whole retina or on certain parts of it, as pure brightness, with- 
out any admixture of color. This is proof that the chromatic 
and achromatic stimulations are separable physiological proc- 



If we apply the principle of parallelism to the chromatie 
stimulation, two facts present themselves. The first is that two 
colors separated by a limited, short distance, when mixed give 
a color that is like the intermediate simple color. This indicates 
that color stimulation is a process which varies with the physical 
stimulus, not continuously, as the tonal stimulation, but in short 
stages, and in such a way that the stages in red and violet are 
longer than in green, where the mixture of colors fairly near 
each other, shows the effects of complementary action. The 
second fact is that certain colors which correspond to rather 
large differences in stimulation, namely, the complementary colors, 
evidently depend upon processes which neutralize each other. 
Now, let it be remembered that chemical processes can neutralize 



§ 6. Pure Sensations. 81 

each other only when they are in some way opposite in character, 
and that for every color recognizable in sensation there is an 
opposite quality, it will then be seen that for every stage in the 
photochemical process of color stimulation there must be a stage 
of complementary action. Furthermore, since there are two 
opposite series of gradations through which these complementary 
effects may be reached, we are justified in drawing the con- 
clusion that the return of the color circle to its beginning has 
its corresponding physiological fact in a return of the chemical 
processes to closely related forms. The whole series of chro- 
matic stimulations, beginning with red and passing beyond violet 
through purple mixtures back to its first point, running parallel, 
as it does, with continuous changes in the wave-length of ob- 
jective light, is to be regarded as an indefinitely long succes- 
sion of photochemical disintegrations. All these processes to- 
gether form a closed circle in which there is, for every stage, 
a neutralizing opposite, and in which there are two possible paths 
of transition in different directions to this neutralizing opposite. 
We know nothing about the total number of photochemical 
stages in this circle of processes. The numerous attempts made 
to reduce all color sensations to the smallest possible number 
of such stages, lack adequate foundation. Sometimes they in- 
discriminatingly translate the results of physical color -mixing 
into physiological processes, as in the assumption of three fun- 
damental colors, red, green, and violet, from the different mix- 
tures of which all sensations of light, even the achromatic, are 
to be derived (Young-Helmholtz' hypothesis). Sometimes they 
start with the psychologically untenable assumption that the 
naming of colors is not due to the influence of certain external 
objects, but to the real significance of the sensations themselves 
(v. sup. p. 71), and assume accordingly four fundamental colors 
as the sources of all color sensations. The four fundamental 
colors here assumed are the two pairs red and green, yellow 
and blue, to which are added the similar pair of sensations of 
pure brightness, black and white. All other light sensations 
such as grey, orange, Violet, etc., are regarded as subjectively 
and objectively mixed colors (Hering's hypothesis). The evidence 
in support of the first as of the second of these hypotheses has 
been derived for the most part from the not infrequent cases 

WuNDT, Psycliology. 2. edit. 6 



82 I' Psychical Elements. 

of partial color-blindness. Those who accept three fundamental 
colors, assert that all these cases are to be explained as a lack 
of the red or green sensations, or else as a lack of both. Those 
who accept four, hold that partial color-blindness always includes 
two fundamental colors which belong together as opposites, that 
color-blindness is, accordingly, either red-green-blindness or yel- 
low-blue-blindness. An unprejudiced examination of color- 
blindness does not justify either of these assertions. The three- 
color theory can not explain total color-blindness, and the four- 
color theory is in contradiction to cases of pure red-blindness 
and pure green-blindness. Finally, both theories are overthrown 
by the cases that unquestionably occur, in which such parts of 
the spectrum as do not correspond to any of the three or four 
fundamental colors, appear colorless. The only thing that our 
present knowledge justifies us in saying, is that every simple 
sensation of light is probably conditioned by a combination of 
two photochemical processes, an achromatic and a chromatic. 
The first is made up, in turn, of a process mainly of disinte- 
gration when the light is more intense, and a process of resti- 
tution when the light is weaker. The chromatic process varies 
by stages in such a way that the whole series of photochemical 
color disintegrations forms a circle of processes in which the 
products of the disintegration for any two relatively most distant 
stages, neutralize each other i). 

Various changes in the living retina have been observed as 
a result of the action of light, all of which go to support the 
assumption of a photochemical process. Such changes are, first, 
the gradual change into a colorless state, of a substance which 
in the retina not exposed to light is purple (bleaching of the visual 



1) The further assumption is made by the defenders of the four 
fundamental colors, that two opposite colors are related just as bright 
and dark achromatic stimulations, that is, that one of these colors 
is due to a photochemical disintegration (dissimilation), the other to 
a restitution (assimilation). This is an analogy that contradicts the 
actual facts. The result obtained by mixing complementary colors 
is on its subjective side a suppression of the color sensation, while 
the mixture of white and black, on the other hand, produces the 
grey. 



§ 6. Pure Sensations. 83 

purple) ; second, microscopical movements of the pigmented pro- 
toplasm between the sensitive elements, or rods and cones; and 
finally, changes in the form of the rods and cones themselves. At- 
tempts to use these phenomena in any way for a physiological 
theory of light- stimulation, are certainly premature. The most 
probable conclusion which we can now draw is that the difference 
in the forms of the rods and cones is connected with a difference 
in function. The centre of the human retina, which is the region 
of direct vision, has only cones, while in the peripheral regions 
the rods predominate. In the centre (which, furthermore, has 
no visual purple) color differentiation is much more complete 
than in the peripheral regions. At the extreme outer limits of 
the retina color vision disappears entirely. The periphery is, on 
the other hand, more sensitive to brightness than the centre. 
It is probable that these differences in the function are related 
to the differences in the photochemical properties of the rods 
and cones, the cones being the chief organs of color vision, the 
rods being the chief organs for achromatic vision. This division 
of functions is, however, obviously not absolute. 

References. Helmholtz, Physiol. Optik, § 20—25. Hering, Zur 
Lehre vom Lichtsinn, 1 — 6. von Kries, Die Gesichtsempfindungen 
und ihre Analyse, 1882. Wundt, Grundziige der phys. Psych., vol. I, 
chap. 9, § 4., and Lectures on Hum. and Anim. Psych., lectures 6 
and 7. On After-images: Fechner, Poggendorff's Ann. der Physik, 
vols 44 and 50. Hering, Pfliiger's Archiv f. Physiol., vol. 43. Kunkel, 
Pfliiger's Archiv, vol. 9. Charpentier, Compt. rend., 1881, no. 113. 
WiRTH, Philos. Studien, vol. 16. On light induction (contrast) : Bruche, 
Denkschr. der Wiener Akad. Math.-naturw. CI., vol. 3. Fechner, 
Poggendorff's Ann., vol. 50. Hering, Pfliiger's Archiv, vol. 41. Kirsch- 
MANN, Philos. Studien, vol. 6. On color-blindness: Holmgren, Die 
Farbenblindheit, 1878. Konig and Dieterici, Zeitsch. f. Psych, u. 
Physiol, d. Sinnesorg., vol. 4. Brodhun, Zeitschr. f. Psych, u. Physiol. 
d. Sinnesorg., vols. 3 and 5. Konig, same journal, vol. 20. v. Kries, 
same journal, vols. 13 and 19. Kirschmann, Philos. Studien, vol. 8. 
On light sensations in indirect vision: ScHON, Die Lehre vom Ge- 
sichtsfeld, 1874. A. E. Pick, Pfliiger's Archiv, vol. 43. Kirschmann, 
Philos. Studien, vol. 8. Hellpach, Philos. Studien, vol. 15. v. Kries, 
Zeitsch. f. Psychol, u. Physiol, d. Sinnesorg., vols. 9 and 15. Sherman, 
Philos. Studien, vol. 13. Tschermak, Pfltiger's Archiv f. Physiol., 
vol. 82. 

6* 



84 I- Psychical Elements. 

§ 7. SIMPLE FEELINGS. 

1. Simple feelings may originate in very many more ways 
than simple sensations. For even such feehngs as we never 
observe except in connection with more or less complex 
ideational processes, are often subjectively unanalyzable (p. 38). 
Thus, for example, the feeling of tonal harmony is just as 
simple as the feeling connected with a single tone. The 
only essential difference between the two is that the feelings 
which correspond to simple sensations can be easily isolated 
from the interconnections of which they form a part in our 
experience, by the same method of abstraction as that which 
we employed in discovering the simple sensations (p. 32). 
Those feelings, on the other hand, which are connected with 
some composite ideational compound, can never be separated 
from the feelings which enter into the compound as subjective 
complements of the sensation factors. Thus, for example, 
it is impossible to separate the feeling of harmony connected 
with the chord c e g from the simple feelings connected with 
each of the single tones c, e, and g. The latter may, indeed, 
be pushed into the background, for as we shall see later 
(§ 12, 3 a), they always unite with the feeling of harmony 
to form a unitary total feeling .^ but they can never be 
ehminated. 

2. The feehng connected with a simple sensation is com- 
monly known as a sense- feeling., or as the affective tone of a 
sensation. These two expressions are capable of misinter- 
pretation in opposite ways. There is a tendency to see in 
the term "sense-feeHng" a reference, not merely to a com- 
ponent of immediate experience which may be isolated by 
abstraction, but more than that, reference to a component 
of such experience which may appear quite independently 
of other elements. The term "affective tone", on the other 



§ 7. Simple Feelings. 85 

hand, is looked upon as indicating tliat some affective quality 
is an invariable attribute of a sensation, just as "color-tone" 
is a necessary determinant of a color sensation. In reality, 
however, a sense-feeling without a sensation can no more 
exist than can a feeling of tonal harmony without tonal sen- 
sations. When, as is sometimes the case^ the feelings ac- 
companying sensations of pain, of pressure, of heat and of 
cold, and the feelings accompanying muscle sensations, are 
called independent sense-feelings, it is due to the confusion 
of the concepts sensation and feeling (p. 40) which is still 
prevalent, especially in physiology. As a result of this con- 
fusion certain sensations, such as those of touch, are called 
"feelings", and in the case of some sensations accompanied 
by strong feelings, as sensations of pain, the discrimination 
of the two elements is neglected. In the second place, it 
would be just as inadmissable to ascribe to a given sensa- 
tion, as one of its attributes, a definite feeling fixed in quality 
and intensity. The real truth is that in every case the sen- 
sation is only one of the many factors that determine the 
feeling present at a given moment; besides the sensation, 
the processes that have gone before and the permanent dis- 
positions — • conditions that we can only partially account 
for in special cases — play an essential part. The concept 
"sense-feeHng" or "affective tone" is, accordingly, in a double 
sense the product of analysis and abstraction: first, we must 
think of the simple feeling as separated from its concomitant 
pure sensation, and secondly, we must pick out from among 
all the various changing affective elements which are con- 
nected with a given sensation under different conditions, the 
one which is most constant and the one in the case of 
which all the influences that could disturb or complicate 
the simple effect of the sensation are as far as possible 
absent. 



86 ^- Psychical Elements. 

The first of these conditions is comparatively easy to 
meet, if we keep in mind the psychological meaning of the 
concepts sensation and feehng. The second is very difficult, 
and, especially in the case of the most highly developed 
sensational systems, that is, the auditory and visual systems, 
it is never really possible to remove entirely such indirect 
influences. Thus, for example, the sensation green arouses 
almost unavoidably the idea of green vegetation, and since 
there are connected with this idea composite feelings the 
character of which may be entirely independent of the af- 
fective tone of the color itself, it is impossible to determine 
directly whether the feeling observed when a green impression 
is presented, is a pure affective tone, a feeling aroused by 
the attending idea, or a combination of both. 

2 a. This difficulty has led many psychologists to argue 
against the existence of any pure affective tone whatever. They 
assert that every sensation arouses some accompanying ideas, and 
that the affective action of the sensation is due in every case 
to these ideas. But the results of experimental variation of the 
conditions for light sensations, tell against this view. If the 
attendant ideas were the only sources of the feeling, then the 
feeling would necessarily be strongest when the sensational con- 
tents of the impression were most like those of the ideas. This 
is by no means the case. The affective tone of a color is 
greatest when its grade of saturation reaches a maximum. The 
pure colors of the spectrum observed in surrounding darkness 
have the strongest affective tone. These colors are, however, 
generally very different from those of the natural objects to 
which accompanying ideas might refer. There is^ equally little 
justification for the attempts to derive tonal feelings exclusively 
from ideas. It can not be doubted that familiar musical ideas 
may be aroused through a single tone ; still, on the other hand, 
the constancy with which certain tonal qualities are chosen to 
express particular feelings, as, for example, deep tones to express 
grave and sad feelings, can be understood only on the ground 



§ 7. Simple Feelings. 87 

that the corresponding affective quality belongs to the simple 
tone sensation, rather than to a suggested idea. The circle in 
which the argument moves is still more obvious when the af- 
fective tones of sensations of taste, smell, and the general sense 
are referred to accompanying ideas. "When, for example, the 
agreeable or disagreeable tone of a taste sensation is increased 
by the recollection of the same impression as experienced before, 
this can be possible only under the condition that the earlier 
impression was itself agreeable or disagreeable. 

3. The varieties of simple sense-feelings are exceedingly 
numerous. The feelings corresponding to a particular sen- 
sational system form an affective system, since, in general, 
a change in the quality or intensity of the affective tone 
runs parallel with every change in the quality or intensity 
of the sensations. At the same time these changes in the 
affective systems are essentially different from the correspond- 
ing changes in the sensational systems. Thus, if the inten- 
sity of a sensation is varied, the affective tone may change 
not only in intensity, but also in quality ; and if the quality 
of a sensation is varied, the affective tone may change not 
only in quality, but also in intensity. For example, increase 
the sensation sweet in intensity and it changes gradually 
from agreeable to disagreeable. Or, gradually substitute for 
a sweet sensation one of sour or bitter, keeping the inten- 
sity constant, it will be observed that, for equal intensities, 
sour, and more especially bitter, produce much stronger 
feelings than sweet. In general, then, every change in sen- 
sation is usually accom'panied hy a hvofold change in feeling. 
The way in which changes in the quality and intensity of 
affective tones are related to each other follows the principle 
that every series of affective changes in one dimension ranges 
between opposites., not, as is the case with the corresponding 
sensational changes, between greatest differences (p. 37). 



88 I- Psychical Elements. 

4. In accordance with this principle there correspond to 
the greatest quahtative differences in sensation, the greatest 
opposites in affective quahty, and the maxima of affective 
intensities. These extremes are either equal, or at least, ac- 
cording to the special peculiarities of the qualitative oppo- 
sites, approximately equal. The middle point between them 
corresponds, when only the single dimension to which the 
opposites belong is considered, to an absence of all intensity. 
This absence of intensity can be observed only when the 
corresponding sensational system is absolutely one-dimensional. 
In all other cases, a point which is a neutral middle for 
one particular series of sensational differences, belongs at 
the same time to another sensational dimension or even to 
a number of such dimensions, in each of which it has a 
definite affective value. Thus, for example, spectral yellow 
and blue are opposite colors which have correspondingly op- 
posite affective tones. In passing gradually along the color 
line from one of these to the other, green would be the 
neutral middle between them. But green itself stands in 
affective contrast vnth its opposite color, purple; and, further- 
more, it is, like every saturated color, one extremity of a 
series made up of the transitional stages of a single color- 
tone to white. Again, the system of simple tone sensations 
forms a continuity of only one dimension but in this case 
more than in others it is impossible to isolate the corre- 
sponding affective tones through abstraction, as we did the 
pure sensations, because in actual experience we always have, 
not only the tonal series to deal with, but also series of 
transitions between absolutely simple tones and noises which 
are made up of a profusion of simple tones. The result of 
these conditions is that every many-dimensional sensational 
system has a corresponding complex system of affective tones, 
in which every point generally belongs at once to several 



§ 7. Simple Feelings. 89 

dimensions, so that the neutral middle between opposite af- 
fective qualities can actually be found in experience only 
in the special cases where the affective tone of a particular 
sensation corresponds to the neutral middle of all the dimen- 
sions to which it belongs. This special condition is obviously 
fulfilled, at least approximately, for the many-dimensional 
sensational systems, especially those of sight and hearing, in 
just the cases in which it is of special practical value for 
the undisturbed occurrence of affective processes. For vision 
it is sensations of medium brightness, and those of the low 
grades of chromatic saturation approximating them, which 
form the neutral indifference -zones of affective quality; in 
the case of hearing it is the auditory impressions of our 
ordinary environment, which are between a tone and a noise 
in character (as, for example, the human voice). On both 
sides of these zones arise the more intense affective tones of 
the more marked sensational qualities. 

5. The variations in affective quality and intensity that 
run parallel to the different grades of sensatioiial intensity ^ 
are much simpler. They can be most clearly seen in the 
homogeneous sensational systems of the general sense. Each 
of these systems is of a uniform quality throughout, and is 
fairly well represented geometrically by a single point (p. 35) ^ 
so that the only possible sensational changes are those of 
intensity, and these can be attended only by a one-dimen- 
sional series of affective changes between opposites. The 
neutral indifference-zone is, accordingly, always easy to ob- 
serve in these cases. It corresponds to the medium sen- 
sations of pressure, heat and cold, which medium sensa- 
tions are connected with the normal, medium intensity of 
ordinary sense-stimuli. The simple feelings on both sides 
of this zone exhibit decidedly opposite characters, and can 
usually be classified on one side as pleasurable feelings, on 



90 I- Psychical Elements. 

the other as unpleasurable (v. inf. 7). The unpleasurable feel- 
ings are the only ones that can be produced with certainty, 
by increasing the intensity of the sensation. Through habit- 
uation to moderate stimuli, such an expansion of the indif- 
ference-zone has taken place in these systems of the general 
sense, that when the stimuli are weak, as a rule only a suc- 
cession of sensations strikingly different in intensity or qual- 
ity, can produce noticeable feelings. In such cases, feelings 
of pleasure always correspond to sensations of medium in- 
tensity. 

The regular relation between sensational intensity and 
affective tone, can be better observed without this influence 
of contrast, in the case of certain sensations of smell and 
taste. At first a pleasurable feeling arises with weak sen- 
sations and increases with the increasing intensity of the 
sensations to a maximum, then the feeling sinks to zero with 
a certain medium sensational intensity, and finally, when this 
intensity increases still more, the feeling becomes unpleasur- 
able and increases until the sensational maximum is reached. 

6. The variety of simple affective qualities seems to be 
indefinitely great, at least it is greater than that of sensa- 
tions. This is due to two facts. First, every sensation of 
the many-dimensional systems belongs at once to several 
series of feelings (p. 88). Secondly, and this is the chief 
reason, the different compounds arising from the various 
combinations of sensations, such as intensive, spacial, and 
temporal ideas, and also certain stages in the course of 
emotions and volitions, have corresponding feelings, which 
are irreducible, and must therefore be classed among the 
simple feelings (p. 38). 

It is greatly to be regretted that the names of simple 
feelings are so much more hazy than the names of sensations. 
The proper nomenclature of feeling is limited entirely to the 



§ 7. Simple Feelings. 91 

expression of certain general antitheses, as agreeable and 
disagreeable, grave and gay, excited and quiet, etc. These 
designations are usually based on the emotions into which 
the feelings enter as elements, and they are, furthermore, 
so general that each includes a large number of single simple 
feelings of very different character. In other cases the names 
of complex ideas with affective characters similar to the 
feehng in question are used in describing the feelings con- 
nected with simple impressions, as, for example, by Goethe 
in his discription of the affective tone of colors, and by 
many writers on music in describing the feelings accompany- 
ing clangs. This poverty of language in special names for 
the feelings, is a psychological consequence of the subjective 
nature of the feelings. All the motives of practical life 
which give rise to the names of objects and their attributes, 
are here wanting. To infer from this poverty of language 
that there is a corresponding poverty of simple affective 
qualities themselves, is a psychological mistake, which is the 
more fatal since it renders an adequate investigation of the 
composite affective processes impossible from the first. 

7. In consequence of the difficulties indicated, a complete 
list of simple affective qualities is out of the question, even 
more than is a complete list in the case of simple sensations. 
Then, too, there are still other reasons why it would be im- 
possible to make such a list of feelings. The feelings, by 
virtue of the attributes described above, do not form separate 
systems, as do the sensations of tone, of light, or of taste, 
but all feelings are united in a single manifold, interconnected 
in all its parts (p. 36). In this manifold of feelings, it is 
however, possible to distinguish certain different chief affective 
series, or dimensions^ terminating in affective opposites of 
predominant character. Such series, or dimensions may al- 
ways be designated by the two names that indicate their 



92 I' Psychical Elements. 

opposite extremes. Each name is^ however, to he looked 
upon as a collective name including a great variety of feelings 
differing from one another in certain minor individual char- 
acteristics. 

Three such chief dimensions may be distinguished. We call 
them the series of pleasu7'able and unpleasurahle feelings^ that 
of arousiiig and subduing (exciting and depressing) feelings, and 
finally that of feelings of strain and relaxation. Any concrete 
feeling may belong to all of these dimensions, or it may belong 
to only two^ or even to only one of them. The last mentioned 
possibility is all that makes it possible to distinguish the 
different directions. The combination of different affective 
dimensions which ordinarily takes place^ and the influences 
mentioned above (p. 38), and explained as due to the over- 
lapping of feelings arising from various causes, all go to 
explain why we are perhaps never in a state entirely free from 
feeling^ although the general nature of the feehngs renders 
it theoretically certain that there is an indifference-zone. 

8. Feelings connected with sensations of the general sense 
and with impressions of smell and taste^ may be regarded 
as good examples of pure pleasurable and unpleasurahle 
forms. A sensation of pain^ for example^ is regularly ac- 
companied by an unpleasurahle feeling without any admixture 
of other affective forms. In connection with pure sensations, 
arousing and subduing feehngs may be observed best in the 
case of color impressions and clang impressions. Thus, red 
is arousing^ blue subduing. Feelings of strain and relaxation 
are always connected with the processes of attention. Thus, 
when we expect a sense impression, we note a feeling of 
strain^ and on the arrival of the expected event, we note a 
feeling of relaxation. Both the expectation and satisfaction 
may be accompanied at the same time by a feeling of ex- 
citement or, under special conditions, by pleasurable or un- 



j^ 7. Simple Feelings. 93 

pleasurable feelings. These other feelings may^ however^ be 
entirely absent, and then the feelings of strain and relaxation 
are recognized as specific forms which can not be reduced 
to others, just as the other forms were recognized as distinct 
and separate in the examples mentioned before. The pres- 
ence of more than one affective tendency may be discovered 
in the case of very many feelings which are, nevertheless, 
just as simple in quality, as the feelings mentioned. Thus, 
the feehngs of seriousness and gaiety connected with the 
sensible impressions of low and high tones or dark and 
bright colors, are to be regarded as characteristic qualities 
which are outside the indifference-zone in both the pleasurable 
and unpleasurable dimension and the exciting and depressing 
dimension. We are never to forget here that pleasurable 
and unpleasurable, exciting and depressing, are not names 
of single affective qualities, but of dimensions or series, 
within which an indefinitely large number of simple qualities 
appear, so that the unpleasurable quality of seriousness is 
not only to be distinguished from that of a painful touch, 
of a discord, etc., but even the different cases of seriousness 
itself may vary in their quality. Again, the series of pleas- 
urable and unpleasurable feelings, is united with that of 
feelings of strain and relaxation, in the case of the affective 
tones of rhythms. The regular succession of strain and 
relaxation in these cases is attended by pleasure, the disturb- 
ance of this regularity, by the opposite feeling, as when we 
are disappointed or surprised. Then, too, under certain cir- 
cumstances the feeling of rhythm may be of either an ex- 
citing or a subduing character. 

8 a. Of the three affective dimensions mentioned, only that 
of pleasurable and unpleasurable feelings has generally been 
recognized ; the others are usually treated as emotions. But the 



94 I' Psychical Elements. 

emotions, as we shall see in § 13, are combinations of feelings ; 
it is obvious, therefore, that the fundamental forms of emotions 
must have their antecedents in the affective elements. Some 
psychologists have regarded pleasurable and unpleasurable feel- 
ings, not as collective terms including a great variety of simple 
feelings, but as entirely uniform, concrete states, so that, for 
example, the unpleasurableness of a toothache, of an intellectual 
failure, and of a tragical experience are regarded as identical in 
their affective contents. Still others seek to identify the feelings 
with special sensations, especially with cutaneous sensations or 
muscle sensations. Such theories are utterly helpless when con- 
fronted with the problems that arise in the study of complex 
emotions, as for example, throughout the sciences of aesthetics 
or ethics, or else they make shift to meet these problems by 
an intellectualistic mode of interpretation copied from the psy- 
chology of the unscientific man. In this latter case the aesthetic 
effects are entirely suppressed under certain logical reflections 
about such effects, and then the assertion is subsequently ac- 
cepted that these logical reflections are themselves the aesthetical 
effects. It would be more within reason to think that the six 
classes of feelings which appeared in the classification of the 
chief affective tendencies, or dimensions (pleasure, unpleasantness, 
excitation and subduing feeling, strain and relaxation) are them- 
selves simple, concrete qualities, capable of giving rise to quali- 
tative differences in emotions through combinations in different 
proportions and in different intensities, and through such com- 
binations only. Such a view of feeling as this, seems in fact 
to be supported by the testimony of those who are partially 
hypnotized and are, therefore, through the consequent concen- 
tration of consciousness (§ 18, 8) in a condition especially adapted 
to subjective analysis of the feelings (0. Yogt). It is possible, 
however, that the concentration of consciousness which favors 
this discrimination of the chief affective tendencies in hypnosis, 
hinders, after all, a complete analysis. At all events, the sup- 
position that there are six uniform fundamental qualities is 
contradicted by the character and attributes of simple color 
feelings and tonal feelings. When, for example, one changes 
the deep sky blue of the spectrum at which he may be looking, 
into indigo-blue, he will feel in both cases the peculiar quieting 



<^ 7. Simple Feelings. 95 

effect of blue, but in the two cases there will be a different 
shade of this feeling which it would be very difficult to account 
for by assuming the admixture of any other feeling. It is still 
more difficult to give adequate explanations of the feelings which 
are connected with complex impressions, on the basis of this as- 
sumption that there are only three pairs of simple feelings. 
Thus such musical intervals as the third, fourth, and fifth are 
accompanied, each by feelings of pleasure which are not merely 
quantitatively different, but also qualitatively different. The 
lack of proper designations makes very difficult, to be sure, 
the accurate verbal discrimination of these finer shades of feel- 
ing, but this lack of terms can not be attributed to a lack of 
feelings, especially as in this case there are obvious grounds 
on which the lack of terms can be more fully understood. 
Indeed, one might draw upon the case of sensations for cor- 
roboration of this view in regard to the lack of terms for 
feelings. The names of sensations are very much more numer- 
ous than the names of feelings, because of the constant use 
of such names for objective designations, but even though 
this is true, yet the names of sensations are very far indeed 
from equaling in number the different qualities that are sub- 
jectively distinguished, especially in the cases of tones, lights, 
and colors. 

References. Goethe, Farbenlehre, Pt. 6. Fechner, Vorschule 
der Aesthetik, vol. II, p. 212. Nahlowsky, Das Gefiihlsleben, 2nd. 
ed., 1884. Zieglek, Das Gefuhl, 1893. Lehmann, Die Hauptgesetze 
des menschl. Gefiihlslebens, 1892. Wundt, Grundziige der physiol. 
Psychol., vol. I, chap. 10, and Lectures on Hum. and Anim. Psych., 
lecture 14 (Figure 40 gives a three-dimensional representation of the 
feelings). 0. Vogt, Zeitschrift fiir Hypnotismus, vols. 14 and 15. 

9. The question whether or not particular physiological 
processes correspond to the simple feelings is more difficult 
to answer than was the similar question in regard to the 
sensations. In looking for such processes, it follows from 
the subjective nature of the feelings, that we should not 
expect to find them, as in the case of sensations, among the 



96 I' Psychical Elements. 

processes produced directly in the organism by external 
agents, we must look rather among the reactions which arise 
indirectly from these first processes. Further evidence point- 
ing in the same direction is derived from observation of 
psychical compounds made up of affective elements, that is, 
from observation of emotions and volitions, the physiological 
concomitants of which are always external movement. 

The analysis of sensations, and of the psychical compounds 
derived from them, makes direct use of the impression 
method) while the investigation of simple feelings, and of the 
processes resulting from their combinations^ can employ this 
method only indirectly. On the other hand, the expression 
method^ that is^ the investigation of the physiological reactions 
of psychical processes, is especially adapted to the examination 
of feelings and processes made up of feehngs. All the 
phenomena in which the inner state of the organism is out- 
wardly expressed, may be utilized as aids in the expression 
method. Such are, besides the movements of the external 
muscles, especially the respiratory and cardiac movements, 
the contraction and dilation of the blood-vessels in particular 
organs, the dilation and contraction of the pupil of the eye, 
etc. The most delicate of these is the beating of the heart, 
which can be examined as exactly reproduced in the pulse 
of some peripheral artery. In addition to these pulse changes, 
the changes in the tension of the muscles of the small arteries 
(the so-called vaso-motor innervations) and the changes in 
the respiratory movements, are more or less characteristic 
symptoms. The mimetic movements appear clearly only when 
the feelings pass into emotions (§ 13, 4). 

10. Of the chief dimensions of feeling mentioned above, 
especially the dimension of pleasurable and unpleasurable 
feelings can be shown to stand in regular relation to the 
pulse. When the feeling is pleasurable, the pulse is retarded 



§ 7. Sifnple Feelings. 97 

and intensified, when unpleasurable, the pulse is accelerated 
and weakened. Of the other forms of feeling, the exciting 
feehngs show their presence through stronger pulse-beats, and 
subduing feehngs through weaker pulse-beats, there being no 
apparent change of rate in either case. For feelings of strain, 
and for those of relaxation the changes seem to consist 
chiefly in temporary irregularities of the pulse, which may 
perhaps be connected with the inhibition of respiration ac- 
companying strain, and with the acceleration of respiration 
accompanying relaxation. Single feelings belong for the most 
part to several of these dimensions at the same time; as a 
result the innervation symptoms are in many cases evidently 
complex in character. It is, accordingly, impossible to infer 
from these physiological processes what are the corresponding 
states of feehng in any special case, and this is all the more so 
because each of the innervation processes is^ in addition to its 
own complexity, complicated by the presence of certain purely 
physiological processes such as the processes of metabolism 
and other processes going on in the lower nerve centres. 
Bodily activity can, then, at best do no more than indicate 
the preponderance of this or that affective tendency, and 
even these indications are not certain unless they are cor- 
roborated by direct observations of the feelings themselves. 



10 a. The investigation of the physiological symptoms of 
feelings needs to be made more complete in several directions. 
The pulse changes that accompany feelings of strain and relaxa- 
tion are especially uncertain. We may accept as established the 
general fact that correspondence exists between certain affective 
opposites and similarly opposite physical symptoms, but we must 
also recognize that any single symptom may have a variety of 
meanings because of the large number of possible complications 
between the effects of different feelings. It follows directly from 
this fact that we can never infer forthwith from the physio- 

Wdndt, Psycliology. 2. edit. 7 



98 ^- Psychical Elements, 

logical symptoms that certain particular feelings are present, 
and that there is no justification for recognizing the method of 
expression as of equal value for psychology with the method of 
impression. The method of impression is the only one which, 
from the nature of the case, can be employed in arousing mental 
processes at will, or in varying them in a similar manner. 

The physiological conditions of cardiac, vaso-motor, and re- 
spiratory symptoms are, for the most part, still obscure. The 
cardiac innervations are the ones which have been most fully 
investigated. Physiology shows that the heart is connected with 
the central organs by two kinds of nerves: excitatory nerves^ 
which run through the sympathetic system and originate in- 
directly in the medulla, and inhibitory nerves^ which belong to 
the tenth cranial nerve (vagus) and also have their source in 
the medulla. The normal regularity of the pulse depends on 
a certain equilibrium between excitatory and inhibitory influences. 
Such influences come not only from the brain, but from the 
centres in the heart itself. Thus, every increase and every 
decrease of the heart's energy may be interpreted in two dif- 
ferent ways. Increase may be due to an increase of excitatory^ 
or to a decrease of inhibitory innervation, and decrease may 
be due to a decrease in excitatory or to an increase in inhibitory 
innervation, or in both cases the two influences may be united. 
We have no universally applicable means of investigating these 
possibilities, still, the fact that the stimulation of the inhibitory 
nerves has a quicker efl'ect than the stimulation of the excitatory, 
gives us good ground in many cases for conjecturing the presence 
of the one or the other. The changes in the pulse always 
follow very quickly the sensations that cause them. It is, there- 
fore, probable that in the case of feelings and emotions, we have 
chiefly changes in inhibitory innervation, originating in the brain 
and conducted along the vagus. It may well be assumed that 
the affective tone of sensation corresponds on its physiological 
side to a spreading of the stimulation from the sensory centre 
to those central regions which are connected with the sources 
of the inhibitory nerves of the heart. What central regions 
these are, we do not know- But the fact that the physiological 
substrata for all the elements of our psychological experience, 
are in all probability to be found in the cerebral cortex, leads, 



§ 7. Simple Feelings. 99 

very naturally to the assumption that the same is true of the 
centre of these inhibitory innervations. Furthermore, the essential 
differences between the attributes of feelings and those of sen- 
sations, make it probable that this centre is not identical with 
the sensory centres. If a special cortical region is assumed as 
the medium for these inhibition effects, there is no reason for 
supposing a special inhibitory region for each sensory centre. 
Indeed, the complete uniformity in the physiological symptoms 
goes more to show that there is only one such region, which 
must serve at the same time as a kind of central organ for the 
connection of the various sensory centres. (For further signif- 
icance of such a central region, and its probable anatomical 
position, compare § 15, 2 a.) 

References. Mosso, Ueber den Kreislauf des Blutes im menschl. 
Gehirn, 1881. Fere, Sensation et mouvement, 1887. Lehmann, Haupt- 
gesetze des menschl. Gefiihlslebens, 1892, and Die korperlichen AuCe- 
rungen psychischer Zustande, 1899. Mentz, Die Wirkung akustischer 
Sinnesreize auf Puis u. Athmung, Philos. Studien, vol. 11. Wundt, 
Bemerkungen zur Theorie der Gefiihle, Philos. Studien, vol. 15. Isen- 
BERG and VoGT, Zeitschr. f. Hypnotismus, vol. 10. Wundt, Lectures 
on Hum. and Anim. Psych., lecture 14. (Figures 38 and 39, table for 
the changes in the pulse and for their investigation.) 



LofC. 



7* 



11. PSYCHICAL COMPOUNDS. 



§ 8. DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION OF 
PSYCHICAL COMPOUNDS. 

1. By "psychical compound" we mean any composite 
component of our immediate experience which is marked off 
from other contents of this experience by characteristics 
peculiarly its own, in such a way that it is recognized as a 
relatively independent unity and is, when practical neces- 
sity demands it^ designated by a special name. In devel- 
oping such a name, language has followed the general rule 
that only classes and the most important species into which 
phenomena may be grouped shall have special designations. 
Thus such terms as idea, emotion, volitional act, etc., des- 
ignate general classes of psychical compounds, such terms 
as visual idea, joy, anger, hope^ etc.^ designate special species 
included in these classes. So far as these designations are 
based upon actual, distinguishing characteristics^ they have 
a certain value for psychological analysis. But in granting 
this, we must avoid from the first, two presuppositions to 
which the existence of these names might easily mislead us. 
The first is, that a psychical compound is an absolutely in- 
dependent content of immediate experience. The second is, 
that certain compounds, as for example, ideas, have the nature 
of things. The truth is that compounds are only relatively 
independent units. Just as they are made up of various 



§ 8. Defmition mid Classification of Psychical Compotmds. 101 

elements^ so they themselves unite to form a complete inter- 
connection^ in which relatively simple compounds may con- 
tinually combine to form more composite ones. Then, again, 
compounds, like the psychical elements contained in them, 
are never things, but processes which change from moment 
to moment, so that it is only through deliberate abstraction, 
which is, indeed, indispensable for the investigation in many 
cases, that they can be thought of as constant at any given 
moment (p. 32). 

2. All psychical compounds may be resolved into psychical 
elements, that is, into pure sensations and simple feelings. 
The two kinds of elements behave, however, in an essentially 
different manner, in keeping with the special properties of 
simple feelings described in § 7. The sensational elements 
found by such a resolution, always belong to one of the 
sensational systems already considered. The affective ele- 
ments, on the other hand, include not only those which cor- 
respond to the pure sensations contained in the compounds, 
but also those due to the interconnection of the elements 
into a compound. The systems of sensational qualities, ac- 
cordingly, remain the same, no matter how many varieties 
of compounds arise, while the systems of simple affective 
qualities continually increase. Furthermore, it is a general 
principle valid for all psychical compounds, whether they are 
composed of sensations only, of feelings only^ or of combi- 
nations of both sensations and feelings, that the attributes 
of psychical compounds are never limited to those of the ele- 
ments that enter into them. It is true rather that new at- 
tributes, peculiar to the compounds themselves, always arise 
as a result of the combination of these elements. Thus, a 
visual idea has not only the attributes of the light sensations 
and sensations of ocular position and movements contained 
in it, but it has also the attribute of spacial arrangement 



102 ^I- Psychical Compounds. 

of the sensations, a factor not present in the elements them- 
selves. Again a volition is made up not only of the ideas 
and feelings into which its single acts may be resolved, but 
there result also from the combination of these single acts, 
new affective elements which are specifically characteristic of 
the complex volition. Here, again, the combinations of sensa- 
tional and affective elements are different. In the first case^ 
on account of the constancy of the sensational systems^ no 
new sensations can arise, but only peculiar forms of their 
arrangement. These forms are the extensive spacial and 
temporal manifolds. When, on the other hand, affective ele- 
ments combine^ new simple feelings arise, which unite with 
those originally present to make intensive affective units of 
composite character. 

3. The classification of psychical compounds is naturally 
based upon the character of the elements that enter into 
them. Those composed entirely or chiefly of sensations are 
called ideaSy those consisting mainly of affective elements^ 
affective processes. The same limitations hold here as in the 
case of the corresponding elements. Although compounds 
are more the products of immediate discrimination among 
actual psychical processes than are the elements, still, there 
is in all exactness no pure ideational process and no pure 
affective process, but in both cases we can only abstract to 
a certain extent from one or the other component. As in 
the case of the two kinds of elements, so here^ we can 
neglect the accompanying subjective states when dealing with 
ideaS;, but we must always presuppose some idea when giving 
an account of the affective processes. 

"We distinguish, accordingly, three chief forms of ideas: 
1) intensive ideas, 2) spacial ideas, 3) temporal ideas; and 
three forms of affective processes: 1) intensive affective com- 
binations, 2) emotions, 3) volitions. Temporal ideas constitute 



§ 9. Intensive Ideas. 103 

a sort of link between the two kinds of compounds, for certain 
feelings play an important part in their formation. 



§ 9. INTENSIVE IDEAS. 

1. A combination of sensations in which every element 
is connected with every other element in exactly the same 
way is called an intensive idea. Thus, for example, a com- 
pound clang made up of the tones d^ f and a is such an inten- 
sive idea. For the immediate perception each of the partial 
combinations into which this compound clang can be resolved, 
as df^ da^ fd^ fa, ad., af are all quite equivalent, in what- 
ever order they are thought of. "We may, accordingly, 
define intensive ideas, as co7nbinations of sensational ele- 
ments., in which the order of the elements may he indefi- 
nitely varied. 

It follows from their nature, that intensive ideas do not 
have, arising from the way in which their elements are 
united, any characteristics by means of which they can be 
resolved into separate parts. Such a resolution is possible 
only through differences in the constituent elements them- 
selves. Thus, we discriminate the elements of the compound 
clang d f a^ only because we hear in it the qualitatively 
different tones d^ f and a. Still, the separate components 
in such a unitary idea are less clearly distinguishable than 
in their isolated state. This relative suppression of the ele- 
ments which is of great importance in all processes of per- 
ception, we call in general the fusion of sensations., and in 
particular, for intensive ideas, intensive fusion. If the con- 
nection of one element with others is so close that the single 
element can be perceived as a part of the whole only 
through unusual concentration of the attention aided by 
experimental variation of the conditions, we call the fusion 



104 ^I' Psychical Compounds. 

complete. If, on the other hand, the elements are immediately 
recognized in their proper quahties, and merely recede some- 
what into the background in comparison with the impression 
of the whole, we call the fusion incomplete. If certain par- 
ticular elements are more prominent in their characteristic 
qualities than others, we call them the pi^edominating ele- 
ments. The concept of fusion as here defined is a purely 
psychological concept which must he assigned to its appro- 
priate place among the processes of association to he dis- 
cussed later (§ 16, 4). 

In reality, every intensive idea always enters into certain 
spacial and temporal combinations. Thus, for example, a 
compound clang is always a process having a certain duration, 
and is at the same time localized by us in some direction 
or other, though often only very indefinitely. But since 
these temporal and spacial attributes can be indefinitely 
varied, while the intensive character of the idea remains the 
same, we may abstract from space and time in investigating 
the intensive attributes. 

2. Among ideas of the general sense we have intensive 
fusions in the form of combinations of sensations of pressure 
with those of heat or cold, or in combinations of pain sensa- 
tions with those of temperature or pressure. All these fusions 
are incomplete, and very of ten. there is no decidedly pre- 
dominating element. The combinations of certain sensations 
of smell and taste are more intimate. This is obviously 
favored on the physiological side by the proximity of the 
sense-organs, and on the physical side by the uniform con- 
nection between certain stimulations of the two senses. In 
such cases the more intense sensations are generally the 
predominating elements, and when these are the sensations 
of taste, the composite impression is usually regarded as a 
taste quality only. Thus, most of the impressions known in 



§ 9. Intensive Ideas. 105 

ordinary life as "tastes", are in reality combinations of tastes^ 
and smells. 

The greatest variety of intensive ideas, in all possible 
gradations of complexity, is presented by the sense of 
hearing. The relatively most simple of these ideas and those 
which are most closely related to simple tones, are the single 
clangs. As more complex forms, we have compound clangs. 
Complex noises may arise from compound clangs when these 
are united with sensations of simple noises, and also under 
certain other circumstances. 

3. A single cla?ig is an intensive idea which is made up 
of a series of tonal sensations regularly graded in quality. 
These elements, the partial tones of the clang, form a com- 
plete fusion, in which the sensation of the lowest partial 
tone becomes the predominating element. The pitch of the 
clang is determined by this principal tone. The other ele- 
ments are higher and are, accordingly, called overtones. The 
overtones are all grouped together under the name clang- 
color which is thus recognized as a second determinant of 
the clang, added to the predominating tone. All the partial 
tones that go to determine the clang-color are placed along 
the tonal line at certain regular intervals from the principal 
tone. The complete series of possible overtones in a clang 
consists of the first octave of the principal tone, the fifth of 
this octave, the second octave of the principal tone and the 
major third and the fifth of this second octave^ etc. This 
series corresponds to the following proportions between the 
number of objective tonal waves: 

1 (principal tone), 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, ... . (overtones). 
When the pitch of the principal tone remains constant, only 
the second determinant of the tonal quality, the clang-color, 
can vary according to the number, position, and relative in- 
tensity of the overtones. In this way we can explain the 



106 U. Psychical Compounds. 

great variety of clang-colors in musical instruments, as well 
as the fact that for every instrument the clang-color changes 
somewhat with the pitch; for in the case of low tones the 
overtones are generally relatively strong, in the case of high 
tones relatively weak, while they disappear entirely when they 
are too high to be audible. 

From a psychological point of view the chief condition 
for the rise of a single clang, is the complete, or approxi- 
mately complete, fusion of several tonal sensations with only 
one predominating element. As a rule, it is impossible to 
distinguish with the unaided ear the overtones in a clang. 
They can be made perceptible by the use of resonators 
which are tuned to the overtones sought, and are thus able to 
strengthen them through resonant reinforcement. After they 
have been isolated in this experimental way the stronger over- 
tones can be successively heard in the clang if the attention 
is directed to them, even without the aid of the resonators. 

4. There are three conditions which must be fulfilled if 
there is to be only one predominating element in a tonal 
fusion. First, one tone must be relatively more intense. 
Secondly, in its qualitative relations to the other partial 
tones, the principal tone must be the fundamental of a series 
whose members are all harmonious. Tliirdly^ all the partial 
tones must be sounded at exactly the same time. This coin- 
cidence in time is objectively guaranteed by deriving the 
clang from a unitary source^ (that is^ producing the clang 
through the vibrations of one stringy one reed-pipe, etc.). A 
failure to comply with the first condition does not destroy 
the idea of a single clang. If^ on the other hand, the second 
condition is not fulfilled the combination becomes a compound 
clang when the predominating fundamental is wanting^ or it 
becomes a noise when the series of tones is not harmonious, 
or finally, it becomes a mixed form, between a clang and a 



§ 9. Intensive Ideas. 107 

noise, wlien both parts of the condition are unfulfilled. If 
the third condition is not met the single clang may again pass 
into a compound clang. A series of simple clangs from a 
number of tuning-forks which should unite to form a single 
clang so far as intensity and quality are concerned, always 
produces in reality the idea of a compound clang. 

5. A compound clang is an intensive combination of single 
clangs. It is in general an incomplete fusion with several 
predominating elements. There are, as a rule, all possible 
grades of fusion in a compound clang, especially when it is 
made up of single clangs of composite quality. In such a 
case, not only does every single clang form a complete fusion 
in itself, but these single clangs fuse the more completely 
with one another the more their fundamentals approach the 
relation of elements of a single clang. So it comes that in 
a compound clang made up of single clangs rich in over- 
tones^ those components whose fundamentals correspond to 
the overtones of some other single clang in the compound, 
fuse more completely with the related clang than with others. 
The other clangs, in turn, fuse the more completely the more 
their relation approaches that of the first members of a series 
of overtones. Thus, in the compound clang c e g c the 
clangs c and c form a nearly complete fusion, while the 
fusions of the clangs c and ^, c and e, are incomplete. Still 
less complete is the fusion between c and eK A determination 
of the degree of fusion may be obtained in all these cases by 
allowing an observer to hear the compound clang for a very 
brief interval, after which he is to decide whether he per- 
ceived only one clang or several. This experiment is repeated 
many times, and the relative number of judgments in favor 
of the unity of the clang is a measure for the degree of fusion. 

6. Besides the elements contained in the single clangs of 
a compound, there always arise from the combination of 



108 ^I' Psychical Compounds. 

vibrations in the auditory organ, additional elements which 
cause new tonal sensations, characteristic of the different 
kinds of compound clangs. These may also fuse more or 
less completely with the original clang. They are sensations 
of difference-tones; they correspond, as their name indicates, 
to the difference between the number of vibrations in two 
primary tones. Some of these tones are due to the inter- 
ference of sound waves in the outer air, outside of the ear 
(objective difference-tones). Such tones can be reinforced 
by properly tuned resonators inserted in the ear. Other 
difference-tones arise within the ear itself, either through the 
interference of the sound waves in the organs of the outer 
ear, especially in the tjnupanic membrane and in the chain of 
ossicles, or else through interferences in the inner ear. This 
second class of difference-tones (subjective difference-tones) 
can not be reinforced by using resonators. Through the 
presence of these difference-tones compound clangs become 
very complex psychical compounds, for such difference-tones 
may result not merely from the interference of the primary 
tones of the complex clang, but also from the interference 
of overtones. It is even possible for the difference-tones to 
interfere with each other, or with the primary tones. To 
distinguish these various classes of difference-tones they are 
designated as difference-tones of the first order, second order, 
third order, etc. The strongest of these difference-tones are 
those which result from the interference of the primary tones 
and then follow in general those which are loiver in pitch 
than the primaries i). The fusion of the difference-tones with 



1) In addition to difference-tones there may arise also, as Helm- 
HOLTZ has shown, under similar conditions of interference summation- 
tones, the number of vibrations in which corresponds to the sum of 
the number of vibrations in the two primaries. The general term 
combination-tones is used to cover both the difference-tones and the 



§ 9. Intensive Ideas. 109 

the primary tones of the compound clang is the more com- 
plete the weaker the difference-tones, and the more nearly 
they correspond to tones which are harmonious with the orig- 
inal elements of the clang. The difference tones are, ac- 
cordingly, as a result of these characteristics, to be compared 
in respect to their importance for the compound clang as a 
whole, with overtones in their relation to simple clangs. 

7. A compound clang may pass through all possible 
intermediate stages into a third form of intensive auditory 
ideas, namely, ideas of noise. When two tones are no longer 
included within a series of harmonious tones and when at 
the same time the difference between the number of their 
vibrations does not exceed certain limits (for higher tones 
about sixty vibrations and for lower thirty or even fewer) 
there arise interruptions in the compound clang, which cor- 
respond in number to the difference between the number of 
vibrations in the primary tones. These interruptions are due 
to the alternating coincidence of like and opposite phases of 
vibration. They are called beats when they consist merely 
in successive weakenings and reinforcements of the clang. 
When, on the other hand, full breaks appear in the clang, 
a result which appears most frequently in the case of low 
tones, we speak of tonal beats. If the differences in the 
number of vibrations exceed the numbers mentioned, the 
tones are at first heard as continuous, for the interruptions 
disappear, but they are harsh. Later the harshness dis- 
appears and we have pure dissonance. As a rule beats re- 
sulting from the interference of difference-tones are perceived 
as combined with this impression of roughness and pure 
dissonance. Ordinary dissonance is^ accordingly, made up 



summation-tones. The summation-tones are in general very weak 
and coincide, for the most part, with the overtones. They have 
therefore no significance in the perception of clangs. 



110 II' Psychical Compounds. 

in a very complex manner, of beats, of roughness from the 
combined tones, and of pure dissonance. In this complex of 
tones each of the elements, namely, primary tones, over-tones, 
and difference-tones of various orders, has its place. If the ele- 
ments of dissonance, that is, if beats, tonal beats, and rough- 
ness, are combined in sufficiently great numbers through the 
simultaneous sounding of a great number of tones, the whole 
complex becomes ultimately a noise. On the psychological 
side this means that the predominating tonal elements dis- 
appear entirely or become mere modifying elements in the 
total idea. In the case of noises which last for a short 
interval only, the general pitch of the most intensive elements 
is determinative for our perception. In the case of noises 
which last longer, the form of the disturbance resulting from 
the rapidity of the beats, from the accompanying tonal beats, 
etc., also has an influence. 

Human articulations are characteristic examples of dif- 
ferent forms of noise. The vowels are intermediate between 
clangs and noises with predominantly clang character; the 
resonants are noises of long duration, and the proper con- 
sonants, noises of short duration. In whispers the vowels 
become simply noises. The fact that the differences in vowels 
are perfectly distinct in whispers, goes to prove that the 
character of vowels depends essentially on their noise ele- 
ments. It is probable that simple sensations of noise (p. 55) 
enter, together with the numerous tonal elements into all 
experienced noises. The irregular air-vibrations arising from 
the disturbances in the tonal waves, excite both the nervous 
elements in the vestibule of the labyrinth, and also the audi- 
tory nerve-fibres themselves. 

7 a. The process of "fusion" occurs here , in the case of 
intensive tonal fusion, under the simplest possible conditions. 



§ 9. Intensive Ideas. Ill 

"We shall come upon fusions of a somewhat different form when 
we take up spacial and temporal ideas. In the case of tonal 
fusions the compound resulting from the fusion process differs 
relatively less from a simple addition of its elements, than do 
the extensive fusions. The general characteristics which distin- 
guish an intensive tonal fusion from a mere sum of the single 
tones which enter into the fusion, are three in number. First, 
many or all (as for example in many noises) of the elements 
sink into insignificance as compared with the total impression 
of the whole compound. Secondly, there is a union of all the 
elements into a single unitary idea with a unitary affective 
value, as may be seen with especial clearness in harmonious 
chords. Thirdly, and finally^ certain dominating elements stand 
out above the others, as for example^ the fundamental tone in 
a single clang. The first and second characteristics are con- 
stant, the third is variable. In the case of complex clangs the 
third characteristic is less noticeable than in the case of single 
clangs, and in the case of noises it is entirely absent. Further- 
more, it will be noted that all of these characteristics are psy- 
chological, so that the concept fusion is also a purely psycho- 
logical concept. And since like, or analogous, phenomena appear 
whenever we find psychological elements combining with each 
other^ there is no reason for seeking to find in these characteristics 
anything except an expression of a certain regular form of 
psychological action. Some investigators have strayed from the 
simple empirical facts in their use of the concept "tonal fusion"^ 
and have regarded the synthesis of the elements into a fusion- 
product as a logical act added to the sum of the sensory ele- 
ments — as a kind of judgment of unity (Stumpf). In op- 
position to this view it is to be recognized most clearly that 
tonal fusions present themselves as pure examples of elementary 
psychical processes of fusion. The incorrect logical theory ob- 
viously arises from the confusion of logical reflections about 
psychical experiences with the experiences themselves — a form 
of confusion which is so frequently, even today, carried over 
from popular psychology into scientific psychology (p. 14). 

The resonance hypothesis formulated by Helmholtz (see 
p. 44 and 57) was the first which attempted to give any account 
of one of the most important of the phenomena which appear 



112 II. Psychical Compounds. 

in tonal fusions^ namely, of the synthesis into a single clang 
idea of all the elementary tonal sensations into which a clang 
may be separated even in its objective nature. It is assumed 
that certain parts of the auditory organ are so tuned that tonal 
waves of a given rate always set in sympathetic vibration only 
the part correspondingly tuned. This explains in a general 
way the analyzing ability of the auditory sense. But it is not 
to be overlooked that the resonance hypothesis succeeds in 
giving a physiological explanation of only one side of the proc- 
ess of tonal fusion, namely, the persistence of single sensations 
in the total intensive idea. It does not explain the other side 
of the process, that is, the more or less complete union of the 
elements. Since the tonal elements which produce a given in- 
tensive clang idea both continue as real sensations in this idea, 
and at the same time give up more or less completely their 
independent existence in the idea as a whole, it is possible that 
tonal fusion is a psychical process and requires as a psychical 
process, no special physiological explanation. But since this 
fusion is very different under different objective conditions, as, 
for example, when the impressions are due to the combined 
vibrations from a single source or to vibrations from several 
distinct sources; these differences must have some physiological 
and physical grounds for their explanation. The most natural 
way to attempt such an explanation is properly to supplement 
the resonance hypothesis. If we assume that besides the ana- 
lyzing parts of the auditory organ, that is, the resonant membrane, 
still others exist which are affected by the total^ unresolved clang, 
we have a sufficient physiological substratum for the different 
effects of the various conditions. We are thus supplied with 
two forms of stimulation, one diffuse and the other selective. 
Through the combined effects of the two it is possible to ex- 
plain the fact that difference-tones of low pitch sometimes ex- 
ceed in intensity the primary tones (Hermann), and that the 
interruptions of a single tone through beats of proper rapidity 
may unite to form a second tone sensation (B. Konig). These 
latter facts, as well as the earlier ones described, could not be 
explained by the resonance hypothesis alone. "Where the seat 
of the diffuse tone stimulation is situated, whether, for example, 
it is in the sensory area in the vestibulum, or in the sensory 



§ 10. Spacial Ideas. y 113 

fibres of the resonating membrane itself, it is impossible to say 
with any definiteness. It has never been possible to explain 
the phenomena of clang analysis with the same degree of com- 
pleteness by means of any of the theories of hearing which have 
not accepted the resonance hypothesis. There is nothing, how- 
ever, in the fact that the resonance hypothesis has proved itself 
up to this time indispensable, which could stand in the way of 
an effort to supplement the hypothesis in the manner described. 
For a treatment of the attributes of the complex feelings which 
arise with complex clangs (feelings of harmony and discord) see 
§ 12, 9. 

References. Helmholtz, (English trans, by A. J. Ellis) The Sensa- 
tions of Tone, Pt. I and II. Stumpf, Tonpsychologie, vol. 2. Wundt, 
Grundziige der physiol. Psych., vol. 2, chap. 12, and Lectures on Hum. 
and Anim. Psych., lecture 5. On Tonal Fusion: Lipps, Grundthatsachen 
des Seelenlebens, chapter 21. Stumpf, Zeitschr. f. Psych, u. Physiol. 
d. Sinnesorgane, vol. 15. R. Schulze, Philos. Studien, vol. 14. On 
Difference-tones and Beats: R. Konig, Poggendorff's Ann. der Physik, 
vols. 157 and 158. Hermann, Pfliiger's Archiv f. Physiol., vol. 49. 
ScHAFER, Pfluger's Archiv f. Physiol., vols. 78 and 83. Kruger, Philos. 
Studien, vols. 16 and 17. On Theories of Hearing: Hermann, Pfluger's 
Archiv, vol. 56. M. Meyer, Zeitschr. f. Psych, u. Physiol, d. Sinnes- 
organe, vol. 16. Ewald, Eine neue Hortheorie, 1899. 



§ 10. SPACIAL IDEAS. 

1. Spacial and temporal ideas are fully distinguished 
from intensive ideas by the fact that the parts of spacial 
and temporal ideas are united, not in an arbitrarily variable 
order, but in a definitely fixed order, so that when the order 
is thought of as changed the idea itself changes. Ideas with 
such a fixed arrangement are called in general extensive 
ideas (p. 102). 

Of the possible forms of extensive ideas, spacial ideas 
are distinguished by the fact that in them it is only in 
respect to the relation of the parts to one another., that there 

WuNDT, Psychology. 2. edit. 8 



114 II- Psychical Compounds. 

is a fixed arrangement. With respect to the relation of 
the parts to the ideating subject there is no such fixed ar- 
rangement. This relation of the parts to the subject may 
be thought of as varied indefinitely. The objective indepen- 
dence of spacial compounds from the ideating subject is ex- 
pressed by saying that spacial compounds are capable of 
movements hackwaj^ds and forwards and of rotation around 
any axis. The number of directions in which movement and 
rotation may take place, is limited. They may all be reduced 
to three dimensions, in each of which it is possible to advance 
in two opposite directions. The number of directions in 
which the parts of a single compound may be arranged 
as well as the number in which various compounds may be 
arranged with reference to one another, is the same as the 
maximal number of directions in which movement and rota- 
tion are possible. This is what we call the three-dimensional 
character of space. A single spacial idea may, accordingly, 
be defined as a three-dimensional compound whose parts are 
fixed in their location with reference to one another^ hut capable 
of indefinite variation in their location with reference to the 
ideating subject. This definition neglects, of course, the 
frequent changes which occur in reality in the arrangement 
of the parts of spacial compounds. When these changes 
take place, they are to be regarded as transitions from one 
idea to another. This three-dimensional arrangement of 
spacial ideas must of necessity include one-dimensional and 
two-dimensional arrangements as special cases. In such cases, 
however, the wanting dimensions must always be added in 
thought as soon as the relation of the idea to the ideating 
subject is taken into account. 

2. This relation to the ideating subject, which is really 
present in all spacial ideas, renders it from the first psycho- 
logically impossible that the arrangement of the elements in 



§ 10. Spaeial Ideas. 115 

such an idea should be an original attribute of the elements 
themselves, in any such way as intensity or quality of sen- 
sations are original attributes of these elements. It is 
obvious, rather, that this arrangement results from the 
bringing together of these elements, and arises from some 
new psychical conditions which depend upon this coexistence. 
If this is not admitted, it becomes necessary not only to 
attribute a spaeial quality to every single sensation, but 
also to postulate for every sensation, however Hmited, a sim- 
ultaneous idea of the whole of three-dimensional space in 
its location with regard to the ideating subject. This would 
lead to the acceptance of an a priori space-perception, prior 
to all concrete sensations, which is not only contradictory 
to all our experiences as to the conditions of the rise of 
psychical compounds in general, but also contradictory to 
our knowledge of all the influences that underlie spaeial ideas. 
3. All spaeial ideas are arrangements either of tactual 
or of visual sensations. Indirectly, through the connection 
of other sensations with either tactual or visual ideas, the 
spaeial relation may be carried over to other sensations. In 
the cases of touch and sight, it is obvious that the extended 
surface of the peripheral sense-organs, and their equipment 
with organs of movement, which render possible a varying 
location of the impressions in regard to the ideating subject, 
are both favorable conditions for an extensive, spaeial ar- 
rangement of the sensations. The tactual sense is the earlier 
of the two here in question, for it appears earlier in the 
development of organisms and shows the structural relations 
in much coarser, but for that reason in many respects much 
plainer, form than does the more delicately organized visual 
organ. Still, it is to be noted that where vision is present, the 
spaeial ideas from touch are greatly influenced by the ideas 
from sight, because of the higher development of vision. 

8* 



116 II- Psychical Compounds. 



A. SPACIAL TOUCH IDEAS. 



4. The simplest possible touch idea is that of a siiigle 
impression from a point on the skin. If such an impression 
is presented even when the eyes are turned away, there arises 
a definite idea of the place touched. Introspection shows 
that this idea, which is called the localization of the stimulus^ 
is not, under the usual condition where vision is present, 
immediate, as we should expect it to be if the spacial quality 
were an original attribute of sensations, but it depends upon 
a secondary, generally very obscure, visual idea of the region 
touched. Localization is, therefore^ more exact near bounding 
lines of the touch-organs than on the uniform intervening 
surfaces, since these bounding lines are more prominent in 
the visual images. The rise of a visual idea from the tactual 
impression, even when the eyes are turned away, is possible 
because every point of the organ of touch gives to the touch 
sensation a peculiar qualitative coloring, which is independent 
of the quahty of the external impression, and is probably 
due to the character of the structure of the skin. This 
qualitative coloring varies from point to point and is never 
exactly the same in two separate regions. 

This local coloring is called the local sign of the sen- 
sations. It varies from point to point in different regions 
of the skin at very different rates: rapidly on the tip of the 
tongue, on the ends of the fingers, and on the lips; slowly 
on the broader surfaces of the limbs and trunk. A measure 
of this variation may be obtained by applying two impres- 
sions near each other to any region of the skin. So long 
as the distance of the impressions is less than that of distin- 
guishable local signs, the two impressions are perceived as 
a single one, but so soon as they pass this limit they are 
perceived as spacially separate. The smallest, just noticeable 



§ 10. Spacial Ideas. 117 

distance between two impressions is called the space threshold 
for touch. It varies from one or two millimetres (tips of 
tongue and fingers) to sixty-eight millimetres (back, upper 
arm, and leg). On the pressure-spots (p. 52), when the stimuli 
are favorably applied, still shorter distances can be perceived. 
Then, too, the threshold is dependent on the condition of 
the tactual organ and on practice. As a result of the first, 
for example, the threshold is smaller for children than for 
adults, since the differences in structure that condition the 
local signs, are obviously more crowded together. As a 
result of practice, the threshold is smaller in the case of 
the blind than it is in the case of those who have vision. 
This is especially true of the ends of the fingers which are 
most used for touching. 

5. The influence of visual ideas of the regions touched, 
as just described, teaches that the locahzation of tactual 
impressions and the spacial arrangement of a number of such 
impressions is not due to an original spacial quality of 
cutaneou.s points or to any primary space-forming function 
of the tactual organ. On the contrary, it presupposes spacial 
ideas of sight. These can be made use of, to be sure, only 
because the various parts of the tactual organ have certain 
qualitative attributes, local signs, which arouse the visual 
image of the part touched. But there is no reason for at- 
tributing an immediate spacial relation to the local signs 
themselves; it is obviously enough that they act as qualitative 
signals to arouse the appropriate visual images. This connection 
with vision depends upon the frequent union of the two. 
The keenness of localization will, therefore, be aided by all 
the influences that increase either the clearness of the visual 
images or the qualitative differences in local signs. - 

We may describe the formation of spacial ideas in this 
case as the arrangement of tactual impressions in visual 



118 n. Psychical Compounds. 

images already present. The whole process is a consequence 
of the constant connection of these visual images with the 
quahtative local signs of the tactual impression. The union 
of the local signs and the visual images of the corresponding 
region may, then, be regarded as an incomplete , but very 
constant., fusion. The fusion is incomplete because both 
visual image and tactual impression retain their independent 
character; but it is so constant that, when the state of the 
tactual organ remains the same, the fusion seems to be in- 
variable. This last fact explains the relative certainty of 
localization. The predominating elements of this fusion are 
the tactual sensations. For many persons the visual images 
are pushed so far into the background that they can not be 
perceived with any certainty, even when examined with the 
greatest attention. The perception of space, in such cases, 
is perhaps an immediate function of tactual and motor sen- 
sations, as for the blind (v. inf. 6). As a rule, however, more 
careful observation shows that it is possible to recognize the 
position and distance of the impressions only by attempting 
to make more distinct the indefinite visual image of the 
region touched. 

6. The conditions that hold when vision is present, are 
essentially different from those found in cases of blindness^ 
especially blindness which is congenital, or acquired early 
in life. Persons who become blind later retain for a long 
time memory images of familiar visual objects, so that the 
spacial ideas of touch always remain, to some extent, products 
of a fusion between tactual sensations and visual images. 
But these visual images can not be continually renewed, so 
that the persons in question make large use of movements. 
The tactual sensations that arise from the joints and muscles 
when the hand passes from one tactual impression to another 
(p. 52), serve as a measure for the movement executed and, 



§ 10. Spacial Ideas. 119 

at the same time, as a measure for the distance between 
the two impressions. These sensations of movement, which 
in acquired blindness are additions to the gradually fading 
visual images and in part substitutes for them, are, in con- 
genital blindness, the only means present from the first for 
the formation of an idea of the relative position and distance 
of the single impressions. We observe in congenital blind- 
ness continual movements of the touch-organs, especially the 
fingers, over the object. Added to these movements are a 
more concentrated attention to tactual sensations and a 
greater practice in their discrimination. Still, the low grade 
of development of touch as compared with sight, always 
shows itself in the fact that the perception by the blind of 
continuous lines and surfaces is much less perfect than the 
perception of points arranged in various ways. The neces- 
sity of making a blind-alphabet of arbitrary figures formed 
by various combinations of raised points, is a proof of this. 
Thus, for example, in the ordinary alphabet (Braille's) one 
point represents A, two points in a horizontal line B, two 
points in a vertical line C, etc. With six points at most all 
the letters can be formed, but the points must be far enough 
apart to be perceived as separate with the end of the index 
finger. The way in which this alphabet is read shows clearly 
how the space ideas of the blind have developed. As a rule 
the index fingers of both hands are used in blind reading. 
The right finger precedes and apprehends a group of points 
simultaneously (synthetic touch), the left finger follows some- 
what more slowly and apprehends the single points succes- 
sively (analytic touch). Both the synthetic and analytic im- 
pressions are united and referred to the same object. This 
method of procedure shows clearly that the spacial dis- 
crimination of tactual impressions is no more immediately 
given in this case than in the case where vision was present, 



120 JJ^' Psychical Compounds. 

but that in the case of the bhncl the movements by means 
of which the finger that is used for analytic touch passes 
from point to point, play the same part as did the accom- 
panying visual ideas in the normal cases with vision. 

An idea of the extent and direction of these movements 
can arise only under the condition that every movement is 
accompanied by an inner tactual sensation (p. 52, 6). The 
assumption that these inner tactual sensations are immedi- 
ately connected with an idea of the space which is traversed 
in the movement, would be liighly improbable, for it would 
not only presuppose the existence of a connate perception 
of surrounding space and of the position of the subject in 
respect to the same (p. 115), but it would also include another 
particular assumption. This is the assumption that inner 
and outer touch sensations, although they are otherwise alike 
in quality and physiological substrata, still differ in that inner 
sensations give, along with the sensation, an image of the 
position of the subject and of the spacial arrangement of 
the immediate environment. This would really necessitate 
a return to the Platonic doctrine of the memory of innate 
ideas, for the sensations arising from touch are here thought 
of as the mere external occasional causes for the revival of 
innate transcendental ideas of space. 

7. Apart from its psychological improbability, such an 
hypothesis as that just mentioned can not be reconciled with 
the influence exercised by practice on the discrimination of 
local signs and on the discrimination of differences in move- 
ments. There is, therefore, no way, except to attribute 
the rise of spacial ideas of the blind, as we did the spacial 
ideas of normal individuals (p. 117), to the combinations 
of the sensations as presented in experience. These com- 
binations result from the fact that every pair of sensa- 
tions, a and Z?, with their difference in local signs, always 



§ 10. Spacial Ideas. 121 

have a corresponding inner touch sensation, a^ accompanying 
the movement from one to the other, while two sensations, 
a and c, with a greater difference in local signs, have a 
more intense sensation of movement, y. For the blind there 
is always such a regular combination of inner and outer 
touch sensations. It can not, therefore, be affirmed that 
either of these sensational systems, in itself, brings the idea 
of spacial arrangements; we can only say that this arrange- 
ment results regularly from the combination of the two. On 
this basis the spacial ideas of the blind, arising, as they do, 
from external impressions, may be defined as a product of 
the fusion of exte7mal tactual sensations and their qualita- 
tively graded local signs, tvith internal tactual sensations 
graded according to intensity. The external sensations with 
their attributes as determined by the external stimulus, are 
the predominating elements in this fusion. They push the 
local signs with their qualitative peculiarities and the inner 
tactual sensations with their intensive attributes, so far into 
the background, that, like the overtones of a clang, all these 
secondary elements can be perceived only when the attention 
is especially concentrated upon them. Spacial ideas from 
touch are, accordingly due to a complete fusion (p. 103). Their 
characteristic peculiarity, in contrast with such fusions as 
intensive tonal fusions, is that the subordinate and supple- 
mentary elements are different in character, and are at the 
same time related to one another according to definite laws. 
They are different, for the local signs form a purely qualita- 
tive system, while the inner touch sensations which accompany 
the movements of the tactual organs, form a series of in- 
tensities. They are related, in that the motor energy used 
in passing through an interval between two points increases 
with the extent of the interval, so that, in proportion as the 
qualitative difference between the local signs increases, there 



122 II- Psychical Compounds. 

must also be an increase in the intensity of the sensations 
which accompany the movement. 

8. The spacial arrangement of tactual impressions is thus 
the product of a twofold fusion. First, the subordinate ele- 
ments fuse. That is, the various qualities of the local sign 
system, which is spread out in two dimensions, are related 
to one another according to the grades of intensity of the 
inner tactual sensations. Secondly, the tactual impressions 
as determined by the external stimuli, fuse with the product 
of the first union. Of course, the two processes do not take 
place successively, but in one and the same process, for the 
local signs and movements must both be aroused by the 
external stimuli. Still, the external sensations vary with the 
nature of the objective stimulus, while the local signs and 
internal tactual sensations are subjective elements, the mutual 
relations of which always remain the same even when the 
external impressions vary. This is the psychological con- 
dition for the constancy of attributes which we ascribe to 
space itself, in contrast with the great changeableness of the 
qualitative attributes of objects in space. 

9. After the spacial fusion of tactual sensations has once 
been effected, either one of the elements which took part in 
the fusion is able by itself, though perhaps in a limited 
degree, to bring about a localization of the sensations. In 
this way not only normal individuals with vision, but also 
the blind, even the congenitally blind, have an idea of the 
place touched, and can perceive as spacially separate two 
impressions that are far enough apart^ even when the touch- 
organs remain perfectly quiet. Of course, the congenitally 
blind can have no visual image of the region touched, but 
they have instead of this an idea of a movement of the part 
touched and where several impressions are received, they 
have the idea of a movement from one to the other. The 



§10. Spacial Ideas. 123 

same fusion takes place in ideas thus formed as takes place 
in the ordinary cases where movements are really present. 
The difference is that one factor, namely, the inner tactual 
sensation, is merely a memory image. 

10. In the same way, we have the converse process. The 
real contents of experience may be a sum of inner tactual 
sensations which arise from the movement of some part of 
the body, while no noticeable external tactual sensations 
whatever are given, and yet these internal sensations which 
accompany the movement may be the basis of a spacial idea. 
This is regularly the case when we have j^ure ideas of our 
own movements. If, for example, we shut our eyes and then 
raise an arm, we have at every moment an idea of the 
position of the arm. To be sure, external tactual sensations 
that arise from the torsion and folding of the skin, play 
some part here too, but they are unimportant in comparison 
with the internal sensations from the joints, tendons, and 
muscles. 

It can easily be observed that where vision is present, 
this idea of position comes from an obscure visual image of 
the limb with its surroundings, which image is aroused even 
when the eyes are closed or turned away. This connection is 
so close that it may arise between the mere memory image of 
the inner tactual sensation and the corresponding visual idea, 
as is observed in the case of paralytics, where sometimes 
the mere will to execute a certain movement arouses the 
idea of a movement really executed. Evidently, the ideas 
of one's own movements depend, when vision is present, on 
incomplete fusions just as do the external spacial ideas of 
touch. The only difference is that here the internal sen- 
sations play the part which the outer sensations play in the 
former case. This leads to the assumption that the inner 
tactual sensations also have local signs, that is, the assumption 



124 ^I' Psychical Compounds. 

that the sensations in the various joints, tendons, and muscles 
show certain series of local differences. Introspection seems 
to confirm this view. If we move alternately the knee-joint, 
hip-joint, and shoulder-joint, or even the corresponding joints 
on the right and left sides, the quality of the sensation 
varies a little each time, even if we neglect the fact that there 
is a visual image of the limb which can never he entirely 
suppressed. 

11. From the relations that exist in the normal cases 
of persons who have vision, we can understand the way in 
which persons who are congenitally blind form ideas of their 
own movements. Here, instead of a fusion with a visual 
image, there must be a fusion of sensations of movement 
with the local signs. Outer tactual sensations also act as aids 
in this case. In fact, they are much more important here 
than when vision is present. The ideas of the bhnd as to 
their own movements are exceedingly uncertain so long as 
they are unaided by contact with external objects. When, 
however, they touch such objects, they have the advantage 
of greater practice with the external tactual sense and a 
keener attention to the same. The so-called "distance-sense 
of the blind" is a proof of this greater practice. It consists 
in the ability to perceive from some distance, without direct 
contact, a resisting object, as, for example, a neighboring 
wall. Now, it can be experimentally demonstrated that this 
distance-sense is made up of two factors : a very weak tactual 
stimulation of the forehead by the atmospheric resistance, 
and a change in the sound of the step. The latter acts as 
a signal to concentrate the attention so that the weak tactual 
stimulations can be perceived. The ''distance-sense" disap- 
pears, accordingly, when the tactual stimulations are prevented 
by binding a cloth around the forehead or when the steps 
are rendered inaudible. 



§ 10. Spacial Ideas. 125 

12. Besides our ideas of the position and movements of the 
various parts of our body, we have also an idea of the position 
and movement of our whole body. The ideas of the position 
of parts of the body can never have anything but a relative 
significance; it is only when considered in connection with 
the idea of the body as a whole that they become absolute. 
The organ of orientation for this general idea is the head. 
We always form a definite idea of the position of the head ; 
the other organs are localized, generally, indeed, very in- 
definitely, with reference to the head, each idea depending 
on the particular complexes of inner and outer tactual sen- 
sations presented in that case. The specific organ of orient- 
ation in the head is the system of semicircular canals, to 
which are added, as secondary aids, the inner and outer 
tactual sensations resulting from the action of the muscles 
of the head. The function of these canals as an organ of 
orientation can be most easily understood by assuming that 
inner tactual sensations with especially marked differences in 
local signs, arise in them through the influence of the chang- 
ing pressure of the fluid medium which fills them. It is 
highly probable that dizziness^ which comes from rapid 
rotation of the head, is due to the sensations caused by the 
violent movements of this fluid. This is in accord with the 
observations that partial derangements of the canals bring 
about constant illusions in localization, and complete derange- 
ment of the same is followed by an almost total suspension 
of the ability to localize. 

12 a. The antagonistic theories in regard to the psychical 
formation of spacial ideas, are generally called nativism and em- 
piricism. The nativistic theory seeks to derive localization in 
space from connate properties of the sense-organs and sense- 
centres, while the empiristic theory seeks to derive it from the 
influence of experience. This discrimination does not give proper 



126 U. Psychical Compounds. 

expression to the actual opposition that exists, for the assumption 
of connate spacial ideas may be attacked without affirming that 
these ideas arise through experience. This is the case when, as 
above, space perceptions are regarded as products of psychical 
fusions due both to the physiological properties of the organs 
of sense and organs of movement, and to the general laws govern- 
ing the rise of psychical compounds. ' Such processes of fusion 
and the arrangements of sense impressions based upon them, 
are everywhere the conditions of our experience, but for this 
very reason it is inadmissible to call them "experience" itself. 
It is much more proper to point out the opposition which really 
exists as the opposition between nativistic and genetic theories. 
Genetic theories may then be subdivided into empirical theories 
and theories of fusion. In view of the fact that the associative 
processes in the fusion theories, are necessary even for the first 
formulation of experience, we may designate these theories as the 
praeempirical forms of genetic theory. It is to be noted that 
the widely accepted nativistic theories contain empirical elements? 
while, on the other hand, empirical theories contain nativistic 
elements, so that the difference is sometimes very small. Sup- 
porters of the nativistic view assume that the arrangement of 
impressions in space corresponds directly to the arrangement of 
sensitive points in the skin and retina. The special way in 
which the projection outward is effected especially in ideas of 
the distance and magnitude of objects and in the reference of 
a plurality of spacially separated impressions to a single object is 
accounted for as dependent upon "attention", "will", or even "ex- 
perience". Supporters of the empirical theory, on the other hand, 
generally presuppose space as given in some way or other, and 
then interpret each single idea as a case of localization in this 
space, the particular localization being in each case due to some 
empirical motive. In the theory of spacial ideas from sight, 
tactual space is generally regarded as this originally given space; 
in the theory of tactual ideas, original spacial qualities have 
sometimes been attributed to inner tactual sensations. Thus, 
in the actual concrete theories empiricism and nativism are very 
ill-defined concepts. They agree in the use of the complex con- 
cepts of popular psychology, such as "attention", "will", and 
"experience", without any examination or analysis. In this 



§ 10. Spacial Ideas. 127 

respect they are different from tlie fusion theory, which seeks 
to discover, by means of a psychological analysis of the ideas, 
the elementary processes from which the ideas arise. 

The special influence of the head on ideas of bodily position 
and movement shows itself in the phenomena of dizziness, and 
in the ideas which we form of movement through space when 
the body is carried along without effort on our own part. This 
special influence was originally attributed to certain parts of 
the brain, especially to the cerebellum. And it is not unlikely 
that the cerebellum participates in a measure directly, and in a 
measure indirectly as the centre for the peripheral organ of 
orientation, in the processes of orientation and in the disturb- 
ances of orientation. As to the peripheral organs of orientation 
the partial and total exterpations which have been performed 
on the semicircular canals, especially on the canals of birds, 
make it evident that the most important of these peripheral 
organs of orientation are the semicircular canals. In addition, 
however, it must not be overlooked that external touch sen- 
sations and visual perceptions are of supplementary importance, 
especially in that they make possible a gradual correction of 
the disturbances of orientation which arise when the semicircular 
canals are disabled. Further confirmation of a striking type is 
found for the belief that the canals are of the first importance 
in the observation that deaf mutes very frequently suffer from 
disturbances in orientation. Such disturbances probably appear 
in every case in which the pathological conditions which, as is 
usual in such deafness, appear early and attack the labyrinth, 
have also attacked the canals. 

References. E. H. Weber, Tastsinn und Gemeingefiihl, Handworterb. 
der Physiol., vol. Ill, pt. 2, 1846. Lotze, Medicinische Psychologic, 
1852. (On p. 324, appears the first statement of the concept local 
signs. This presentation was essentially metaphysical in motive.) 
WuNDT, Beitrage zur Sinneswahrnehmung, sect. 1, 1862. Vierordt, 
Grundriss der Physiol., 5th. ed. (1877) p. 340. Washburn, Philos. 
Studien, vol. 11. Judd, Philos. Studien, vol. 12. Goldscheider, Ges. 
Abhandlungen, vol. 1. On the Blind: Heller, Philos. Studien, vol. 11. 
On Nativistic and Genetic Theories: Wundt, Grundziige der physiol. 
Psych., vol. II., chap. 11, and Lectures on Hum. and Anim. Psych., 
lecture 9. Lipps, Grundthats. des Seelenl., (1883) chap. 22. On Ideas 



128 -f^- Psychical Go77ipounds. 

of the Position of the Body as a Whole : Goltz, Pfliiger's Archiv f. 
Physiol., vol. 3. Beeuee,, Pfliiger's Archiv, vol. 48. Mach, Grundlinien 
der Lehre von den Bewegungsempfindungen, 1875. Delage-Aubert, 
Studien iiber die Orientirung, 1888. Ewald, Physiol. Untersuch. liber 
das Endorgan des Nervus octavus, 1892. Kreidl, Pfliiger's Archiv, 
vols. 61 and 54 (on the ability of the deaf and dumb to stand). 

B. SPACIAL SIGHT IDEAS. 

13. Tlie general properties of the touch sense are repeated 
in the visual sense, but in a more highly organized form. 
Corresponding to the sensory surface of the outer skin, we 
have here the retina with its rods and cones arranged in 
rows and forming an extraordinarily fine mosaic of sensitive 
points. Corresponding to the movements of the tactual organs, 
we have the movements of both eyes in fixating objects and 
following thek bounding lines. But there is this difference, 
while tactual impressions are perceived only through im- 
mediate contact with the objects, the refractive media in front 
of the retina throw upon the visual surface inverted reduced 
images. These images allow space for a large number of 
simultaneous impressions, and the ability of light to traverse 
space makes it possible for both neighboring and distant 
objects to yield impressions. Vision thus becomes a distance 
sense in a much higher degree than hearing. 

14. With regard to its spacial attributes, every visual 
idea may be resolved into two factors : 1) the location of the 
single elements in relation to one another, and 2) their loca- 
tion in relation to the ideating subject. Even the idea of 
one single point of light, contains both these factors, for we 
must represent a point in some spacial environment, and also 
in some direction and at some distance from ourselves. These 
factors can be separated only through dehberate abstraction, 
never in reality, for the relation of any point in space to its 
environment regularly determines its relation to the ideating 



§ 10. Spacial Ideas. 129 

subject. As a result of this dependence, the analysis of 
visual ideas may better start with the location of the elements 
in relation to one another, and then take up later the location 
of the compound in relation to the subject. 



a. The Location of the Elements of a Visual Idea 
in Relation to One Aiwther. 

15. In the perception of the reciprocal relations between 
elements of a visual idea, the characteristics of space per- 
ception through the tactual sense are all repeated, only in a 
much more highly organized form, and with a few modifi- 
cations which are important in determining the special char- 
acter of visual ideas. Thus, in vision as in touch, we im- 
mediately connect with the simplest possible impression of a 
point the idea of its ^lace in space; that is, we give it a 
certain definite position in relation to the parts of space 
about it. This localization is not effected, however, as in 
touch, by the direct reference of the impression to the cor- 
responding point of the sense-organ itself; we project it 
rather into a field of vision^ which lies at some distance out- 
side of the ideating subject. Here too we have a measure, 
as in the case of touch, of the accuracy of localization, in 
the distance at which two points can be just distinguished 
as spacially different. The distance is not given in this case 
as a directly measurable hnear extension on the sensory 
surface itself, but as the shortest perceptible interval between 
two points in the field of vision. The field of vision may 
be at any distance whatever, so that it is best to use as a 
measure for the fineness of localization, not a linear exten- 
sion, but an angle., the angle formed by the intersection of 
the lines passing from the points in the field of vision, through 
the optical centre of the eye, to the corresponding retinal 

WuNDT, Psychology. 2, edit. 9 



130 II- Psychical Compounds. 

points. This angle of vision remains constant so long as the 
size of the retinal image is unchanged, while the distance 
between the points in the field of vision increases in pro- 
portion to their distance from the subject. If an equivalent 
linear distance is sought in place of the angle of vision, it 
can be found in the diameter of the retinal image. This 
may be calculated directly from the angle and the distance 
of the retina from the optical centre of the eye. 

16. The measurements of the keenness of visual locali- 
zation made according to this principle show that there is 
a great difference in different parts of the field of vision, 
corresponding to the differences found for different regions 
of the tactual organs (p. 117). Still, the distances that 
measure the smallest perceptible visual intervals are all very 
much smaller than in the case of touch. Then too, while 
there are many regions of finer discrimination scattered 
over the tactual organ, there is only one region of finest 
discrimination in the field of vision. This is the middle of 
the field of vision which corresponds to the centre of the 
retina. From this region towards the periphery the fineness 
of localization diminishes very rapidly. The whole field of 
vision, or the whole retinal surface, is, accordingly, analogous 
to a single tactual region, as, for example, that of the index 
finger, except that the visual region much surpasses the tactual 
in fineness of localization, especially at the centre, where 
two impressions at a distance corresponding to 60" — 90" in 
the angle of vision, are just distinguishable; at two degrees 
and a half from the centre toward the periphery, the smallest 
perceptible extension is 3' 30"; and at eight degrees toward 
the periphery it increases to 1°. 

In normal vision we turn the eye towards objects of 
which we wish to gain more accurate spacial ideas, in such 
a way that these objects occupy the middle of the field of 



§ 10. Spacial Ideas. 131 

vision, their images falling, as a result, on the centre of the 
retina. "We speak of such objects as seen directly^ of all 
others, which lie in the eccentric parts of the field of vision, 
as seen indirectly. The centre of the region of direct vision 
is called the point of regard^ or the fixation-point. The 
line that unites the centre of the retina with the centre of 
the field of vision is known as the line of regard. 

If we compute the distance on the retina that cor- 
responds to the smallest angle of vision at which two points 
in the centre of the field of vision may be perceived as 
separate, we shall find it to be .004 to .006 mm. This dis- 
tance is about equal to the diameter of a retinal cone, and 
since the centre of the retina has only cones and these are 
so close together that they are in direct contact, it may be 
concluded with probability that two impressions must fall 
upon at least two different retinal elements if they are to be 
perceived as separate in space. This view is supported 
by the fact that in the peripheral regions of the retina the 
rods and cones, which are the two forms of elements sen- 
sitive to light, are really separated by greater intervals. It 
may, then, be assumed that the keenness of vision is directly 
dependent on the proximity of the retinal elements to one 
another, for two impressions can be distinguished as spacially 
different only when they act upon different elements. 

16 a. Because of this relation between the keenness of vision 
and the arrangement of retinal elements, it has often been con- 
cluded that every retinal element has from the first the property 
of localizing any stimulus that acts upon it, in that position in 
space which corresponds to its own projection in the field of 
vision. In this way the attempt has been made to explain the 
fact that the visual sense represents its objects in an external 
field of vision at some distance from the subject, as a connate 
energy of the retinal elements or of their central connections 

9* 



132 11- Psychical Compounds. 

in the visual centre in the brain. There are certain pathological 
disturbances of vision that seem at first sight to confirm this 
assumption. When some region of the retina is pushed out of 
place as a result of inflammation underneath, certain distortions 
in the images, the so-called 7netamorphopsia^ arise. The extent 
and direction of these distortions can be fully explained when 
it is assumed that the displaced retinal elements continue to 
localize their impressions as they did when in their normal 
positions. But it is obvious that these distortions of the images, 
when they appear, as they do in most cases, as continually 
changing phenomena, during the gradual formation and disap- 
pearance of the excretion, furnish us with no more evidence 
of a connate energy of localization in the retina, than does the 
readily observed fact that distorted images of objects are seen 
when one looks through prismatic glasses. Furthermore, if a 
stationary condition is gradually reached, the metamorphopsia 
disappear, and that, too, not only in cases where it may be 
assumed that the retinal elements return to their original position, 
but even in those cases where such a return is entirely improb- 
able on account of the extent of the afi'ection. In cases like 
the latter, the development of a new connection between the 
single retinal elements and their corresponding points in the 
field of vision, must be assumed^). This conclusion is supported 
by observations made with normal eyes on the gradual adapta- 
tion to such distorted images as are produced by external optical 
appliances. If a pair of prismatic glasses be worn before the 
eyes, marked and disturbing distortions of the images are the 
regular results. The straight bounding lines appear bent and 
the forms of the objects are thus distorted. These disturbances 
gradually disappear entirely if the glasses are worn some time. 



1) A process analogous to this elimination of the metamorphopsia 
is sometimes observed in binocular vision when the disturbances 
arising from squinting are gradually overcome. When the squinting 
begins, the two lines of regard no longer meet in the field of vision, 
so that double images of objects arise. These may gradually dis- 
appear, however, if the condition of the eyes remains perfectly 
stationary; a new set of relations is developed for the retinal ele- 
ments of the squinting eye. 



§ 10. Spacial Ideas. 133 

When the glasses are removed, the distortions may appear in 
the opposite direction. 

17. Besides the retinal sensations there are other psy- 
chical elements that always take part in the spacial arrange- 
ment of light impressions. The physiological properties of 
the eye point a priori to the sensations that accompany 
ocular movements^ as such elements. These movements ob- 
viously play the same part in the estimation of distances in 
the field of vision as do the tactual movements in the estima- 
tion of tactual impressions. By means of a most admirably 
arranged system of six muscles, the eye can be turned in 
all directions about its centre of rotation, which is fixed in 
its relation to the head. It is thus well suited to following 
continuously the bounding lines of objects or to passing each 
time in the shortest line from a given fixation-point to 
another. Movements in the direction which corresponds to 
the position of the objects most frequently and closely ob- 
served, namely, movements downward and inward are favored 
above the others by the arrangement of the muscles. Further- 
more, the movements of the two eyes are so adapted to one 
another through the synergy of their innervation, that nor- 
mally the two lines of regard are always turned upon the same 
fixation-point. In this way a cooperation of the two eyes is 
made possible which not only permits a more perfect per- 
ception of the position of objects in relation to one another, 
but also furnishes the most essential means for the determi- 
nation of the spacial relations of objects to the subject 
(24 seq.). 

18. The phenomena of vision teach that the idea of the 
relative distance of two points from each other is dependent 
on the motor energy employed in passing through this dis- 
tance, just as the discrimination of two distinct points in the 



134 II- Psychical Compoitnds. 

field of vision depends on the arrangement of the retinal 
elements. The motor energy becomes a component of the 
idea through its connection with a sensation of tension which 
can be perceived, especially in extensive movements and by 
comparing ocular movements in various directions. Thus, for 
example, an upward movement of the eyes is clearly ac- 
companied by more intense sensations than an equal down- 
ward movement; and the same is true of outward move- 
ments of the eye as compared with inward movements. 

The influence of these inner tactual sensations is most 
apparent in the fact that the disturbances in localization 
which arise from partial paralysis of single ocular muscles 
correspond exactly to the changes in the amount of energy 
required to move the eye. The general principle of such 
disorders is that the distance between two points seems 
greater when these points lie in the direction of the more 
difficult movement. The more difficult movement has a corre- 
spondingly more intense sensation of tension which intense sen- 
sation under normal conditions accompanies a more extensive 
movement. As a result, the distance passed through appears 
greater. Furthermore, the same illusion may appear for dis- 
tances that lie in the direction of difficult movement, but 
have not been actually passed through, for the standard ac- 
quired during movement determines the motor impulse in the 
eye even when it is not moved. 

19. Similar variations can be demonstrated for the normal 
eye. Although the ocular muscles are so arranged that their 
movements in various directions require about the same 
amount of exertion, still, there is not exact equality in this 
respect. The reasons for the existing differences are con- 
nected with the adaptation of the eye to its functions. The 
neighboring objects of our immediate environment, on which 
the lines of regard must be converged, are the ones at which 



§ 10. Spaeial Ideas. 135 

we most often look. For this reason, the muscles of the 
eye have so adapted themselves that the movements for the 
convergence of the Knes of regard are the easiest, particu- 
larly those directed downwards as compared with other pos- 
sible movements of convergence. This facilitation of con- 
vergent movements is brought about by the special mode of 
placing the muscles which move the eye upward and down- 
ward. These muscles, the superior rectus and the inferior 
rectus, do not lie exactly in the vertical median plane of the 
eye^ from which position they would give the eye a simple 
upward and downward vertical movement; they lie rather at 
such an angle to this median plane that their contraction 
results in an inward, as well as an upward and downward 
movement. Furthermore, each of these recti muscles is sup- 
plemented by an oblique muscle^ the superior rectus by the 
inferior oblique, and the inferior rectus by the superior 
oblique. These oblique muscles aid in producing upward 
and downward movements and at the same time counter- 
balance the rotation movements produced in the eyes by the 
asymmetrical placing of the recti muscles. As a result of 
the greater complexity of muscular activity in upward and 
downward directions, the exertion required to run over Knes 
in these directions is greater than the exertion required for 
horizontal lines, where only the internal and external recti 
act. Furthermore, the relative ease of downward movements 
of convergence as contrasted with upward movements shows 
itself partly in the differences in intensity of sensations ac- 
companying the downward movements, as already remarked, 
and partly in the fact that downward convergence is in- 
voluntarily too great and upward convergence too small. 

There are certain constant optical illusions depending on 
the position of a given object in the field of vision., which 
correspond to these differences in the motor mechanism. 



136 II' Psychical Compounds. 

They are of two kinds: illusions of direction, and those of 
length. 

Both eyes are subject to an illusion as to the direction 
of vertical lines in the field of vision. Such a line whose 
upper end is inclined 1° — 3° outward, appears vertical, and 
one really vertical, seems inclined inward. Since the illusion 
is in opposite directions for the two eyes, it disappears in 
binocular vision. It can obviously be explained by the fact 
just noted, that the downward movements of the eyes are 
connected with an involuntary increase in convergence, and 
the upward movements with a decrease in convergence. This 
deflection of the movement from the vertical is not noticed 
in itself, it is referred to the object as a deflection in the 
opposite direction. 

An equally regular illusion of length appears when w^e 
compare straight lines extending perpendicularly to each other 
in the field of vision. This too is to be explained by the differ- 
ences in the arrangement of the muscles which move the eye 
upward and downward as compared with those which move the 
eye outward and inward. The illusion consists in the fact that 
a vertical straight line is judged on the average 1/7 to Yio too 
long as compared with an equal horizontal line. A square, 
accordingly, appears as a rectangle whose base is shorter 
than its sides, and a square drawn by the eye is always too 
short in its vertical dimensions. As in the case of partially 
paralyzed eyes, so here in normal vision, distances in the 
direction of the more difficult movement appear greater. 

Besides this difference between vertical and horizontal 
distances, which is most noticeable because it is so large, 
there are less marked differences between upward and down- 
ward and also between outward and inward distances. The 
upper half of a vertical line is overestimated on the average 
by Y16 of its length, and the outer half of a horizontal line 



§ 10. Spacial Ideas. 137 

by 740- The first of these illusions corresponds to the fa- 
cilitation of downward movements (described p. 135), the 
second corresponds to the general facilitation of movements 
of convergence. 

20. In addition to these two constant illusions, which 
arise from the special structure of ocular muscles in their 
adaptation to the purposes of vision, there are certain other 
variable optical illusions which are due to certain attributes 
common to all our voluntary movements and which have 
their analogues in the movements of the tactual organs. 
These variable illusions may also be divided into those of 
direction^ and those of length. The former follow the rule 
that acute angles are overestimated, obtuse angles under- 
estimated, and that the direction of the lines forming the 
angles varies correspondingly. For the illusions of length 
we have the rule, that forced or interrupted movements 
require more exertion than free and continuous ones. Any 
straight line that necessitates fixation is, accordingly, over- 
estimated in comparison with an open distance marked off 
by two points, and a straight Hne interrupted by several 
dividing lines is overestimated in comparison with an uninter- 
rupted line. 

20 a. The tactual analogues of the illusion in visual angles is 
to be found in the tendency to overestimate small articular 
movements and to underestimate large ones. This comes under 
the general principle that a relatively greater expenditure of 
energy is required for a short movement than for a more ex- 
tensive one, because it is relatively more difficult to begin a 
movement than to continue it after it is already started. The 
tactual phenomena analogous to the overestimation of interrupted 
lines, is that a distance estimated by a movement of one of the 
limbs always seems shorter when it is traversed in a single con- 
tinuous movement, than it does when the movement is several 
times interrupted. Here too, the intensity of the sensation 



138 JI- Psychical Compounds. 

corresponds to the expenditure of energy, both being, of course, 
greater for an interrupted movement than for a continuous 
movement. The overestimation of interrupted lines by the eye 
takes place, as we can easily understand, only so long as no 
motives arise from the way in which the division is made, to 
hinder the movement of the eye over the interrupted line. Such 
a hindrance is present, for example, when the line is interrupted 
only once. This one point of division makes fixation necessary. 
If we compare such a line with a continuous one, we tend to 
estimate the first without any movement, the point of division 
being the fixation-centre, while the second is perceived by a 
movement of the eye. As a result the continuous line seems 
longer than the interrupted line. 

20b. All of these illusions of direction and length, whether 
variable or constant, are classified as "geometrical optical il- 
lusions", and are thus distinguished from certain other optical 
illusions which depend upon pure optical irregularities. The 
term geometrical is used because it is in the construction of 
geometrical figures that the best opportunities for the discovery 
of such illusions appear. The term is extended so as to cover 
not only these illusions which have been described and which 
depend upon the characteristics of eye movements, but also to 
include other unusual forms of visual space perception which 
are due to the laws of association to be discussed later. These 
latter we may distinguish by the special designation "association 
illusions". Such association illusions are exemplified by the 
fact that a given line when placed near a very much shorter line 
is overestimated, and, conversely, when placed near a long line 
the same given line is underestimated. Similar underestimation 
or overestimation appears in the case of an angle compared 
respectively with a larger and smaller angle. These facts are 
obviously analogous to the facts of light and color contrast 
(§ 17, ll). Similar associations appear in the variable illusions 
of direction and length described above in which the illusory 
figures due to difi'erences in the energy of movement, were in 
each case brought into agreement with the retinal images by a 
projection of the flat figure into depth. Thus, for example, we 
not only see an interrupted straight line as longer than an 
uninterrupted line of equal length, but we also interpret the 



§ 10. Spacial Ideas. 139 

interrupted line as lying at a greater distance. This latter fact 
of interpretation depends upon the general rule of perception 
which has been established by a large number of associations, 
that of two objects casting retinal images of equal size the 
more remote is the larger. Such perspective association illusions 
appear more clearly in cases of rigid fixation than when the 
eye is moving freely, because such illusions depend very largely 
on the direct comparison of retinal images. They furnish also 
a means of distinguishing between variable illusions and constant 
illusions, for the constant illusions do not, as a rule, show any 
of these tendencies towards perspective interpretation. For 
further discussion of association illusions compare § 16, 9. For 
spacial contrast § 17, 11. 

21. Both the variable and the constant optical illusions 
point to the immediate dependence of the perception of 
spacial directions and distances on ocular movements. As 
further evidence pointing in the same direction, we have the 
negative fact that the arrangement of the retinal elements, 
especially their proximity to one another, normally has no 
appreciable influence on the ideas of direction and magnitude. 
This is most strikingly evident in the fact that the distance 
between two points appears the same whether observed in 
direct or indirect vision. Two points that are clearly dis- 
tinguished in direct vision, may become one in the eccentric 
parts of the field of vision, but so soon as they are dis- 
tinguished at all, they will appear just as far apart in one 
region as in the other, or if there is is any apparent differ- 
ence, it is so uncertain and so variable that it to be en- 
tirely overlooked as bearing upon the main fact, in view of 
the very marked differences in the distribution of the sen- 
sitive elements at the centre and periphery of the retina. 
This fact that our perception of magnitude is independent 
of the proximity of the retinal elements holds even for a 
part of the retina that is not sensitive to light at all — for 



140 II- Psychical Compounds. 

the blind spot^ where the optic nerve comes into the eye. 
Objects whose images fall on the blind spot are not seen. 
The size of this spot is about 6°, and it is located 15" in- 
ward from the point of fixation. Images of considerable 
size, as, for example, that of a human face at a distance of 
six feet, may disappear entirely on it. Still, when points 
appear at the right and left or below and above this region, 
we localize them just as far from each other as we should 
in any other, uninterrupted part of the field of vision. The 
same fact is observed when some part of the retina becomes 
blind through pathological conditions. The resulting break 
in the field of vision shows itself only in the fact that 
images falling on it are not seen, it never appears through any 
changes in the localization of objects lying on opposite sides 
of the blind region i). 

22. The keenness of vision Biid the pe7xeption of directions 
and distances in the field of vision., are, as all these phenom- 
ena show, two different functions, which depend upon dif- 
ferent conditions: the first depends on the proximity of the 
retinal elements to one another., the second on ocular move- 
ments. It follows directly that spacial ideas from sight can 
not be regarded as original ideas or ideas arising from light 
impressions in themselves, any more than the spacial ideas 
of touch can be referred directly to the tactual impressions 
themselves. The spacial order is in both cases developed 
from the combination of certain sensational components which, 



1) In this connection we have the fact that the blind spot does 
not appear in the field of vision as a break, without sensational 
content, but as a continuation of the general brightness and color 
of the whole field. Thus, the field is seen as continuously white 
when we are looking at a white surface, as black when we look at 
a black surface. This filling out of the blind spot is possible only 
through reproduced sensations, and is to be considered as one of 
the phenomena of association to be discussed later (§ 16). 



§ 10. Spacial Ideas. 141 

taken separately, have no spacial attributes whatever. Other 
conditions also indicate that the elements are related in 
vision in the same way as in the case of touch, and that 
the development of visual space under normal conditions 
runs entirely parallel to the development of space in cases 
of congenital bhndness, that is, under the only condition 
under which touch attains a similar independence. Retinal 
impressions correspond to impressions of contact, and ocular 
movements to touch movements. Tactual impressions can 
gain spacial qualities only through the local coloring of the 
sensations connected with them — the local signs — and 
in Hke manner, we must recognize the same to be true for 
retinal impressions. 

22 a. To he sure, a qualitative gradation of local signs on 
the retina can not be demonstrated with the same evidentness 
as for the skin. Still, by the use of colors it can be established 
in a general way that at relatively great distances from the 
retinal centre the sensational quality gradually changes. Colors 
are not so saturated in indirect vision, and the color-tone also 
changes; for example, yellow appears orange. There is, indeed, 
in these facts of retinal response no strict proof of the existence 
of pure local differences in the sensations, at least not in the 
fine gradations that must be assumed in the retinal centre. Still, 
the facts show that local differences in sensations do exist, and 
this seems to justify the assumption of such differences even 
beyond the limits of demonstration. This assumption is all the 
more justifiable because in vision where the gradations are 
much finer than in touch, the tendency to translate sensational 
differences directly into local differences, a tendency which has 
already been noticed in the case of touch, would certainly do 
much more to destroy the specifically qualitative character of 
these local differences. As a confirmation of this view we have 
the fact that the demonstrable sensational differences at greater 
distances from the retinal centre, can be observed only under 
favorable conditions, that is, when limited impressions are used; 



142 ^I- Psychical Compounds. 

they disappear entirely when surfaces of uniform color are 
looked at. This disappearance of marked qualitative differences 
must be attributed in part at least to their relation to local 
differences. 

23. We assume, accordingly, qualitative local signs, which, 
judging from the data derived from the keenness of vision, 
are graded in the finest stages at the retinal centre and 
more slowly in the eccentric parts. The formation of visual 
space may then be described as a combination of this system 
of local signs arranged in two dimensions, with a system of 
intensive inner tactual sensations. For any two local signs 
a and h there will be a corresponding sensation of strain «, 
arising from the movement through the distance a 6, and 
serving as a measure of the same. A longer distance a e 
will have a more intense sensation af strain, y. Just as the 
point of finest discrimination on the finger is the centre of 
reference, so in the same way the retinal centre is such a 
point of reference for the eye. In fact, this is, because of 
the laws of ocular movements, more obvious for the eye than 
it is for the tactual organ. Any luminous point in the field 
of vision is a stimulus for the centre of ocular innervation, 
and tends to turn the line of regard reflexly upon itself. 
This reflex relation of eccentric stimuli to the retinal centre 
is probably an essential condition for the development of the 
synergy of ocular movements mentioned above, and is, at 
the same time, an explanation of the great difficulty of ob- 
serving objects in indirect vision. This difficulty is evidently 
due to the greater reflex impulse toward a point in indirect 
vision when the attention is concentrated upon it. As a 
result of the preeminent importance which the retinal centre 
h-as for ocular movements, the point of fixation necessarily 
becomes the centre of reference in the field of vision, and 
all distances in this field are brought under a unitary standard 



§ 10. Spacial Ideas. 143 

by being determined with reference to the fixation-point. 
The excitation of local signs is due to the action of external 
impressions, and both together cause the movement towards 
the retinal centre. The whole process of visual space ar- 
rangement is thus due to the fusion of three different sen- 
sational elements: first, the sensational qualities depending 
upon the character of the external stimulus, second the 
qualitative local signs depending on the points upon which 
the stimuli act, and third, the intensive motor sensations 
determined by the relation of the stimulated points to the 
centre of the retina. The latter elements may either ac- 
company actual movements — this is the original case — 
or, when the eye remains at rest, these elements are mere 
motor impulses of a particular intensity. Because of the 
regular connection between qualitative local signs and in- 
tensive sensations of strain which accompany the movements, 
the two factors may together be regarded as a single system 
of complex local signs. The spacial localization of a simple 
visual impression, is a product of a complete fusion of the 
sensation caused by the external stimulus with the two inter- 
connected elements belonging to this system of complex local 
signs. The arrangement of a number of simple impressions 
in space consists in the combination of a great number of 
such fusions, which are graded in quality and intensity ac- 
cording to the elements of the system of local signs. The 
predominating elements in these fusions are the sensations 
due to the external stimulation. In comparison with these, 
the elements of the system of local signs are little recognized, 
because in the immediate perpeption of objects the local 
signs are entirely swallowed up in their spacial interpretation. 



144 II- Psychical Compounds. 

b. The Location of Visual Ideas in Relation to the 
Ideating Subject. 

24. The simplest case of a relation between an impres- 
sion and the subject, which can appear in a visual idea, is 
evidently that in which the impression is limited in extent 
to a single point. If a single point of light is presented in 
the field of vision, both Hues of regard are, as a result of 
the reflex impulse exerted by the stimulus (p. 142), turned 
upon it in such a way that in both eyes the images fall 
upon the retinal centres. Furthermore, the organs of ac- 
commodation are also adapted to the distance of the point. 
The point thus represented on the centres of both retinas 
is seen as single^ and as situated in a certain particular 
direction, and at a certain particular distance from the 
ideating subject. 

The subject is represented, as a rule, by a point which 
may be defined as the middle point of the straight line con- 
necting the centres of rotation of the two eyes. We will 
call this the jpoint of orientation for the field of vision, and 
the straight line drawn from this point to the intersection of 
the two lines of regard, that is to the external fixation-point, 
we will call the line of orientation. When a point in space 
is fixated, there is always a fairly exact idea of the direction 
of the line of orientation. This idea is produced by the inner 
tactual sensations arising from the position of the two eyes. 
Such sensations are very noticeable because of their intensity, 
when the eyes are rotated much out of the central position. 
They are just as perceptible for a single eye, so that locali- 
zation in direction is as perfect in monocular as in binocular 
vision. In monocular vision, however, the line of orientation 
generally coincides with the line of regard i). 

1) The habit of seeing with two eyes results in exceptions to 



§10. Spacial Ideas. 145 

25. The idea of the dista?ice of objects from the subject, 
or of the absolute le^igth of the line of orientation, is much 
more indefinite than the idea of direction. We are always 
inclined to ideate this distance shorter than it really is, as 
may be shown by comparing it with a standard placed 
somewhere in the field of vision perpendicular to the line of 
orientation. In this way we find that the distance on the 
standard which is judged to be equal to the line of orienta- 
tion , is always much shorter than the real length of this 
line. The discrepancy between the two increases as the 
point of fixation moves further away, that is, as the line of 
orientation becomes longer. The only sensational components 
that can produce this idea of distance, are the sensations of 
tention arising from the position of the two eyes. These 
sensations arise particularly from the convergence of the 
lines of regard and give somewhat of a measure of the ab- 
solute extent of this convergence. In fact, it is possible to 
observe sensations when the convergence is changed: from 
the inner angle of the eye when the degree of convergence 
is increased, from the outer angle when the convergence 
is decreased. The sum of all the sensations correspond- 
ing to a given position of convergence distinguishes such a 
position completely from all others. 

26. It follows that an idea of a definite, absolute length 
of the line of orientation can be developed only through 
experience, during which there appear, in addition to the 
sensational elements, a great many associations. This explains 
why these ideas always remain indefinite and why they are 



this rule. Often when one eye is closed, the line of orientation re- 
mains the same as in binocular vision and does not coincide with 
the line of regard. In such cases the closed eye usually makes the 
movements of convergence to a fixation point which is the same as 
that of the open eye. 

WuNDT, Psycliology. 2. edit. XQ 



146 II- Psychical Compomids. 

sometimes aided, sometimes interfered with by other com- 
ponents of visual ideas, especially by the size of the retinal 
images of familiar objects. On the other hand, we have in 
the sensations of convergence, a relatively fine measure for 
differences in the distances of objects. For positions in which 
the lines of regard are nearly parallel, changes in convergence 
may be perceived that correspond to an angle of vision of 
60" or 70". When the convergence increases, the absolute 
amount of this least perceptible change in convergence also 
increases considerably, but, in spite of this increase in angular 
amount, the corresponding differences in the length of the 
line of orientation become smaller and smaller. Thus the 
purely intensive sensations which accompany movements of 
convergence, are translated directly into ideas of changes in 
the distance between the fixation-point and the point of 
orientation of the subject. 

This translation of a certain particular sensational com- 
plex into an idea of distance, is not due to any connate 
energy, but to a particular psychical development, as is shown 
by a great number of experiences. Among these is the fact 
that the perception both of absolute distances and of differ- 
ences in distance, is greatly improved by practice. Children 
are generally inclined to localize very distant objects in the 
immediate neighborhood: they grasp at the moon, at the 
slater on the tower, etc. In the same way, it has been ob- 
served that the congenitally blind are, immediately after an 
operation, entirely unable to distinguish near and far. 

27. It is of importance for the development of this dis- 
crimination between far and near, that under the natural 
conditions of vision, not mere isolated points are presented, 
but extended three-dimensional objects^ or at least a number 
of points at different depths, to which we assign relatively 
different distances along their respective lines of orientation. 



§ 10. Spacial Ideas. 147 

Let us consider first the simplest case, where two points 
a and h are presented, lying at different depths and con- 
nected by a straight line. A change in the fixation from 
a to & is always accompanied by a change in convergence, 
and brings about, first, the passage through a continuous 
series of retinal local signs corresponding to the points on 
the line a 5, and, secondly, an inner tactual sensation, a, 
corresponding to the difference in convergence between a 
and h. This gives us the elements of a spacial fusion. 
The product of this fusion is, however, pecuHar in kind; 
it differs in both its components, that is, in the successive 
series of local signs and in the concomitant tactual sen- 
sations of movement, from the fusions that arise when we 
view a line in the field of vision (p. 142), which does not 
extend in the third dimension, but lies entirely in a given 
plane. In the latter case the changes in local signs and 
sensations of movement are alike for both eyes, while in 
the former case, that is^ in changing the point of fixation 
from far to near, or the reverse, the changes in local signs 
are opposite in the two eyes. For when the convergence 
gives the right eye a rotation towards the left, it will 
produce a rotation towards the right in the left eye, and 
vice versa. The same must also hold for the movement of 
the retinal images: when the image of the point as it 
leaves the point of fixation, moves towards the right in the 
right eye, it moves towards the left in the left eye, and vice 
versa. The first takes place when the eyes turn from a 
nearer to a more distant point, the latter, when they move 
in the opposite direction. Such fusions arising from move- 
ments of convergence have, so far as their qualitative and 
intensive components are concerned, a composition analogous 
to the fusion on which the arrangement of the elements in 
the field of vision with regard to one another depends; but 

10* 



148 I^- Psychical Compounds. 

the special way in which these elements are united is entirely 
different in the two cases. 

28. Thus, the fusions between local signs and inner tac- 
tual sensations form a system of complex local signs which is 
analogous to that described above (p. 142), but is in some 
respects unique in its composition. This second system of 
local signs adds to the reciprocal relation between the ob- 
jective elements, a relation between the ideating subject and 
these elements. This relation to the subject divides into two 
ideational elements, characterized by distinctive sensational 
elements : the idea of direction and that of distance. Both refer 
primarily to the point of orientation in the head of the 
ideating subject, and are then secondarily applied to the 
relations of external objects in regard to one another. Thus, 
we come to assign to two points which lie at different 
distances along the line of orientation a certain direction 
and a certain distance in relation to each other. All such 
ideas of spacial distance of various positions along the line 
of orientation, when taken together make up what are called 
ideas of depth., or when they are also ideas of particular 
single objects ideas of tJiree-dimensioiial objects. 

29. An idea of depth arising in the way described varies 
according to objective and subjective conditions. The deter- 
mination of the absolute distance of an isolated point in the 
field of vision, is always very uncertain. Even the deter- 
mination of the relative distance between two points a and h 
lying at different depths is generally certain only under the 
conditions assumed above, namely, the conditions that the 
points are connected by a line along which the points of 
fixation for the two eyes can move in changing the con- 
vergence from one to the other. We may call such lines 
which connect different points in space with one another 
lines of fixation. The principle may then be formulated: 



§ 10. Spacial Ideas. 149 

points in space are perceived in their true relations, only 
when they are connected by lines of fixation, along which 
the points of fixation of the two eyes may move. This 
principle is explicable on the ground that the conditions for 
a regular union of the local signs of the retina with sen- 
sations of strain that accompany convergence, are obviously 
fulfilled only when impressions are presented which can 
arouse on the retina local signs appropriate to the particular 
sensations of strain given through the convergence. 

30. When the conditions mentioned are not fulfilled and 
there either arises an imperfect and indefinite idea of the 
differences in the relative distance of the two points from the 
subject, or else the two points seem to be equally distant — 
a phenomenon which can appear only when one of the points 
is rigidly fixated — there always arises in the idea another 
important change consisting in the fact that only the fixated 
point is seen as single, the other is seen as double. The 
same thing happens in looking at extended objects when 
they are not connected with the binocular fixation-point by 
means of lines of fixation. Double images that arise when 
the fixated point is nearer than the observed object, are 
uncrossed i. e., the right belongs to the right eye, the left 
to the left eye; they are crossed when the point of fixation 
is beyond the object. 

Binocular localization in depth and binocular double 
images are, accordingly, phenomena directly interrelated. 
Where localization is indefinite and imperfect we have double 
images, and where, on the other hand, double images are 
absent, the localization in depth is definite and exact. The 
two phenomena stand in such a relation to the line of 
fixation that, when such a line is present, it aids in forming 
the idea of depth and in doing away at the same time with 
double images. Stilly this rule is not without exception, for 



150 II- Psyehical Compounds. 

when a point is rigidly fixated witli both eyes, double images 
may arise in spite of any lines of fixation that may be present. 
This is explained by the general conditions mentioned above 
(p. 149) as necessary for ideas of depth. Just as the absence 
of lines of fixation results in the lack of the required suc- 
cession of the local signs, so in a similar way the inner 
tactual sensations connected with movements of convergence 
are absent in rigid fixation. 



c. Belations between the Location of the Elements in Regard 
to one another and their Location in Regard to the Subject. 

31. "When the field of vision is thought of merely as a 
series of locations of visual impressions in relation to one 
another^ we represent this field to ourselves as a surface, 
and call the single objects lying in this surface two-dimen- 
sionalj in contrast with those which have also depth. But 
even an idea of two dimensions must always be related to 
the seeing subject in two ways. For, in the first place, 
every point in the field of vision is seen in a particular 
direction on the subjective line of orientation mentioned 
above (p. 144), and secondly, the whole field of vision is 
localized at a more or less definite distance from the subject. 

The location in a particular direction results in an erect 
ideational object corresponding to an inverted retinal image. 
This relation between the objective localization in direction 
and the retinal image is as necessary a result of ocular 
movements, as the inversion of the image is a result of the 
optical properties of the eye. Our line of orientation in 
space is the external line of regard, or, for binocular vision, 
the middle line resulting from the combined effects of move- 
ments of fixation. A direction upward on this line of ori- 
entation in external space corresponds to a direction down- 



§ 10. Spacial Ideas. 151 

ward in the internal ocular space where the retinal image 
lies, behind the centre of ocular rotation. And the converse 
is true for directions downward on the line of orientation. 
32. The location at some distance or other, which also 
is never absent, results in the fact that all the points of the 
field of vision seem to be arranged on the surface of a concave 
hemisphere the centre of which is the point of orientation, 
or, in monocular vision, the centre of the eye's rotation. 
Now small areas of a large curved surface appear plane, so 
that the two-dimensional ideas of single objects are as a 
rule plane\ thus, for example, figures drawn upon a plane, 
such as those of plane geometry. But as soon as some 
parts of the general field of vision separate from this field 
in such a way that they are localized before or behind, that 
is in different planes, the idea of two dimensions gives place 
to one of three. 

32 a. The fusions formed between qualitative local signs and 
inner tactual sensations when we change from the fixation of 
a more distant point to the fixation of a nearer, or the reverse, 
may be called complex local signs of depth. Such local signs 
form for every series of points lying before or behind the 
fixation-point, or for every extended body which is nothing but 
a series of such points, a regularly arranged system in which 
a stereometric series of points located at a particular distance 
is always unequivocally represented by a particular group of 
complex local signs of depth. When one of two points lying 
at difi'erent distances is fixated, the other is represented in a 
definite and unequivocal manner by the positions of its images 
in the two eyes, which positions with their corresponding complex 
local signs are different in the two eyes. The same is true of 
connected series of points or extended bodies. "When we look 
at a solid object, it throws images in the two eyes that are 
different from each other on account of the different relative 
X^ositions of the object with reference to the two .:;''^s. We 
designate the difference between the positions of a certain ^^^ ">int 



152 U. PsyGhieal Compounds. 

in the image in the two eyes as the binocular parallax. This 
parallax is zero for the point fixated and for those points which 
are equally distant on the line of orientation; for all other 
points it has some real positive or negative value according as 
such points are more or less distant than the fixation-point. 
If we fixate solid objects with both eyes, only the point fixated 
together with those points which are equidistant and in its 
neigborhood in the field of vision, will give rise to images cor- 
responding in position in the two eyes. All points of the 
object located at different distances, give images varying in 
position and size. These differences in the images are just what 
produce the idea of the solidity of the object when the proper 
lines of fixation are present. For in the way above described, 
the angle of binocular parallax for the image of any point lying 
before or behind the point of fixation and connected with the 
same by a line of fixation, furnishes, according as the direction 
and magnitude of the parallax varies, a measure of the relative 
distance of this point in depth. This measure it furnishes 
through the complex local signs connected with the angle of 
parallax. This angle of parallax for a given objective depth, 
decreases as the distance of the solid object from the subject in- 
creases, so that the impression of solidity diminishes, the further 
off the objects are, and when the distance is so great that all 
angles of parallax disappear, the body will appear flat, unless 
the associations to be discussed later (§ 16, 9) produce an idea 
of depth. 



33. The influence of binocular vision on the idea of depth 
may be investigated experimentally by means of a stereo- 
scope. This instrument consists of two prisms with their 
angles of refraction turned toward each other in such a way 
that it renders possible a binocular combination of two plane 
drawings which correspond to the two retinal images from 
a three-dimensional object. The influence of the various 
conditions that underlie the formation of ideas of depth, 
may, in this way, be studied much better than by looking 



§ 10. Spacial Ideas. 153 

at actual three-dimensional objects, for in tlie stereoscope we 
may vary tlie conditions at will. 

To give a concrete illustration, it is observed that complex 
stereoscopic pictures generally require several movements of 
convergence back and forth before a clear plastic idea arises. 
Furthermore, the effect of the parallax appears in looking 
at stereoscopic pictures the parts of which are movable in 
respect to each other. Such movements are always accom- 
panied by changes in the relief which answer exactly to the 
changes in binocular parallax. This parallax is dependent 
on the distance of the two eyes from each other, so that 
ideas of depth can be produced even in the case of objects 
too distant in reality to give a plastic effect. Plastic effect 
is secured in such cases by combining in the stereoscope, 
pictures taken from positions much further apart than the 
two eyes. This is done, for example, in making stereoscopic 
photographs of landscapes. The result is that these photo- 
graphs when combined, do not look like real landscapes, but 
like plastic models regarded from a short distance. 

34. In monocular vision all the conditions which are 
connected with movements of convergence are absent. There 
are, furthermore, no binocular differences in the retinal 
images such as may be artificially reproduced in the stereo- 
scope. But even here not all the influences are wanting to 
produce a localization in the third dimension, although this 
localization is more imperfect. 

The direct influence of movements of accommodation is, 
in comparison with other conditions, relatively small. Still, 
like movements of convergence, movements of accommodation 
are also accompanied by sensations which can be clearly per- 
ceived in the case of greater changes of accommodation from 
distant, to neighboring points. For smaller changes in depth 
these sensations are very uncertain. As a result the move- 



154 II- Psychical Compounds. 

ment of a point in the direction of the line of regard, when 
it is looked at with only one eye, is generally not clearly 
observed until a change in the size of the retinal image 
appears. 

35. For the development of monocular ideas of depth 
the influences which the components of the so-called per- 
spective exercise, are of the greatest importance. These are 
the relative magnitude of the angle of vision, the direction 
of limiting lines, the direction of shadows, the change in 
colors due to atmospheric absorption, etc. All these in- 
fluences, depend on associations of ideas, and will, therefore, 
be treated in a later chapter (§16). 

35 a. "We have in general the same opposing theories for 
the explanation of visual ideas as for tactual ideas (p. 125). 
The empirical theory has sometimes committed the fallacy of 
limiting itself to optics and turning the real problem of space 
perception over to touch. In such cases it has tried to explain 
only how a localization of visual ideas can take place with the 
aid of experience, on the basis of already existing spacial ideas 
from touch. Such an interpretation is, however, not only self- 
contradictory, but it also conflicts with experience, which shows 
that in normal persons with vision, visual space perception de- 
termines tactual, not the reverse (p. 115). The fact of general 
development, that touch is the more primitive sense, can not be 
applied to the development of the individual. The chief evi- 
dences in support of nativistic theories are, first, the meta- 
morphopsia after dislocation of retinal elements (p. 132) and, 
secondly, the position of the line of orientation (p. 144), which 
indicates united functioning of the two eyes from the first. It 
has been noted already (p. 132) that the metamorphopsia and 
other related phenomena prove the exact opposite as soon as 
the changes to which they are due become stationary. Further- 
more, the fact that in long continued use of only one eye the 
line of orientation conies to coincide with the line of regard 
(p. 144), proves that the position of this line is not given from 
the first, but that it has arisen under the influence of the con- 



§ 10. Spacial Ideas. 155 

ditions of vision. Still another fact against the nativistic and 
in favor of the genetic theory, is the development in the child 
of the synergy of ocular movements under the influence of ex- 
ternal stimuli and the organization of space perceptions which 
apparently accompanies it. Here as in many other respects the 
development of most animals is different. In animals the reflex 
connections of retinal impressions with movements of the eyes 
and head, function perfectly immediately after birth (v. inf. 
§ 19, 2). 

The fusion theory has gained the ascendency over older na- 
tivistic and empirical views, chiefly through the more thorough 
investigation of the phenomena of binocular vision. Nativism 
has difficulty with the question why we generally see objects 
single although they produce images in each of the two eyes. 
The effort is made to avoid the difficulty by assuming that two 
identical retinal points are connected with the same optic fibre 
which divides in the chiasma, and that in this way the two 
retinal points represent what in the sensorium is only a single 
point. This doctrine of the "identity of the two retinas" 
became, however, untenable as soon as the actual conditions of 
binocular vision in three dimensions began to be investigated. 

Keferences. Helmholtz, Physiol. Optik, sect. 3. Hering, Her- 
mann's Handbuch Physiol., vol. Ill, pt. 1, sect. 4. Wundt, Grund- 
ztige der phys. Psych. voL II, chap. 13, and Lectures on Hum. and 
Anim. Psych., lectures 10 to 13. On the Keenness of Vision: Aubert, 
Physiol, der Netzhaut, (1865) p. 187. Wertheim, Archiv f. Ophth., 
vol. 33, no. 2. A. E. Pick, Archiv f. Ophth., vol. 45. A. Konig, Ber. 
der Berliner Akad., 1897. On eye Movements: Hering, Lehre vom 
binocularen Sehen, 1868. Wundt, Grundziige der physiol. Psych., 
vol. II, p. 109, and Lectures on Hum. and Anim. Psych., lecture 10, 
see fig. 21 for the muscles of the eye. On Geometrical Optical 
Illusions: J. Oppel, Ber. des physik. Vereins zu Frankfurt, 1854, 1856 
and 1860. Muller-Lyer, Archiv f. Physiol., Supplement for 1889, 
and Zeitschr. f. Psychol, und Physiol, d. Sinnesorgane, vols. 9 and 
13. LiPFS, Raum/asthetik und geometrisch-optische Tau.,c''iungen, 1897. 
Wundt, Abhandl. der sachs. Ges. d. Wiss., math. -phys. Ci., vol. 24 
(1898), and Philos. Studien, vol. 14, and Lectures on Hum. and Anim. 
Psych., lecture 10 (figures 22 and 23). On the Influence of Conver- 
gence and Accommodation: Hillebrand, Zeitschr. f. Psych, und 
Physiol, der Sinnesorgane, vol. 7. Arrer, Philos. Studien, vol. 13. 



156 I^- Psychical Com'pounds. 

On Binocular Vision, and Stereoscopic Vision: Wheatstone, Philo- 
sophical Transactions, 1838. Dondees, Archiv f. Ophth., vol. 17. 
WuNDT, Lectures on Hum. and Anim. Psych., lectures 12 and 13 
(figures 26 — 37). On the Behavior of the congenitally Blind after 
Operation: Helmholtz, Physiol. Optik, p. 428. Rahlmann, Zeitschr. 
f Psych, u. Physiol, d. Sinnesorgane, vol. 2. Uhthoff, Zeitschr. f. 
Psych, u. Physiol, d. Sinnesorgane, vol. 14. On Theories of spacial 
Vision: Nativistic Theories: J. Muller, Zur vergl. Physiol, des Ge- 
sichtssinns, 1826. Panum, Physiol. Untersuchungen iiber das Sehen 
mit zwei Augen, 1858. Hering, Hermann's Handb., vol. Ill, pt. 1. 
Empirical Theories: Berkeley, Essay toward a New Theory of Vision, 
1709. Helmholtz, Physiol. Optik, § 23. Fusion Theories: Herbart, 
Psychologie als Wissenschaft, Pt. 2, sect. 1, chap. 3. Wundt, Bei- 
trage zur Theorie der Sinneswahrnehmungen, (1862) pts. 3 and 4, and 
Philos. Studien, vol. 14. Lipps, Grundthatsachen des Seelenlebens, 
chap. 23, and Psychol. Untersuchungen, I, 1885. 



§ 11. TEMPOEAL IDEAS. 

1. All our ideas are at once spacial and temporal. But 
just as the conditions for the spacial arrangement of im- 
pressions belong originally to the tactual and visual senses, 
and just as spacial relations are only secondarily carried 
over from these to all other sensations, so there are only 
two kinds of sensations, namely, the inner tactual sensations 
from movements and the auditory sensations, which are 
primary sources of temporal ideas. Still, there is a charac- 
teristic difference between spacial and temporal ideas in the 
fact that in the case of spacial ideas the two senses men- 
tioned are the only ones which can develop an independent 
spacial order, while in the case of temporal ideas the two 
most important kinds of sensation are merely those in which 
the conditions are most favorable for the rise of temporal 
ideas. These conditions are not entirely wanting in any sen- 
sations. This indicates that the psychological basis of tem- 
poral ideas is more general^ and that it is not determined 



§ 11. Temporal Ideas. 157 

by the special structures of particular sense organs. In 
agreement with this view is the fact that we attribute to 
subjective processes, *such as feeHngs and emotions, the same 
temporal attributes as we attribute to ideas. It is to be 
noted, however, that no justification for the conclusion that 
time perception is in itself a more universal form of per- 
ception, is to be found in this fact that the conditions 
of time perception are more general than are those of 
space perception. In the same way that we carry over 
spacial attributes from the two senses that give us space 
perception to other kinds of sensations, so also we give 
spacial attributes secondarily to feelings and affective proc- 
esses, through the sensations and ideas inseparably connected 
with them. It may with equal right be doubted whether 
affective processes in themselves, without their related ideas, 
would have temporal attributes, for among the conditions of 
a temporal order are certain attributes of the sensational 
elements of ideas. The real facts in the case are that all 
psychical contents, are at once spacial and temporal. The 
spacial order arises from certain particular sensational ele- 
ments : in normal cases where vision is present from visual im- 
pressions, in blindness, from tactual impressions. Time ideas, 
on the other hand, can arise from all possible sensations. 

2. Temporal compounds like spacial, and in contrast to 
intensive ideas, are characterized by the definite, unchange- 
able order of their component elements. If this order is 
changed, the given compound becomes another, even though 
the quality of its components remains the same. In spacial 
ideas, this unchangeableness of the order refers only to the 
relation of the elements to one another, not to the relation 
of the elements to the ideating subject. In temporal com- 
pounds, on the other hand, when the relation of one element 
is changed with respect to other elements, it is at the same 



158 li- Psychical Compounds. 

time changed with respect to the ideating subject. There is 
no change of position in time analogous to that possible in 
the case of space compounds. 

2 a. This property of the absolute, strictly speaking unchange- 
able, relation with respect to the ideating subject which belongs 
to every temporal compound, and every time element, however 
short, is what we call the -flow of time. Every moment in time 
filled by any content whatever, has, on account of this flow, 
such a relation to the ideating subject that no other moment 
can be substituted for it. With space the case is just reversed : 
the very possibility of substituting any spacial element in its 
relation to the subject for any other element whatever, is what 
gives rise to the percept of constaney., or absolute duration, as 
we express it, by applying a time idea to a space idea. The 
idea of absolute duration, that is, of time in which no change 
takes place, is strictly speaking impossible in time perception 
itself. The relation to the subject must change continually. 
"We speak of an impression as lasting, when its single periods 
in time are exactly alike so far as their sensational contents and 
affective contents are concerned, so that they differ only in their 
relation to the subject. The concept of duration when applied 
to time is, therefore, a merely relative concept. One time idea 
may be more lasting than another, but no time idea can have 
absolute duration. Even an unusually long unchanging sen- 
sation can not be retained. We interrupt it continually with 
other sensational and affective contents. 

We may, however, separate the two temporal relations always 
united in actual experience, namely, that of the elements to one 
another, and that of the elements to the ideating subject, since 
each relation is connected with certain particular attributes of 
time ideas. In fact, this separation of the two relations found 
its expression in special terms for certain forms of occurrence 
in time, even prior to an exact psychological analysis of time 
ideas. If the relation of the elements to one another is alone 
attended to, without regard to their relation to the subject, 
temporal modes come to be discriminated, such, for example, as 
brief, long, regularly repeating, irregularly changing, etc. If, 



§ 11. Temporal Ideas. 159 

on the contrary, the relation of the subject is attended to, and 
the objective forms of occurrence neglected, we have as the chief 
forms of this relation the temporal stages, past, present, and 
future. 

A. TEMPORAL TOUCH IDEAS. 

3. The original development of temporal ideas belongs 
to touch. Tactual sensations, accordingly, furnish the general 
substratum for the rise of both the spacial and temporal 
arrangements of ideational elements (p. 115, 3). The spacial 
functions of touch, however^ come from the outer tactual 
sensations, while the iimer touch sensations which accompany 
movements are the primary contents of the earliest temporal 
ideas. 

The mechanical properties of the Hmbs are important 
physiological bases for the rise of these ideas. The arms 
and legs can be moved in the shoulder-joints and hip-joints 
by their muscles, and are at the same time subject to the 
action of gravitation drawing them downward. As a result 
there are two kinds of movements possible for these ex- 
tremities. First, we have movements which are continually 
regulated by voluntary activity of the muscles and may, 
therefore, be indefinitely varied and accommodated at every 
moment to existing needs — we will call these the arhyth- 
mical movements. Secondly, we have movements in which the 
voluntary energy of the muscles is operative only so far as 
it is required to set the limbs oscillating in their joints and 
to maintain this movement — rhythmical movements. We 
may neglect for our present consideration the arhythmical 
movements exhibited in the various uses of the limbs. Their 
temporal attributes are in all probability derived from the 
rhythmical movements, and only a very indefinite comparison 
of the duration of irregular movements is possible. 



150 ^^' Psychical Compounds. 

4. With rhytlimical movements the case is different. Their 
significance for the psychological development of time ideas 
is due to the same principle as that which gives them their 
importance as physiological organs, namely, the principle of 
the isochronism of oscillations of like amplitude. In walking, 
the regular oscillations of our legs in the hip-joints not only 
reduce the amount of the muscular energy expended, but 
also reduce to a minimum the continual voluntary control 
of the movements. Furthermore, in natural walking the 
arms are supplementary aids. Their oscillation is not inter- 
rupted at every step as is that of the legs by the placing 
of the foot on the ground, so that they furnish, because of 
the continuity of their movement, a means for the more 
uniform regulation of the whole action. 

Every single period of oscillation in such a movement is 
made up of a continuous succession of sensations which are 
repeated in the following period in exactly the same order. 
The two limits of the period are marked by a complex of 
outer tactual sensations: the beginning by the impression 
accompanying the removal of the foot from the ground, the 
end by the impr-ession accompanying the return of the foot 
to the ground. Between these there is a continuous series 
of weak inner tactual sensations from the joints and muscles. 
The beginning and . end of this series of inner sensations 
coincide in time with the appearance of outer sensations, 
and are more intense than the intermediate internal sensa- 
tions. These more intense internal sensations accompany 
the impulse of movement coming to the muscles and joints 
and the sudden inhibition of these impulses, and they assist 
much in marking off the successive periods. 

Connected with this regular succession of sensations is a 
regular and exactly parallel series of feelings. If we con- 
sider a single period in a series of rhythmical movements, 



§ 11. Temporal Ideas. 161 

there is always at its beginning and end a feeling of fulfilled 
expectation. Between the two limits of the period there is, 
beginning with the first movement, a gradually growing feeling 
of strained expectation., which suddenly sinks at the last 
moment from its maximum to zero, and gives place to the 
rapidly rising and sinldng feeling of fulfillment. From this 
point on the same series is again repeated. Thus, the whole 
process of a rhythmical touch movement consists, on its 
affective side, of a succession of two qualitatively antagonistic 
feelings. In their general character these feelings belong to 
the series of straining and relaxing feelings (p. 92). One 
of these feelings is very rapid in its course, the other grad- 
ually reaches a maximum and then suddenly disappears. As 
a result, the most intense affective processes are crowded 
together at the extremities of the periods, and are made all 
the more intense through the contrast between the feeling 
of satisfaction and the preceding feeling of expectation. Just 
as this sharply marked limit between the different periods 
has its sensational substratum in the strong outer and inner 
tactual impressions arising at this instant, as above pointed 
out, so there is also a complete series of feehngs of expec- 
tation corresponding to the continuous series of weaker inner 
tactual sensations accompanying the oscillatory movements 
of the limbs. 

5. The simplest temporal ideas of touch are made up of 
the rhythmically arranged sensations which, when like oscil- 
latory movements are repeatedly carried out, follow one 
another with perfect uniformity in the manner described. 
But even in ordinary walking a slight tendency towards a 
somewhat greater complication arises. The beginning of the 
first of two successive periods is emphasized, both in the 
sensation and in the accompanying feeling, more than the 
beginning of the second period. In this case the rhythm of 

WuNDT, Psycliology. 2. edit. W 



162 I^' Psychical Compounds. 

movement begins to be metrical A simple regular succession 
of accented and unaccented ideas corresponds to the simj^lest 
measure, ^/g-time. It arises easily in ordinary walking because 
of the physiological superiority of the right side, and appears 
very regularly when several persons are walking together — 
in marching. In the latter case even more than two periods 
may be united into one rhythmical unit. The same is true 
of the complicated rhythmical movements of the dance. But 
in such composite tactual rhythms the auditory temporal 
ideas have a decided influence. 

B. TEMPORAL AUDITORY IDEAS. 

6. The attribute of the auditory sense which most of all 
adapts it to the more accurate perception of the temporal 
relations in external processes, is the exceedingly short per- 
sistence of its sensations after the cessation of the external 
stimulation, as a result of which any temporal succession of 
sounds is reproduced with almost perfect fidehty in the cor- 
responding succession of sensations. Connected with this 
fact are certain psychological properties of temporal auditory 
ideas. In the first place, temporal auditory ideas differ from 
temporal ideas of touch in that often only the extremities 
of the single intervals that go to make up the total idea, 
are marked by sensations. In such a case the relations of 
such intervals to one another are estimated by means of 
the apparently empty or heterogeneously filled intervals that 
lie between the limiting sensations. 

This is especially noticeable in the case of rhythmical 
auditory ideas. There are in general two possible forms of 
such ideas ; continuous, or only rarely interrupted successions 
of relatively lasting sensations, and discontinuous successions 
of strokes, in which only the extremities of the rhythmical 
periods are marked by external sounds. Eor a discontinuous 



§ 11. Temporal Ideas. 163 

succession of entirely uniform sounds the temporal attributes 
of the ideas are in general more apparent than for lasting 
impressions, since in the former case any effects from the 
tonal qualities as such are entirely obviated. We may con- 
fine our consideration to discontinuous series, because the 
principles that apply here hold for continuous successions 
also. In fact, the rhythmical division in the latter case, is 
made by means of certain single accents which are either 
given in the external impression or voluntarily applied to it. 

7. A series of regular strokes made in this way as the 
simplest form of temporal auditory ideas, as for example, a 
series of ticks of a clock or of a metronome, is distinguished 
from the simplest form of temporal touch ideas, described 
above (p. 161), mainly by the absence of all objective sensa- 
tional content in the intervals. The external impressions 
here do nothing but divide the separate intervals from one 
another. Still, the intervals of such a series are not entirely 
empty, they are filled by subjective affective and sensational 
contents which correspond fully to those observed in tactual 
ideas. Most emphatic of all are the affective contents of the 
intervals consisting of successive periods of expectation. This 
expectation gradually rises in each period and is at the end 
of such a period suddenly fulfilled. Even the sensational sub- 
stratum for this feeling is not entirely absent; it is merely 
more variable. Sometimes it is nothing but the sensations 
of tension of the tympanic membrane, in their various inten- 
sities. Then again, in those cases in which an involuntary 
rhythmical movement is connected with the auditory series, 
it is the accompanying sensations of tension from other 
organs, or finally, it is a series of some other kind of inner 
tactual sensations. 

The influence of the subjective elements on the character 
of time ideas shows itself most clearly in the case of the 

11* 



164 II' Psychical Compounds. 

rhythmical auditory impressions in the effect produced by 
different rates of succession of the sensations. A certain 
medium rate of about 0.2 sec. is found to be most favorable 
for the union of a number of successive auditory impressions, 
and it is easy to observe that this is the rate at which the 
above mentioned subjective sensations and feelings are most 
pronounced in their alternation. If the rate is made much 
slower, the strain of expectation is too great and passes into 
an unpleasurable feeling which becomes more and more un- 
endurable. If, on the contrary, the rate is accelerated, the 
rise of the feeling of expectation is interrupted so soon 
that the feeling is barely noticeable. Thus, in both di- 
rections, limits are approached at which the synthesis of 
the impressions into a rhythmical time idea is no longer 
possible. The upper limit is about one second, the lower 
about 0.1 sec. 

8. Then again, this influence of the course of our sen- 
sations and feelings upon our perception of temporal inter- 
vals, shows itself just as clearly in the changes that our 
ideas of such an interval undergo when the conditions of 
perception are varied without changing the objective length 
of the interval. Thus, it has been observed that in general 
a period divided into intervals is estimated as longer than 
one not so divided. We have here a phenomenon analogous 
to that observed in the illusion with interrupted Knes (p. 137). 
The overestimation is always much greater for temporal 
intervals. This is obviously due to the fact that the oft 
repeated alternations of sensations and feelings in an interval 
of time have a greater influence than the interruption of the 
movement through points of division in the case of the 
similar space-illusion. Furthermore, if in a series of regular 
beats, single impressions are emphasized by their greater 
intensity or by some qualitative peculiarity, the result is al- 



§ 11. Temporal Ideas. 165 

ways that the intervals preceding and following the empha- 
sized impression are overestimated in comparison with the 
other intervals of the same series. If, however, a certain 
rhythm is produced successively with weak and then with 
strong beats, the rate appears slower in the first case than 
in the second. 

These phenomena are also explicable from the influence 
of the sensational and affective changes. An impression dif- 
ferent from the rest, produces a change in the course of 
the sensations, and especially in the course of the feelings 
which precede its apprehension, for there must be a more 
intense strain of expectation and a correspondingly stronger 
feeling of relief or satisfaction. The feeling of expectation 
lengthens the interval preceding the impression, the feeling of 
relief that following. The case is different when the whole 
series is made up at one time of weak impressions, and at 
another of strong ones. In order to perceive a weak im- 
pression we must concentrate our attention upon it more. 
The sensations and feelings of tension are, accordingly, more 
intense, as may be easily observed, for weaker beats than 
for stronger ones. Here too, then, the different intensities 
of the subjective elements that give rise to the temporal 
ideas are reflected in the differences between these ideas. 
The effect is, therefore, not only lost, but even reversed, 
when we compare, not weak beats with strong, but strong 
beats with still stronger beats. 

9. The tendency found in the case of rhythmical touch 
ideas for at least two like periods to unite and form a reg- 
ular metrical unit, shows itself in auditory ideas also, only 
in a much more marked degree. In tactual movements, 
where the sensations that limit the single periods are under 
the influence of the will, this tendency to form a rhythmical 
series shows itself in the actual alternation of weaker and 



166 11. Psychical Compounds. 

stronger impressions. With auditory sensations, on the other 
hand, where the single impressions can be dependent only 
on external conditions, and are, therefore, objectively exactly 
alike, this tendency may lead to the following characteristic 
illusion. In a series of beats which are exactly alike in in- 
tensity and are separated by equal periods of time, certain 
single beats, occurring at regular intervals, are always heard 
as stronger than the others. The rhythm that most frequently 
arises when there is nothing to determine it, is that known 
as Ys-time, that is, a regular alternation of arses and theses. 
A slight modification of this, the ^/g-time, where two unac- 
cented beats follow one accented beat, is also very common. 
This tendency to mark time can be overcome only by an 
effort of the will, and then only for very fast or very slow 
rates, where, from the very nature of the series, the limits of 
rhythmical perception are nearly reached. For medium rates, 
which are especially favorable to the rise of rhythmical ideas, a 
suppression of this tendency toward rhythmical arrangement 
for any length of time is hardly possible. If the effort is made 
to unite as many impressions as possible in a unitary time 
idea, the phenomena become more complicated. "We have 
accents of different degrees which alternate in regular suc- 
cession with unaccented members of the series and thus, 
through the resulting divisions of the whole into groups, the 
number of impressions that may be comprehended in a single 
idea is considerably increased. The presence of two different 
grades of accent gives ^1^-tim.Q and Ys-^me, the presence of 
three grades gives Y4~'thne and ^4-^^16, and as forms with 
three feet there are '^j^-iim.Q and ^Yg-time. More than three 
grades of accentuation or, when the unaccented note is 
counted, more than four grades of intensity, are not to be 
found in either musical or poetical rhythms, nor can we 
produce more by voluntary formation of rhythmical ideas. 



<^ 11. Temporal Ideas. 167 

Obviously, these three grades of accentuation mark tlie limits 
of the possible complexity of temporal ideas, in a way anal- 
ogous to that in which the maximal number of included 
impressions (§ 15, 6) marks the limits of the length of tem- 
poral ideas. 

The phenomena of subjective accentuation and the in- 
fluence of this accentuation on the sensations that go to 
make up the rhythms, show clearly that temporal ideas, 
like spacial ideas, are not derived from objective impres- 
sions alone, but that there are always connected with these, 
subjective elements which help by their character to deter- 
mine the mode of apprehending the objective impressions. The 
primary cause of the accentuation of a particular impression 
is always to be found in the increase in the intensity of the 
preceding and concomitant feelings and inner tactual sen- 
sations of movements. This increase in the intensity of the 
subjective elements is then carried over to the objective im- 
pression, and makes the latter also seem more intense. The 
strengthening of the subjective elements may be voluntary^ 
when the tension of the muscles which produce inner tactual 
sensations is voluntarily intensified, thus producing a corre- 
sponding intensification in the feeling of expectation. Or 
the strengthening of the subjective elements may be in- 
voluntary^ when a grouping of the elements of the temporal 
idea is brought about as an immediate consequence of the 
fluctuations in sensation and feeling that take place during 
the effort to include as many factors as possible in the 
percept. 

C. GENERAL CONDITIONS FOR TEMPORAL IDEAS. 

10. If we seek to account for the rise of temporal ideas 
on the basis of the phenomena just discussed, we must start 
with the fact that a sensation thought of by itself can no 



168 I^- Psychical Compounds. 

more have temporal than it could have spacial attributes. 
Position in time can be possible only when single psychical 
elements enter into certain characteristic relations with other 
such elements. This condition holds for temporal ideas just 
as much as for spacial ideas. The nature of the union is, 
however, characteristic and essentially different for the two 
kinds of ideas. 

The members of a temporal series a h c d e f^ can all 
be immediately presented as a single whole, when the series 
has reached /", just as well as if they were a series of points 
in space. In the case of a spacial idea, however, the ele- 
ments would, on account of original ocular reflexes, be ar- 
ranged in relation to the point of fixation, and this fixation 
point could, at different times, be any one of the impressions 
a to f. In time ideas, on the other hand, it is always the 
impression of the present moment in relation to which all 
the rest are arranged in time. "When a new impression 
becomes, in a similar manner, the present impression, even 
though its sensational contents are exactly the same as that 
of the earlier idea, still, it will be perceived as subjectively dif- 
ferent, for though the affective state accompanying a sensation 
may, indeed, be related to the feelings of another moment, 
the two can never be identical. Suppose, for example, that 
following the series a h c d e f^ there is a second series of 
impressions, a' h' c' d' e' /', in which a' = a, h' =^ &, c' = c, 
etc., so far as their sensational elements are concerned. Let 
us represent the accompanying feelings hj a ^ y d e cp and 
a' /?' y' d' e' cp'. Then a and «', ^ and /?', y and 7', etc., 
will be similar feelings, because the sensations are the same ; 
but they will not be identical, because every affective ele- 
ment depends, not only upon the sensation with which it is 
immediately connected, but also upon the state of the subject 
as determined by the totality of its experiences. The state 



§ 11. Temporal Ideas. 169 

of the subject is different for each of the members of the 
series a' h' c' d! . . ., than it was for the corresponding 
member of the series a b c d . . .^ because when the im- 
pression a' arrives, a has already been present, and so a 
can be associated with a, while no such thing was possible 
in the case of a. Analogous differences in the affective states 
show themselves in composite series when repeated. These 
states are never identical, however much the subjective con- 
ditions of the momentarily present feelings may agree, for 
every one of them has its characteristic relation to the to- 
tality of psychical processes. If we assume, for example, a 
succession of a number of similar series a b c d, a' b' d d' ., 
ct' b" d' d!\ etc., in which a equals o! and d\ b equals V 
and V\ etc., so far as their sensational contents are con- 
cerned, still, d' differs from a in its affective conditions, for 
a! can be associated only with a., while d' can be associated 
with both d and a. Besides this, it is true that other 
differences between impressions alike in themselves always 
arise from some chance accompanying sensations which in- 
fluence the affective state. 

11. Since every element of a temporal idea is, as above 
remarked, placed in some fixed relation to the impression 
immediately present, it follows that this present impression 
will have an attribute which makes it more prominent than 
any of the other elements of the same idea. This attribute 
is similar to that possessed by the "point of fixation in the 
field of vision, or by the central points of the tactual sur- 
faces, and consists in the fact that the present impression 
is the most clearly and distmctly perceived of all the ele- 
ments of the idea. But there is a great difference in that 
this most distinct perception in the temporal idea is not con- 
nected with the physiological organization of the sense-organ, 
but is due entirely to the general attributes of the ideating 



170 ^^- Psychical Compounds. 

subject, as expressed in the affective processes. The mo- 
mentary feeling accompanying the immediately present im- 
pression is what helps to make it the impression most clearly 
perceived. "We may, accordingly, call the part of a temporal 
idea which forms the immediate impression the fixation-point 
of the idea or in general, since it does not depend on ex- 
ternal structure, as does the fixation-point of spacial ideas, 
we may call it figuratively the inner fixation-point. The 
impressions that lie outside this point of fixation, that is, im- 
pressions that have preceded the present, are indirectly per- 
ceived. They are arranged in a regular gradation of dimin- 
ishing degrees of clearness, from the fixation-point. A unitary 
temporal idea is possible only so long as the degree of clear- 
ness of each of its elements has some positive value. When 
the clearness of any element sinks to zero, the idea divides 
into its components. 

12. The inner fixation-point of temporal percepts differs 
essentially from the outer fixation points of spacial percepts 
in that its character is primarily determined, not by sensa- 
tional, but by affective elements. Since these affective ele- 
ments are continually changing, in consequence of the vary- 
ing conditions of psychical life, the inner fixation-point is 
also always changing. This change of the inner fixation- 
point is called the continuous flow of time. By the phrase 
continuous flow we mean to express the fact that no moment 
of time is like any other, and that no such moment can 
return (cf. sup. p. 158, 2 a). This fact is connected with the 
one-dimensional character of time, which is due to this very 
condition that the inner fixation-point of temporal ideas is 
continually moving forward, so that a single point can never 
recur. The arrangement of time in one dimension, with 
reference always to a changing point of fixation in which 
the subject represents himself, is what gives rise to the result 



§ 11. Temporal Ideas. 171 

tliat the elements of time ideas have a fixed relation, not 
only with respect to one another, but also with respect to 
the ideating subject (p. 157, 2). 

13. If we try to give an account of the means through 
which this reciprocally interdependent order of the parts of 
an idea, and the determination of these parts with reference 
to the ideating subject, originate, it is obvious that these 
means can be nothing but certain of the elements connected 
with the idea itself, which elements, however, considered in 
themselves, have no temporal attributes, but gain such at- 
tributes through their union. "We may call these elements 
temporal signs, after the analogy of local signs. The charac- 
teristic conditions for the development of temporal ideas in- 
dicate from the first that these temporal signs are, in the 
main, affective elements. In the course of any rhythmical 
series every impression is immediately characterized by the 
concomitant feeling of expectation, while the sensation is of 
influence only in so far as it arouses the feeling. This may 
be clearly perceived when a rhythmical series is suddenly 
interrupted. Furthermore, the only sensations that are never 
absent as components of all time ideas are the imier tactual 
sensations. In the case of tactual time ideas these inner 
tactual sensations fuse immediately with the tactual sensa- 
tions which arise from the movements of the part of the 
body in action, while in auditory and other ideas that are 
brought into the time form, they stand out distinctly from 
the other outer impressions as subjective accompanying phe- 
nomena. We may, accordingly, regard the feelings of ex- 
pectation as the qualitative temporal signs, the inner tactual 
sensations described, as the intensive, temporal signs of a 
temporal idea. The idea itself must then be looked upon 
as a fusion of the two kinds of temporal signs with each 
other and with the objective sensations arranged in the tem- 



172 II- Psychical Compounds. 

poral form. Thus, the inner tactual sensations, as a series 
of intensive sensations, give a uniform measure for the ar- 
rangement of the objective sensations; the accompanying 
feelings, on the other hand, furnish the qualitative charac- 
teristics of these impressions which are necessary for the 
temporal ideas. 

13 a. The inner tactual sensations play a similar part in 
the formation of both time ideas and space ideas. This common 
sensational substratum leads very naturally to a recognition of 
a relation between these two forms of perception, which finds 
its expression in the geometrical representation of time by a 
straight line. Still, there is an essential difference between the 
complex system of temporal signs and the systems of local signs 
in the fact that the former is based primarily, not on the qual- 
itative attributes of sensations connected with certain special 
external sense-organs, but on feelings which may come in exactly 
the same way from the most widely differing kinds of sensation, 
for these feelings are not dependent on the objective content 
of the sensations, but on their subjective synthesis. The marked 
variations in the conditions that control the course of these 
feelings explain, furthermore, why it is that our time ideas are 
very much less certain than our space ideas. The influence of 
the particular course of the feelings in any given case shows 
itself in the fact that the degree of certainty of any subjective 
estimation of a time interval depends primarily on the duration 
of the interval. Our comparison of temporal quantities, as, 
for example, in the case of successive rhythmical periods, is 
most accurate, other things being equal, for those intervals 
which are most favorable in point of length for rhythmical di- 
vision. This favorable interval is, in the case of auditory sen- 
sations about 0.2 seconds (7). It may be observed when such 
an interval is given that the exactness of perception is conditioned 
by the favorable succession of feelings of expectation and ful- 
fillment. Such a favorable succession makes it possible to rec- 
ognize with greatest certainty when a new impression inter- 
rupts the feeling of expectation before it has risen to the same 
intensity as in a preceding case, or when, on the other hand, 



§ 12. Composite Feelings. 173 

the new impression has, by its delay, allowed the feeling to 
reach a higher degree of intensity. "When the succession of 
impressions is very slow the feelings of expectation become ex- 
cessively intense. When, on the other hand, the succession is 
very rapid, it is almost possible to notice a feeling of surprise 
accompanying every impression. Even this feeling of surprise, 
however, can reach only a moderate intensity because of the 
relatively small degree of intensity attained by the preceding 
feelings of tension. For the facts of time memory compare 
§ 16. 

13 b. Here again we have on the question of the psycho- 
logical origin of time ideas the same opposed nativistic and 
genetic theories which we had in the case of spacial ideas 
(p. 125, 12 a). In this case, however, nativism has never devel- 
oped a theory in any proper sense. It usually limits itself to 
the general assumption that time is a "connate form of per- 
ception", without attempting to give any account of the in- 
fluence of the elements and conditions of temporal ideas which 
can be actually demonstrated. The genetic theories of older 
psychology, as, for example, that of Herbart, seek to deduce 
time perception from ideational elements only. This is, how- 
ever, pure speculation and loses sight of the conditions given 
in actual experience. 

References. Vierordt, Der Zeitsinn, 1868. Mach, (English trans.) 
Analysis of Sensations. This is an attempt to develop a nativistic theory. 
Meumann, Philos. Studien, vols. 8 and 9. Schumann, Zeitsch. f. Psych, 
u. Physiol, d. Sinnesorgane, vol. 4. Nichols, Amer. Journal of Psychol., 
vol. 4. On Rhythm: Meumann, Philos. Studien, vol. 10. Bolton, 
Amer. Journal of Psychol., vol. 6. Bucher, Arbeit und Rhythmus, 
2nd. ed. 1899. Smith, Philos. Studien, vol. 16. Wundt, Grrundziige 
der phys. Psych., vol. II, chapt. 16, § 5, and Lectures on Hum. and 
Anim. Psychol., lectures 17 and 18. 



§ 12. COMPOSITE FEELINGS. 

1. In the development of temporal ideas it appears clearly 
that the discrimination of sensational and affective components 
in immediate experience is purely a product of abstraction. 



174 II' Psychical Compounds. 

For time ideas the abstraction proves impossible, because, in 
this case, certain feelings play an essential part in the rise 
of the ideas. Time ideas may, therefore, be called ideas 
only when the final results of the process, that is, the ar- 
rangement of certain sensations in relation to one another 
and to the subject, are considered. "When their real com- 
position is looked into, they are complex products of sen- 
sations and feelings. They are thus to a certain extent 
transitional forms between ideas and those other psychical 
compounds which are made up of affective elements, and 
are designated by the general name affective processes. 
Affective processes resemble time ideas especially in the im- 
possibility of an abstract separation of their affective ele- 
ments from their sensational elements in any investigation 
of their rise. This impossibility of abstract separation is 
due to the fact that in the development of all kinds of af- 
fective processes, sensations and ideas are included as de- 
termining factors. 

2. Intensive affective combinations., or composite feelings, 
must be the first affective processes discussed, because in 
them the characteristic attributes of the single compound are 
the products of a momentary state. The description of the 
feeling, therefore, requires only the exact comprehension of 
the momentary condition, not a comprehension at once of 
several processes occurring in time and proceeding from one 
another. There are, on the other hand, certain relatively 
permanent combinations of such feelings which appear not 
infrequently. Such permanent combinations we call moods. 
These moods frequently pass into emotions and thus may 
be looked upon as lying on the boundary line between feel- 
ings and emotions. Such boundary forms must be classified, 
because of their relatively permanent character, under the 
composite feelings. 



§ 12. Composite Feelings. 175 

3. Composite feelings, then, are intensive states of uni- 
tary character in which single simple affective components 
are to be perceived. We may distinguish in every such 
feeling, component feelings and a resultant feeling. The fun- 
damental component feelings are always simple sense-feelings. 
Several of these may unite to form a partial resultant which 
enters into the whole as a compound component. 

Every composite feeling may, accordingly, he divided, 

1) into a total feeling made up of all its components, and 

2) into single partial feelings which go to make up the total 
feeling. These partial feelings are in turn of different grades 
according as they are simple sense-feelings (partial feehngs 
of the first order) or feelings which are themselves composite 
(partial feelings of the second or higher orders). Where we 
have partial feelings of higher orders, complicated combi- 
nations or interlacings of the component elements may take 
place. A partial feeling of lower order may, at the same 
time, enter into several partial feelings of higher order. 
Such interlacings may render the nature of the total feeling 
exceedingly complicated. The whole may sometimes change 
its character, even when its elements remain the same, ac- 
cording as one or the other of the possible combinations of 
partial feelings predominates. 

3 a. Thus, the musical chord g e g has a corresponding total 
feeling of harmony, the fundamental elements of which, or partial 
feelings of the first order, are the feelings corresponding to the 
single clangs c, e, and g. Between these two kinds of feeling 
stand, as partial feelings of the second order, the three feelings 
of harmony from the double clangs c e, e ^, and c g. The char- 
acter of the total feeling may have four different shades ac- 
cording as one of these partial feelings of the second order pre- 
dominates, or all are equally strong. The cause of the pre- 
dominance of one of these complex partial feelings may be either 
the greater intensity of its sensational components, or the 



176 II- Psychical Compounds. 

influence of preceding feeling. If, for example, c e g follows cP e g 
the effect of c e will be intensified, while if c e ^ follows c e a 
the same will hold for g g. Similarly, a number of colors may- 
have a different effect according as one or the other partial 
combination predominates. In the last case, however, because 
of the extensive arrangement of the impressions, the spacial 
proximity has an influence antagonistic to the variation in the 
manner of combination and, furthermore, the influence of the 
spacial form with all its accompanying conditions is an essen- 
tially complicating factor. 

4. The structure of composite feelings is, thus, in general 
exceedingly complicated. Still, there are different degrees 
of development even here. The complex feelings arising 
from impressions of touch, smell, and taste are essentially 
simpler in character than those connected with auditory and 
visual ideas. 

The total feeling connected with outer and inner tactual 
sensations is designated in particular as the common feeling^ 
since it is regarded as the feeling in which our total state 
of sensible comfort or discomfort expresses itself. From this 
point of view, the two lowest chemical senses, those of smell 
and taste, must also be regarded as contributors to the sen- 
sational substratum of the common feeling, for the partial 
feelings that arise from these two senses unite with those 
from touch to form unanalyzable affective complexes. In 
single cases one or the other of these feelings may play the 
chief part. But, in the midst of all this change in its sen- 
sational substratum, the common feeling is always the im- 
mediate expression of our sensible comfort and discomfort, 
and is, therefore, of all our composite feelings most closely 
related to the simple sense -feelings. Auditory and visual 
sensations, on the other hand, contribute to the sensational 
substratum of the common feeling only in exceptional cases, 
especially when the intensity is unusually great. 



§ 12. Composite Feelings. 177 

5. The common feeling is the source of the distinction 
between pleasurable and unpleasurable feelings. This dis- 
tinction is then carried over to the single simple feelings 
that compose it, and sometimes even to all feelings. Pleas- 
urable and unpleasurable are expressions well adapted to in- 
dicate the chief extremes between which the common feel- 
ing, as a total feeling corresponding to the sensible comfort 
or discomfort of the subject, may oscillate. Though it is to 
be noted that this feeling may not infrequently lie for a 
longer or shorter period in an indifference-zone. In the same 
way, these expressions, pleasurable and unpleasurable, may 
be applied to the single constituents that go to make up 
one of the total feelings. On the other hand, it is entirely 
unjustifiable to apply these names to all other feelings, or, 
as is sometimes done, to make their applicability a neces- 
sary factor in the general definition of feeling. Even for 
the common feeling, pleasurable and unpleasurable can only 
be used as general class names which include a number of 
qualitatively different feelings. The differences among feelings 
of the same class result from the very great variations in 
the composition of the single total feelings that we have 
included under the general name common feeling (cf. 
p. 92 sq.). 

6. This fact that certain common feelings are composite 
in character explains why it is that there are common feelings 
which can not, strictly speaking, be called pleasurable or 
unpleasurable, because they consist in a succession of ele- 
ments belonging to both classes, and under circumstances 
either the one kind of element or the other may predominate. 
Such feelings made up of partial feelings of opposite character 
and deriving their characteristics from this combination, may 
be called contrast- feelings. A simple form of such among 
the common feelings is that of tickling. It is made up of 

Wdndt, Psychology. 2. edit. 12 



178 I^- Psychical Compounds. 

a weak pleasurable feeling accompanying a weak external 
tactual sensation, and of feelings connected with muscular 
sensations whicli are aroused by the strong reflex impulses 
from the tactual stimuli. These reflex impulses may spread 
more or less, and often cause inhibitions of respiration when 
they reach the diaphragm, so that the resultant feeling may 
vary greatly in different single cases, in intensity, scope, and 
composition. 

6 a. The combination of partial feelings into a composite 
feeling was first noticed in the case of the common feeling. 
The psychological laws of this combination were indeed mis- 
understood, and, as is usually the case in physiology, the feeling 
was not distinguished from its underlying sensations. Common 
feeling was, thus, sometimes defined as the "consciousness of 
our sensational state", or again as the "totality, or unanalyzed 
chaos of sensations" which come to us from all parts of our 
body. As a matter of fact, the common feeling consists of a 
number of partial feelings. But it is not the mere sum of these 
feelings ; it is rather a resultant total feeling of unitary character. 
At the same time it is, however, a total feeling of the simplest 
possible composition, made up of partial feelings of the first 
order, that is, of single sense-feelings which generally do not 
unite to form partial feelings of the second or of higher orders. 
In the resultant feeling a single partial feeling is usually pre- 
dominant. This is more especially the case when a very strong 
local sensation is accompanied by a feeling of pain. On the 
other hand, weaker sensations may determine the predominant 
affective tone through their relatively greater importance. This 
is especially frequent in the case of sensations of smell and taste, 
and also in the case of certain sensations connected with the 
regular functioning of the organs, such as the inner tactual 
sensations accompanying the movements of walking. Often the 
relatively greater importance of a single sensation is so slight 
that the predominating feeling can not be discovered except by 
directing our attention to our own subjective state. In such a 
case the concentration of the attention upon it can generally 
make any partial feeling whatever predominant. 



§ 12. Composite Feelings. 179 

Keferences. E. H. Weber, Tastsinn und Gemeingefiihl. Wundt, 
Beitrage zur Theorie der Sinneswahrnehmung, sect. 6, and Grund- 
ziige der phys. Psycla. vol. I, chapt. 10, § 3, and Lectures on Hum. 
and Anim. Psych., lecture 14. On Pathological Changes in the Common 
Feeling: Storking, Vorlesungen iiber Psychopathologie (1900), lectures 
23 and 24. 

7. The composite feelings from sight and hearing are 
commonly called elementary aesthetic feelings. This name 
includes all feelings that are connected with composite per- 
ceptions and are therefore themselves composite. As a special 
form of feelings belonging to the class defined by the broader 
meaning of the term aLod-rjaig, we have those feelings which 
are the elements of aesthetic effects in the narrower sense. 
The term elementary does not apply in this case to the 
feelings themselves, for they are by no means simple, but 
it is merely intended to express the relative distinction be- 
tween these feelings and still more composite, higher aesthetic 
feelings. 

The perceptive^ or elementary aesthetic, feelings of sight 
and hearing may serve as representatives of all the com- 
posite feelings that arise in the course of intellectual proc- 
esses, such as the logical^ the moral, and the higher aesthetical 
feelings, for the general psychological structure of these 
complex affective forms is exactly like that of the simpler 
perceptive feelings, except that the former are always con- 
nected with feelings and emotions that arise from the whole 
interconnection of psychical processes. 

While the extremes between which the common feelings 
move are chiefly the affective qualities which we call pleas- 
urable and unpleasurable in the sense of personal comfort 
and discomfort, the elementary aesthetic feelings belong for 
the most part to the same affective series, but in the more 
objective sense of agi'eeahle and disagreeable feelings. These 
latter terms express the relation of the object to the ideat- 

12* 



180 ^^- Psychical Compounds. 

ing subject, rather than any personal state. It is still more 
apparent here than in the case of pleasurable and unpleas- 
urable feelings, that each of these terms is not the name of 
a single feehng, but indicates a general group, to which 
belong an endless variety of feeKngs with individual peculi- 
arities for each single idea. In single cases, too, but more 
variably, the other affective series, (p. 92), namely, those of 
the arousing and subduing feelings, or of the straining and 
relaxing feelings, may show themselves. 

8. If we neglect for the moment this general classifi- 
cation mentioned, according to which the single cases are 
brought under the chief affective forms, the perceptive feel- 
ings may be divided into the two classes of intensive and 
extensive feelings, according to the relations which exist be- 
tween the corresponding sensational elements and determine 
the quality of the feelings. By intensive feelings we mean 
those that depend on the relation of the quahtative attributes 
of the sensational elements of ideas, by extensive feeUngs 
those that arise from the spacial and temporal arrangement 
of the elements. The expressions "intensive" and "extensive" 
do not refer to the character of the feelings themselves, 
for the feelings are in reality always intensive, but the 
terms refer rather to the conditions of the rise of these 
feelings. 

Intensive and extensive feelings are, accordingly, not 
merely the subjective concomitants of the corresponding 
ideas but, since every idea consists usually of elements that 
are qualitatively different and also consists of some extensive 
arrangement of these elements, the same idea may be at 
once the substratum of both intensive and extensive feelings. 
Thus, a visual object made up of different colored parts 
arouses an intensive feeling through the mutual relation of 
the colors and it also arouses an extensive feeling through 



§ 12. Composite Feelings. 181 

its form. A succession of clangs is connected with an in- 
tensive feeling wliicli corresponds to the qualitative relation 
of the clangs, and also with an extensive feeling coming 
from the rhythmical or arhythmical temporal succession of 
these clangs. In this way, both intensive and extensive 
feelings are always connected with visual and auditory ideas, 
but, of course, under certain conditions one form may push 
the other into the background. Thus, when we hear a clang 
for just an instant, the only feeling perceived is the inten- 
sive feeling. Or when, on the other hand, a rhythmical 
series of indifferent sounds is heard, only the extensive feel- 
ing is noticeable. For the purpose of psychological analysis 
it is obviously of advantage to produce conditions under 
which one particular affective form is present and others are, 
so far as possible, excluded. 

9. When inte^isive feelings are observed in this way, it 
appears that those accompanying the combination of colors 
follow the rule that there corresponds to a combination of two 
colors between which the qualitative difference is a maximum, 
a maximal agreeable feeling. Still, every particular color 
combination has its specific character which is made up of 
the partial feeling from the single colors, and of the total 
feeling arising as a resultant of the combination. Then, too, 
as in the case of simple color-feelings, the effect is complicated 
by chance associations and the complex feelings coming from 
these associations (p. 86). Combinations of more than two 
colors have not been adequately investigated. 

The feelings connected with combinations of clangs are 
exceedingly numerous and various. They constitute the affect- 
ive sphere in which we see most clearly the formation dis- 
cussed above (p. 175), of partial feeKngs of different orders, 
together with the interfacings of such feelings which arise 
under special conditions. The investigations of the single 



182 J^I- Psychical Compounds. 

feelings that arise in this way is one of the problems of the 
psychological aesthetics of music. 

10. Extensive feehngs may be subdivided into spacial 
and temporal. Of these, the first, or the feelings of form^ 
belong mainly to vision, and the second, or the feelings of 
rhythm^ belong to hearing, while the beginnings of the de- 
velopment of both forms are to be found in touch. 

The optical feeling of form shows itself first of all in 
the preference of regular to irregular forms, and then in 
the preference among different regular forms of those which 
have certain simple proportions in their various parts. The 
most important of these proportions are those of symmetry, 
or 1:1, and of the golden section, or x -]- 1 : x == x : 1 
(the whole is to the greater part as the greater part is to 
the smaller). The fact that symmetry is generally preferred 
for the horizontal dimensions of figures and the golden 
section for the vertical, is probably due to associations, 
especially with organic forms, such as that of the human 
body. This preference for regularity and for certain simple 
proportions can have no interpretation other than that the 
measurement of every single dimension is connected with an 
inner tactual sensa^tion from the eye and with an accompany- 
ing sense-feeling which enters as a partial feeling into the 
total optical feeling of form. The total feeling of regular 
arrangement that arises at the sight of the whole form, is 
thus modified by the relation of the different sensations to 
one another, and also by the relation of the partial feelings 
to one another. As secondary components, which also fuse 
with the total feeling, there are here also associations and 
their concomitant feelings. 

The feeling of rhythm is entirely dependent on the con- 
ditions discussed in considering temporal ideas. The partial 
feelings here are the feelings of strained and fulfilled expec- 



§ 12. Composite Feelings. 183 

tation, which in their regular alternation constitute the rhyth- 
mical time ideas themselves. The way in which these partial 
feelings are united, however, and especially the predominance 
of special ones in the total feeling, is dependent even more 
than is the momentary character of an intensive feeling, on 
the relation in which the feeling present at a given instant 
stands to the preceding feehngs. This is especially apparent 
in the great influence that every alteration in rhythm exer- 
cises on the accompanying feeling. For this reason as well 
as hecause of their general dependence on a particular tem- 
poral form of occurrence, the feelings of rhythm are direct 
forms of transition to the emotions. To be sure, an emotion 
may develop from any composite feeling, but in no other 
case is the condition for the rise of a feeling, as here, at 
the same time a necessary condition for the rise of a certain 
degree of emotion. The emotion is, however, usually moder- 
ated in this case, through the regular succession of feelings 
(cf. § 13, 1, 7). 

11. The immense variety of composite feelings and the 
equally great variety of their conditions, render it impossible 
to formulate any such comprehensive, and at the same time 
unitary, psychological theory as that which was possible for 
spacial and temporal ideas. Still, there are even here some 
common attributes, through which composite feelings may 
be brought under certain general psychological heads. There 
are two factors which go to make up every feeling: first, 
the relation of the combined partial feelings to one another, 
and second, their synthesis into a unitary total feeling. The 
first of these factors is more prominent in intensive, the 
second in extensive feelings. In reality both factors are al- 
ways united, and determine each other reciprocally. Thus, 
a figure which is all the time agreeable, may be more and 
more complex the more the relations of its parts accord with 



184 -?^- Psychical Compounds. 

certain rules, and the same holds for a rhythm. On the 
other hand, the union into a single whole helps to emphasize 
the separate affective components. In all these respects 
combinations of feelings show the closest resemblance to in- 
tensive ideas. The extensive arrangement of impressions, 
on the contrary, especially the spacial arrangement, tends 
much more to favor a relatively independent coexistence of 
several ideas. 

12. The close intensive union of all the components of 
a feeling, even in the case of those feelings which corre- 
spond to spacial or temporal ideas, is connected with a 
principle that holds for all affective processes, including those 
which we shall have to discuss later. This principle we can 
call the principle of the unity of the affective state. It may 
he formulated as follows: in a given moment only one 
total feeling is possible, or in other words, all the partial 
feelings present at a given moment unite, in every case, to 
form a single total feeling. This principle is obviously con- 
nected with the general relation between idea and feeling. 
For the "idea" deals with an immediate content of ex- 
perience and the properties that belong to it, without regard 
to the subject; the "feeling" expresses the relation that in- 
variably exists between this content and the subject. 

12 a. Of all the different forms of elementary aesthetic feel- 
ings mentioned, the feelings of tonal hannony and discord are 
the most suitable for the purposes of psychological analysis, 
because of the relatively obvious character of their sensation 
basis. Furthermore, the interest in the study of the aesthetics 
of music has existed for a long time and has served to bring 
out a great variety of theoretical explanations of these feelings. 
To be sure, these explanations have not infrequently paid too 
little attention to the actually observable facts. They have often 
substituted hypothetical and purely arbitrary assumptions for 
observation. Such is the case when harmony is explained as 



§ 12. Composite Feelings. 185 

an unconscious recognition of regular number relations (Euler); 
or when harmony is attributed to an unconscious effect of the 
rhythm of sound vibrations (LiPPS) ; or finally, when harmony is 
attributed to the effects of tonal fusion (Stumpf). Sometimes, 
on the other hand, a single contributing factor is given undue 
prominence, as when the disturbing effect of beats is the only 
recognized factor in dissonance (Helmholtz). On the basis of 
the facts pointed out in §§ 6 and 9 we may recognize the 
following three conditions as those which probably have the 
greatest significance for the feeling of harmony. The first con- 
dition consists in the fact that there is a preference for simple 
divisions of the tonal line, in keeping with the principle of 
arithmetical division which holds for our tonal sensations. This 
is illustrated in the case of the major cord where the ratios 
are 4:5:6 (p. 58 sq., metrical principle). This preference ex- 
plains the agreeableness of harmonious intervals when tones which 
are entirely without overtones are sounded, either simultaneously 
or in succession. The second condition consists in the coin- 
cidence of the partial tones of the clang, which coincidence in- 
creases in degree as the harmony increases. This phonic principle, 
as we may call it, shows itself in the relation between tones 
when the tones are successive, and when the tones are simulta- 
neous it shows itself in the intensification of certain partial 
tones (difference-tones or over-tones) which are characteristic of 
the given intervals in any particular case. The third condition 
consists in the fact that beats of the primary tones, or beats of 
the over-tones and difference-tones, appear in the case of dis- 
sonant intervals in compound clangs. (Principle of dissonant 
beats). 

Eeferences. On the Affective Results of Color Combinations: 
Goethe, Farbenlehre. J. Cohn, Philos. Studien, vol. 10. On Feelings 
of Optical Form: Fechner, Vorschule der Aesthetik (1876), vol. I, 
and Abhandl, der sachs. Ges. der Wiss., vol. 14. Witmek, Philos. 
Studien, vol. 9. Vischee, Das optische Formgefuhl, 1873. Hildebkand, 
Das Problem der Form in der bildenden Kunst, 1893. Lipps, Raum- 
asthetik und geometrisch-optische Tauschungen, 1897. On Clang 
Harmonies: Helmholtz, The Sensations of Tone, sect. 19. v. Oettingen, 
Harmoniesystem in dualer Entwicklung, 1866. Stumpf, Zeitsch. f. 



186 II- Psychieal Compounds. 

Psycla. u. Physiol, d. Sinnesorgane, vol. 15. Riemann, Elemente der 
musikalischen Aesthetik, 1900. Lipps, Psychol. Studien, 1885. Wundt, 
Grundziige der phys. Psych., vol. 11, chap. 12. 



§ 13. EMOTIONS. 

1. Feelings, like all psychical phenomena, are never per- 
manent states. In the psychological analysis of a composite 
feehng, therefore, we must always think of a momentary af- 
fective state as if it were held constant. This can be done 
the more easily the more slowly and continuously the psy- 
chical processes occur, so that the word feeling has come to 
be used mainly for relatively slow processes and for those 
which in their regular form of occurrence never pass beyond 
a certain medium intensity, such as the feelings of rhythm. 
Where, on the other hand^ a series of feelings succeeding 
one another in time unite into an interconnected process 
which is distinguished from preceding and following processes 
as an individual whole, and which has in general a more 
intense effect on the subject than a single feeling, we call 
such a succession of feelings an emotion. 

This very name indicates that it is not any specific sub- 
jective contents of experience which distinguish emotion from 
feeling, but rather the arousing effect which comes from a 
special combination of particular affective contents. In this 
way it comes that there is no sharp line of demarcation 
between feeling and emotion. Every feehng of greater in- 
tensity passes into an emotion. The separation of the feel- 
ings within an emotion from one another is always a more 
or less arbitrary sundering of complete relations. In the 
case of feelings which have a certain particular form of oc- 
currence, that is in feelings of rhythm^ such a breaking up 
of the emotions is entirely impossible. The feeling of rhythm 



§ 13. Emotions. 187 

is distinguished from an emotion only by the small inten- 
sity of its moving effect on the subject^ which is what gives 
"emotion" its name. And even this distinction is by no means 
fixed, for when the feelings produced by rhythmical impres- 
sions become somewhat more intense, as is usually the case, 
especially when the rhythm is connected with sensational 
contents that arouse the feehngs greatly, the feelings of 
rhythm become in fact emotions. Rhythms are for this 
reason the important means both in music and poetry of 
portraying emotions and arousing them in the auditor. 

2. The names of different emotions, like those of feelings, 
do not indicate single processes, but classes in which a large 
number of single affective processes are grouped because of 
certain common characteristics. Emotions such as joy, hope, 
anxiety, care, and anger, are accompanied in every case by 
new ideational contents; their affective elements also, and 
even the way in which the emotions themselves occur, may 
vary greatly. The more composite a psychical process, the 
more variable will be its single concrete manifestations; a 
particular emotion will, therefore, be less apt to occur in 
exactly the same form than will a particular feeling. Every 
general name for emotions indicates^ accordingly, certain 
typical forms in which related affective processes occur, 

3. Not every interconnected series of affective processes 
is called an emotion or is to be classed as such under one 
of the typical forms discriminated by language. An emotion 
is a unitary whole which is distinguished from a composite 
feeling through two characteristics. First, an emotion has a 
definite temporal course and secondly, it exercises a more 
intense present and subsequent effect on the interconnection 
of psychical processes. The first characteristic arises from 
the fact that an emotion is a process of a higher order as 
compared with a single feehng, for it always includes a 



188 II- Psychical Compounds. 

succession of several feelings. The second characteristic 
depends on the intensification of the effect produced by the 
summation of the feehngs. 

As a result of these characteristics, emotions have in the 
midst of all their variations in form a regularity in the 
manner of their occurrence. They always begin with a more 
or less intense inceptive feeling which in its quality and 
direction is immediately characteristic of the nature of the 
emotions. This inceptive feehng is due either to an idea 
produced by an external impression (outer emotional stimu- 
lation) or to a psychical process arising from associative or 
apperceptive conditions (inner stimulation). Following this 
inceptive feeling, comes an ideational process accompanied 
by its corresponding feehngs. This process shows in cases 
of particular emotions, characteristic differences both in the 
quahty of its feehngs and in its rapidity. Finally, the emotion 
closes with a terminal feeling which continues even after the 
emotion has given place to a quiet affective state. In this 
terminal feeling the emotion gradually fades away, unless it 
passes directly into the inceptive feeling of a new emotion. 
This last mentioned transition sometimes occurs, especially 
in feelings of the intermittent type (inf. 13). 

4. The intensification of the effect which may be observed 
in the course of an emotion, appears not merely in the psy- 
chical contents of the feelings that compose it, but in the 
physical concomitants as well. For single feelings these 
accompanying phenomena are usually limited to slight changes 
in the innervation of the heart and respiratory organs, which 
can be demonstrated only by using exact graphic methods 
(p. 96 sq.). It is only in relatively rare cases that there 
are added to these minor forms of reaction, mimetic move- 
ments of even moderate extent and intensity. "With emotions 
the case is essentially different. As a result of the summa- 



§ 13. Emotions. 189 

tion and alternation of successive affective stimuli there is 
in emotions not only an intensification of the effect on hearty 
blood-vessels, and respiration, but the external muscles are 
always affected in an unmistakable manner. Strong move- 
ments of the mimetic muscles appear at first, then movements 
of the arms and of the whole body (pantomimetic movements). 
In the case of stronger emotions there may be still more 
extensive disturbances of innervation, such as trembling, 
convulsive contractions of the diaphragm and of the facial 
muscles, and paralytic relaxation of the muscles. 

Because of their symptomatical significance for the emo- 
tions, all these movements are called expressive movements. 
As a rule they are entirely involuntary, being either reflexes 
following emotional excitations, or else impulsive acts prompted 
by the affective components of the emotion. They may be 
modified, however, in the most various ways through volun- 
tary intensification or inhibition of the movements or even 
through intentional production of the same, so that the whole 
series of external reactions which we shall have to discuss 
under volitional acts, may enter into these expressive move- 
ments (§ 14). 

5. According to their symptomatical character, expressive 
movements may be divided into three classes. 1) Purely 
intensive symptoms; these are always expressive movements 
for more intense emotions, and consist of strong movements 
for emotions of middle intensity, and of sudden inhibitions 
and paralysis of movement for violent emotions. 2) Quali- 
tative expressions of feelings] these are mimetic movements, 
the most important of which are the reactions of the oral 
muscles, resembling the reflexes following sweet, sour, and 
bitter impressions of taste. The reaction for sweet corresponds 
to pleasurable emotions, the reactions for sour and bitter, 
to unpleasurable emotions, while the other modifications of 



190 II- Psychical Compounds. 

feeling, such as excitement and depression, strain and relief, 
are expressed by a tension of the muscles. 3) Expressions 
of ideas'^ these are generally pantomimetic movements that 
either point to the object of the emotion (indicative gestures) 
or else describe the objects as well as the processes con- 
nected with them by the form of the movement (represen- 
tative gestures). These three classes of expressive movements 
correspond exactly to the psychical elements of emotions : the 
first class corresponds to the intensity of the psychical ele- 
ments, the second to the quality of the feelings, and the 
third to the ideational content. A concrete expressive move- 
ment may unite all three forms in itself. The third class, 
that of expressions of ideas^ is of special psychological sig- 
nificance because of its genetic relations to speech (cf. 
§ 21, 3). 

6. The changes in pulse and respiration that accompany 
emotions are of three kinds. 1) They may consist of the 
immediate effects of the feelings which make up the emotions, 
as, for example, a lengthening of the pulse curve and respira- 
tion curve when the feelings are pleasurable, and a shorten- 
ing of the same for unpleasurable feelings (cf. sup. p. 96). 
This holds only for relatively quiet emotions, where the single 
feelings have sufficient time to develop. When sufficient 
time is not given, other phenomena appear which depend, 
not merely on the quality of the feehngs, but also, and that 
mainly, on the intensity of the innervations, due to the sum- 
mation of these innervations. 2) Such summations may consist 
of intensified innervation. This arises from an increase in 
the excitation which in turn results from an adding together 
of the separate effects when the succession of feelings is not 
too rapid. This increase shows itself in retarded and strength- 
ened pulse-beats, since the more intense excitation affects 
most the inhibitory nerves of the heart. Besides these there 



§ 13. Emotions. 191 

is usually an increased innervation of the mimetic and panto- 
mimetic muscles. These are called sthenic emotions. 3) If 
the feelings are very violent or last an unusually long time 
in a single direction, the emotion brings about a more or 
less complete paralysis of the innervation of the heart and 
a reduction of the tension of the outer muscles. Under 
certain circumstances disturbances in the innervation of special 
groups of muscles appear, especially in the innervation of 
the muscles of the diaphragm and the innervation of the 
sympathetic facial muscles. The first symptom of the par- 
alysis of the regulative cardiac nerves is a marked acceler- 
ation of the pulse and a corresponding acceleration of the 
respiration, accompanied by a weakening of the same, and a 
relaxation of the tension of the external muscles to a degree 
equal to that in paralysis. These are the asthenic emotions. 
There is still another distinction, which is not important 
enough, however, to lead to the formation of an independant 
class of physical effects of emotions, since we have to do 
here only with modifications of the phenomena characteristic 
of sthenic and asthenic emotions. It is the distinction between 
rapid and sluggish emotions, based upon the greater or less 
rapidity with which the increase or inhibition of the inner- 
vation appears. 

7. Both in natural and in voluntarily aroused emotions 
the physical concomitants have, besides their symptomatica! 
significance, the important psychological attribute of being able 
to intensify the emotion. This attribute is due to the fact 
that the excitation or inhibition of certain particular groups 
of muscles is accompanied by inner tactual sensations which 
produce certain sense-feelings. These feelings unite with the 
other affective contents of the emotion and increase the in- 
tensity of the emotion. From the heart, respiratory organs^ 
and blood-vessels we have such feelings only in cases of 



192 U. Psychical Compounds. 

emotions, when the feelings may indeed be very intense. 
On the other hand, even in moderate emotions the state of 
greater or less tension of the mimetic and pantomimetic 
muscles, exercises an influence on the affective state and 
thereby on the emotion. 

7a. Older psychology, because of its general tendency to 
give an intellectualistic interpretation to psychical processes, 
generally offered logical reflections about emotions, as a theory 
of the emotions, or even as a full description of them. The 
best illustration of this kind of a theory of the emotions is the 
doctrine of Spinoza. In such theories the psychological treat- 
ment was very largely influenced by ethical considerations. As 
one result of such influence, we have the distinction between 
emotions and passions^ the latter term being employed to des- 
ignate those conditions in which certain particular impulses 
through long continued feeling and emotions, gain the complete 
ascendency over volition. Kant modified these definitions of 
emotions and passions, in that he regarded the essential attribute 
of emotions to be their sudden rise, while the essential attribute 
of passions consisted for him in the fact that the tendencies of 
feeling have settled into fixed habits. These modes of classi- 
fication are all either of merely practical significance and belong 
accordingly in the domain of characterology or ethics, or else 
they are based upon characteristics which are essential only in 
discussions of the intensity and course of emotions, and will, 
accordingly, be dealt, with under these heads in a later para- 
graph (12). From the psychological point of view, the passions 
are in no essential respect different in nature from the emotions. 
In contrast with this practical mode of treating the emotions, 
there has arisen a tendency in recent times to give more and 
more attention to the expressive movements, and to the other 
physiological accompaniments of the emotions which show them- 
selves in the pulse and respiration and in the vaso-motor changes. 
There begins to show itself thus, a recognition of the value of 
these phenomena as aids to the study of the emotions, just as 
there is a recognition of the innervation symptoms of feelings. 
To be sure, the study of these outer phenomena can never take 



§ 13. Emotions. 193 

tlie place of immediate observation of the psychical processes 
themselves ; it can serve at most to call attention to certain 
of the attributes and relations of the psychical processes which 
might perhaps be otherwise overlooked. Thus, for example, the 
objective observation suggests very easily the fact that emotions 
are intensified through the sensory feelings which are connected 
with the expressive movements. But when Lange and James 
make these concomitant phenomena the exclusive causes of the 
emotions, when they describe the emotions as psychical processes 
which can be aroused only through expressive movements, we 
must reject their paradoxical view for the following three reasons. 
First, the definite outer symptoms of emotions do not appear 
until such time as the psychical nature of the emotion is al- 
ready clearly established. The emotion, accordingly, precedes 
the innervation effects which are looked upon by these investi- 
gators as causes of the emotion. Secondly, it is absolutely 
impossible to classify the rich variety of psychical emotional 
states in the comparatively simple scheme of innervation changes. 
The psychical processes are much more varied than are their 
accompanying forms of expression. Thirdly, and finally, the 
physical concomitants stand in no constant relation to the psy- 
chical quality of the emotions. This holds especially for the 
effects on pulse and respiration, but is true also for the pan- 
tomimetic expressive movements. It may sometimes happen that 
emotions with very different, even opposite kinds of affective 
contents, may belong to the same class so far as the accompany- 
ing physical phenomena are concerned. Thus, for example, joy 
and anger may be in like manner sthenic emotions. Joy ac- 
companied by surprise may, on the contrary, present the ap- 
pearance, on its physical side of an asthenic emotion. 

7 b. The general phenomena of innervation which give rise 
to the distinction between sthenic and asthenic, and rapid and 
sluggish emotions, do not show the character of the affective 
contents of these emotions, but only the formal attributes of the 
intensity and rapidity of the feelings. This is clearly proved by 
the fact that differences in involuntary innervation analogous 
to those which accompany the different emotions, may be pro- 
duced by a mere succession of indifferent impressions, as, for 
example, by the strokes of a metronome. It is observed in 

WuNDT, Psychology. 2. edit. 13 



194 II' Psychical Compounds. 

such a case that especially the respiration tends to adapt itself 
to the faster or slower rate of the strokes, becoming more rapid 
when the rapidity of the metronome increases. Commonly, too, 
certain phases of respiration coincide with particular strokes. 
Furthermore, the hearing of such an indifferent rhythm is not 
unattended by emotion. When the rate changes, we observe 
at first a quiet, then a sthenic, and finally, when the rapidity 
is greatest, an asthenic emotion. Still, the emotions in this 
case have to a certain extent a mere formal character; they 
exhibit a great indefiniteness in their contents. This indefinite- 
ness disappears only when we think into them concrete emotions 
of like formal attributes. This is very easy, and is the con- 
dition of the great utility of rhythmical impressions for describ- 
ing and producing emotions. All that is necessary to arouse 
an emotion in all its fulness, is a mere hint of qualitative af- 
fective content, such as it is possible to give in music through 
the clangs of a musical composition. 

7 c. The external expressive effects of emotions are, accord- 
ingly, ambiguous symptoms and can, therefore, have^ when taken 
by themselves, no psychological value. They may, however, 
acquire such value when connected with introspection which has 
been properly provided for in an experimental way. Indeed, 
as checks for experimental introspection the expressive move- 
ments have great value. The principle that observation is 
wholly inadequate when applied to psychical processes which 
present themselves in the natural course of life, holds especially 
for the emotions. In the first place, emotions come to the 
psychologist by chance, at moments when he is not in a con- 
dition to subject them to scientific analysis; and secondly, in 
the case of strong emotions the causes of which are real, 
we are least of all able to observe ourselves with exactness. 
Exact observation can be carried on much more successfully 
when we voluntarily arouse in ourselves a particular emotional 
state. In such a case, however, it is not possible to estimate 
how nearly the subjectively aroused emotion agrees in intensity 
and in mode of occurrence with one of like character due to ex- 
ternal circumstances. For this reason the simultaneous investiga- 
tion of the physical effects, especially of those effects most re- 
moved from the influence of the will, namely, the effects on the 



§ 13. Bniotions, 195 

pulse and respiration, furnishes a check for introspection. For 
when the psychological quality of emotions is alike, we may 
infer from their like physical effects that their formal attributes 
also agree. Indeed, the intensity of the expressive movement 
furnishes a fairly reliable measure of the degree in which the 
artificial emotion approximates the natural emotion. 

References. Kant, Anthropologic, Bk. 3. Darwin, The Expres- 
sion of the Emotions, 1872. Piderit, Mimik und Physiognomik, 2nd. 
ed. 1866. Hughes, Die Mimik des Menschen, 1900. Lehmann, Die 
korperlichen AeuCerungen psychischer Zustande, vol. 1, 1899. Mosso 
(English trans, by Kiesow), On Fear. Wundt, Volkerpsychologie, 
vol. I, pt. 1, chap. 1. James, Principles of Psychology, vol. II, chap. 25. 
Wundt, Zur Lehre von den Gemiithsbewegungen, Philos. Studien, 
vol. 6 (contains also a criticism of the various theories). 

8. The great number of factors that must be taken into 
consideration for the investigation of emotions renders a 
psychological analysis of the single forms impossible. This 
is all the more so because each of the numerous distin- 
guishing names marks off a whole class^ within which there 
is a great variety of special forms, including in turn an end- 
less number of single cases of the most various modifications. 
All we can do is to take a general survey of the fundamen- 
tal forms of emotions. The general principles of division 
here employed must be psychological^ that is, such as are 
derived from the immediate attributes of the emotions them- 
selves, for the accompanying physical phenomena have only 
a symptomatica! value and are even then, as noted above, 
frequently equivocal in character. 

Three such psychological principles of classification may 
be made the basis for the discrimination of emotions: 1) emo- 
tions may be grouped according to the quality of the feelings 
entering into the emotions, 2) according to the intensity of 
these feelings, 3) according to the form of occurrence., this 
form being conditioned by the character and rate of the 
affective changes. 

13* 



196 ^^- Psychical Compounds. 

9. On the basis of quality of feelings we may distinguish 
certain fundamental emotional forms corresponding to the 
chief affective dimensions distinguished above (p. 92). This 
gives us pleasurable and unpleasurable emotions, exciting 
and depressing emotions, straining and relaxing emotions. 
It must be noted, however, that because of their more com- 
posite character the emotions are always, even more than 
the feelings, mixed forms. Generally only a single affective 
tendency can be called primary for a particular emotion. 
There are affective elements belonging to other dimensions 
which enter in as secondary elements. The secondary char- 
acter of such elements usually appears in the fact that 
under different conditions various sub-forms of the primary 
emotion may arise. Thus, for example, joy is primarily a 
pleasurable emotion. Ordinarily it is also exciting, since it 
intensifies the feelings, but when the feelings are too strong, 
it becomes a depressing emotion. Sorrow is an unpleasur- 
able emotion, generally of a depressing character; when the 
intensity of the feelings becomes somewhat greater, however, 
it may become exciting, and when the intensity becomes 
maximal, it passes again into depression. Anger is much 
more emphatically exciting and unpleasant in its predominant 
characteristics, but when the intensity of the feeHngs be- 
comes greater, as when it develops into rage, it becomes 
depressing. Thus, exciting and depressing tendencies are 
always mere secondary qualities connected with pleasurable 
and unpleasurable emotions. Feelings of strain and relaxa- 
tion, on the contrary, may more frequently be the primary 
components of emotions. Thus, in expectation, the feeling 
of strain peculiar to this state is the primary element of the 
emotion. When the feeling develops into an emotion, it 
may easily be associated with unpleasurable feelings which 
are, according to circumstances, either exciting or depressing. 



§ 13. Emotions. 197 

In the case of rhythmical impressions or movements there 
arise from the alternation of feelings of strain with those 
of relaxation, pleasurable emotions which may be at the 
same time either exciting or depressing, according to the 
character of the rhythm. When they are depressing there 
may be unpleasurable feelings intermingled with them, or 
the feehngs may all become unpleasurable, especially when 
other affective elements cooperate, as for example in feelings 
of clang or harmony. 

10. Language has paid the most attention in its devel- 
opment of names for emotions to the qualitative side of 
feelings, and among these qualities particularly to pleasurable 
and unpleasurable forms. These names may be divided into 
three classes. First we have names of emotions that are sub- 
jectively distinguished, chiefly through the nature of the affec- 
tive state itself. Such are joy and sorrow and, as subforms 
of sorrow in which either depressing, straining, or relaxing 
tendencies of the feeling are also exhibited, sadness, care, 
grief, and fright. Secondly, there are names of objective 
emotions referring to some external object, such as delight 
and displeasure and, as subforms of the latter in which, 
various tendencies unite, annoyance, resentment, anger, and 
rage. Thirdly, we have names of objective emotions that 
refer rather to outer events not expected until the future^ 
such as hope and fear and, as modifications of the latter, 
worry and anxiety. They are combinations of feehngs of 
strain with pleasurable and unpleasurable feelings and, in 
different ways, with exciting and depressing tendencies as well. 

Obviously language has produced a much greater variety 
of names for unpleasurable emotions than for pleasurable. 
This may be due either to an actual superiority in the number 
of unpleasurable forms of emotion, or it may be due to the 
fact that unpleasurable experiences attract a higher degree 



198 II- Psychical Compounds. 

of attention. Probably the full explanation involves both 
factors. 

11. On the basis of the intensity of the feelings, tv^o 
classes of emotions, namely, the iveak and the strong may 
be distinguished. These concepts, derived from the psychical 
properties of the feelings, do not coincide with the concepts 
of sthenic and asthenic emotions, based upon the physical 
concomitants, for the relation of the psychological categories 
to the psycho-physical, is dependent not only on the inten- 
sity of the feelings, but on their quality as well. Thus, 
weak and moderately strong pleasurable emotions are always 
sthenic, while, on the contrary, unpleasurable emotions be- 
come asthenic after a longer duration, even when they are 
of a low degree of intensity, as, for example, care and 
anxiety. Finally, the strongest emotions, such as fright, 
worry, rage, and even excessive joy, are always asthenic. 
The discrimination of the psychical intensity of emotions is 
accordingly of subordinate significance, especially since emo- 
tions that agree in all other respects, may not only have 
different degrees of intensity at different times, but may on 
the same occasion vary from moment to moment. Then too, 
since this variation from moment to moment is essentially 
determined by the sense-feelings that arise from the accom- 
panying physical phenomena, in accordance with the prin- 
ciple of the intensification of emotions discussed above (p. 191), 
it is obvious that sthenic and asthenic character which is 
due originally to certain physiological conditions, often has 
a more decisive influence even on the psychological character 
of the emotion than the primary psychical intensity itself. 

12. The third distinguishing characteristic of emotions, 
the form of occurrence^ is more important. Here we distinguish 
three classes. First, there are sudden^ irruptive emotions, 
such as surprise, astonishment, fright, disappointment, and rage. 



§ 13. Emotions. 199 

They all reach their maximum very rapidly and then gradually 
sink to a quiet affective state. Secondly, we have gradually 
arising emotions, such as anxiety, doubt, care, mournfulness, 
expectation, and in many cases joy, anger, worry. These 
rise to their maximum gradually and sink in the same way. 
As a third form, and at the same time a modification of 
the class just mentioned, we have intermittent emotions, in 
which several periods of rise and fall follow one another 
alternately. All emotions of long duration belong in this 
last class. Thus, especially joy, anger, mournfulness, and 
the most various forms of gradually arising emotions, come 
in waves and often permit a distinction between periods of 
increasing and those of decreasing emotional intensity. The 
sudden, irruptive emotions, on the contrary, are seldom in- 
termittent. They are intermittent only in cases in which 
the emotion may belong also to the second class. Such 
emotions of a very changeable form of occurrence are, for 
example, joy and anger. They may sometimes be sudden 
and irruptive. In such cases, to be sure, anger generally 
becomes rage. Or such emotions may gradually rise and 
fall; they are then generally of the intermittent type. In 
their psycho-physical concomitants, the sudden irruptive emo- 
tions are all asthenic, the gradually arising emotions may 
by either sthenic or asthenic. 

12 a. The form of occurrence, then, however characteristic 
it may he in single cases, is just as little a fixed criterion for 
the psychological classification of emotions as is the intensity of 
the feelings. Obviously a psychological classification can be 
based only on the quality of the affective contents, while in- 
tensity and form of occurrence may furnish the means of sub- 
division. The way in which these conditions are connected 
with one another and with the accompanying physical phenomena 
and through these with secondary sense -feelings, shows the 
emotions to be most highly composite psychical compounds which 



200 n. Psychical Compounds. 

are therefore in single cases exceedingly variable. A classifica- 
tion which is in any degree exhaustive must, therefore, sub- 
divide such varying emotions as joy, anger, fear, and anxiety 
into their sub forms, according to their modes of occurrence, ac- 
cording to the intensity of their component feelings, and finally 
according to their physical concomitants, which physical con- 
comitants are dependent on both the psychical factors mentioned. 
Thus, for example, we may distinguish a strong, a weak, and 
a variable form of anger, a sudden, a gradually arising, and 
an intermittent form of its occurrence, and finally a sthenic, 
asthenic, and a mixed form of its expressive movements. For 
the psychological explanation, an account of the causal inter- 
connection of the single forms in each particular case is much 
more important than this mere classification. In giving such 
an account, we have to deal in the case of every emotion with 
two factors: first the quality and intensity of the component 
feelings, and second, the rapidity of the succession of these 
feelings. The first factor determines the general character of 
the emotion, the second its intensity in part, and more especially 
its form of occurrence, while both together determine its physical 
accompaniments and the psycho-physical changes resulting from 
the sense-feelings connected with these accompanying phenomena 
(p. 189). It is for this very reason that the physical con- 
comitants are as a rule to be called psycho-physical. The ex- 
pressions "psychical" and "psycho-physical" should not, however, 
be regarded as absolute opposites in such a case as this where 
we have to do merely with symptoms of emotion. We speak 
of psychical emotional phenomena when we mean those that do 
not show any immediately perceptible physical symptoms, even 
when such symptoms can be demonstrated with exact apparatus 
(as, for example, changes in the pulse and in respiration). On 
the other hand we speak of psycho-physical phenomena in those 
cases which can be immediately recognized as two-sided. 

References. Maass, Versuch iiber die Leidenschaften, 2pts., 1805. 
(This is a comprehensive resume of the older psychology). Bain, 
The Emotions and the Will, 3rd. ed, 1888. Ribot, Psychologic des 
sentiments, 1896. Bourdon, L'expression des emotions et des ten- 
dances dans le langage, 1892. Lehmann, Die Hauptgesetze des mensch- 



§ 14. Volitional Processes. 201 

lichen Gefuhlsleben, 1892. Wundt, Grundziige der phys. Psych., vol. II, 
chap. 18, and Lectures on Hum. and Anim. Psych., lectures 25 
and 26. 

§ 14. VOLITIONAL PEOOESSES. 

1. Every emotion, made up, as it is, of a unified series 
of interrelated affective processes, may terminate in one of 
two ways. It may give place to the ordinary variable and 
relatively unemotional course of feelings. Such affective proc- 
esses that fade out without any special result, constitute the 
emotions in the strict sense, such as were discussed in the 
last paragraph. In a second class of cases the emotional 
process may pass into a sudden change in ideational and 
affective content, which brings the emotion to an instanta- 
neous close; such changes in the sensational and affective 
state which are prepared for by an emotion and bring about 
its sudden end, are called volitional acts. The emotion to- 
gether with its result is a volitional process. 

A volitional process is thus related to an emotion as a 
process of a higher stage, in the same way that an emotion 
is related to a feeling. Volitional act is the name of only 
one part of the process ^ that part which distinguishes a 
volition from an emotion. The way for the development of 
volitions out of emotions is prepared by those emotions in 
connection with which external pantomimetic expressive move- 
ments (p. 189) appear. These expressive movements appear 
chiefly at the end of the process and generally hasten its 
completion; this is especially true of anger, but to some ex- 
tent also of joy, care, etc. Still, in these mere emotions 
there is an entire absence of those changes in the train of 
ideas, which changes are the immediate causes of the mo- 
mentary transformation of the emotion into volitions, and 
are also accompanied by characteristic feelings. 



202 ^I' Psychical Compounds. 

This close interconnection of volitional acts with panto- 
mimetic expressive movements necessarily leads ns to con- 
sider as the earliest stages of volitional development those 
volitions v^hich end in certain bodily movements, which are 
in turn due to the preceding train of ideas and feelings. 
In other words, we come to look upon volition ending in 
external volitional acts, as the earliest stages in the devel- 
opment of volitions. The so-called internal volitional acts, 
on the other hand, or those which close simply with effects 
on ideas and feelings, appear in every case to be products 
of later development. 

2. A volitional process that passes into an external act 
may be defined as an emotion which closes with a panto- 
mimetic movement which has, in addition to the character- 
istics belonging to all such movements and due to the quality 
and intensity of the emotion, the special property of ;pro- 
ducing an external effect which removes the emotions itself. 
Such an effect is not possible for all emotions, but only for 
those in which the very succession of component feelings 
produces feelings and ideas which are able to remove the 
preceding emotion. This is, of course, most commonly the 
case when the final result of the emotion is the direct op- 
posite of the preceding feelings. The fundamental psycho- 
logical condition for volitional acts is, therefore, the contrast 
between feelings^ and the origin of the first volitions is most 
probably in all cases to be traced back to unpleasurable feel- 
ings which arouse external movements, which in turn produce 
contrasted pleasurable feelings. The seizing of food to re- 
move hunger, the struggle against enemies to appease the 
feeling of revenge, and other similar processes are original 
vohtional processes of this kind. The emotions coming from 
sense-feelings, and the most widespread social emotions such 
as love, hate, anger, and revenge, are thus, both in men 



§ 14. Volitional Processes. 203 

and animals, the common origin of will. A volition is dis- 
tinguished in such cases from an emotion only by the fact 
that the former has added to its emotional components an 
external act that gives rise to feelings which, through con- 
trast with the feehngs contained in the emotion, bring the 
emotion itself to an end. The execution of the vohtional 
act may then lead directly, as was originally always the case, 
or indirectly through an emotion of contrasted affective 
content, into the ordinary quiet flow of feelings. 

3. The richer the ideational and affective contents of 
experience, the greater the variety of the emotions and the 
wider the sphere of vohtions. There is no feeling or emo- 
tion that does not in some way prepare for a volitional act, 
or at least have some part in such a preparation. All feel- 
ings, even those of a relatively indifferent character, contain 
in some degree an effort towards or away from some end. 
This effort may be very general and aimed merely at the 
maintenance or removal of the present affective state. While 
volition appears as the most complex form of affective proc- 
ess, presupposing feehngs and emotions as its components, 
still, we must not overlook, on the other hand, the fact that 
single feehngs continually appear which do not unite to form 
emotions, and emotions appear which do not end in voli- 
tional acts. In the total interconnection of psychical proc- 
esses, however, these three stages are conditions of one 
another and form the related parts of a single process which 
is complete only when it becomes a volition. In this sense 
a feeling may be thought of as the beginning of a volition, 
or a volition may be thought of as a composite affective 
process, and an emotion may be regarded as an intermediate 
stage between the two. 

4. The single feelings in an emotion which closes with 
a volitional act are usually far from being of equal impor- 



204 U. Psychical Compounds. 

tance. Certain ones among them, together with their re- 
lated ideas, are prominent as those which are most important 
in preparing for the act. Those combinations of ideas and 
feehngs which in our subjective consciousness are the immediate 
antecedents of the act, are called motives of volition. Every 
motive may be divided into an ideational and an affective 
component. The first we may call the moving reason., the 
second the impelling feeling of action. When a beast of 
prey seizes his victim, the moving reason is the sight of the 
victim, the impelling feeling may be either the unpleasur- 
able feeling of hunger or the race-hate aroused by the sight. 
The reason for a criminal murder may be theft, removal of 
an enemy, or some such idea, the impelling feeling the feel- 
ing of want, hate, revenge, or envy. 

When the emotions are of composite character, the reasons 
and impelling feelings are mixed, often to so great an extent 
that it would be difficult for the author of the act himself 
to decide which was the leading motive. This is due to the 
fact that the impelling feelings of a volitional act combine, 
just as the elements of a composite feeling do, to form a 
unitary whole in which all other impulses are subordinated 
to a single predominating one; the feelings of like direction 
strengthening and accelerating the effect, those of opposite 
direction weakening it. In the combinations of ideas and feel- 
ings which we call motives, the final weight of importance in 
preparing for the act of will belongs to the feelings, that is, to 
the impelling feelings rather than to the ideas. This follows 
from the very fact that feelings are integral components of 
the volitional process itself, while the ideas are of influence only 
indirectly, through their connections with the feelings. The as- 
sumption that a volition may arise from pure intellectual con- 
siderations, or that a decision may appear which is opposed 
to the inclinations expressed in the feelings, is a psychological 



§ 14. Volitional Processes. 205 

contradiction in itself. It rests upon the abstract concept 
of a will whicli is transcendental and absolutely distinct from 
actual psychical volitions. 

The combination of a number of motives, that is, the 
combination of a number of ideas and feelings which stand 
out from the composite train of emotions to which they 
belong as the ideas and feelings which determine the final 
discharge of the act — this combination furnished the essential 
condition for the development of tvill, and also for the dis- 
crimination of the single forms of volitional action. 

5. The simplest case of volition is that in which a single 
feehng in an emotion of suitable constitution, together with 
its accompanying idea, becomes a motive and brings the 
process to a close through an appropriate external move- 
ment. Such volitional processes determined by a single motive, 
may be called simple volitions. The movements in which 
they terminate are often designated impulsive acts. In 
popular parlance, however, this definition of impulse by the 
simplicity of the motive, is not sufficiently adhered to. An- 
other element, namely, the character of the feehng that 
acts as impelling force is, in popular thought, usually brought 
into the definition. All acts that are determined by sense- 
feelings., especially common feelings, are generally called im- 
pulsive acts without regard to whether a single motive or a 
plurality of motives is operative. This basis of discrimina- 
tion is psychologically inappropriate and there is no justifica- 
tion for the complete separation to which it naturally leads 
between impulsive acts and volitional acts as specifically 
distinct kinds of psychical processes. 

By impulsive act, then, we mean a simple voKtional act, 
that is, one resulting from a single motive, without refer- 
ence to the relative position of this motive in the series of 
affective and ideational processes. Impulsive action, thus 



206 II- Psychical Compounds. 

defined, must necessarily be the starting point for the de- 
yelopment of all volitional acts, even though it may continue 
to appear later, along with the complex volitional processes. 
To be sure, the earliest impulsive acts are those v^hich come 
from sense - feehng. Thus, most of the acts of animals are 
impulsive, but such impulsive acts appear continually in the 
case of man, partly as the results of simple sense emotions, 
partly as the products of the habitual execution of certain 
volitional acts which were originally determined by complex 
motives (10). 

6. When several feelings and ideas in the same emotion 
tend to produce external action, and when those components 
of an emotional train which have become motives tend at 
the same time toward different external ends, whether related 
or antagonistic, then there arises out of the simple act a 
complex volitional process. In order to distinguish this from 
a simple volitional act, or impulsive act, we call it a volun- 
tary act. 

Voluntary and impulsive acts have in common the char- 
acteristic of proceeding from single motives, or from com- 
plexes of motives that have fused together and operate as a 
single unequivocal impulse. They differ in the fact that in 
voluntary acts the decisive motive has risen to predominance 
from among a number of simultaneous and antagonistic 
motives. When a clearly perceptible strife between these 
antagonistic motives precedes the act, we call the volition 
by the particular name selective act^ and the process pre- 
ceding it we call a clwice. The predominance of one motive 
over other simultaneous motives can be understood only when 
we presuppose such a strife in every case. But we perceive 
this strife now clearly, now obscurely, and now not at all. 
Only in the first case can we speak of a selective act in 
the proper sense. The distinction between ordinary volun- 



§ 14. Volitional Processes. 207 

tary acts and selective acts is by no means hard and fast. 
In ordinary voluntary acts the psychical state is, however, 
more like that in impulsive acts, and the difference between 
such impulsive acts and selective acts is clearly recognizable. 

7. The psychical process immediately preceding the act, 
in which process the final motive suddenly gains the as- 
cendency, is called in the case of voluntary acts resolution^ 
in the case of selective acts decision. The first word in- 
dicates merely that action is to be carried out in accordance 
with some consciously adopted motive; the second implies 
that several courses of action have been presented as pos- 
sible and that a choice has finally been made. 

In contrast to the first stages of a volition, which can 
not be clearly distinguished from an ordinary emotional pro- 
cess, the last stages of voHtion are absolutely characteristic. 
They are especially marked by accompanying feelings that 
never appear anywhere but in volitions, and must therefore 
be regarded as the specific elements peculiar to volition. 
These feelings are first of all feelings of resolution and feel- 
ings of decision. Feelings of decision differ from feelings 
of resolution only in the fact that the former are more in- 
tense. They are both exciting and relaxing feelings, and 
may be united under various circumstances with pleasurable 
or unpleasurable factors. The relatively greater intensity 
of the feeling of decision is probably due to its contrast 
with the preceding feehng of doubt which attends the waver- 
ing between different motives. The opposition between doubt 
and decision gives the feeling of relaxation a greater intensity. 
At the moment when the volitional act begins, the feelings 
of resolution give place to the specific feeling of activity.^ 
which has its sensational substratum, in the case of external 
volitional acts, in the sensations of tension accompanying the 
movement. This feeling of activity is clearly exciting in its 



208 II- Psychical Compounds. 

character, and may, according to the special motives of the 
volition, be accompanied now by pleasurable, now by un- 
pleasurable elements, which may in turn vary in the course 
of the act and alternate with one another. As a total feel- 
ing, this feeling of activity is a rising and falling temporal 
process extending through the whole act and finally passing 
into the most various feelings, such as those of fulfilment, 
satisfaction, or disappointment, or into the feelings and emo- 
tions connected with the special result of the act. Taking 
the process as seen in voluntary and selective acts as com- 
plete volitional acts, the essential reason for distinguishing 
impulsive acts from complete volitional acts is to be found 
in the absence of the antecedent feelings of resolution and 
decision. The feeling connected with the motive passes in 
the case of impulsive acts directly into the feeling of activ- 
ity, and then into the feelings which correspond to the effect 
of the act. 

8. The transition from simple to complex volitional acts 
brings with it a number of other changes which are of great 
importance for the development of will. The first of these 
changes is to be found in the fact that the emotions which 
introduce volitions lose their intensity more and more, as a 
result of the counteraction of different mutually inhibiting 
feelings, so that finally a volitional act may result from an 
apparently unemotional affective state. To be sure, emotion 
is never entirely wanting; in order that the motive which 
arises in an ordinary train of feelings may bring about a 
resolution or decision, it must always be connected with 
some degree of emotional excitement. The emotional ex- 
citement can, however, be so weak and transient that we 
overlook it. We do this the more easily the more we are 
inclined to unite in the single idea of the volition both the 
short emotion which merely attends the rise and action of 



§ 14. Volitional Processes. 209 

the motive, and the resolution and execution which con- 
stitute the act itself. This weakening of the emotions results 
mainly from the combinations of psychical processes which 
we call intellectual development and of which we shall treat 
more fully in the discussion of the interconnection of psy- 
chical compounds (§ 17). Intellectual processes can, indeed, 
never do away with emotions; such processes are, on the 
contrary, in many cases the sources of new and character- 
istic emotions. A volition entirely without emotion, deter- 
mined by a purely intellectual motive, is, as already remarked 
(p. 204), a psychological impossibility. Still, intellectual de- 
velopment exercises beyond a doubt a moderating influence 
on emotions. This is particularly true whenever intellectual 
motives enter into the emotions which prepare the way for 
volitional acts. This may be due partly to the counteraction 
of the feelings which generally takes place, or it may be 
due partly to the slow development of intellectual motives, 
for emotions usually are the stronger, the more rapidly their 
component feelings rise. 

9. Connected with this moderation of the emotional com- 
ponents of voHtions under the influence of intellectual motives, 
is still another change. It consists in the fact that the act 
which closes the volition is not an external movement. The 
effect which removes the exciting emotion is itself a psychical 
process which does not show itself directly through any ex- 
ternal symptom whatever. Such an effect which is imper- 
ceptible for objective observation is called an internal voli- 
timial act The transition from external to internal voHtional 
acts is so bound up with intellectual development that the 
very character of the intellectual processes themselves is to 
be explained to a great extent by the influence of voHtions 
on the train of ideas (§ 15, 9). The act that closes the 
volition in such a case is some change in the train of ideas, 

Wdndt, Psychology. 2. edit. 14 



210 ^-^- Psychical Compounds. 

which change follows the preceding motives as the result of 
some resolution or decision. The feelings that accompany 
these acts of immediate preparation, and the feeHng of ac- 
tivity connected with the change itself, agree entirely with 
the feelings observed in the case of external volitional acts. 
Furthermore, action is followed by more or less marked 
feelings of satisfaction, of removal of preceding emotional 
and affective strain. The only difference, accordingly, be- 
tween these special volitions connected with the intellectual 
development and the earlier forms of volition, is to be found 
in the fact that here the final effect of the volition does not 
show itself in an external bodily movement. 

Still, we may have a bodily movement as the secondary 
result of an internal volitional act, when the resolution refers 
to an external act to be executed at some later time. In 
such a case the act itself always results from a second, later 
volition. The decisive motives for this second process come, 
to be sure, from the preceding internal volition, but the two 
are nevertheless distinct and different processes. Thus, for 
example, the formation of a resolution to execute an act in 
the future under certain expected conditions, is an internal 
volition, while the later performance of the act is an ex- 
ternal action different from the first, even though requiring 
the first as a necessary antecedent. It is evident that where 
an external volitional act arises from a decision after a conflict 
among the motives, we have a transitional form in which 
it is impossible to distinguish clearly between the two kinds 
of volition, namely, that which consists in a single unitary 
process and that which is made up of two processes, that 
is, of an earlier and a later volition. In such a transitional 
form, if the decision is at all separated in time from the 
act itself, the decision may be regarded as an internal voli- 
tional act preparatory to the execution. 



§ 14. Volitional Processes. 211 

10. These two changes which take place during the de- 
velopment of will, namely, the moderation of emotions and 
the rendering independent of internal volitions, are changes 
of a progressive order. In contrast with these there is a 
third process which is one of retrogradation. When complex 
volitions with the same motive are often repeated, the conflict 
between the motives grows less intense; the opposing motives 
that were overcome in earlier cases grow weaker and finally 
disappear entirely. The complex act has then passed into 
a simple, or impulsive act This retrogradation of complex 
voHtional processes shows clearly the utter inappropriateness 
of the limitation of the concept "impulsive" to acts of will 
arising from sense-feelings. As a result of the gradual ehm- 
ination of opposing motives, there are intellectual, moral, 
and aesthetic, as well as simple sensuous, impulsive acts. 

This regressive development is but one step in a process 
which unites all the external acts of living being, whether they 
are volitional acts automatic reflex movements. When or 
the habituating practice of certain acts is carried further, 
the determining motives finally become, even in impulsive 
acts, weaker and more transient. The external stimulus 
originally aroused a strongly affective idea which operated as 
a motive, but now the stimulus causes the discharge of the 
act before it can arouse an idea. In this way the impulsive 
movement finally becomes an automatic movement. The more 
often this automatic movement is repeated, the easier it, in 
turn, becomes, even when the stimulus is not sensed, as, for 
example, in deep sleep or during complete diversion of the 
attention. The movement now appears as a pure physio- 
logical reflex, and the volitional process has become a simple 
reflex process. 

This gradual reduction of volitio7ial to mechanical proc- 
esses., which depends essentially on the elimination of all 

14* 



212 II' Psychical Compounds. 

the psychical elements between the beginning and end of 
the act, may take place either in the case of movements 
that were originally impulsive, or in the case of movements 
which have become impulsive through the retrogradation of 
voluntary acts. It is not improbable that all the reflex move- 
ments of both animals and men originate in this way. As 
evidence or this we have, besides the above described re- 
duction of volitional acts through practice to pure mechanical 
processes, also the purposeful character of reflexes, which 
points to the presence at some time of purposive ideas as 
motives. Furthermore, the fact that the movements of the 
lowest animals are all evidently simple volitional acts, not 
reflexes, tells for the same view, so that here too there is 
no justification for the assumption frequently made that acts 
of will have been developed from reflex movements. Finally, 
we can most easily explain from this point of view the fact 
mentioned in § 13 (p. 189), namely, that expressive movements 
may belong to any one of the forms possible in the scale 
of external acts. Obviously the simplest movements are im- 
pulsive acts, while many complicated pantomimetic move- 
ments probably came originally from voluntary acts which 
passed first into impulsive and then into reflex movements. 
Observed phenomena make it necessary to assume that the 
retrogradations that begin in the individual life are gradu- 
ally carried further through the transmission of acquired 
dispositions, so that certain acts which were originally vol- 
untary may appear from the first in later descendants as 
impulsive or reflex movements (§ 19 and § 20). 

10 a. For reasons similar to those given in the case of emo- 
tions, the observation of volitional processes which come into ex- 
perience by chance, is an inadequate and easily misleading 
method for establishing the actual facts in the case. Wherever 
internal or external volitional acts are performed in meeting 



§ 14. Volitional Processes. 213 

either the theoretical or practical demands of life, our interest 
is too much taken up in the action itself to allow us at the 
same time to observe with exactness the psychical processes that 
are going on. In the theories of volition given by older psy- 
chologists — theories that very often cast their shadows in the 
science of to-day — we have a clear exhibition of the unde- 
veloped state of the methods of psychological observation. Ex- 
ternal acts of will are the only ones in the whole sphere of 
volitional processes that force themselves emphatically on the 
attention of the observer. As a result the tendency was to 
limit the concept will to external volitional acts, and thus not 
only to neglect entirely the whole sphere so important for the 
higher development of will, namely, internal volitional acts, but 
also to pay very little attention to the components of the voli- 
tion which are antecedent to the external acts, or at most to 
pay attention only to the more striking ideational components 
of the motive. It followed that the close genetic interconnec- 
tion between impulsive and voluntary acts was not observed, 
and that the former were regarded as not belonging to will, 
but as closely related to reflexes. "Will was thus limited to the 
voluntary and selective actions. Furthermore, the one-sided 
consideration of the ideational components of the motives led 
to a complete neglect of the development of volitional acts 
from emotions, and the singular idea found acceptance that 
volitional acts are not the products of antecedent motives and 
of psychical conditions which act upon these motives and bring 
one of them into the ascendency, but that volition is a process 
apart from the motives and independent of them, a product of 
a metaphysical volitional faculty. This faculty was, on the 
ground of the limitation of the concept volition to voluntary 
acts, even defined as the choosing faculty of the mind, or as 
the faculty for preferring one from among the various motives 
that influence the mind. Thus, instead of deriving volition from 
its antecedent psychical conditions, only the final result, namely, 
the volitional act, was used to build up a general concept which 
was called will, and this class-concept was treated in accordance 
with the faculty-theory as a first cause from which all concrete 
volitional acts arise. 

It was only a modification of this abstract theory when 



214 II- Psychical Compounds. 

Schopenhauer and, following liim, many modern psychologists 
and philosophers declared that volition in itself is an "uncon- 
scious" occurrence which comes to consciousness only in its 
result, the volitional act. In this case, obviously, the inade- 
quate observation of the volitional process preceding the act, 
has led to the assumption that no such process exists. Here, 
again, the whole variety of concrete volitional processes is sup- 
planted by the concept of a single unconscious will, and the 
result for psychology is the same as before : in place of a com- 
prehension of real psychical processes and their combination^ 
an abstract concept is set up and then erroneously looked upon 
as a general cause. 

Modern psychology and even experimental psychology is still 
to a great extent under the control of this deep-rooted abstract 
doctrine of will. In denying from the first the possibility of 
explaining an act by the concrete psychical causality of the 
antecedent volitional process, this theory leaves as the only 
characteristic of an act of will the sum of the sensations which ac- 
company the external act, or may, in cases where the act has 
often been repeated, immediately precede the act as pale memory- 
images. The physical excitations in the nervous system are 
regarded as the causes of the act. Here, then, the question of 
the causality is taken out of psychology and given over to 
physiology instead of to metaphysics, as in the theory discussed 
before. In reality, however, it is here too lost in metaphysics 
in attempting to cross to physiology. For physiology must, as 
an empirical science, abandon the attempt to give a complete 
causal explanation of the physical processes accompanying a 
complex volitional act, from the antecedents of these processes^ 
not only for the present, but for all time, because this leads 
to the problem of an infinite succession. The only possible 
basis for such a theory is, therefore, the principle of material- 
istic metaphysics, that the so-called material processes are all 
that make up the reality of things and that psychical processes 
must accordingly be explained from material processes. But it 
is an indispensable principle of psychology as an empirical 
science, that it shall investigate the facts of^ psychical processes 
as they are presented in immediate experience, and that it shall 
not examine their interconnections from points of view which 



§ 14. Volitional Processes. 215 

are entirely foreign to the facts themselves (§ 1 and p. 18 sq.). 
It is impossible to find out how a volition proceeds, in any- 
way other than by following it exactly as it is presented to us 
in immediate experience. In this experience, however, volition 
is not presented as an abstract concept, but as concrete single 
volitions. Of any particular volition, too, we know nothing 
except what is immediately perceptible in the process. We can 
know nothing of an unconscious or, what amounts to the same 
thing for -psychology, a material process which is not imme- 
diately perceived but merely assumed hypothetically on the basis 
of metaphysical presuppositions. Such metaphysical assumptions 
are obviously mere devices to cover up an incomplete or en- 
tirely wanting psychological observation. 

References. Review of the chief Theories of Volition : Volkmann, 
Lehrbuch der Psychologic, vol. II, § 147 (Herbartian Intellectualism). 
Baumann, Handbuch der Moral, 1879, and Philos. Monatshefte, vol. 17 
(ordinary view). Munsterberg, Die Willenshandlung, 1888 (psycho- 
physical materialism). In opposition to all these theories see Wundt, 
Philos. Studien, vols. 1 and 6, and Lectures on Hum. and Animal 
Psych., lectures 14 and 16. 

11. The exact observation of volitional processes is, for 
the reasons given above, impossible in the case of volitional 
acts that come naturally in the course of life; the only way 
in which a thorough psychological investigation can be made, 
is, therefore, through experimental observation. To be sure, 
we can not produce volitional processes of every kind when- 
ever we wish to do so, but we must limit ourselves to the 
observation of such processes as can be easily influenced 
through external means, namely, such as begin with external 
stimulations and terminate in external acts. The experiments 
which serve this purpose are called reaction experiments. 
They may be described in their essentials as follows. A 
volitional process of simple or complex character is incited 
by an external sense-stimulus and then after the occurrence of 
certain psychical processes which serve in part as motives, the 



216 II- Psychical Compounds. 

volition is brought to an end by a motor reaction. Eeaction 
experiments have a second and more general significance in 
addition to their significance as means for the analysis of voli- 
tional processes. They furnish means for the measurement of 
the rate of certain psychical and psycho-physical processes. 

The simplest reaction experiment that can be tried is as 
follows. A short interval (2 — 3 sec.) after a signal that 
serves to concentrate the attention, an external stimulus is 
allowed to act on some sense-organ. At the moment when 
the stimulus is perceived, a movement that has been de- 
termined upon and prepared before, as, for example, a move- 
ment of the hand, is executed. The psychological conditions 
in this experiment correspond essentially to those of a simple 
volition. The sense impression serves as a simple motive, 
and this is to be followed invariably by a particular act. 
If now we measure objectively by means of either graphic 
or other chronometric apparatus, the interval that elapses 
between the action of the stimulus and the execution of the 
movement, it will be possible, by frequently repeated ex- 
periments of the same kind, to become thoroughly acquainted 
with the subjective processes that make up the whole reac- 
tion, while at the same time the results of the objective 
measurement will furnish a check for the constancy or pos- 
sible variations in these subjective processes. This check is 
especially useful in those cases where some condition in the 
experiment, and thereby the subjective course of the volition 
itself, is intentionally modified. 

12. Such a modification may, indeed, be introduced even 
in the simple form of the experiment just described, by vary- 
ing the way in which the reactor prepares^ before the ap- 
pearance of the stimulus, for the execution of the act. 
When the preparation is of such a character that expecta- 
tion is directed toward the stimulus which is to serve as a 



§ 14. Volitional Processes. 217 

motive, and the external act does not take place until the 
stimulus is clearly recognized, there results a complete form 
of reaction, or the form known as sensorial reaction. When, 
on the other hand, the preparatory expectation is so directed 
toward the motive which is to arouse the act, that the move- 
ment follows the reception of the stimulus as rapidly as 
possible, there results a shortened form of reaction, or the 
so-called muscular reaction. In the first case the ideational 
factor of the expectation is a pale memory image of the 
familiar sense impression. When the period of preparation 
is more extended, this image oscillates between alternating 
clearness and obscurity. The affective element is a feeling 
of expectation that oscillates in a similar manner and is 
connected with sensations of strain from tho sense-organ to 
be affected, as, for example, with tension of the tympanic 
membrane, or of the ocular muscles of accommodation and 
movement. At the moment when the impression arrives the 
preparatory feelings mentioned are followed by a compara- 
tively weak relieving feeling of surprise. This surprise in 
turn gives place to a clearly subsequent arousing feeling 
of activity which accompanies the reaction movement and 
appears in conjunction with the inner tactual sensations. In 
the second case^ on the other hand, where the reaction is of 
the shortened form, we may observe during the period of 
preparatory expectation a pale, wavering memory image of 
the motor organ which is to react {e. g.., the hand) together 
with strong sensations of strain in the same, and a fairly 
continuous feeling of expectation connected with these sen- 
sations. At the moment when the stimulus arrives the state 
of expectation gives place to a strong feeling of surprise. 
There connects itself, then, with this surprise both the 
feeling of activity which accompanies the reaction and also 
the sensations that arise in the reaction. So rapid is this 



218 II- Psychical Compounds. 

connection that the surprise and the subsequent state are 
not distinguished at all, or at most only very vaguely. 
Complete reaction-time is on the average 0.210 — 0.290 sec. 
(the shortest time is for sound, the longest for light), with 
a mean variation of 0.020 sec. for the single observations. 
Shortened reaction-time is 0.120 — 0.190 sec, with a mean 
variation of 0.010 sec. The different values of the mean 
variation in the two cases are chiefly important as objective 
checks for the discrimination of these forms of reaction i). 

13. By introducing special conditions we may make 
complete and shortened reactions the starting points for the 
study of the development of volitions in two different direc- 
tions. Complete (sensorial) reactions furnish the means of 
passing from simple to complex voKtions because we can in 
this case easily insert different psychical processes between 
the perception of the impression and the execution of the 
reaction. Thus we have a voluntary act of relatively simple 
character when we allow an act of cognition or discrimina- 
tion to follow the perception of the impression and then let 



Ij Complete and shortened forms of reaction are further dis- 
tinguished by the characteristic fact that in long series of these 
two classes of reactions no early reactions or mistaken reactions ap- 
pear among the complete reactions, while they are very frequent 
among the shortened reactions. Both early reactions and mistaken 
reactions may be observed when the true stimulus is, in frequently 
repeated experiments, preceded at a uniform interval by a prepara- 
tory signal. An early reaction is one in which the reactor moves his 
hand before the arrival of the signal agreed upon. A mistaken reac- 
tion is one in which the reactor moves in response to some acci- 
dental sensory stimulus. The reaction-times for sensations of taste, 
smell, temperature, and pain are not reckoned in the figures given. 
They are all longer. The differences are, however, obviously to be 
attributed to purely physiological conditions (slow transmission of the 
stimulation to the nerve-endings, and in the case of pain slower 
central conduction), so that they are of no very great interest for 
psychology. 



§ 14. Volitional Processes. 219 

the movement depend on this second process. In this case, 
not the immediate impression, but the idea that results from 
the act of cognition or discrimination is the motive for the 
act to be performed. This motive is only one of a greater 
or smaller number of equally possible motives that could 
have come up in place of it ; as a result the reaction move- 
ment takes on the character of a voluntary act. In fact, we 
may observe clearly the feeling of resolution antecedent to the 
act and also the feeHngs preceding the feehng of resolution 
and connected with the perception of the impression. This is 
still more emphatically the case, and the succession of idea- 
tional and affective processes is at the same time more com- 
plicated, when we bring in still another psychical process, as, 
for example, an association, to serve as the motive for the 
execution of the movement. Finally, the voluntary process 
becomes one of choice when, in such experiments, the act is 
not merely influenced by a plurality of motives in such a 
way that several must follow one another before one de- 
termines the act, but when, in addition to that, one of a 
number of possible different acts is decided upon according 
to the motive presented. This takes place when preparations 
are made for different movements, for example, one with the 
right hand, another with the left hand, or one with each of 
the ten fingers, and the condition is prescribed for each move- 
ment that an impression of a particular quahty shall serve 
as its motive, for example, the impression blue for the right 
hand, red for the left. 

14. Shortened (muscular) reactions, on the contrary, may 
be used to investigate the retrogradation of volitional acts as 
they become reflex movements. In this form of reaction the 
preparatory expectation is directed entirely towards the ex- 
ternal act which is to be executed as rapidly as possible, 
so that voluntary inhibition or execution of the act in ac- 



220 ^I' Psychical Compounds. 

cordance with the special character of the impression can 
here not take place. In other words, a transition from 
simple to complex acts of will, is in this case impossible. 
On the other hand, it is easy by practice so to habituate 
one's self to the invariable connection of an impression and 
a particular movement, that the process of perception fades 
out more and more or takes place after the motor impulse, 
so that finally the movement becomes just like a reflex move- 
ment. This reduction of volition to a mechanical process, 
shows itself objectively most clearly in the shortening of the 
objective time to that observed for pure reflexes, and shows 
itself subjectively in the fact that for psychological obser- 
vation there is a complete coincidence in point of time, of 
impression and reaction, while the characteristic feehng of 
resolution gradually disappears entirely. 

14 a. The chronometric experiments familiar in experimental 
psychology under the name of "reaction experiments", are im- 
portant for two reasons: first, as aids in the analysis of voli- 
tional processes, and secondly, as means for the investigation of 
the temporal course of psychical processes in general. This 
twofold importance of reaction experiments reflects the central 
importance of volitions. On the one hand, the simpler proc- 
esses, feelings, emotions, and their related ideas, are com- 
ponents of a complete volition ; on the other, all possible forms 
of the interconnection of psychical compounds may appear as 
components of a volition. Volitional processes are, consequently, 
appropriate subjects to form the links between what has gone 
before and the topic to be discussed in the next chapter, namely, 
the interconnection between psychical compounds. 

For a "reaction experiment" which is to be the basis of an 
analysis of a volitional process or any of its component psychical 
processes, we must have first of all exact and sufficiently fine 
(reading with exactness to ^-qVf ^®^-) chronometric apparatus 
(electric clock or graphic register). The apparatus must be so 
arranged that we ca^ determine exactly the moment at which 



§ 14. Volitional Processes. 221 

the stimulus acts and that at which the subject reacts. This 
can be accomplished by allowing the stimulus itself (sound, light, 
or tactual stimulus), to close an electric current that sets an 
electric clock, reading to j-^jj sec, in motion, and then allow- 
ing the observer, by means of a simple movement of the hand 
which raises a telegraph-key, to break the current again at the 
moment at which he perceives the stimulus. In this way we 
may measure simple reactions varied in different ways (complete 
and shortened reactions, reactions with or without preceding 
signals), or we may bring into the process various other psy- 
chical acts (discriminations, cognitions, associations, selective 
processes) which may be regarded either as motives for the voli- 
tion or as components of the general interconnection of psychical 
compounds. A simple reaction always includes, along with the 
volitional process, purely physiological factors (conduction of the 
sensory excitation to the brain and of the motor excitation to 
the muscle). If, now, we insert further psychical processes (dis- 
criminations, cognitions, associations, acts of choice), a modifica- 
tion which can be made only when complete reactions are em- 
ployed, the duration of clearly definable psychical processes may 
be gained by subtracting the interval found for simple reactions 
from those found for the compound reactions. In this way it 
has been determined that the time required for the cognition 
and for the discrimination of relatively simple impressions (colors, 
letters, short words) is 0.03—0.05 sec. ; the time of association 
is 0.3 — 0.8 sec. The time for choice between two movements 
(right and left hand) is 0.06 sec, between ten movements (the 
ten fingers) 0.4 sec, etc As already remarked the value of 
these figures is not their absolute magnitude, but rather their 
utility as checks for introspection. Furthermore, we may at 
the same time apply this introspective observation to processes 
subject to conditions which are prescribed with exactness by 
means of experimental methods and which may therefore be 
repeated at pleasure. One must not lose sight of the fact that 
as the reaction processes become more and more complex, the 
figures given can be less and less definitely assigned to special 
clearly differentiated psychical processes. Thus, a choice process 
or an association process is composed of a great number of 
elementary processes which in different individual cases are com- 



222 I^- Psychical Compounds. 

bined in different ways and appear in different degrees of com- 
pleteness. The result is that the average time found by trying 
a large number of experiments gives a certain relative measure 
of the complexity of the processes, but no absolute indication 
of the duration of any single definitely distinguishable psychical 
phenomenon. In general it is to be noted that reaction ex- 
periments are among the most difficult of investigation in ex- 
perimental psychology, if they are to be conducted in such a 
way as to have any value for psychology. They require the 
greatest technical care, the collection and statistical treatment of 
a large number of observations ; and they require also the 
highest degree of practice in introspection. Unfortunately, these 
conditions are not met in all cases. Sometimes far reaching 
conclusions in regard to the nature of psychical processes are 
based upon a few cursory observations. Or else the individual 
differences in the reaction times of different reactors, as dis- 
covered in a few experiments, which differences carry in them- 
selves no evidence of being anything but chance variations, are 
treated as "typical" differences. When the experiments are 
carried out with proper care these individual differences (which 
belong to the discussions of psychological characterology, dis- 
appear more and more. As the individual differences disappear, 
the influences of the variable conditions, such as differences in 
preparation and in the direction of attention, become more 
clearly apparent. 

References. DONDERS, Archiv f. Anat. u. Physiol. 1868 (the first 
attempt to work out the value of reaction experiments for psychol- 
ogy). ExNER, Pfliiger's Archiv, wol. 7. Wundt, Philos. Studien, vol. 1 
(on psychological methods). Merkel, same, vol. 2. Cattell, same, 
vols. 3 and 4. L. Lange, same, vol. 4. Alechsieff, same, vol. 16. 
Kraepelin, Ueber die Beeinflussung einfacher psychischer Vorgange 
durch einige Arzneimittel, 1892. Wundt, Grundzuge der phys. Psych, 
vol. II, chap. 16, and Lectures on Hum. and Anim. Psych., lecture 18. 
(Figures 49 and 60.) 



III. INTERCONNECTION OF PSYCHICAL 
COMPOUNDS. 



§15. CONSCIOUSNESS AND ATTENTION. 

1. Every psychical compound is composed of a number 
of psychical elements which usually do not all begin or end 
at exactly the same moment. As a result, the interconnec- 
tion which unites the elements into a single whole always 
reaches beyond the individual compounds, so that different 
simultaneous and successive compounds are united, though 
indeed somewhat more loosely than are the elements within 
a single compound. We call this interconnection of psychical 
compounds consciousness. 

Consciousness, accordingly, does not mean something that 
exists apart from psychical processes, nor does it refer merely 
to the sum of these processes without reference to how they 
are related to one another. It is the name for the general 
synthesis of psychical processes, in which general synthesis 
the single compounds are marked off as more intimate com- 
binations. A state in which this interconnection is inter- 
rupted, as deep sleep or a faint, is called an unconscious 
state; and we speak of "disturbances of consciousness" when 
abnormal changes in the combination of psychical compounds 
arise, even though the compounds themselves show no internal 
changes whatever. 



224 m. Interconnection of Psychical Compounds. 

2. Consciousness stands under the same external con- 
ditions as psychical phenomena in general. Indeed, con- 
sciousness is merely another name for these phenomena, re- 
ferring more particularly to the mutual relations of the com- 
ponents of these phenomena to one another. As the substratum 
for the manifestations of an individual consciousness we have 
in every case an individual animal organism. In the case 
of men and similar higher animals the cerebral cortex, in 
the cells and fibres of which all the organs that stand in 
relation to psychical processes are represented, appears as 
the immediate organ of this consciousness. The complete 
interconnection of the cortical elements may be looked upon 
as the physiological correlate of the interconnection of psy- 
chical processes in consciousness, and the differentiation of 
the functions of different cortical regions, as the physiological 
correlate of the great variety of single conscious processes. 
The differentiation of functions in the central organ is, in- 
deed, merely relative; every psychical compound requires 
the cooperation of numerous elements and many central 
regions. When the destruction of certain cortical regions 
produces definite disturbances in voluntary movements and 
sensations, or when such a destruction interferes which the 
formation of certain classes of ideas, it is perfectly justifiable 
to conclude that these regions furnish certain indispensable 
links in the chain of physical processes which run parallel 
to the psychical processes in question. The assumptions often 
made on the basis of these phenomena, that there is in the 
brain a special organ for the faculties of speech and writing, 
or that visual, tonal, and verbal ideas are stored in special 
cortical cells, are not only the results of the grossest phy- 
siological misconceptions, but they are irreconcilable with the 
psychological analysis of these functions. Psychologically 
regarded, these assumptions are nothing but modern revivals 



j5? 15. Consciousness and Attention. 22b 

of that most unfortunate form of faculty-psychology known 
as phrenology. 

2 a. The facts that have been discovered in regard to the 
localization of certain psycho-physical functions in the cortex, 
are derived partly from pathological and anatomical observations 
on men, and partly from experiments on animals. They may 
be summed up as follows : 1) Certain cortical regions correspond 
to certain peripheral sensory and muscular regions. Thus, the 
cortex of the occipital lobe is connected with the retina, a part 
of the parietal lobe is connected with the tactual surface, and 
a part of the temporal lobe with the auditory organ. The 
central ganglia of special groups of muscles generally lie directly 
next to, or between the sensory centres functionally related to 
them. 2) Certain complex disturbances have been demonstrated 
as occurring when certain cortical regions which are not directly 
connected with peripheral organs, but are inserted between other 
central regions, fail to carry out their functions. The only 
relation of this kind which has been proved beyond a doubt, 
is that of a certain region of the frontal lobe to the functions 
of speech. The front part of this region is connected in par- 
ticular with the articulation of words (its disturbance results 
in interference with motor coordination, "ataxic aphasia"), the 
part further back is connected with the formation of word ideas 
(its disturbance hinders sensorial coordination and produces in 
this way the so-called "amnesic aphasia"). It is also observed 
that these functions are as a rule confined entirely to the left 
frontal lobe and that generally apoplectic disturbances in the 
right lobe do not interfere with speech, while those in the left 
lobe do. Furthermore, in all these cases, in both simple and 
complex disturbances, there is usually a gradual restoration of 
the functions in the course of time. This is probably effected 
by the vicarious functioning of some, generally a neighbouring, 
cortical region in place of that which is disturbed (in disturb- 
ances of speech, perhaps it is the opposite, before untrained, 
side that comes into play). Localization of other complex psy- 
chical functions, such as processes of memory and association, 
has not yet been demonstrated with certainty. The name 

WuNDT, Psychology. 2. edit. 15 



226 III' Interconnection of Psychical Compounds. 

"psychical centres", applied to certain cortical regions by many 
anatomists, is for the present at least based exclusively either 
on the very questionable interpretation of experiments on animals, 
or else on the mere anatomical fact that no motor or sensory 
fibres running directly to these regions can be found, and that 
in general connective fibres are here developed relatively late. 
The cortex of the frontal brain is such a region. In the human 
brain it is noticeable for its large development. It has been 
observed in many cases that disturbances of this part of the 
brain soon result in marked inability to concentrate the atten- 
tion or in other intellectual defects which are possibly reduce- 
able to this; and from these observations the hypothesis has 
been made that this region is to be regarded as the seat of the 
function of apperception which will be discussed later (4), and 
of all those components of psychical experience in which, as in 
the feelings, the unitary interconnection of mental life finds its 
expression (comp. p. 99). This hypothesis requires, however, a 
firmer empirical foundation than it has at present. It is to be 
noted that certain cases which differ from the first ones men- 
tioned, in the fact that a partial injury of the frontal lobe is 
sustained without any noticeable disturbance of intelligence, are 
by no means proofs against this hypothesis. There is much 
evidence to show that just here, in the higher centres, local 
injuries may occur without any apparent results. This is probably 
due to the great complexity of the connections and to the various 
ways in which the different elements can, therefore, take the 
places of one another. The expression "centre" in all these 
cases is, of course, employed in the sense that is justified by 
the general relation of psychical to physical functions, that is, 
in the sense of a parallelism between the two classes of elementary 
processes, the one regarded from the point of view of the natural 
sciences, the other from that of psychology (comp. p. 2 and 
§ 22, 9). 

Eeferences. H. Munk, Ueber die Functionen der GroChirnrinde, 
1891. Flechsig, Gehirn und Seele, 2nd. ed. 1896, and Neurol. Cen- 
tralbl., No. 21, 1898. Wundt, Philos. Studien, vol. 6, and Grundziige 
der phys. Psych., vol. I, chap. 5, and Lect. on Hum. and Anim. Psych., 
lecture 30. On the Speech Centre : Wundt, Volkerpsychologie, vol. I, 
Pt. 1, chap. 5. 



§ 15. Goiiseiousness and Attention. 227 

3. The interconnection of psychical processes, which con- 
stitutes what we understand under the concept consciousness, 
is in part a simultaneous, in part a successive interconnection. 
The sum of all the processes present at a given moment is 
always a unitary whole whose parts are more or less closely 
united. This is what constitutes the simultajieous intercon- 
nection. On the other hand, a present state is derived directly 
from that which immediately preceded it, in one of two ways. 
Either certain processes disappear and others change their 
course and still others arise, or else a state of unconscious- 
ness intervenes and the new processes are brought into rela- 
tion with those which were present befoxc. These are what 
constitute successive interconnections. In all these cases the 
scope of the single combinations between preceding and 
following processes determines the state of consciousness. 
Consciousness gives place to unconsciousness when this inter- 
connection is completely interrupted, and it is more incomplete 
the looser the connection between the processes of the moment 
and those preceding it. Thus, after a period of unconscious- 
ness the normal state of consciousness is generally only slowly 
recovered through a gradual reestablishment of relations with 
earlier experiences. 

So we come to distinguish grades of consciousness. The 
lower limit, or zero grade, is unconsciousness. This con- 
dition, which consists in an absolute absence of all psychical 
interconnections, is essentially different from the disappearance 
of single psychical contents from consciousness. The latter 
is continually taking place in the flow of mental processes. 
Complex ideas and feelings and even single elements of these 
compounds may disappear, and new ones take their places. 
Any psychical element that has disappeared from conscious- 
ness, is to be called unconscious in the sense that we assume 
the possibility of its renewal, that is, its reappearance in the 

15* 



228 III' Interconnection of Psychical Compounds. 

actual interconnection of psychical processes. Our know- 
ledge about an element that has become unconscious does 
not extend beyond this possibility of its renewal. For psy- 
chology, therefore, it has no meaning except as a disposition 
for the rise of future components of psychical processes, 
which components are connected with earlier conscious proc- 
esses. Assumptions as to the state of the "unconscious" or 
as to "unconscious processes" of any kind which are thought 
of as existing along with the conscious processes of experi- 
ence, are entirely unproductive for psychology. There are, 
of course, physical concomitants of the psychical dispositions 
mentioned, of which some can be directly demonstrated, 
some inferred from various experiences. These physical con- 
comitants are the effects which practice produces on all organs, 
especially on the organs of the nervous system. As a uni- 
versal result of practice we observe a facilitation of action 
which renders a repetition of the process easier. To be sure, 
we do not know any details in regard to the changes that 
are effected in the structure of the nervous elements through 
practice, but we can represent them to ourselves through 
very natural analogies with mechanical processes, such, for 
example, as the reduction of friction resulting from the 
rubbing of two surfaces against each other. 

4. It was noted in the case of temporal ideas (p. 168), 
that the member of a series of successive ideas which is im- 
mediately present in our perception, has the most favorable 
position. Similarly in the simultaneous interconnection of 
consciousness, for example in a compound clang or in a 
series of spacial objects, certain single components are favored 
above the others. In both cases we designate the differences 
in the perception as differences in clearness and distinctness. 
Clearness is the relatively favorable recognition of the content in 
itself, distinctness the sharp discrimination from other objects. 



§ 15. Consciousness and Attention. 229 

Distinctness is generally connected witli clearness. The state 
which accompanies the clear grasp of any psychical content 
and is characterized by a special feeling, we call attention. 
The process through which any content is brought to clear 
comprehension we call ajpperception. In contrast with this, 
perception of content which is not accompanied by a state 
of attention, we designate apprehension. Those contents of 
consciousness upon which the attention is concentrated are 
spoken of, after the analogy of the external optical experi- 
ences of fixation, as being at the fixation-point of conscious- 
ness^ or at the inner fixation-point. On the other hand, 
the whole content of consciousness at any given moment is 
called the field of consciousness. When a psychical process 
passes into an unconscious state we speak of its sinking 
below the threshold of consciousness and when a psychical 
process arises we say it appears above the threshold of con- 
sciousness. These are all figurative expressions and must 
not be understood literally. They are useful, however, be- 
cause of the brevity and clearness they permit in the de- 
scription of conscious processes. 

5. If we try to describe the train of psychical compounds 
in their interconnection, with the aid of these expressions, 
we may say that this train of compounds is made up of a 
continual coming and going. At first some compound comes 
into the field of consciousness and then advances into the 
inner fixation-point, from which it returns to the field of 
consciousness before disappearing entirely. Besides this train 
of psychical compounds all of which are apperceived, there 
is also a coming and going of other compounds which are 
merely apprehended, that is, there are compounds which 
enter the field of consciousness and pass out again without 
reaching the inner fixation-point. Both the apperceived and 
the apprehended compounds may have different grades of 



230 III- Interconnection of Psychical Compounds. 

clearness. In the case of apperceived compounds this appears 
in the fact that the clearness and distinctness of apperception 
in general is variable according to the state of consciousness. 
To illustrate: it can easily be shown that when one and the 
same impression is apperceived several times in succession, 
if the other conditions remain the same, the successive ap- 
perceptions are usually clearer and more distinct. The dif- 
ferent degrees of clearness in the case of compounds that 
are merely apprehended, may be observed most easily when 
the impressions are composite. It is then found, especially 
when the impressions last but an instant, that even here, 
where all the components are obscure from the first, there 
are still different gradations. Some seem to rise more above 
the threshold of consciousness, some less. 

6. These relations can not be determined with certainty 
through chance introspections, they require systematic ex- 
perimental observations. The best kinds of conscious contents 
to use for such observations are ideas because they can be 
easily produced at any time through external impressions. 
Now, in any temporal idea, as already remarked (§ 11, 
p. 168), those components which belong to the present moment 
are in the fixation-point of consciousness. Those of the 
preceding impressions which were present shortly before, 
are still in the field of consciousness, while those which were 
present longer before, have disappeared from consciousness 
entirely. A spacial idea, on the other hand, when it has 
only a limited extent, may be apperceived at once in its to- 
tality. If it is more composite, then its parts too, must pass 
successively through the inner fixation-point if they are to 
be clearly perceived. It follows, therefore, that composite 
spacial ideas (especially momentary visual impressions) are 
peculiarly well suited to furnish a measure of the amount 
of content that can be apperceived in a single act, or of the 



§ 15. Consciousness and Attention. 231 

scoi^e of aUeibtio)i\ while composite temporal ideas (for example, 
rhythmical auditory impressions , hammer-strokes ) may be 
used for measuring the amount of content that can enter 
into consciousness at a given moment, or the scope of con- 
sciousness. Experiments made in this way give, under dif- 
ferent conditions, a scope of from 6 to 12 simple impres- 
sions for attention and of 16 to 40 such impressions for 
consciousness. The smaller figures hold for those impressions 
which do not unite at all to form ideational combinations, 
or at most unite very incompletely, while the larger figures 
hold for those impressions in which the elements combine 
as far as possible into composite compounds. 

6 a. The most accurate way of determining the scope of atten- 
tion is to use spacial impressions of sight, for in such cases it 
is very easy, by means of an electric spark, or by means of 
the fall of a screen made with an opening in the centre, by 
means of a tachistoscope, to expose the objects for an instant 
and in such a way that they all lie in the region of clearest 
vision. In these experiments there must be a point for fixation 
before the momentary illumination, in the middle of the surface 
on which the impressions are to appear. Immediately after the 
experiment, if it is properly arranged, the observer knows that 
the number of objects which were clearly seen in a physiological 
sense, is greater than the number included within the scope of 
attention. When, for example, a momentary impression is made 
up of letters, it is possible, by calling up a memory image of 
the impression, to read afterwards some of the letters that were 
only indistinctly recognized at the moment of illumination. This 
memory image, however, is clearly distinguished in time from 
the impression itself, so that the determination of the scope of 
attention is not disturbed by it. It is true, rather, that careful 
introspection easily succeeds in fixating the state of conscious- 
ness at the moment the impression arrives, and in distinguish- 
ing this from the subsequent acts of memory, which are always 
separated from it by a noticeable interval. Experiments made 
in this way show that the scope of attention is by no means 



232 III' Interconnection of Psychical Compounds, 

a constant magnitude, but that, even when the concentration 
of the attention is approximately at its maximum, its scope 
depends in part on the simplicity or complexity of the impres- 
sions, in part on their familiarity. The simplest spacial im- 
pressions are arbitrarily distributed points. Of these a maximum 
of six can be apperceived at one time. AVhen the impressions 
are somewhat more complex, but of a familiar character, such 
as simple lines, figures and letters, six are, as a rule, perceived 
simultaneously. The figures just given hold for vision; for 
touch the same limits seem to hold only in the case of the 
simplest impressions, namely, points. Six such simple impressions 
can , under favorable conditions , be apperceived in the same 
instant. This fact has been made use of in a practical way in 
the blind alphabet made with points (p. 119). For both touch 
and vision the number of familiar ideas that can be grasped 
at once decreases as the complexity increases. In such cases, 
however, it should be noted that the total number of elements 
increases in spite of the decrease in the number of separate 
total ideas. Thus, when nonsense syllables are used, from six 
to ten letters can be apperceived at once. Familiar phrases and 
proverbs may appear to be apperceived in a much more ex- 
tensive way. Indeed, sometimes apperception seems to include 
four or five short words with a total of twenty or thirty letters. 
In these cases, however, the process of apperception is decidedly 
complicated by the fact that assimilation (which will be discussed 
in § 16) makes itself felt in a very marked degree. If assim- 
ilation is checked by a closer concentration of the attention 
upon the impression itself, the scope of attention is again re- 
duced even for these familiar groups of words to about the same 
limits as those which appear in the case of separate impressions. 
Another group of conditions under which the scope of attention 
seems to be much enlarged is the group of conditions presented 
when impressions are given for a relatively longer period of 
time, so that the attention finds opportunity to pass from point 
to point, thus approximating the conditions which arise in or- 
dinary reading. If, however, these complications of successive 
observation, and the above mentioned complications of reproduc- 
tive association, are all eliminated, the maximum scope of atten- 
tion for both vision and touch seems to be expressed by the 



§ 15. Consciousness and Attention. 233 

figures given at first. The scope of attention includes from four 
to six simple impressions. Under any conditions, then, the 
assertion sometimes made that attention can be concentrated on 
only one impression, or one idea at a time, is false. 

Then too, the observations overthrow the assumption that 
the attention can sweep continuously and with great rapidity 
over a great number of single ideas. In the experiment described, 
if the attempt is made to fill up from memory the image which 
is clearly perceived an instant after the impression, a very 
noticeable interval is required to bring into clear consciousness 
an impression that was not apperceived at first. The successive 
movement of attention over a number of objects appears ac- 
cordingly, to be a periodic process, made up of a number of 
separate acts of apperception following one another. Such a 
periodic rise and fall of attention can, under favorable conditions, 
be directly demonstrated. It is generally irregular in its periods, 
but when there are special conditions favoring rhythmical suc- 
cession the periods may become regular. Thus, if we allow a 
weak continuous impression to act on a sense organ and remove 
as far as possible all other stimuli, it will be observed when 
the attention is concentrated upon this impression that at certain, 
generally irregular, intervals, the impression becomes for a short 
time indistinct, or even appears to fade out entirely, only to 
appear again the next moment. This wavering begins, when 
the impressions are very weak, after 3 — 6 seconds; when they 
are somewhat stronger, after 18 — 24 seconds. These variations 
are readily distinguished from changes in the intensity of the 
stimulus itself, as may be easily demonstrated by purposely 
weakening or interrupting the stimulus in the course of the 
experiment. There are two characteristics that distinguish the 
subjective variations from those due to the changes in the 
stimulus. First, so long as the impression merely passes through 
subjective variations there is always an idea of the continuance 
of the impression, just as there was in the experiments with 
momentary impressions an indefinite and obscure idea of the 
components which were not apperceived. Secondly, the oscilla- 
tions of attention are attended by characteristic feelings and 
sensations which are added to the increasing and decreasing 
clearness of the impressions, and which are entirely absent when 



234 HI' Interconnection of Psychical Compounds. 

the changes are objective. The characteristic feelings are those 
of expectation and activity, which will be described later and 
which regularly increase with the concentration of attention and 
decrease with its relaxation. The sensations come from the 
sense-organ affected, or at least emanate indirectly from it. They 
consist in sensations of tension in the tympanic membrane or in 
sensations of accommodation and convergence, etc. These two 
series of characteristics distinguish the concepts, clearness and 
distinctness of psychical contents from the concept intensity of 
sensational elements. A strong impression may be obscure 
and a weak one clear. The only relation between these two 
different concepts is to be found in the fact that in general 
the stronger impressions force themselves more upon appercep- 
tion. "Whether or not they are really more clearly apperceived, 
depends on the other conditions present at the moment. The 
same is true of the advantages possessed by those parts of a 
visual impression which fall within the region of clearest vision. 
As a rule, the fixated objects are also the ones apperceived. 
But, in the experiments with momentary impressions described 
above, it can be shown that this interconnection may be broken 
up. This happens when we voluntarily concentrate our atten- 
tion on a point in the eccentric regions of the field of vision. 
The object which is obscurely seen then becomes the one which 
is clearly ideated. 

6 b. In the same way that momentary spacial impressions 
are used to determine the scope of attention, we may use im- 
pressions which succeed one another in time, as a measure of 
the scope of consciousness. In this case we start with the as- 
sumption that a series of impressions can be united in a single 
unitary idea only when they are all together in consciousness, 
at least for one moment. If we listen to a series of hammer- 
strokes, it is obvious that while the present sound is apperceived, 
those immediately preceding it are still in the field of conscious- 
ness. Their clearness diminishes, however, just in proportion 
to their distance in time from the apperceived impression, and 
those lying beyond a certain limit disappear from consciousness 
entirely. If we can determine this limit, we shall have a 
measure of the scope of consciousness under the special con^ 
dition given in the experiment. As a means for the determi- 



§ 15. Consciousness and Attention. 235 

nation of this limit we may use tlae ability to compare temporal 
ideas which follow one another immediately. So long as such 
a more or less complex idea is present in consciousness as a 
single unitary whole, we can compare a succeeding idea with it 
and decide whether the two are alike or not. On the other 
hand, such a comparison is absolutely impossible when the pre- 
ceding temporal series is not a unitary whole for consciousness, 
that is, when a part of its constituents have passed into un- 
consciousness before the end is reached. Thus, we may produce 
in immediate succession two series of strokes by means of a 
metronome, marking oif each series by a signal at its beginning 
with a bell-stroke. "When now, these two series are perceived, 
we can judge directly from the impression, so long as the strokes 
of the given series can be grasped as single wholes in con- 
sciousness, whether the two series are alike or not. Of course, 
in such experiments counting of the strokes must be strictly 
avoided. In making the judgments it may be noticed that the 
impression of likeness is produced by the same affective elements 
as in the temporal ideas mentioned before (p. 170). Every stroke 
in the second series is preceded by a feeling of expectation cor- 
responding to the analogous stroke of the first series, so that 
every stroke too many or too few produces a feeling of dis- 
appointment due to the disturbance of the expectation. It 
follows that it is not necessary for the two successive series to 
be present in consciousness at the same time in order that they 
may be compared; but what is required is the union of all the 
impressions of one series into a single unitary idea. The rela- 
tively fixed boundary of the scope of consciousness is clearly 
shown in the fact that the likeness of two temporal ideas is 
always recognized with certainty so long as these ideas do not 
pass the bound that holds for the conditions under which they 
are given, while the judgment becomes absolutely uncertain when 
this limit is once crossed. The extent of the scope of conscious- 
ness as found in measurements made when the conditions of 
attention remain the same, depends partly on the rate of the 
successive impressions and partly on their more or less complete 
rhythmical combination. When the rate of succession is slower 
than about one every four seconds, it becomes impossible to 
combine successive impressions into a temporal idea; by the time 



236 ^11- Interconnection of Psychical Compoimds. 

a new impression arrives, the preceding one has ah'eady dis- 
appeared from consciousness. When the rate passes the upper 
limit of about one every 0.12 sec, the formation of distinctly 
defined temporal ideas is impossible because the attention can 
not follow the impressions any longer. The most favorable rate 
is a succession of strokes, one every 0.2 — 0.3 sec. "With this 
rate and with the simplest rhythm of ^/g time which generally 
arises of itself when the perception is uninfluenced by any special 
objective conditions, as a rule, 8 double or 16 single impres- 
sions can be just grasped together. The best rhythm for the 
perception in one group of the greatest possible number of 
single impressions is the Y4-measure with the strong accent on 
the first stroke and the medium accent on the fifth. In this 
case a maximum of five feet or forty single impressions, can 
be grasped at once. If these figures are compared with those 
obtained when the scope of attention was measured (p. 231), 
putting simple and compound temporal impressions equal to 
the corresponding spacial impressions, we find that the scope of 
consciousness is about four times as great as that' of attention. 

References. On the Scope of Attention: Cattell, Philos. Studien, 
vol. 3. Zeitler, Philos. Studien, vol. 16. On Fluctuation of Atten- 
tion: N. Lange, Philos. Studien, vol. 4. Eckner, Pace, Philos. Studien, 
vol. 8. On the scope of consciousness: Dietze, Philos. Studien, vol. 2. 
WuNDT, Grundziige der phys. Psych., vol. II, chap. 16, and Lect. 
on Hum. and Anim. Psych., lectures 16 and 17 (Fig. 41 Tachisto- 
scope, Fig. 43 Measure of the scope of consciousness). 

7. Besides the properties of clearness and distinctness 
which belong to conscious contents in themselves or in their 
mutual relations to one another, there are regularly other 
properties which are immediately recognized as acco7npa7iying 
processes. These are partly feelings which are characteristic 
of particular forms of apprehension and apperception, partly 
sensations of a somewhat variable character. Especially the 
ways in which psychical contents enter the field of conscious- 
ness^ and the way in which they enter the fixation-point of 
consciousness, vary according to the different conditions under 



j^ 15. Consciousness and Attention. 237 

which the entrance takes place. When any psychical process 
rises above the threshold of consciousness, it is the affective 
elements which, as soon as they are strong enough, are what 
first become noticeable. They begin to force themselves 
energetically into the fixation-point of consciousness before 
anything is perceived of the ideational elements. This is the 
case whether the impressions are new or are revivals of earlier 
processes. This is what causes those peculiar states of mind 
the reasons for which we are usually unable to discover. 
They are sometimes states of a pleasurable or unpleasurable 
character, sometimes they are predominantly states of strained 
expectation. In this latter case the sudden entrance into 
the scope of the attention of the ideational elements belong- 
ing to the feelings, is accompanied by feelings of relief or 
satisfaction. When we are trying to recall something that 
has been forgotten, this affective state may arise. Often 
there is vividly present in such a case, besides the regular 
feeling of strain, the special affective tone of the forgotten 
idea, although the idea itself still remains in the background 
of consciousness. In a similar manner, as we shall see later 
(§ 16), the clear apperception of ideas in acts of cognition 
and recognition is always preceded by special feelings. Sim- 
ilar affective states may be produced experimentally by the 
momentary illumination of a field of vision in which there 
are in the region of indirect vision, impressions of the strongest 
possible affective tone. All these experiences seem to show 
that every content of consciousness has some influence on 
attention. Every content thus shows itself partly through 
its own proper affective tone, and partly through the feel- 
ings connected with acts of attention. The whole effect 
of these obscure contents of consciousness on the atten- 
tion fuses, according to the general law of the synthesis 
of affective components (p. 175), with the feelings attending 



238 III' Interconnection of Psychical Compounds. 

the clearly conscious contents, thus forming a single total 
feeling. 

8. When any psychical content enters the fixation-point 
of consciousness, new and peculiar affective processes are 
added to those that have been described. These new feelings 
are in turn of different kinds, according to the different con- 
ditions attending the entrance of the content into the fixa- 
tion-point. The conditions are of two classes and are related 
for the most part, to the above described preparatory affec- 
tive influences of the content before it is apperceived. 

First, the new content may force itself on the attention 
suddenly and without preparatory affective influences; this 
we call passive apperception. While the content of conscious- 
ness is becoming clearer both in its ideational and affective 
elements, there is first of all a concomitant feeling of passive 
receptivity, which is a depressing feeling, and is generally 
stronger the more intense the psychical process, and the 
more rapid its rise. This feeling soon sinks and then gives 
place to an antagonistic, exciting feeling of activity. There 
are connected with both these feelings characteristic sen- 
sations in the muscles of the sense-organ from which the 
ideational components of the process proceed. The feeling 
of receptivity is accompanied by a transient sensation of 
relaxation, that of activity by a succeeding sensation of strain. 

Secondly, the new content may be preceded by the ]3re- 
paratory affective influences mentioned above (7), and as a 
result the attention may be concentrated upon this content 
even before it arrives; this we call active apperception. In 
such a case the apperception of the content is preceded by 
a feeling of expectation^ sometimes of longer, sometimes of 
shorter duration. This feeling is generally one of strain and 
may at the same time be one of excitement; it may also 
have pleasurable or unpleasurable factors, according to its 



§ 15. Consciousness and Attention. 239 

ideational elements. This feeling of expectation is usually 
accompanied by fairly intense sensations of tension in the 
muscles of the sense-organ affected. At the moment in 
which the content arises in clear consciousness, this feeling 
gives place to a feeling of fulfillment which is generally very 
short and has the character of a feeling of relief. Under 
circumstances it may also be depressing or exciting, pleas- 
urable or unpleasurable. After this feeling of fulfillment, 
we have at once the feeling of activity. This is the same 
feeling as that which appeared at the close of passive apper- 
ception, and is here, as it was there, attended by an increase 
in the feelings of strain. 

8 a. The experimental observation of the different forms of 
apperception can be carried out best with the aid of the reaction- 
experiments described in § 14. Passive apperception may be 
studied by the use of unexpected impressions, and active, by the 
use of expected impressions. At the same time it will be ob- 
served that between these typical differences there are intermediate 
stages. Either the passive form will approach the active because 
of the weakness of the first stage, or the active will approach 
the passive form because in the sudden relaxation of the ex- 
pectation the contrast between the expectation and the relief 
and depression which come in the succeeding feeling of fulfill- 
ment, is more marked than usual. 

9. If the affective side of these processes of attention is 
more closely examined, it appears that the affective elements 
are exactly the same as in the case of all volitional processes. 
It is also clear that in its essential character passive apper- 
ception corresponds to an impulsive act while the active form 
of apperception corresponds to a voluntary act. In the first 
case the psychical content which forces itself upon attention 
without preparation is evidently the single motive, and there- 
fore arouses the act of apperception without any conflict 



240 ni. Interconnection of Psychical Go^npounds. 

with other motives. The act is here too connected with the 
feeling of activity characteristic of all volitional acts. In 
the case of active apperception, on the other hand, other 
psychical contents with their affective elements tend to force 
themselves upon the attention during the preparatory Mective 
stages, so that the act of apperception when it finally is 
performed is often recognized as a voluntary process. It 
may even be recognized as a selective process when the 
conflict between different contents comes clearly into con- 
sciousness. The existence of such selective acts under the 
circumstances mentioned was recognized even in older psy- 
chology where "voluntary attention" was spoken of. But 
here too, as in the case of external volitional acts, will was 
made to stand alone; there was no explanation of it by its 
antecedents, because the central point in the development, 
namely, the fact that so-called involuntary attention is only 
a simpler form of internal volition, was entirely overlooked. 
Then, too, in accordance with the methods of the old faculty- 
theory, "attention" and "will" were regarded as different, 
sometimes as related forces, sometimes as mutually excluding 
psychical forces, while the truth evidently is that these two 
concepts refer to the same class of psychical processes. 

10. In connection with these internal volitional acts which 
we call processes of attention, there takes place the forma- 
tion of certain concepts of the highest importance for all 
psychical development. This is the formation of the concept 
subject and the establishment of the correlate concept objects, 
as independent realities standing over against the subject. 
The full formation of these concepts can be carried out in 
logical form only with the aid of scientific reflection, still 
the concepts have their bases in the processes of attention. 

Even in immediate experience there is a division between 
components of this experience. On the one hand are those 



§ 15. Conseiotisness and Attention. 241 

components which are arranged in space with relation to 
the point of orientation mentioned above (p. 144), and are 
either called objects^ that is, something outside the perceiving 
subject, or are called with reference to the mode of their 
rise in consciousness, ideas ^ that is something which the 
subject perceives. On the other hand, there are other com- 
ponents of experience which do not belong to this spacial 
order, though they are continually brought into relation with 
it through their quality and intensity. These latter com- 
ponents as we saw in § 12 — 14, are intimately interconnected. 
Feelings are parts of emotions and emotions are to be con- 
sidered as components of volitional processes. Any such 
process may end before it is fully completed, as is often the 
case when a feeling gives rise to no noticeable emotion, or 
when an emotion fades out without really causing the voli- 
tional act for which it prepared the way. All affective proc- 
esses may, then, be subsumed under the general concept 
volitional process. Volition is the complete process of which 
the other two are merely components of simpler or more 
complex character. From this point of view we can easily 
understand how it is that even simple feelings contain, in 
the extremes between which they vary, a volitional direction; 
and that these same feelings express by their tendencies the 
amount of volitional energy present at a given moment; and 
finally, that they correspond to certain particular phases of 
the volitional process itself. The direction of volition is ob- 
viously indicated by the pleasurable or unpleasurable direc- 
tions of feelings, which correspond directly to an effort to 
reach something, or to an effort to avoid something. The 
amount of volitional energy finds its expression in the arous- 
ing and subduing directions of feelings, while the opposite 
phases of a volitional process are related to the directions ; 
of strain and relaxation. - iii'j(ii([o 

WuNDT, Psycliology. 2. edit. 16 



242 J^I- Interconnection of Psychical Compounds. 

11. Thus, volition proves to be the fundamental fact from 
which arise all those processes which are made up of feelings. 
In the process of apperception^ which is found through psy- 
chological analysis to have all the characteristics of a voli- 
tional act, we have the direct relation between this funda- 
mental fact of volition and the ideational contents of ex- 
perience. Now, voHtional processes are recognized as being 
unitary processes and as being uniform in character in the 
midst of all the variations in their components. As a result 
there arises an immediate feeling of this unitary intercon- 
nection in connection with the feeling of activity which ac- 
companies all volition. This feeling of unity is then carried 
over to all conscious contents because of the relation men- 
tioned in which these conscious contents stand to volition. 
This feehng of the interconnection of all psychical experi- 
ences of an individual, is called the "ego". It is a feeling, 
not an idea as it is often called. Like all feelings, however, 
it is connected with certain sensations and ideas. The idea- 
tional components most closely related to the ego are the 
common sensations and the idea of one's own body. 

That part of the affective and ideational contents which 
detaches itself from the totality of consciousness and fuses 
with the feeling of the ego, is called self-consciousness. It 
is no more a reality, apart from the processes of which it 
is made up, than is consciousness in general. It is merely 
a name for the interconnection of these processes, which 
furthermore, especially in their ideational components, can 
never be sharply distinguished from the rest of conscious- 
ness. This shows itself most of all in the facts that the 
idea of one's own body sometimes fuses with the feeling of 
the ego, sometimes is distinct from this feeling as an idea of 
an object, and that in general self-consciousness in its devel- 
opment always tends to reduce itself to its affective basis. 



§ 15. Consciousness and Attention. 243 

12. This separation of self-consciousness from the other 
contents of consciousness also gives rise to the discrimination 
of subject and objects. The concept subject has, accordingly, 
as a result of its psychological development three different 
meanings of different scope, each of which may at different 
times be the one employed. In its narrowest sense the subject 
is the interconnection of volitional processes, which inter- 
connection finds expression in the feeling of the ego. In 
the next wider sense it includes the real content of these 
volitional processes together with the feelings and emotions 
that prepare their way. Finally, in its widest significance it 
embraces the constant ideational substratum of these sub- 
jective processes, that is, the body of the individual as the 
seat of the common sensations. In the line of development 
the widest significance is the oldest, and in actual psychical 
experience the narrowest is continually giving way to a return 
to one of the others, because the narrowest form can be 
fully attained only through conceptual abstraction. This 
highest form is, then, in reality merely a kind of limit to- 
wards which self- consciousness may approach more or less 
closely. 

12a. This discrimination of subject and objects, or of the 
ego and the outer world as it is commonly expressed by reducing 
the first concept to its original affective substratum and gather- 
ing the second together in a general concept — this discrim- 
ination is the basis of all the considerations responsible for the 
dualism which first gained currency in the popular view of things 
and was then carried over into philosophical systems. It is on 
this ground that psychology comes to be set over against the 
other sciences, in particular the natural sciences, as a science of 
the subject (§ 1, p. 4). Such a view could be correct only 
under the conditions that the discrimination of the ego from the 
outer world were a fact preceding all experience and that the 
concepts subject and objects could be unequivocally distinguished 

16* 



244 JII' Intercomiection of Psychical Compounds. 

once for all. But neither of these conditions is fulfilled. Self- 
consciousness depends on a whole series of psychical processes 
of which it is the product, not the producer. Subject and 
object are, therefore, neither originally, nor in later develop- 
ment, absolutely different contents of experience. They are 
concepts which are due to reflection and they result from the 
interrelations of the various components of the absolutely unitary 
content of our immediate experience. 

Keferences. Staude, Der Begriff der Apperception in der neueren 
Psychologie, Philos. Studien, vol. 1. Kulpe, Die Lehre vom Willen 
in der neueren Psychologie, Philos. Studien, vol. 5. Wundt, Grund- 
zuge der phys. Psych., chapters 16 § 6, and 22 § 1. Lectures on Hum. 
and Anim. Psych., lecture 17. 

13. The interconnection of psychical processes which makes 
up consciousness, has its deepest spring in the processes of 
combination which are continually taking place between the 
elements of the single contents of experience. Such proc- 
esses are operative in the formation of single psychical com- 
pounds and they are what give rise to the simultaneous unity 
of the state of consciousness present at a given moment and 
also to the continuity of successive states. These processes 
of combination are of the most various kinds; each one has 
its individual coloring, which is never exactly reproduced in 
any second case. Still, the most general differences are 
those exhibited by attention, in the passive reception of im- 
pressions and the active apperception of impressions. As 
short names for these differences we use the term association 
to indicate a process of combination in a passive state of 
attention, and the terms apperceptive combination to indicate 
a combination in which the attention is active. 



§ 76. Associations. 245 

§ 16. ASSOCIATIONS. 

1. The concept association has undergone, in the modern 
development of psychology, a necessary and very radical 
change in meaning. To be sure, this change has not been 
accepted everywhere, and the original meaning is still re- 
tained, especially by those psychologists who support, even 
to-day, the fundamental positions on which the association- 
psychology grew up {§ 2, p. 13 sq.). Association-psychology 
which is predominantly intellectualistic, pays attention to 
nothing but the ideational contents of consciousness and, ac- 
cordingly, limits the concept of association to the combina- 
tions of ideas. Hartley and Hume, the two founders of 
association-psychology, spoke of "association of ideas" in this 
limited sense i). Ideas were regarded as objects, or at least 
as processes that could be repeated in consciousness with 
exactly the same character as that in which they were present 
at first (p. 14, 8). This led to the view that association was 
a principle for the explanation of the so-called "reproduction" 
of ideas. Furthermore, it was not considered necessary to 
account for the rise of composite ideas through psychological 
analysis, since it was assumed that the physical union of 
impressions in sense perception was sufficient to explain their 
psychological combination, and so the concept of association 
was limited to those forms of reproduction in which the 
associated ideas succeed one another in time. For the dis- 
crimination of the chief forms of successive associations, 
Aristotle's logical scheme for the memory processes was 
accepted, and in accordance with the principle of classification 
by opposites the following forms were discriminated : association 



[1) The author remarks that the English word idea as here used 
corresponds to the German Vorstelhmg. Tr.] 



246 III- Intercomiection of Psychical Compounds. 

by similarity and contrast, and association by simultaneity 
and succession. These class-concepts gained by a logical 
dichotomic process were dignified with the name "laws of 
associations". Modern associationism has generally sought 
to reduce the number of these laws. Contrast is regarded 
as a special form of similarity, for only those contrasted 
concepts are associated which belong to the same general 
class; and associations by simultaneity and succession are 
both included under contiguity. Contiguity is then regarded 
as outer association and contrasted with inner association 
by similarity. Some psychologists believe it possible to 
reduce these two forms to a single, still more fundamen- 
tal, "law of association" by making association by con- 
tiguity a special form of similarity, or, what is still more 
common, by explaining similarity as a result of associa- 
tion by contiguity. In both cases association is generally 
brought under the more general principle of practice or 
habituation. 

2. The whole foundation for this kind of theorizing is 
destroyed by two facts which force themselves irresistibly 
upon us as soon as we begin to study the matter experimen- 
tally. The first of these facts is the general result of the 
psychological analysis of sense perceptions, namely, the fact 
that composite ideas, which association-psychology regards 
as irreducible psychical units, are in fact the results of syn- 
thetic processes which are obviously closely related to the 
complex processes commonly called associations. The second 
fact comes from the experimental investigation of memory 
processes. It is found that the reproduction of an idea in the 
strict sense of a renewal in its unchanged form of an earlier 
idea, never takes place at all. What really does happen in 
an act of memory is the rise of a new idea in conciousness ; 
this new idea always differs from the earlier idea to which 



*? 16. Associations. 247 

it is referred, and usually derives its elements from a number 
of preceding ideas. 

It follows from the first fact that there are elementary 
processes of association which unite the components of ideas 
and are earlier in their appearance than the associations of 
composite ideas with one another, although it is this later 
group of processes to which the name associations is gener- 
ally limited. The second fact proves that ordinary associa- 
tions can be nothing but complex products of the earlier 
elementary associations. These conclusions show the utter 
lack of justification for the exclusion from the concept asso- 
ciation of the elementary processes the products of which are 
simultaneous ideas rather than successive ideas. Then, too, 
there is no reason for limiting the concept even to ideational 
processes. The existence of composite feelings, emotions, 
etc., shows, on the contrary, that affective elements also enter 
into regular combinations, which may in turn unite with as- 
sociations of sensational elements to form complex products, 
as we saw in the rise of temporal ideas (§ 11, p. 156 sq.). 

3. It follows from what has been said that the concept 
of association can gain a fixed, and in any particular case 
unequivocal, significance, only when association is regarded 
as in itself an elementary process which never appears in 
actual psychical processes except in a more or less complex 
form, so that the only way to find out the character of 
elementary association is to subject complex associated products 
to a psychological analysis. The ordinarily so-called associa- 
tions (the successive associations) are only one, and the 
loosest at that, of all the forms of combination. In contrast 
with these we have the closer combinations from which the 
different kinds of psychical compounds arise. For these 
processes we have already adopted the general name fusions., 
because of the closeness of the union (p. 103 sq.). The next 



248 III- Interconnection of Psychical Compounds. 

stage of combination is found in the simultaneous associa- 
tions whicli arise when a given psychical compound is changed 
through the influence of the elements of other compounds 
acting upon it. We designate these processes, because of 
the way in which the elements interact, assimilations. In 
addition to these assimilations we have another group of 
associations which are also generally simultaneous in character, 
namely, the processes which Hekbart called complications., 
and which consist in simultaneous associations of jpsycMcal 
compounds derived from different spheres of sensation. Finally, 
there are associations which unite psychical compounds into 
temporal successions of ideas. These are the forms of as- 
sociation which are most easily observed. They were there- 
fore, the only forms recognized at first. We call these suc- 
cessive associations. 

A. FUSIONS. 

4. The various forms of fusion of psychical elements 
which are possible, have been described in detail in the 
course of the discussion of psychical compounds. These 
compounds are, indeed, nothing more nor less than the 
products of such fusions. The various fusion processes require, 
therefore, at this point only a brief treatment with special 
reference to the definition of their relation to the other 
processes of association. With reference then, to their special 
characteristics as association processes, the processes of fusion 
may be described as thoroughly fixed associations of psychical 
elements. An element of a fusion may, to be sure, appear 
in other combinations, but it can never appear alone. It is 
the processes of fusion, then, through which all the real 
psychical compounds of our conscious experience arise, for 
there are no isolated elements in consciousness (p. 32). The 
existence of these simplest forms of association could have 



§ 16. Associations. 249 

been inferred from the existence of more complex associa- 
tions, even if there had been no direct evidence of the simple 
associations in the analysis of the various forms of psychical 
compounds. For it would hardly be comprehensible that 
combinations should arise between complex compounds if 
there were no tendency towards these combinations in the 
elements. Indeed, it will appear as a fact in the later dis- 
cussions, that the associations of complex compounds are 
always to be traced back to associations between the ele- 
ments of these compounds (p. 256). 

5. We may distinguish as the chief forms of psychical 
fusion y intensive fusion and extensive fusion. This agrees 
with the results of our earlier discussions of psychical com- 
pounds. The intensive fusions subdivide into sensation fusions 
and affective fusions. The chief examples of sensation fusions 
are those which appear in clang compounds (p. 105), and 
the chief examples of affective fusions are composite feelings 
(p. 175). If we neglect for the moment those differences 
between various forms of intensive fusion which result from 
the nature and relations of the specific elements which in 
each case enter into the fusions, there are two distinguish- 
ing characteristics common to all intensive fusions. In the 
first place, such fusions result from the combination of sen- 
sational components, or affective components belonging to a 
single system. For example, the elements of a clang fusion 
belong to the sphere of tone sensations, the elements of a 
common feeling belong to the sphere of touch. In the 
second place, in every intensive fusion one element of the 
combination stands out as the predominant factor. For 
example, in a clang there is a chief tone, in a total feeling 
there is a chief feeling. Extensive fusions include spacial 
and temporal ideas, emotions and volitional processes. They 
are more complex than the intensive fusions because they 



250 m- Interconnection of Psychical Compounds. 

always include combinations of disparate elements. But even 
here there are certain predominating elements which give to 
the fusion products their unitary character. As predomina- 
ting elements in the case of spacial ideas, -we find outer 
tactual sensations and visual sensations. In the case of 
temporal ideas the feelings of tension and relief are such 
predominating factors. In the case of emotions and volitions 
the predominating factors are the partial feelings which result 
from the above mentioned feelings of tension and relief, and 
from feelings of excitation and depression (p. 171, 203). In 
point of complexity the various extensive fusions may be 
arranged in a series beginning with the least complex. The 
first members of such a series are the spacial ideas which 
are pure sensational ideas. They are, as compared with the 
other extensive fusions, relatively simple, while they are, as 
compared with intensive compounds, more complicated in 
character. Following the spacial ideas in the series, come 
temporal ideas. These contain both sensational and affective 
elements, but certain sensations are so closely fused with 
the dominating feelings that even the feehngs are more or 
less ideational in character, that is, are directly referred to 
sensory impressions. The last members of the series are the 
emotional and volitional processes. These processes differ 
only in their closing phase, and all belong, therefore, to a 
single form. They constitute the transitional stage between 
fusions and complex associations, because in them, complex 
compounds, such as spacial and temporal ideas and com- 
pound feelings, all enter as accessories to the main process. 
The extensive fusions, including the spacial ideas as their 
simplest form, and volitional processes as their most complex 
form, may be said to have the same characteristics in 
regard to the kinds of elements which they contain as 
have complications. They also show^ certain of the essential 



§ 16. Associations. 251 

characteristics of successive associations. In this way it may be 
said that there are in the various forms of fusions, anticipa- 
tions of each of the complex forms of association which are 
to be described. Assimilations are anticipated in intensive 
fusions; complications are anticipated in extensive spacial 
fusions; and, finally, successive associations are anticipated 
in temporal fusions and in emotional and vohtional processes, 
which appear as the more highly developed complications 
arising from temporal ideas. Intensive fusions and spacial 
fusions may also be classified, together with assimilations 
and complications, as simultaneous processes. Temporal ideas, 
emotions and volitions belong, together with the memory 
processes to be described later and the related processes, 
under the general head of successive associations. 



B. ASSIMILATIONS. 

6. Assimilations are forms of association which constantly 
appear during the formation of intensive ideas and spacial 
ideas and thus serve to supplement the process of fusion. 
Assimilation is most clearly demonstrable when certain single 
components of the product of an assimilation are given 
through external sense impressions, while others belong to 
earlier ideas. In such a case the assimilation may be de- 
monstrated by the fact that certain components of the idea 
which are wanting in the objective impression or are there 
represented by components other than those actually present 
in the idea itself, can be shown to arise from earlier ideas. 
Experience shows that of these reproduced components, those 
are most favored which are very frequently present. Certain 
single elements of the impression are, however, after the 
analogy of the dominating elements in fusion, usually of 
more importance in determining the association than are the 



252 IJI- Interconnection of Psychical Compounds. 

others, so that when these dominating elements are altered, 
as may be the case especially with assimilations of the visual 
sense, the product of the assimilation undergoes a correspond- 
ing change. 

7. Among intensive compounds it is the auditory ideas 
which are most frequently the results of assimilation. They 
also furnish the most striking examples of the influence on 
present processes of earlier combinations which have become 
familiar through repetition. Of all the auditory ideas, the 
most familiar are the readily available ideas of words, for 
these usually receive more attention than other sound im- 
pressions. As a result the hearing of words is continually 
accompanied by assimilations; the sound impression is in- 
complete, but it is entirely filled out by earher impressions, 
so that we do not notice the incompleteness. So it comes 
that not the correct hearing of words, but the misunder- 
standing of them, that is, the erroneous filling out of in- 
complete impressions through incorrect assimilations, is what 
generally leads us to notice the process. We may find an 
expression of the same fact in the ease with which any sound 
whatever, as, for example, the cry of an animal, the noise 
of water, wind, machinery, etc., can be made to sound like 
words almost at will. 

8. In the case of intensive feelings we note the presence 
of assimilations in the fact that impressions which are ac- 
companied by sense-feelings and elementary aesthetic feelings, 
very often exercise a second direct affective influence for 
which we can account only when we recall certain ideas of 
which we are reminded by the impressions. In such cases 
the association is usually at first only a form of affective 
association, and only so long as this is true is the assimila- 
tion simultaneous. The related ideational association which 
explains the effect is, on the contrary, usually a later process 



§ 16. Assooiations. 253 

which must be classified as a form of successive association. 
For this reason it is often hardly possible, when we have 
clang impressions or color impressions accompanied by par- 
ticular feelings ; or when we have simple spacial ideas, to 
decide what is the immediate affective influence of the im- 
pression itself, and what is the influence of the association. 
As a rule, in such cases the affective process is to be looked 
upon as the resultant of an immediate factor and an asso- 
ciative factor which unite to form a single, unitary total 
feeling in accordance with the general laws of affective 
fusion (p. 175). 

9. Association in the case of spacial ideas is of the most 
comprehensive character. It is somewhat less noticeable in 
the sphere of touch when vision is present ^ on account of 
the small importance of tactual ideas in general and espe- 
cially on account of the small importance of touch for memory. 
For the blind, on the other hand, touch is the essential 
means of rapid orientation in space, as for example, in the 
rapid reading of the blind-alphabet. The effects of assimila- 
tion are most strikingly evident when several tactual surfaces 
are concerned, because in such cases assimilation is easily 
betrayed by the illusions which may arise in consequence 
of some disturbance in the usual interrelation of the sensa- 
tions. Thus, for example, when we touch a small ball with 
the index and middle fingers crossed, we have the idea of 
two balls. The explanation is obvious. In the ordinary 
position of the fingers the external impression here given 
actually corresponds to two balls, and the many perceptions 
of this kind which have been perceived before, exercise an 
assimilative action on the new impression. 

In visual sense perceptions , assimilative processes play a large 
part. They aid especially in the formation of ideas of the magni- 
tude, of the distance, and of the three-dimensional character of 



254 IIJ- Interconnection of Psychical Oompoimds. 

visual objects. In this last respect they are essential supple- 
ments of immediate binocular motives for projection into depth. 
Thus, the correlation that exists between the ideas of the 
distance and ideas of magnitude of objects, as, for example, 
the apparent difference in the size of the sun or moon on 
the horizon and at the zenith, is to be explained as an effect 
of assimilation. The perspective of drawing and painting 
also depends on these influences. A picture drawn or painted 
on a plane surface can appear three-dimensional only on 
condition that the impression arouses elements of earlier 
percepts which are assimilated with the new impression. This 
is most evident in the case of unshaded drawings that can 
be seen either in relief or in intaglio. Observation shows 
that these differences in appearance are by no means accidental 
or dependent on the so-called "power of imagination", but 
that there are always elements in the immediate impression 
which determine definitely the assimilative process. The 
elements that are thus operative are, above all, the sensa- 
tions arising from the position and movements of the eye. 
Thus, for example, a hnear design of a prism which is looked 
at with one eye only so as to eliminate the binocular data 
for the perception of depth, will be seen alternately in relief 
and in intaglio according as we fixate in the two cases the 
parts of the drawing which correspond ordinarily to a solid 
or to a hollow object. A solid angle represented by three 
lines in the same plane appears in relief when the fixation- 
point is moved along one of the lines, starting from the 
apex; it appears in intaglio when the movement is in the 
opposite direction, that is from the end of the line towards 
the apex. In these and all like cases the assimilation is 
determined by the rule that in its movement over the fixation- 
lines of objects the eye usually passes from nearer to more 
distant points, and when it fixates any point for a longer 



§ 16. Associations, 255 

period of fixation, it generally turns toward those parts of 
the object which lie near at hand. Effects of assimilation 
are also noticeable in cases of misreading of words. These 
facts of misreading correspond fully with the facts of in- 
correct hearing described above (p. 252). In reading we 
overlook the misprints in a book. This is due, not so much 
to the fact that we have failed to notice the wrong letter 
which was present, as to the fact that we have substituted 
the right letters for the wrong one^). 

In other cases the geometrical optical illusions § 10 (19 
and 20) which are due to the laws of ocular movements, 
produce as secondary effects certain ideas of depth which 
eliminate the contradictions between the retinal images which 
result from these figures, and the illusions of length and 
directions which arise from the perceptions of the impressions. 
Thus, to illustrate, an interrupted straight line appears longer 
than an equal uninterrupted line (p. 137); as a result we tend 
to project the first to a greater depth than the latter. Here 
both lines cover just the same distances on the retina in 
spite of the fact that because of the different motor energy 
connected with their estimation their lengths are perceived 
as different. An elimination of the contradiction which thus 
arises is effected by the formation of different ideas of 
distance, for when one of two lines the retinal images of 
which are alike appears longer than the other, this longer 
line must, under the ordinary conditions of vision, belong 
to a more distant object. Again, to take another illustra- 
tion, when one straight line is intersected at an acute angle 
by another line, the result is an overestimation of the acute 



1) Assimilation processes which take place during reading may 
be studied most advantageously by means of the tachistoscope men- 
tioned on page 231. This apparatus allows the words to be seen 
only for a short interval. 



256 III- Interconnection of Psychical Compounds. 

angle, which overestimation sometimes gives rise, when the 
line is long, to an apparent bending of the line near the 
point of intersection (p. 137). Here too the contradiction 
between the true course of the line and the increase in the 
angle of intersection, is eliminated by the apparent projec- 
tion of the line into the third dimension. In all these cases 
the perspective can be explained only as the assimilative 
effect of the elements of earlier ideas. 

10. In none of the assimilations discussed is it possible 
to show that any former idea has acted as a whole on the 
new impression. Generally such action of a whole idea is 
impossible because we must attribute the assimilative in- 
fluence to a large number of ideas, differing in many respects 
from one another. Thus, for example, a straight line which 
intersects a vertical at an acute angle, corresponds to in- 
numerable cases in which an inclination of the line with its 
accompanying increase of the angle appeared as a component 
of a three-dimensional idea. But all these cases may have 
been very different in regard to the size of the angle, the 
length of the lines, and other attending circumstances. We 
must, accordingly, think of the assimilative process as a 
process in which not a single definite idea is operative, nor 
even a definite combination of elements from earlier ideas, 
but rather, as a rule, we must think of it as a process in 
which a great number of such combinations are operative. 
These many antecedents need agree only approximately with 
the new impression in order to affect consciousness. 

We may gain some notion of the way in which this effect 
is produced from the important part that certain elements 
connected with the impression play in the production of the 
process, as, for example, the inner tactual sensations in visual 
ideas. Obviously it is these immediate sensational elements 
which serve to pick out from the great mass of ideational 



§ 16. Associations. 257 

elements reacting on tlie impression, certain particular ele- 
ments which correspond to themselves. The present sensa- 
tions then hring these selected factors into a form agreeing 
with the form of the rest of the components of the immediate 
impression. At the same time it appears that not merely 
are the elements of our memory images relatively indefinite 
and therefore variable, but that even the perception of an 
immediate impression may, under special conditions, vary 
within fairly wide limits. In this way the assimilative process 
starts primarily from elements of the immediate impression, 
chiefly from such as are of preeminent importance for the 
formation of the idea, as, for example, in visual ideas, the 
sensations of ocular position and movement. These elements 
call up certain particular memory elements corresponding to 
themselves. These memories then exercise an assimilative 
effect on the immediate impression, and the impression in 
turn reacts in the same way on the reproduced elements. 
These separate acts are, like the whole process, not succes- 
sive, but, at least for our consciousness, simultaneous. For 
this reason the product of the assimilation is apperceived as 
an immediate, unitary idea. The two distinguishing charac- 
teristics of assimilation are, accordingly, 1) that it is made 
up of a series of elementary processes of combination, that 
is, processes that have to do with the components of ideas, 
not with the whole ideas themselves, and 2) that the united 
components modify one another through reciprocal assim- 
ilations. 

11. On this basis we can explain without difficulty the 
main differences between complex assimilative processes, by 
the very different parts that the various factors necessary 
to such processes play in the various concrete cases. In 
ordinary sense perceptions the direct elements are so pre- 
dominant that the reproduced elements are as a rule entirely 

WuNDT, Psychology. 2. edit. 17 



258 ^11- Interconnection of Psychical Gompoimds. 

overlooked, although in reality they are never absent and 
are often very important for the perception of the objects. 
These reproduced elements are much more noticeable when 
the assimilative effect of the direct elements is hindered 
through external or internal influences, such as indistinctness 
of the impressions or affective and emotional excitement. In 
all cases where the difference between the impression and 
the idea becomes, in this way, so great that it is apparent 
at once on closer examination, we call the product of the 
assimilation an illusion. 

The universality of assimilation makes it certain that such 
processes occur also between reproduced elements, in such a 
way that any memory idea which arises in the mind is im- 
mediately modified by its interaction with other memory ele- 
ments. Still, in such cases we have, of course, no means of 
demonstration. All that can be established as probable is 
that even in the case of so-called "pure memory processes", 
direct elements in the form of sensations and sense-feelings 
aroused by peripheral stimuh, are never entirely absent. In 
reproduced visual images, for example, such elements are 
present in the form of inner tactual sensations of the eye. 



C. COMPLICATIONS. 

12. Co7nplications , or the combinations between unlike 
psychical compounds, are no less regular components of con- 
sciousness than are assimilations. Just as there is hardly an 
intensive or extensive idea or composite feeling which is not 
modified in some way through the processes of reciprocal as- 
similation between direct and reproduced elements, so almost 
every one of these compounds is at the same time connected 
with other, dissimilar compounds, with which it has some 
constant relations. In all cases, however, complications are 



§ 16. Associations. 259 

different from assimilations in the fact that the unlikeness 
of the compounds makes the connection looser, however 
regular it may be, so that when one component is direct 
and the other reproduced, the latter can be readily distin- 
guished at once. There is, however, another reason which 
makes the product of a complication appear unitary in spite 
of the easily recognized difference between its components. 
This is the predominance of one of the compounds, which 
pushes the other components into the obscurer field of con- 
sciousness. 

If the complication unites a direct impression with memory 
elements of disparate character, the direct impression with 
its assimilations is regularly the predominant component, 
while the reproduced elements sometimes have an influence 
noticeable only through their affective tone. Thus, when 
we speak, the auditory word ideas are the predominant com- 
ponents, and in addition we have as obscure factors, direct 
motor sensations and reproductions of the visual images of 
the words. In reading.^ on the other hand, the visual images 
come to the front while the others become weaker. In 
general it may be said that the existence of a complication 
is frequently noticeable only through the pecuhar coloring 
of the total feeling which accompanies the predominant idea. 
This is due to the power of obscure ideas to have a rela- 
tively intense effect through their affective tones on the atten- 
tion (p. 237). Thus, for example, the characteristic impres- 
sion of a rough surface, a dagger-point, or a gun, arises 
from a complication of visual and tactual impressions, and 
in the last case, of auditory impressions as well; but as a 
rule such complications are noticeable only through the 
feelings they excite. 



17* 



260 III- Interconnection of Psyehieal 



D. SUCCESSIVE ASSOCIATIONS. 



13. Successive association is by no means a process that 
differs essentially from the two forms of simultaneous asso- 
ciation, assimilation and complication. It is, on the contrary, 
due to the same general causes as these, and differs only in 
the secondary characteristic that the process of combination, 
which in the former cases consisted, so far as immediate 
introspection was concerned, of a single instantaneous act, 
is here protracted and may therefore be readily divided into 
two acts. The first of these acts corresponds to the appear- 
ance of the reproducing elements, the second to the appear- 
ance of the reproduced elements. Here too, the first act is 
often introduced by an external sense impression, which is 
as a rule immediately united with an assimilation. Other 
reproduced elements which might enter into an assimilation 
or complication are held back through some inhibitory in- 
fluence or other — as, for example, through other assimila- 
tions that force themselves earlier on apperception — and 
do not begin to exercise an influence until later. In this 
way we have a second act of apperception clearly distinct 
from the first, and differing from it in psychical content. 
The difference is the more essential, the more numerous the 
new elements which are added through the retarded assimi- 
lation and complication, and the more these new elements 
displace the earlier elements because of their differences in 
character. 

14. In the great majority of cases the association thus 
formed is hmited to two successive ideational or affective 
processes which are connected, in the manner described, 
through assimilations or complications. New sense impres- 
sions or some apperceptive combinations (§. 17) may then 
connect themselves with the second member of the associa- 



§ 16. Associations. 261 

tion. Less frequently it happens that the same processes 
which led to the first division of an assimilation or complica- 
tion into a successive process, may be repeated with the 
second or even with the third member, so that in this way 
we have an associational series. G-enerally, however, such a 
series is formed only under exceptional conditions. Such 
conditions arise when the normal course of apperception has 
been disturbed, as for example, in the so-called "flight of 
ideas" of the insane. In normal cases and under the ordinary 
conditions of life, serial associations hardly ever appear. 

14 a. Such serial associations may be produced most easily 
under the artificial conditions of experimentation, when the effort 
is purposely made to suppress new sense impressions and ap- 
perceptive combinations. But the process resulting in such 
cases differs from that described above in that the successive 
members of the series do not connect, each with its immediate 
predecessor, but all go back to the first, until a new sense im- 
pression or an idea with an especially strong affective tone 
furnishes a new starting point for the succeeding associations. 
The associations in the "flight of ideas" of the insane generally 
show the same typical tendency to return to certain predominant 
centres. 

a. Sensible Recognition and Cognition. 

15. The cases in which the ordinary form of association 
which is made up of two partial processes, may be most 
clearly observed arising out of simultaneous assimilations 
and complications, are the cases designated by the special 
names, sensible recognition and cognition. The qualification 
"sensible" is added when referring to these associative proc- 
esses, to indicate, on the one hand, that the first member 
of the process is always a sense impression, and, on the 
other, to distinguish these associations from the logical proc- 
esses of cognition. 



262 III- Interconnection of Psychical Compounds. 

The case of recognition which from the psychological 
point of view is the simplest, is that in which an object has 
been perceived only once and is recognized as the same when 
met a second time. If this second perception follows very soon 
after the first, or if the first was especially emphatic and 
exciting, the association usually takes place inunediately, as 
a simultaneous assimilation. This process differs from other 
assimilations, which take place in connection with every sense 
perception, only in the characteristic accompanying feehng, 
the feeling of familiarity. Such a feeling is never present 
except when there is some degree of "consciousness" that 
the given impression has been received before. It is, there- 
fore, evidently one of those feeKngs which comes from the 
ideas obscurely present in consciousness. The psychological 
difference between this and an ordinary simultaneous assim- 
ilation must be looked for in the fact that at the moment 
when, in the apperception of the impression, the assimilation 
takes place, there arise in the obscure regions of conscious- 
ness some components of the original idea which do not 
enter into the assimilation. The relation of these obscure 
components to the elements of the idea which is apperceived, 
finds expression in the feehng of familiarity. The unassim- 
ilated components may be elements of an earher impression 
which were so different from certain elements of the new, 
that they could not be assimilated, or, and this is usually 
the case, they may be comphcations that were clear before, 
but now remain unobserved. This influence of complication 
explains how it is that the name of a visual object, for 
example, the proper names of persons, and often other 
auditory qualities, such as the tone of voice, are very great 
helps in recognition. To serve as such helps, however, 
they need not necessarily be clear ideas in consciousness. 
When we have heard a man's name, the recognition of the 



§ 16. Associaiions. 263 

man the next time we meet him may be aided by the mime 
without oui' calling it clearly to mind. 

16. The observations described show what are the con- 
ditions under which a recognition may pass from a simul- 
taneous into a successive association. If a certain inteiTal 
elapses before the elements of the earher idea which gradu- 
ally rise in consciousness, can produce a distinct feeling of 
familiarity, the whole process divides into two acts: into the 
act of perception and the act of recognition. Perception de- 
pends on the ordinary simultaneous assimilations only, while in 
recognition the obscui'e, unassimilated elements of the earher 
idea show theii' influence. The line of division between these 
partial processes is, accordingly, more distinct the greater the 
difference between the earher impressions and the new one. 
In a case of marked difference not only is there usually a 
long period of noticeable inhibition between perception and 
recognition, but certain additional apperceptive processes, 
namely, the processes of voluntary attention which take part 
in the act of recollection, also come to the aid of the asso- 
ciation. As a special form of this kind of process we have 
the phenomenon called -mediate recognition". This consists 
in the recognition of an object, not through its own attributes, 
but thi'ough some accompanying mark, which stands in a 
chance connection with it, as, for example, when a person 
is recognized because of his companion. Between such a 
case and a case of immediate recognition there is no essential 
psychological difference. For even those characteristics that 
do not belong to the recognized object in itself, still belong 
to the whole complex of ideational elements that help in 
the preparation and final carrying out of the association. 
And yet, as we should naturally expect, the retardation 
which divides the whole recognition into two ideational 
processes, and often leads to the cooperation of voluntary 



264 lU. Interconnection of Psychical Compounds. 

recollection, generally appears in its most evident form in 
mediate recognitions. 

17. This simple process of recognition which takes place 
when we meet again an object that has been perceived once 
before, is a starting point for the development of various 
other associative processes, for processes which like recognition 
stand on the boundary between simultaneous and successive 
associations, and for processes in which there is a more 
marked degree of that retardation in the formation of asso- 
ciations and complications which leads to a successive rather 
than simultaneous occurrence of the processes. Thus, the 
recognition of an object that has often been perceived is 
easier and, therefore, as a rule an instantaneous process. 
It is also more like the ordinary assimilation because the 
feeling of familiarity is much less intense. Sensible cognition 
differs generally but little from the recognition of single 
familiar objects. The logical distinction between the two 
concepts consists in the fact that recognition means the 
establishment of the individual identity of the newly per- 
ceived object with a formerly perceived object, while cognition 
is the subsumption of an object under a familiar concept. 
Still, there is no real logical subsumption in a process of 
sensible cognition any more than there is a fully developed 
class-concept under which the subsumption could be made. 
The psychological equivalent of such a subsumption is to 
be found in this case in the mere process of associating the 
impression in question with an indefinitely large number of 
objects. This presupposes an earlier perception of various 
objects which agree only in certain particular properties, so 
that the process of cognition approaches more nearly to the 
ordinary assimilation in its psychological character, the more 
familiar the class to which the perceived object belongs, and 
the more the object agrees with the most common objects 



16. Associations. 265 

of this class. In equal measure the feelings peculiar to the 
processes of cognition and recognition decrease and finally 
disappear entirely, so that when we meet very familiar objects 
we do not speak of a cognition at all. The process of 
cognition is noticeable only when the assimilation is hindered 
in some way, either because the perception of the class of 
objects in question has become uncommon or because the 
single object shows some unique characteristics. In such a 
case the simultaneous association may become successive by 
the separation of perception and cognition into two succes- 
sive processes. Just in proportion as this happens, we have 
a specific feeling of cognition which is indeed related to the 
feeling of familiarity, but, as a result of the different con- 
ditions for the rise of the two, differs from the feeling of 
familiarity especially in its temporal course. 

b. Memory processes. 

18. There is another direction, essentially different from 
that just described, along which the process of recognition 
may develop. This shows itself when the hindrances to im- 
mediate assimilation which give rise to the transition from 
simultaneous to successive associations, are so great that the 
ideational elements which do not agree with the new per- 
ception, unite — either after the recognition has taken place 
or even when there is no such recognition whatever — to 
form a special idea referred directly to an earlier impression. 
The process that arises under such circumstances is a memory 
process and the idea that is perceived is a memory idea., or 
memory image. 

18 a. Memory processes were the ones to which association 
psychology generally limited the application of the concept asso- 
ciation. But, as has been shown, these are associations that 



266 III- Interconnection of Psychical Compounds. 

take place under especially complicated conditions. The erro- 
neous view of association psychology rendered an understanding 
of the genesis of an association impossible from the first, and 
it is easy to see that the doctrine accepted by the associationists 
is limited essentially to a logical rather than a psychological 
classification of the association products which are to be ob- 
served in memory processes. An insight into the character of 
the more complex processes is possible, however, only through 
a study starting with the simpler associative processes, for the 
ordinary simultaneous assimilations and simultaneous and suc- 
cessive recognitions present themselves very naturally as the 
antecedents of memory associations. But even simultaneous re- 
cognition itself is nothing but an assimilation accompanied by 
a feeling which comes from the unassimilated ideational elements 
obscurely present in consciousness. In the second process these 
unassimilated elements serve to retard the process, so that the 
recognition develops into the primitive form of successive asso- 
ciation. The impression is at first assimilated in the ordinary 
way, and then again in a second act with an accompanying 
feeling of recognition which feeling serves to indicate the greater 
influence of certain reproduced elements. In this simple form 
of successive association the two successive ideas are referred 
to one and the same object, the only difference being that each 
time some different ideational and affective elements are apper- 
ceived. "With memory associations the case is essentially different. 
Here the elements of the earlier impressions which are different 
from those in the present impression predominate, and the first 
assimilation of the impression is followed by the formation of 
an additional idea. This idea is made up of elements of the 
present impression and of elements belonging to certain earlier 
impressions, which earlier impressions are suitable for the assim- 
ilation because of certain of their components. The more the 
elements of the earlier impression which differ from the elements 
of the present impression, predominate, the more the second 
idea differs from the first, or, on the other hand, the more the 
like elements predominate, the more the two ideas will be alike. 
In any case the second idea is always a reproduced idea and 
distinct from the new impression as an independent compound. 



§ 16. Associations. 267 

19. The general conditions for the rise of memory images 
may also exhibit shades and differences which correspond 
to the differences which appear in the processes of recogni- 
tion and cognition (15, 17). Thus the recognition of an 
object perceived once and the recognition of an object familiar 
through frequent perceptions, and finally, the cognition of 
an object that is familiar in its general class- characteristics 
may all become sources of various modifications in memory 
processes. 

Simple recognition becomes a memory process when the 
immediate assimilation of the impression is hindered by ele- 
ments that belong, not to the object itself, but to circum- 
stances that attended its earlier perception. Just because 
the former perception occurred only once, or at least only 
once so far as the reproduction is concerned, these accom- 
panying elements may be relatively clear and distinct and 
sharply distinguished from the surroundings of the new im- 
pression. In this way we have transitional forms between re- 
cognition and remembering: the object is recognized, and at 
the same time referred to a particular earlier sense perception 
the accompanying circumstances of which add a definite spacial 
and temporal relation to the memory image. The memory 
process is especially predominant in those cases in which the 
elements of the new impression that gave rise to the assim- 
ilation are entirely suppressed by the other components of the 
image, so that the associative relation between the memory 
idea and the impression may remain entirely unnoticed. 

19 a. Such cases have been spoken of as "mediate memories", 
or "mediate associations". Still, just as in the case of "mediate 
recognitions", so here, we are dealing with processes that are 
fundamentally the same as ordinary associations. Take, for 
example, the case of a person who, sitting in his room at even- 
ing, suddenly remembers without any apparent reason a landscape 



268 III- Interconneetion of Psychical Gompoimds. 

that he passed through many years before; examination shows 
that there happened to be in the room a fragrant flower which 
he saw for the first time in that landscape. The difference 
between this and an ordinary memory process in which the 
connection of the new impression with an earlier experience is 
clearly recognized, obviously consists in the fact that here the 
elements which recall the idea are pushed into the obscure back- 
ground of consciousness by other ideational elements. The not 
infrequent experience, commonly known as the "spontaneous 
rise" of ideas, in which a memory image suddenly appears in 
our mind without any assignable cause, is in all probability 
reducible in every case to such latent associations. 

20. Memory processes that develop from recognitions 
which have been often repeated and from cognitions^ are, in 
consequence of the greater complexity of their conditions, 
different from those connected with the recognition of objects 
perceived but once. When we perceive an object that is 
familiar either in its own individual characteristics or in the 
characteristics of its class, the range of possible associations 
is incomparably greater, and the way in which the memory 
processes shall arise from a particular impression depends 
less on the single experiences which give rise to the associa- 
tion, than it does on the general disposition and momentary 
mood of consciousness, and also on the interference of certain 
active apperceptive processes and on the intellectual feelings 
and emotions which are connected with these processes. Word 
ideas are important aids to association. These ideas are in 
many cases connected with individual objects (proper names), 
but they are especially important when they refer to class 
characteristics of ideas (class names). "With conditions which 
are so varied, it is easy to see that as a general thing it is 
impossible to calculate beforehand what the association in 
any given case will be. As soon as the act of memory is 
ended, however, the traces of its associative origin seldom 



§ 16. Associations. 269 

escape careful examination, so that we are justified in re- 
garding association as the universal and only cause of memory 
processes under all circumstances. 

In thus deriving memory from association, it is never 
to be forgotten that every concrete memory process is by 
no means a simple process, but is made up of a large 
number of elementary processes., as is apparent from the 
fact that every such process is produced by a psychological 
development of its simple antecedents, namely, the simul- 
taneous assimilations. The most important of these ele- 
mentary processes is the assimilative interaction between 
some external impression and the elements of an earlier 
psychical compound, or between a memory image already 
present and such elements. Connected with this there are 
two other processes which are characteristic of memory 
processes : one is the hindrance of the assimilation by unlike 
elements, the other is to be found in the assimilations 
and complications connected with these elements and giving 
rise to a psychical compound which differs from the first 
impression and is referred more or less defiinitely to some 
previous experience, especially through its complications. This 
reference to the earlier experience shows itself through a 
characteristic feeling, the feeling of remembering., which is 
related to the feeling of familiarity, but is in its temporal 
genesis different, probably in consequence of the greater 
number of obscure complications that accompany the appear- 
ance of the memory image. 

If we try to find the elementary processes to which both 
memory processes and all complex associations are reducible, 
we shall find two such processes : combinations resulting from 
identity and combinations resulting from contiguity. In general 
the first class is predominant when the process is more like 
an ordinary assimilation and recognition, while the second 



270 I^I- Interconnectio7i of Psychical Compounds. 

appears more prominently the more the processes approach 
mediate memory in character, that is, the more the processes 
take on the semblance of spontaneous ideas. 

20 a. It is obvious that the usual classification, which makes 
all memory processes associations by either similarity or con- 
tiguity, is entirely unsuitable if we attempt to apply it to the 
modes of psychological genesis that these processes manifest. 
On the other hand, it is too general and indefinite if we try 
to classify the processes logically according to their products, 
without reference to their genesis. In the latter case the various 
relations of subordination, superordination, and coordination, of 
cause and end, of temporal succession and existence, and the 
various kinds of spacial connection, find only inadequate expres- 
sion in the very general concepts "similarity" and "contiguity". 
When, on the other hand, the manner of origin is studied, every 
memory process is found to be made up of elementary processes 
that may be called partly associations by similarity, partly asso- 
ciations by contiguity. The assimilations which serve to intro- 
duce the process and also those which serve to bring about the 
reference to a particular earlier experience at its close, may be 
called associations by similarity. But the term "similarity" is 
not exactly suitable even here, because it is identical elementary 
processes which give rise to the assimilation, and when an 
identity of elements does not exist, such identity is always 
produced by reciprocal assimilation. In fact, the concept of 
"association by similarity" is based on the presupposition that 
composite ideas are permanent psychical objects and that asso- 
ciations take place between these finished ideas. The concept 
of association by similarity must be rejected when once this 
presupposition is given up as entirely contradictory to psychical 
experience and fatal to a proper understanding of the same. 
"When certain products of association, as, for example, two suc- 
cessive memory images, are similar, this likeness is always re- 
ducible to processes of assimilation made up of elementary com- 
binations resulting from identity or contiguity. The association 
through identity may take place either between components that 
were originally the same, or between those that have gained 



§ 16. Associations. 271 

this character through assimilation. Association by contiguity 
is the form of combination between those elements that hinder 
the assimilatiouj thus dividing the whole process into a succes- 
sion of two processes, and also contributing to the memory image 
those components which give it the character of an independent 
compound, different from that of the impression which gave rise 
to it. The joint action of associations of identity and contiguity 
is also very obvious in the case of the simplest forms of memory 
association, namely, in those forms which are made up of simple 
sensory impressions. Indeed, it is only by means of this joint 
action of the two forms of association that we can give any 
natural explanation of the facts in question. Thus, when a 
yellow color impression calls up in the mind the similar color 
orange, the explanation offered by the pure theory of associa- 
tion by similarity is that the close similarity between the two 
colors produced the association. On the other hand, the pure 
theory of contiguity explains the same fact on the ground that 
the two impressions have been seen next to each other an in- 
definite number of times in the rainbow, in the spectrum, and in 
the shadings of painted surfaces. In reality the facts are not 
as stated in either of these explanations. It is true, rather, that 
colors, like tones, form a continuous sensation series within which 
the impressions standing nearest to each other are always most 
closely associated on account of the conditions of their natural 
rise and variation. There are always brought into conscious- 
ness with any given color impression, other associated colors, 
especially those that lie nearest to the given color. This is 
possible only because the present color calls up first the color 
which is identical with itself in some memory complex, and then 
calls up through this identical color the one next to it in the 
memory complex. Yellow, for example, can call up the yellow 
which has been seen before in the spectrum (association by iden- 
tity) and then through this first process, may further call up 
the neighboring orange (association by contiguity). It is especi- 
ally obvious in this case that there must be a combination of 
the two forms of association, because the two stages in the 
complete association are much more distinctly separate than in 
the case of complex ideas where the two stages unite at once 
into a single composite process. 



272 III' IntercomieGtion of Psychical Compounds. 

21. All the results of memory associations, so far as they 
are related to earlier impressions, are commonly grouped 
together under the name memory. This concept memory 
originated in popular psychology and was then carried over 
into the now abandoned faculty psychology. Memory must, 
of course, in every particular case be subjected to a special 
analysis to show what are the elementary association proc- 
esses involved in the special phenomena under consideration, 
and what are the particular effects of these association proc- 
esses. Such analysis finds the simplest conditions for its 
application in those cases in which the memory associations 
take place between simple impressions, or at least between 
impressions which arise under relatively simple and uniform 
conditions. Thus, one may investigate the memory for tone 
sensations, or for simple visual objects, by measuring the 
accuracy of such memory in terms of the clearness with which 
an earlier impression is recognized after the lapse of a given 
interval. As a result of such measurements it appears that 
immediately after an impression is given, its reproduction is 
relatively accurate. Very soon (in the case of tones after 
even two seconds, in the case of simple visual objects after 
an interval somewhat, but not very much, longer) reproduction 
reaches its maximum of accuracy and then begins to decrease 
with gradually lessening rapidity until, finally, (after about 
60 seconds) it reaches a point at which it remains approxi- 
mately constant for a long time. In the course of this general 
decrease in accuracy of reproduction, there appear successive 
periods of fluctuating accuracy which probably are related 
to the fluctuations of attention already mentioned (p. 233). 
Of special interest for the investigation of the relation of 
intervals to memory processes are the facts of time me^nory. 
By time memory we mean the memory for temporal intervals. 
This form of memory can be investigated with the highest 



§ 16. Associations. 273 

degree of exactness, just as can the attributes of time ideas 
in general, by using so-called empty intervals marked off by 
auditory impressions. Through investigations of this sort it 
appears that the relation betv^een the memory image of an 
interval and the objective length of this interval depends, in 
the first place, on the length of the interval in question; 
and, in the second place, on the amount of time that elapses 
between the giving of the impression and the formation of 
the memory image. The length of the given interval affects 
the process in accordance w^ith the general rule, that short 
intervals are overestimated in memory and long inte?^vals are 
underestimated. Between these two forms of false estimation 
lies an indifference-interval for which the remembered interval 
is, on the average, equal to the given interval. When the 
reproduction follows the impression very quickly this in- 
difference-interval is 0.5 — 0.6 sec. If the interval is increased 
in length there appears here also a kind of periodic recur- 
rence of exact estimations, for which the regular rule is, that 
all the multiples of the indifference -interval are more ac- 
curately estimated than are the intervals lying between these 
multiples. This periodic recurrence of exact estimations is 
probably due to the fact that longer intervals have to be 
broken up into groups of short intervals in order to be 
grasped in consciousness as single wholes. In such division 
and grouping the indifference-interval presents itself as the 
standard simple unit. The fact of periodic accuracy in 
estimation is also doubtless connected with the above de- 
scribed processes of involuntary rhythmical subdivision of 
long time intervals (p. 165). When the period between im- 
pression and reproduction is longer, the exactness of estima- 
tion suffers a general decrease, just as in the case of the 
reproduction of qualitative tone sensations and light sensa- 
tions. It finally reaches a minimum at which it continues 

WuNDT, Psychology. 2. edit. 13 



274 III- Intereonnection of Psychical Compounds. 

for a relatively long period of time at an approximately 
constant level. With a lengthening of the period between 
impression and reproduction the reproduced interval becomes 
more and more clearly shortened in comparison with the 
original interval. No very exact determinations have been 
made of these last described facts. They are, however, 
familiar from every-day experience. 

22. The character of memory ideas is intimately connected 
with the complex nature of the memory processes. The de- 
scription of these ideas as weaker, but otherwise faithful, 
copies of the direct sense perceptions is as far out of the 
way as it could possibly be. Memory images and sense 
perceptions differ, not only in quality and intensity, but most 
emphatically in their elementary composition. We may 
diminish the intensity of a sensible impression as much as 
we Hke, but so long as it is perceptible at all it is an essen- 
tially different compound from a memory idea. The incom- 
pleteness of the memory idea is much more characteristic than 
the small intensity of its elements. For example, when I 
remember an acquaintance, the images I have of his face 
and figure are not mere obscure reproductions of what I 
have in consciousness when I look directly at him, but most 
of the features do not exist at all in the reproduced ideas. 
Connected with the few ideational elements which are really 
present and which can be but little increased in number 
even when the attention is voluntarily concentrated upon the 
task, are certain factors added through contiguity and certain 
complications, such as the environments in which I saw my 
acquaintance, his name, and finally, and more especially, 
certain affective elements which were present at the meeting. 
These accompanying components are what make the image 
a memory image. 

23. There are great differences in the effectiveness of 



§ 16. Associations. 275 

these accompanying elements and in the distinctness of the 
sensational elements of the memory image in the cases of 
different individuals. Some persons locate their memory 
images in space and time much more precisely than do others ; 
the ability to remember colors and tones is also very markedly 
different. Very few persons seem to have distinct memories 
of odors and tastes; in place of these most of us have, as 
substitute complications, accompanying motor sensations of 
the nose and taste-organs. 

These differences between different individuals are all 
referred to as differences in "memory". The concept memory 
is, thus, a supplementary concept which is very useful in 
giving clear expression to these individual differences in the 
memory processes. It must, however, never be forgotten 
that the term always refers to what is in reality a series of 
processes, and that in each particular case a special explana- 
tion of the facts is required. We speak of a faithful, com- 
prehensive, and easy memory, or of a good spacial, temporal, 
and verbal memory, etc. These expressions serve to point 
out the different directions in which, according to the original 
disposition or habit of the person, the elementary assimila- 
tions and complications occur. 

One important phenomenon among the various differences 
referred to, is the gradual iveakening of memory with old 
age. The disturbances resulting from diseases of the brain 
agree in general with the results of this weakening of memory 
through age. Both are of special importance to psychology 
because they exhibit very clearly the influence of complica- 
tions on memory processes. One of the most striking symptoms 
of failing memory, in both normal and pathological cases, 
is the weakening of verbal memory. It generally appears 
as a lack of ability to remember, first proper names, then 
names of concrete objects in the ordinary environment, still 

18* 



276 J^II- Interco7inection of Psychical Compounds. 

later abstract words, and finally, particles that are entirely 
abstract in character. This succession corresponds exactly 
to the possibility of substituting in consciousness for single 
classes of words other ideas that are regularly connected 
with them through complication. This possibility is obviously 
greatest for proper names, and least for abstract particles, 
which can be retained only through their verbal signs- 
References. Bain, The Senses and tlie Intellect, 4tli. ed., p. 335 
seq. (The part on Intellect is a through-going exposition of associa- 
tionism). Wundt, Bemerkungen zur Associationslehre, Philos. Studien, 
vol. 7, and Grundziige der phys. Psych., vol. II, chap. 17, and Lectures 
on Hum. and Anim. Psych., lectures 19 and 20. On Recognition, 
Discussion of Association by Similarity and Contiguity: Hoeffding, 
Vierteljahrsschr. f. wiss. Philos., vols. 13 and 14, and Philos. Studien 
vol. 5. Lehmann, Philos. Studien, vols. 7 and 8. On Forms of Asso-' 
ciation, and Association Time: Trautscholdt, Philos. Studien, vol. 1. 
AscHAFEENBURG, Kraepclin's Psychol. Arbeiten, vols. 1 and 2. On 
Mediate Association: Scripture, Philos. Studien, vols. 7. Cordes, 
Philos. Studien, vol. 17. On Memory: Wolfe (on memory for tones), 
Philos. Studien, vol. 3. Radoslawow (on memory for simple visual 
objects), Philos. Studien, vol. 15. On Memory for Time: Vierordt, 
Der Zeitsinn. Kollert, Estel, Glass, Philos. Studien, vols. 1, 2, 4. 
Meumann, Philos. Studien, vol. 8. On Complex Phenomena of Memory 
(Experiments on memorizing, etc.): Ebbinghaus, Das Gedachtniss, 1885 
Muller and Schumann, Ztschr. f. Psych, u. Physiol, d. Sinnesorg., 
vol. 6. Muller and Pilzecker, Zeitschr. f. Psych, u. Physiol, d. 
Sinnesorg., Supplement No. 1, 1900. Binet and Henri, Annee psychol, 
vol. 1, 1894. Bolton, Franz, Honston, Psychological Review, vol. 3, 
1896. On Diseases of the Memory: Ribot, Diseases of the Memory. 
Wundt, Volkerpsychologie, vol. I, Pt. 1, chap. 5 (on word m emory) 



§ 17. APPERCEPTIVE COMBINATIONS. 

1. Associations in all their forms are regarded by iis as 
passive experiences, because the feeling of activity, which is 
characteristic of all processes of volition and attention, never 
arises except as it is added to the already completed asso- 
ciation process in a kind of apperception of the resultant^ 



§ 17. Apperceptive Combinations. 277 

given content (p. 238). Associations are, accordingly, proc- 
esses that can arouse volitions but are not themselves 
directly influenced by volitions. This absence of any de- 
pendence on vohtion is, however, the criterion of a passive 
process. 

The case is essentially different with the second kind of 
combinations which are formed between different psychical 
compounds and their elements, namely, the apperceptive com- 
binations. Here the feeling of activity with its accompany- 
ing variable sensations of tension does not merely follow the 
combinations as an after-effect produced by them, but it 
precedes them so that the combinations themselves are im- 
mediately recognized as formed with the aid of the attention. 
In this sense these experiences are called active experiences. 

2. Apperceptive combinations include a large number of 
psychical processes that are distinguished in popular parlance 
under the general terms thinking, reflection, imagination, 
understanding. These are all regarded as psychical processes 
of a type higher than sense perceptions or pure memory 
processes, while at the same time they are all looked upon 
as different from one another. Especially is this true of the 
so-called functions of imagination and understanding. In 
contrast with this loose view of the faculty theory, associa- 
tion psychology sought to find a unitary principle by sub- 
suming also the apperceptive combinations of ideas under 
the general concept of association, and at the same time 
limiting the concept, as noted above (p. 245), to successive 
association. This reduction to successive association was 
effected either by neglecting the essential subjective and ob- 
jective distinguishing marks of apperceptive combinations, or 
by attempting to avoid the difficulties of an explanation, 
through the introduction of certain supplementary con- 
cepts taken from popular psychology. Thus, "interest" and 



278 ^11- Interconnection of Psychical Compounds. 

"intelligence" were credited with an influence on associations. 
Yery often this view was based on the erroneous notion that 
the recognition of certain distinguishing features in apper- 
ceptive combinations and associations meant the assertion of 
a fundamental division between the former and the latter. 
Of course, this is not true. All psychical processes are con- 
nected with associations as much as with the original sense 
perceptions. Yet, just as associations always form a part 
of every sense perception and in spite of that appear in 
memory processes as relatively independent processes, so 
apperceptive combinations are based always on associations, 
but the essential attributes of these apperceptive combinations 
are not traceable to associations. 

3. In trying to account for the essential attributes of 
apperceptive combinations, we may divide the psychical proc- 
esses that belong to this class into simple and complex ap- 
perceptive functions. The simple functions are those of 
relating and comparing^ the complex those of synthesis and 
analysis. 

A. SIMPLE APPERCEPTIVE FUNCTIONS. 
(Relating and Comparing.) 

4. The most elementary apperceptive function is that 
of relating two psychical contents to each other. The grounds 
for such relating are always given in the single psychical 
compounds and their associations, but the actual carrying 
out of the process itself is a special apperceptive activity 
through which the relation itself becomes a special conscious 
content, distinct from the contents which are related, though 
indeed inseparably connected with them. For example, when 
we recognize the identity of an object with one perceived 
before, or when we are conscious of a definite relation between 
a remembered event and a present impression, there is in 



§ 17. Apperceptive Combinations. 279 

both cases a relating apperceptive activity connected with 
the associations. 

So long as the recognition remains a pure association, 
the process of relating is limited to the feeling of familiarity 
which follows the assimilation of the new impression either 
immediately, or after a short interval. When, on the contrary, 
apperception is added to association, this feeling is supplied 
with a clearly recognized ideational substratum. The earlier 
perception and the new impression are separated in time and 
then brought into a relation of agreement on the basis of 
their essential attributes. The case is similar when we become 
conscious of the motives of a memory act. This also pre- 
supposes that a comparison of the memory image with the 
impression which occasioned it, is added to the merely asso- 
ciative process which gave rise to the image. This, it will 
be seen, is a process that can be brought about only through 
active attention. 

5. Thus, the relating function is brought into activity 
through associations, wherever these associations themselves 
or their products are made the objects of voluntary observa- 
tion. The relating function is connected, as the examples 
mentioned show, with the function of comparingj whenever 
the related contents of consciousness are clearly separated 
processes, belonging to one and the same class of psychical 
experiences. Relating activity is, therefore, the wider concept, 
comparison is the narrower. A comparison is possible only 
when the compared contents are brought into relation with 
one another. On the other hand, conscious contents may be 
related without being compared with one another, as is the 
case, for example, when an object and the attributes of the 
object are related, or when one process is related to another 
which regularly follows or precedes it. As a result of this 
it follows that where the fuller conditions necessary for a 



280 JJ^I- Interconnection of Psychical Compounds. 

comparison are present, the experiences given may be merely 
related, or they may also be compared with each other. 
Thus, one calls it relating when he thinks of a present 
impression as the reason for remembering an earlier experi- 
ence; he calls it comparing, on the other hand, when he 
establishes certain definite points of agreement or difference 
between the earlier and the present impression. 

6. The process of comparing is, in turn, made up of two 
elementary functions which are as a rule intimately inter- 
connected. These two elementary functions are first, the 
pejxeption of agreements., and second, the perception of dif- 
ferences. There is a mistaken view prevalent even in present- 
day psychology. It originated in popular psychology and 
was strengthened by the discussions of logical intellectualism. 
It consists in the acceptance of the notion that the mere 
existence of psychical elements and compounds is identical 
with their apperceptive comparison. Every sensation is ac- 
cordingly treated as a "sensory judgment", every immediate 
perception of distance as a "judgment of depth", and so on 
through the whole series of processes. In all these cases, 
however, the judgment appears after the sensations and ideas ; 
the judgment must, therefore, be recognized as a separate 
process. To be sure, agreements and differences arise in 
our psychical processes, if they did not we could not observe 
them. But the comparing activity through which these like- 
nesses and differences in sensations and ideas are made evident, 
is not identical with the sensations and ideas themselves. 
It is a function that may arise in connection with these 
elements, but does not necessarily so arise. 

7. Even the psychical elements, that is, sensations and 
simple feelings, can be compared with reference to their 
agreements and differences. Indeed, it is through a series 
of such comparisons that we arrange these psychical elements 



§ 17. Apperceptive Combinations. 281 

into systems, each one of which contains the elements that 
are most closely related. Within a given system two kinds 
of comparison are possible, namely, comparison in respect to 
quality and comparison in respect to intensity. Then, too, 
a comparison between grades of clearness is possible when 
attention is paid to the way in which the elements appear 
in consciousness. In the same way comparison is applied to 
intensive and extensive psychical compounds. Every psychical 
element and every psychical compound, in so far as it is a 
member of a regular system, constitutes a psychical magnitude. 
A determination of the value of such a psychical magnitude is 
possible only through comparison with some other in the same 
system. Psychical magnitude is, accordingly, an original at- 
tribute of every psychical element and compound. It is of 
various kinds, as intensity, quality, extensive (spacial and tem- 
poral) value, and, when the different states of consciousness 
are considered, clearness. But the determination of psychical 
value can be effected only through the apperceptive function 
of comparison. 

8. Psychical measurement differs from physical measure- 
ment in the fact that the latter may be carried out in acts 
of comparison separated almost indefinitely in time, because 
its objects are relatively constant. For example, we can 
determine the height of a certain mountain to-day with a 
barometer and then after a long time we may determine the 
height of another mountain, and if no sensible changes in 
the configuration of the land have taken place in the interval, 
we can compare the results of our two measurements. Psy- 
chical compounds, on the other hand, are not relatively per- 
manent objects, but continually changing processes, so that 
we can compare two such psychical magnitudes only when 
other conditions remain the same, and the two factors to 
be compared follow each other in immediate succession. 



282 III- Interconnection of Psychical 

These requirements have as their immediate corollaries : first, 
that there is no absolute standard for the comparison of 
psychical magnitudes, but every such comparison stands by 
itself and is of merely relative validity; secondly, that finer 
comparisons are possible only between psychical magnitudes 
of the same dimension, so that a reduction, analogous to 
that by which the most widely separate physical quantities, 
such as periods of time and physical forces, are all expressed 
in terms of one dimension of space, is out of the question 
in psychical comparisons. 

9. It follows that the possible relations between psychical 
magnitudes which can be established by direct comparison 
are limited in number. The establishment of such relations 
is possible only in certain particularly favorable cases. These 
favorable cases are 1) the equality between two psychical 
magnitudes and 2) the just noticeable difference between two 
such magnitudes^ as, for example, two sensational intensities 
of like quality, or two qualities of like intensity belonging 
to the same dimension. As a somewhat more complex case 
which still lies within the limits of immediate comparison we 
have 3) the equality of two differences between magnitudes^ 
especially when these magnitudes belong to neighboring parts 
of the same system. It is clear that in each of these three 
kinds of psychical measurements the two fundamental functions 
in apperceptive comparison, the perception of agreements and 
the perception of differences, are both applied together. In the 
first case one of two psychical magnitudes, A and B is gradu- 
ally var^d until it agrees for immediate comparison with the 
other; thus, for example, B is varied until it agrees with A, 
In the second case A and B are taken equal at first and then 
B is changed until it appears either just noticeably greater 
or just noticeably smaller than A. Finally, the third case is 
used to the greatest advantage when a whole line of psy- 



§ 17. Apperceptive Combinations. 283 

chical magnitudes as, for example, of sensational intensities, 
extending from ^ as a lower limit to C as an upper limit, 
is so divided by a middle quantity 5, which has been found 
by gradual variations, that the partial distance AB w> ap- 
perceived as equal to BC. 

10. The most direct and most easily utilizable results 
derived from these methods of comparison are given by the 
second method, or the method of minimal differences as it is 
called. The difference between the physical stimuli which 
corresponds to the just noticeable difference between psychical 
magnitudes is called the difference threshold of the stimulus. 
The intensity at which the resulting psychical process, as for 
example, a sensation, can be just apperceived, is called the 
stimulus threshold. Observation shows that the difference 
threshold of the stimulus increases in proportion to the 
distance from the stimulus threshold, in such a way that the 
relation between the difference threshold and the absolute 
quantity of the stimulus, or the relative difference threshold., 
remains constant. If, for example, a certain sound the in- 
tensity of which is 1 must be increased -| in order that the 
sensation may be just noticeably greater, one whose intensity 
is 2 must be increased |, one 3 must be increased |, etc., 
to reach the difference threshold. This law is called Weber's 
law., after its discoverer E. H. "Weber. It is easily under- 
stood when we look upon it as 'a law of apperceptive com- 
parison. From this point of view it must obviously be inter- 
preted to mean that psychical magnitudes can he compared 
only according to their relative values. 

This view that Weber's law is an expression of the general 
law of the relativity of psychical magnitudes, assumes that 
the psychical magnitudes which are compared, themselves in- 
crease in direct proportion to their stimuli, within the limits 
of the validity of the law. It has not yet been possible to 



284 ^^^- Intereonnection of Psychical Compounds. 

demonstrate tlie truth of this assumption on its physiological 
side, on account of the difficulties of measuring exactly the 
stimulation of nerves and sense-organs. Still, we have evidence 
in favor of it in the psychological fact that in certain special 
cases, where the conditions of observation lead very natur- 
ally to a comparison of absolute differences in magnitude, the 
absolute difference threshold, instead of the relative thresh- 
old, is found to be constant. We have such a case, for 
example, in the comparison, within wide limits, of minimal 
differences in pitch (p. 58). Then, too, in many cases where 
large differences in sensations are compared according to 
the third method described above (p. 282), equal absolute 
stimulus differences, not relative differences, are perceived 
as equal. This shows that apperceptive comparison may 
follow two different principles under different conditions: a 
principle of relative comparison (Weber's law) which is the 
more general, and a principle of absolute comparison which 
takes the place of the first principle under special conditions 
which favor such a form of apperception. 

10 a. Weber's law has been shown to hold, first of all, for the 
intensity of sensations and then, in a more limited way, for the 
comparison of extensive compounds, especially temporal ideas, 
and also, to some extent, for spacial ideas of sight and for motor 
ideas. On the other hand, it does not hold for the spacial ideas 
of external touch, obviously on account of the complexity of the 
local signs (p. 115); and it can not be verified for sensational 
qualities. The scale of tonal intervals is relative because every 
interval corresponds to a certain ratio between the number of 
vibrations (for example, an octave 1 : 2, a fifth 2:3, etc.). This 
is probably due to the relationship between clangs which is due 
to the relation of the fundamental tone to its overtones (comp. 
p. 105 sq.). Even when an absolute comparison takes place instead 
of a comparison according to "Weber's law of relativity, we must 
not confuse this with the establishment of an absolute measure. 



§17. Apperceptive Combinations. 285 

That would presuppose an absolute unit, that is, the possibility of 

finding a constant standard, which, as noted above (p. 282), is in 

the psychical world impossible. Absolute comparison must take 

the form of a recogiiition of the equality of equal absolute differences. 

This is possible in certain single cases without a constant unit. 

Thus, for example, we compare two sensational lines AB and BG 

according to their relative values, when we think in both cases of 

the relation of the upper to the lower extreme sensation. In such 

a case, accordingly, we judge AB and BC to be equal when 

7? C 

— = — (Weber's law). On the other hand, we compare AB and 

A B 

BG according to their absolute values when the difference between 
G and B in the single sensational dimension in question appears 
equal to that between -B and ^, that is, when G' — B = B — A 
(law of proportionality, Merkel). The recognition of quanti- 
tative or qualitative difference is rendered more difficult when 
the two stimuli to be compared are presented in continuous 
sequence, and with neither a time or space interval separating 
them. The difference threshold is, accordingly, greater in such 
cases, and it grows still longer the more slowly the continuous 
transition from one stimulus to the other takes place. Thus, 
the threshold for brightness, when two distinct stimulations are 
compared with each other, is Y^oq (P- ^^j- When, on the other 
hand, the two stimuli are not separate, but the first passes directly 
into the second, the threshold is Yioo if ^^^ transition is rapid 
and about ^^/loo if it is slow. The threshold for distinctly sep- 
arated tones is ^fr, vibrations (p. 58); for continuous tonal 
changes Yg to 1^2 vibrations. The treshold for distinctly sep- 
arated pressures is Y^oo (P- ^S)? for continuous changes ^Yioo 
to ^'^/loo? the larger fraction represents the results of slow tran- 
sitions. Even under the more difficult conditions of comparison 
described, Weber's law holds true for those spheres of com- 
parison to which" it applies under any conditions. 

By treating Weber's law as an expression of the functional 
relation between sensation and stimulus and by assuming that 
the law is valid for infinitely small changes of both sensation and 

(] J? 
stimulus, Fechner worked out the formula, dE ■= G • —^[B 



286 -WI. Interconnection of Psychical Compomids. 

represents the stimulus and E the sensation). From this formula 
he derived as the formula for finite sensation values and stimuli 
the following logarithmic expression E=k - log B -{- c. That is, 
the sensation is proportional in its increase to the logarithm of the 
stimulus, c and k representing constants which must be determined 
by experiment (Fechner's Psycho-physical Law). This formula, 
however, because of its assumption of an immediate relation be- 
tween sensation and stimulus, fails to indicate the fact that in all 
probability the law depends upon the relation between the sensations 
measwred. If we recognize the relation as one between the sen- 

JE 
sations, we may adopt the formula V =^ m ' -— - . ^E repre- 

E 

sents the difference threshold, V the ratio of comparison. This 
formula contains nothing but psychical magnitudes thus con- 
forming to the probable significance of Weber's law. 

The methods for the demonstration of Weber's law, or of 
other relations between psychical magnitudes, whether elementary 
or compound, are usually called psycho-physical methods. The 
name is unsuitable, however, because the fact that physical 
means are here employed is not unique, but holds for all the 
methods of experimental psychology. The methods could better 
be called "methods for the measurement of psychical magnitudes". 
With these methods it is possible to follow one of two courses 
in finding the relations mentioned as favorable for judgment. 
A first or direct mode of procedure is as follows: one of two 
psychical magnitudes A and B^ as, for example, A^ is kept 
constant, and B is gradually varied until it stands in one of 
the relations mentioned, that is, either equals A or is just 
noticeably greater or smaller, etc. These are the adjustment 
methods. Among these we have as the method frequently applied 
and that which leads most directly to conclusions, the "method 
of minimal changes", and then as a kind of modification of this 
for the case of adjustment in which equality is the end sought, 
the "method of average error". The second mode of procedure 
is to compare in a large number of cases any two stimuli, A 
and B^ which are very little different, and to compute from the 
number of cases in which the judgments are A = B^ A"^ B, 
A <^ Bj the position of the relations mentioned, especially the 



§17. Apperceptive Combinations. 287 

difference threshold. These are the calculation methods. The chief 
of these is the method known as that of "right and wrong cases". 
It would be more proper to call it the "method of three cases" 
(equality, positive difference, and negative difference). Details 
as to this and the other methods belong in a special treatise 
on experimental psychology. 

There are two other interpretations of Weber's law still 
met with besides the psychological interpretation given above; 
they may be called the physiological and the psycho -physical 
theories. The first derives the law from hypothetically assumed 
relations in the conduction of excitations in the central nervous 
system. The second regards the law as a specific law of the 
"interaction between body and mind". The physiological inter- 
pretation is entirely hypothetical and in certain cases, as, for 
example, for temporal and spacial ideas, entirely inapplicable. 
The psycho-physical interpretation of Fechner is based upon a 
view of the relation of mind which must be rejected by the 
psychology of to-day (cf. § 22, 8). 

References. E. H. Weber, Tastsinn und Gemeingefiihl, Hand- 
worterb. d. Physiol., vol. Ill, Pt. 2. Fechner, Elemente der Psycho- 
physik, 1860, and In Sachen der Psychophysik, 1877, and Revision 
der Hauptpunkte der Psychophysik, 1882 and Ueber die psychischen 
MaCprincipien , Philos. Studien, vol. 4, 1887. G. E. Muller, Zur 
Grundlegung der Psychophysik, 1878. Delboeuf, Elements de psycho- 
physique, 1883. G. F. LiPPS, Grundriss der Psychophysik, 1899. Wundt, 
Philos. Studien, vols. 1 and 2, and Grundziige der phys. Psych., vol. I, 
chap. 8, and Lectures on Hum. and Anim. Psych., lectures 2 — 4, and 
Logik, vol. II, Pt. 2, chap. 2 (on the measurement of psychical magni- 
tudes in general). Special Investigations: Merkel, Philos. Studien, 
vols. 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9. Tischer, Philos. Studien, vol. 1. Kraepelin, 
vol. 2. Angell, vol. 7, Kampfe, vol. 8. On Comparison of Changes 
in Sensations: Hall and Motora, Amer. Journal of Psych., vol. I. 
Stratton, Philos. Studien, vol. 12. Stern, Psychologic der Verande- 
rungsauffassung, 1898. 

11. As special cases among the apperceptive comparisons 
generally falKng under Weber's law, are the comparisons of 
magnitudes which are related to each other as relatively 
greatest sensational differences or, when dealing with feelings. 



288 IIL Interconnection of Psychical Compounds. 

as opposites. The phenomena that appear in such cases are 
usually grouped together under the class name contrasts. 
In the department where contrasts have been most thoroughly- 
investigated that is, in the case of light sensations^ there is 
generally an utter lack of discrimination between two phe- 
nomena which are obviously entirely different in origin, though 
their results are to a certain extent related. We may dis- 
tinguish these as light induction or physiological contrast 
(p. 78), and true contrast or psychological contrast. Phy- 
siological contrasts are closely connected with the phenomena 
of after-images, perhaps they are the same (p. 77 sq.). Psy- 
chological contrasts are essentially different; they are usually 
pushed into the background by the stronger physiological 
contrasts when the impressions are intense. Psychological 
contrasts are distinguished from physiological by two impor- 
tant characteristics. First, psychical contrasts do not reach 
their greatest intensity when the brightness and saturation 
are greatest, but when the sensations are at the medium 
stages, where the eye is most sensitive to changes in bright- 
ness and saturation. Secondly, psychical contrasts can be 
removed by comparison with an independent object. Especially 
the latter characteristic shows these contrasts to be unqual- 
ifiedly the products of comparisons. Thus, for example, 
when a grey square is laid on a black ground and close by 
a similar grey square is laid on a white ground and all are 
covered with transparent paper, the two squares appear 
entirely different; the one on the black ground looks bright, 
nearly white, that on the white ground looks dark, nearly 
black. Now after-images and irradiations are very weak 
when the colors are thus seen through translucent media, so 
that it may be assumed that the phenomenon described is a 
psychical contrast. If, again, a strip of black cardboard 
which is also covered with the transparent paper, and there- 



§ 17. Apperceptive Combinations. 289 

fore appears exactly the same grey as the two squares, is 
held in such a position that it. connects the two squares, the 
contrast will he removed entirely, or, at least, very much 
diminished. If in this experiment a colored ground is used 
instead of the achromatic ground, the grey squares will appear 
very clearly in the corresponding complementary color. But 
here, too, the contrast can he made to disappear through 
comparison with an independent grey object. 

12, Similar contrasts appear also in other spheres of 
sensation when the conditions for their demonstration are 
favorable. They are also especially marked in the case of 
feelmgs and may arise under proper conditions in the case 
of spacial and temporal ideas. Sensations of pitch are 
relatively most free, for most persons have a well developed 
ability to recognize absolute pitch and this probably tends 
to overcome contrast. In the case of feelings the effect of 
contrast is intimately connected with the natural opposition 
between affective qualities. Thus, pleasurable feeHngs are 
intensified by unpleasant feelings immediately preceding, and 
the same holds for many feelings of relaxation following 
feeHngs of strain, as, for example, a feehng of fulfilment 
after expectation. The effect of contrast in the case of spacial 
and temporal ideas is most obvious when the same spacial 
or temporal interval is compared alternately with a longer 
and with a shorter interval. In such cases the interval ap- 
pears different, in comparison with the shorter it appears 
greater, in comparison with the longer, smaller. Here, too, 
the contrast between spacial ideas can be removed by bring- 
ing an object between the contrasted figures in such a way 
that it is possible easily to relate them. 

13. "We may regard the phenomena which result from 
the apperception of an impression the real character of which 
differs from the character expected^ as special modifications 

WuNDT, Psychology. 2. edit. 19 



290 ^^^' Intereonneetion of Psychical Compounds. 

of psychical contrast. For example, if we are prepared to 
lift a heavy weight, and find in the actual lifting of the 
weight that it proves to be light, or if we Hft a heavy weight 
when we expected a light one, the result is in the first case 
an underestimation, in the second an overestimation of the 
real weight. If a series of exactly equal weights of different 
sizes are made to vary in size so that they look like a set 
of weights varying regularly from a lighter to a heavier, 
they will appear to be different in weight when raised. The 
smallest will seem to be the heaviest and the largest to be 
the lightest. The familiar association that the greater volume 
is connected with the greater mass determines in this case 
the tendency of expectation. The false estimation of the 
weight then results from the contrast between the real and 
the expected sensation. 

Beferences. On Light Contrasts : H. Meyer, Poggendorff's Ann. 
d. Physik, vol. 44. Helmholtz, Physiol. Optik, Pt. 2, § 24. On Space 
Contrasts: Muller-Lyer, Zeitschr. f. Psych u. Physiol, d. Sinnesorg., 
vol. 9. WUNDT, Geometr.-optische Tauschungen, Abh. d. sachs. Ges. 
d. W., 1898. On Time Contrast: Meumann, Philos. Studien, vol. 8. 
On Illusions of Weights through Contrast: MtJLLER and Schumann, 
Pfliiger's Archiv f. Physiol., vol. 37. Seashore, Scripture's Studies 
of Yale Psych. Lab., 1895. 

B. COMPLEX APPERCEPTIVE FUNCTIONS. 
(Synthesis and Analysis.) 

14. When the simple processes of relating and compar- 
ing are repeated and combined several times, the complex 
psychical functions of synthesis and analysis arise. Sy^ithesis 
is primarily the product of the relating activity of apper- 
ception, analysis of the comparing activity. 

As a combining function apperceptive synthesis is based 
upon fusions and associations. It differs from fusions and 
^associations in the fact that some of the ideational and affective 



§17. Apperceptive Combinations. 291 

elements which are brought forward by the association are 
voluntarily emphasized and others are pushed into the back- 
ground. The motives of the choice can be explained only 
from the whole previous development of the individual con- 
sciousness. As a result of this voluntary activity the product 
of this synthesis is a complex in which all the components 
are derived from former sense perceptions and associations, 
but in which the combination of these components may differ 
more or less from the original forms. 

The ideational elements of a compound thus resulting 
from apperceptive synthesis may be regarded as the sub- 
stratum for the rest of its contents, and so we call such a 
compound in general an aggregate idea. When the combi- 
nation of the elements is peculiar, that is, markedly different 
from the products of associations, the aggregate idea and 
each of its relatively independent ideational components is 
called an idea of imagination or image of imagination. Since 
the voluntary synthesis may vary more or less from the com- 
binations presented in sense perception and association, it 
follows that practically no sharp line of demarcation can be 
drawn between images of imagination and those of memory. 
But we have a more essential mark of the apperceptive 
process in the positive characteristic that it depends on a 
voluntary synthesis than in the negative fact that the com- 
bination does not correspond in character to any particular 
sense perception. This positive characteristic is also the 
source of a most striking difference between images of imagi- 
nation and those of memory. This difference consists in the 
fact that the sensational elements of an apperceptive com- 
pound are much more like those of an immediate sense per- 
ception in clearness and distinctness, and usually also in 
completeness and intensity. This is easily explained by the 
fact that the reciprocally inhibitory influences which the 

19* 



292 III' Interconneetion of Psychical Compounds. 

uncontrolled associations exercise on one another, and which 
prevent the formation of fixed memory images, are diminished 
or removed by the voluntary emphasizing of certain partic- 
ular ideational compounds. It is possible to mistake images 
of imagination for real experiences. In the case of memory 
images this is possible only when they become images of 
imagination, that is, when the memories are no longer allowed 
to arise passively, but are to some extent produced by the 
will. Generally, there are such voluntary modifications of 
memories through a mixing of real with imagined elements. 
All our memories are therefore made up of "fancy and 
truth" 1). Memory images thus change under the influence 
of our feelings and volition to images of imagination, and 
we generally deceive ourselves with their resemblance to real 
experiences. 

15. From the aggregate ideas which thus result from 
apperceptive synthesis there arise two forms of apperceptive 
analysis which work themselves out in opposite directions. 
The one is known in popular parlance as activity of the 
imagination^ the second as activity of the understanding. 
The two are by no means absolutely different, as might 
be surmised from these names, but are, rather, closely 
related and almost always connected with each other. 
Their fundamental determining motives are what distin- 
guish them and condition all their secondary differences 
and also the reaction that they exercise on the synthetic 
function. 

In the case of the activity of Hmagination^'^ the motive 
is the reproduction of real experiences or of experiences anal- 
ogous to reality. This is the earlier form of apperceptive 
analysis and arises directly from association. It begins with 



1) "Dichtung und Wahrheit". 



§17. Apperceptive Gomhinations. 293 

a more or less comprehensive aggregate idea made up of a 
variety of ideational and affective elements and embracing 
the general content of a complex experience in which the 
single components are only indefinitely distinguished. The 
aggregate idea is then divided in a series of successive acts 
into a number of more definite, connected compounds, partly 
spacial, partly temporal in character. The primary voluntary 
synthesis is thus followed by analytic acts which may in 
turn give rise to the motives for a new synthesis and thus 
to a repetition of the whole process with a partially modified, 
or more limited aggregate idea. 

The activity of imagination shows two stages of devel- 
opment. The first is more passive and arises directly from 
the ordinary memory function. It appears continually in the 
train of thought, especially in the form of an anticipation 
of the future, and plays an important part in psychical 
development as a preparation or antecedent of volitions. It 
may, however, in an analogous way, appear as a represen- 
tation in thought of imaginary situations or of successions 
of external phenomena. The second, or active^ form of 
imagination is under the influence of a fixed idea of some 
end, and therefore presupposes a high degree of voluntary 
control over the images of imagination, and a strong inter- 
ference, partly inhibitory, partly selective, with the memory 
images that tend to push themselves into consciousness 
without voluntary action. Even the first synthesis of the 
aggregate idea is more systematic when produced by this 
active process. And an aggregate idea, when once formed 
in this way, is held more firmly and subjected to a more 
complete analysis. Very often the components themselves 
are subordinate aggregate ideas to which the same process 
of analysis is again applied. In this way the principle of 
organic division according to the end in view governs all 



294 III' Interconnection of Psychical Compounds. 

the products and processes of active imagination. The pro-, 
ductions of art show this most clearly. Still, there are, in 
the ordinary play of imagination, the most various inter- 
mediate stages between passive imagination, or that which 
arises directly from memory, and active imagination, or that 
which is directed by fixed ends. 

16. In contrast with this imagination or imaginative re- 
production of real experiences, or of experiences which may 
be thought of as real, the function of the '^ understanding^^ 
is the perception of agreements and differences and other 
derived logical relations between contents of experience. Under- 
standing also starts with aggregate ideas in which a number 
of experiences that are real or may be ideated as real, are 
voluntarily set in relation to one another and combined into 
a unitary whole. The analysis that takes place in this case, 
however, is turned by its fundamental motive in a different 
direction. Such analysis consists not merely in a clearer 
grasp of the single components of the aggregate idea, but 
it consists also in the estabHshment of the manifold relations 
which exist between the various components and which we 
may discover through comparison. In establishing such rela- 
tions it is possible, as soon as analyses have been made 
several times, to introduce into any particular case the results 
gained through relating and comparing processes carried out 
on other occasions. 

As a consequence of this more strict apphcation of the 
elementary relating, and comparing functions, the activity 
of understanding follows definite rules even in its external 
form, especially when it is highly developed. The fact which 
showed itself in the case of imagination and even of memory, 
appears here in a developed form. The fact in question is, 
that the apperceived relations between the various psychical 
contents are presented in imagination and memory, not merely 



§17. Apperceptive Combinations. 295 

simultaneously, but successively^ so that we proceed from one 
relation to the next, and so on. In the case of under- 
standing, this successive presentation of relations develops 
into the discursive division of the aggregate idea. This is 
expressed in the law of the duality of the logical forms of 
thought^ according to which, analysis resulting from relating 
comparison divides the content of the aggregate idea into 
two parts, subject and predicate, and may then separate 
each of these parts again once or several times. These 
secondary divisions give rise to grammatical forms that stand 
in a logical relation analogous to that of subject and pred- 
icate, such as noun and attributive, verb and object, verb 
and adverb. In this way the process of apperceptive anal- 
ysis results in a judgment which finds expression in the 
sentence. 

For the psychological explanation of judgment it is of 
fundamental importance that judgment be regarded, not as 
a synthetic, but as an analytic function. The original ag- 
gregate ideas which are divided by judgment into their recip- 
rocally related components, are exactly like ideas of imagi- 
nation. The products of analysis which result from judgment 
are, on the other hand, not as in the case of imagination, 
images of more limited extent and greater clearness, but 
conceptual ideas .^ that is, ideas which stand, with regard 
to other partial ideas of the same whole, in some one of 
the relations which are discovered through the general 
relating and comparing functions. If we call the aggre- 
gate idea which is subjected to such a relating analysis a 
thought., then a judgment is a division of this thought inta 
its components, and a concept is the product of such a 
division. 

17. Concepts found in this way are arranged in certain 
general classes according to the character of the analyses 



296 UJ^- Interconnection of Psychical Compounds. 

that produced them. These classes are the concepts of objects., 
concepts of attributes, and concepts of states. Judgment as a 
division of the aggregate idea, sets an object in relation to its 
attributes or states, or it sets various objects in relation to one 
another. Since a single concept can never, strictly speaking, 
be thought of by itself, but is always connected in the whole 
idea with one or more other concepts, the conceptual ideas 
are strikingly different from the ideas of imagination because 
of the indefiniteness and variableness of the former. This 
indefiniteness is essentially increased by the fact that as a 
result of the like outcome of different kinds of judgment, 
concepts arise which may form components of many ideas 
that differ in their concrete characters. Such general concepts 
constitute, on account of the wide application of relating 
analysis to different contents of judgment, the great majority 
of all concepts ; and they have a greater or smaller number 
of corresponding single ideational contents. A single idea 
is selected from this group of contents as a representative 
of the concept. This gives the conceptual idea a greater 
definiteness. At the same time there is always connected 
with this idea the consciousness that it is merely a repre- 
sentative. This consciousness generally takes the form of a 
characteristic feeling, the conceptual feeling. This feeling 
may be traced to the fact that obscure ideas, which have 
the attributes that make them suitable to serve as represen- 
tations of the concept, tend to force themselves into con- 
sciousness in the form of memory images. As evidence of 
this we have the fact that the feeling is very intense when 
any concrete image of the concept is chosen as its represent- 
ative, as, for example, when a particular individual stands 
for the concept man, while it disappears almost entirely as 
soon as the representative idea differs entirely in content 
from the objects included under the concept. Word ideas 



§17. Apperceptive Combinations. 297 

fulfil this latter condition and that is what gives them their 
importance as universal aids to thought. Word ideas 
are furnished to the individual consciousness in a finished 
state, so that we must leave to social psychology the 
question of the psychological development of the processes 
of thought which are active in their formation (comp. 
§ 21, A). 

18. From all that has been said it appears that the 
activities of imagination and understanding are not specific- 
ally different, but interrelated; that they are inseparable in 
their rise and manifestations, and are based at bottom on 
the same fundamental functions of apperceptive synthesis and 
analysis. What was true of the concept ^'memorif (p. 272), 
holds also of the concepts ^'understanding'^ and 'imagina- 
tion^'' : they are names , not of unitary forces or faculties, 
but of complex phenomena made up of the usual elementary 
psychical processes, not of elementary processes of a specific, 
distinct kind. Just as memory is a general concept for 
certain associative processes, so imagination and understand- 
ing are general concep*ts for particular forms of apperceptive 
activity. They have a certain practical value as ready means 
for the classification of a variety of differences in the capacity 
of various persons for intellectual activity. Each class thus 
found may in turn contain an endless variety of gradations 
and shades. Thus, neglecting the general differences in grade, 
we have as the chief forms of individual imagination the per- 
ceptive and combining forms; as the chief forms of under- 
standing, the inductive and deductive forms, the first being 
mainly concerned with the single logical relations and their 
combinations, the second more with general concepts and 
their analysis. A person's talent is his total capacity re- 
sulting from the special tendencies of both his imagination 
and understanding. 



298 I^I' Interconnection of Psychical Compounds. 

References. Wundt, Lectures on Hum. and Anim. Psych., lecture 
21, and Logik, vol. I, chap. 1 and Volkerpsychologie, vol. I, Pt. 2, 
chap. 7. 



§ 18. PSYCHICAL STATES. 

1. Tlie normal state of consciousness upon which the 
discussion of the foregoing paragraphs has been based may 
undergo such a variety of changes that general psychology 
must give up the attempt to discuss these changes in detail. 
Then, too, the more important of these changes, namely, 
those which are observed in the various forms of nervous 
diseases, brain-diseases, and insanity, belong to special branches 
of pathology which border upon psychology and are more 
or less dependent upon it. All that psychology can do is 
to indicate the main psychical conditions for abnormal states. 
We may distinguish in general three kinds of such condi- 
tions. They may consist 1) in the abnormal character of 
the psychical elements^ 2) in abnormalities in « the way in 
which psychical compounds are constituted, and 3) in ab- 
normalities in the way in which psychical compounds are 
combined. As a result of the intimate interconnection of 
these different kinds of conditions it hardly ever happens 
that one of these three conditions is operative alone; all 
three usually unite. The abnormal character of the elements 
results in abnormalities of the compounds, and this in turn 
brings about changes in the general interconnection of con- 
scious processes. 

2. The psychical elements.^ that is, sensations and simple 
feelings, show only such changes as result from some dis- 
turbance in the normal relation between them and their 
psycho-physical conditions. In the case of sensations such 
changes may be reduced to an increase or decrease of the 
sensitivity for stimuH (hyperaesthesia and anaesthesia) result- 



§ 18. Psychical States. 299 

ing especially from the action of certain physiological in- 
fluences within the sensory centres. The most important 
psychological symptom in this case is the increased excita- 
bility which is one of the most common factors of complex 
psychical disturbances. In similar fashion, changes in the 
simple feehngs betray themselves in states of depression or 
exaltation as a decrease or increase in the affective excita- 
bility. These different states may be recognized from the 
way in which the emotions and volitional processes occur. 
Thus, changes in the psychical elements can be demonstrated 
only by the influence that they exercise on the character of 
the various psychical compounds. 

3. The defects in ideational compounds arising from 
peripheral or central anaesthesia are generally of limited 
importance. They have no far-reaching effect on the inter- 
connection of psychical processes. It is essentially different 
with the relative increase in the sensation which results from 
central hyperaesthesia. The effect of such hyperaesthesia is 
especially important because when it is present, reproduced 
sensational elements may become as intense as external sense 
impressions. The result may be that a pure memory image 
is objectified as a sense perception. This is an hallucination. 
Or, when elements are united which are partly from direct 
external stimulation, partly from reproduction, the sense im- 
pression may be essentially modified through the intensity 
of the reproduced elements. The result is then an illusion 
of fancy ^]. The two abnormalities are not always distin- 



1) The expression "illusions of fancy" is used when this class of 
illusions is to be distinguished from the sense illusions that appear 
in the normal state of consciousness, as, for example, from the radiat- 
ing' form of the stars, which is due to the refraction of light in the 
crystalline lens, or the varying apparent size of the sun or moon 
at the horizon and at the zenith. 



300 -HI Interconneetion of Psychical Compomids. 

guisliable, for though in many cases particular ideas can be 
shown to be illusions of fancy, the presence of pure hallu- 
cinations is almost always doubtful because it is so easy 
to overlook some direct sensational elements. In fact, it is 
by no means improbable that the great majority of so-called 
hallucinations are illusions. These illusions are in their psy- 
chological character nothing but assimilations (p. 251 sq.). 
They may be defined as assimilations in which the repro- 
duced elements predominate. Just as normal assimilations 
are connected with successive associations, so for the same 
reason, the illusions of fancy are closely related to the 
changes in the associative ideational processes to be discussed 
later (5). 

4. In the case of complex affective and volitional processes 
the abnormal states are clearly distinguishable as states of 
depression and exaltation. The state of depression is due 
to the predominance of inhibitory, asthenic emotions, that 
of exaltation to a predominance of exciting, sthenic emo- 
tions, while at the same time we observe, in the first case 
a retardation or complete checking of resolution, in the 
second an exceedingly rapid, impulsive activity of the motive. 
In this sphere it is generally more difficult to draw the 
line between normal and abnormal conditions than in the 
sphere of ideational compounds, because even in normal 
mental life the affective states are continually changing. In 
pathological cases the change between states of depression and 
exaltation, which are often very striking, appear merely as 
intensification of the normal oscillation of the feelings and 
emotions about an indifference-condition (pp. 87, 186). States 
of depression and exaltation are especially characteristic 
symptoms of general psychical disturbances; their detailed 
discussion must therefore be left to psychical pathology. 
Greneral psychical disturbances are always symptoms of dis- 



§ 18. Psychical States. 301 

eases of the brain, so that these abnormalities in affective 
and volitional processes are doubtless accompanied, like ab- 
normalities of the sensations and ideas, by physiological 
changes. The nature of these changes is, however, still un- 
known. We can only surmise, in accordance with the more 
complex character of affective processes, either that they 
are more extensive than the changes in central excitabihty 
accompanying hallucinations and illusions, or that they affect 
the central cortial regions directly concerned in apperceptive 
processes. 

5. Connected with these changes in the sensory excita- 
bility and with states of depression and exaltation, there are, 
as a rule, simultaneous changes in the interconnection and 
course of psychical processes. Using the concept conscious- 
ness which we employ to express this interconnection (p. 223), 
we may call these changes abnormal changes of consciousness. 
So long as the abnormality is limited to the single psychical 
compounds, ideas, emotions, and voHtions, consciousness is of 
course changed because of the changes in its components, 
but we do not speak of an abnormality of consciousness 
itself until not merely the single compounds, but also the 
combinations of these compounds, exhibit some noticeable 
abnormalities. Such changes in the combinations always 
arise when the elementary disturbances become greater, be- 
cause the combinations of elements into compounds and of 
compounds with one another, are processes that pass con- 
tiuously into each other. Corresponding to the different 
kinds of combination which make up the interconnection of 
consciousness (p. 244), there may be distinguished in general 
three kinds of abnormahties of consciousness: 1) changes in 
the associations, 2) changes in the apperceptive combinations, 
and 3) changes in the relation of the two forms of combi- 
nation. 



302 ^11 Intereonnection of Psychical Compounds. 

6. Chaiiges in associations are the first to result directly 
from tlie elementary disturbances. The increase of sensory 
excitability changes normal assimilations into illusions of 
fancy, and this results in an essential disturbance in the 
associative processes of recognition (p, 261). Sometimes that 
which is known to the subject appears to be unknown, and 
then again what is unknown appears familiar, according as 
the reproduced elements are connected with definite earlier 
ideas, or are derived from perceptions which have only a 
remote relation to one another. Then, too, the increased 
sensory excitability tends to accelerate the association, so 
that the most superficial connections, which are occasioned 
by accidental impressions or by habit, are the ones that pre- 
dominate. The states of depression and exaltation, on the 
other hand, determine mainly the quality and direction of 
the association. 

In a similar manner the elementary ideational and affective 
changes influence apperceptive combinations^ either retarding 
or accelerating them, or else determining their direction. 
Still, in these cases all marked abnormalities in ideational 
or affective processes result in an increase, to a greater or 
less degree, of the difficulty of carrying out the processes 
connected with active attention, so that often, only the 
simpler apperceptive combinations are possible, sometimes 
only those are possible which through practice have become 
simple associations. Connected with the last mentioned fact 
are the changes that take place in the relation between ap- 
perceptive and associative combinations. The influences dis- 
cussed thus far are in the main favorable to associations, 
but unfavorable to apperceptive combinations. In keeping 
with this is the fact that one of the most frequent symptoms 
of a far-reaching psychical abnormality is a great preponder- 
ance of associations. This is most obvious when the dis- 



§ 18. Psychical States. 303 

turbance of consciousness is a continually increasing process, 
as it is in many cases of insanity. The observation may be 
made in such cases that the functions of apperception, that 
is, the so-called processes of imagination and understanding 
are more and more supplanted by associations, until finally 
the latter are all that remain. If the disturbance progresses 
still further, the associations gradually become more limited 
and confined to certain habitual combinations (fixed ideas). 
Finally this state gives place to one of complete mental 
paralysis. 

7. Apart from mental diseases in the strict sense of the 
term', the irregularities of consciousness just discussed are 
to be found in two conditions that appear in the course of 
normal life: in dreams and hypnosis. 

The ideas which arise in dreams come, at least to a great 
extent, from sensations, especially from those of the general 
sense, and are therefore mostly illusions of fancy, probably 
only seldom pure memory ideas that have become hallucina- 
tions. The decrease of apperceptive combinations in com- 
parison with associations, is also striking and goes to explain 
the frequent modifications and exchanges of self -conscious- 
ness, the confusion of the judgment, etc. The characteristics 
of dreams which distinguish them from other similar psy- 
chical states, are to be found, not so much in these positive 
attributes, as in certain negative attributes. The increase of 
excitability is limited entirely to the sensory functions, the 
external volitional activity being in ordinary sleep and dreams 
completely inhibited. When the fanciful ideas of dreams 
are connected with corresponding volitional acts, we have 
the very infrequent phenomena of sleep-walking ., which are re- 
lated to certain forms of hypnosis. Motor concomitants are 
generally limited to articulations, and appear as talking in 
dreams. 



304 in. Interconnection of Psychical Compounds. 

8. Hypnosis is the name applied to certain states related 
to sleep and dreams and produced by means of certain defi- 
nite psychical agencies. Consciousness is here generally in 
a condition halfway between waking and sleeping. The main 
cause of hypnosis is suggestion., that is, the communication 
of an idea strong in affective tone. This communication 
generally takes the form of a command from some other 
person (outward suggestion), but may sometimes be given by 
the subject himself, when it is called autosuggestion. The 
command or resolution to sleep, to make certain movements, 
to perceive certain objects which are not present, or not to 
perceive objects which are present, etc., — these are the most 
frequent suggestions. Monotonous stimuli, especially tactual 
stimuli are helpful auxiliaries. Then, too, there is a certain 
disposition of the nervous system of unknown character, 
which is necessary for the rise of the hypnotic state and 
this disposition is decidedly increased when the state is re- 
peatedly produced. 

The first symptom of hypnosis is the more or less complete 
inhibition of external volitional acts. This is connected with 
a concentration of the attention on one thing, generally the 
command of the hypnotizer (automatism). The subject not 
only sleeps at command, but retains in this state any position 
that is given him, however unnatural (hypnotic catalepsy). 
If the sleep becomes still deeper the subject makes, to all 
appearances automatically, the movements which he is directed 
to make, and he shows that ideas suggested to him appear 
like real objects (somnambulism). In this last state it is 
possible to give either motor or sensory suggestions which 
are to go into effect when the subject awakes, or even at 
some later time (terminal suggestions). The phenomena that 
accompany such "posthypnotic effects" render it probable 
that the after-effects are due either to a partial persistence 



§ 18. Psychical States. 305 

of the hypnosis or (in the case of terminal suggestions) to 
a renewal of the hypnotic state. 

9. It appears from all these phenomena that sleep and 
hypnosis are related states, differing only in the fact that 
their mode of origin is different. They have as common 
characteristics the inhibition of processes of volition and at- 
tention, and a disposition toward aroused excitability in the 
sensory centres that brings about an assimilation of the sense 
impressions and thus results in illusions of fancy. The char- 
acteristics which distinguish sleep and hypnosis are the 
complete inhibition of volition in sleep, especially of the 
apperceptive function and of every phase of motor function, 
and the concentration in hypnosis of the passive attention 
on one thing. This concentration is conditioned by suggestion 
and is at the same time favorable to the reception of further 
suggestions. These differences are, however, not absolute, for 
in sleep-walking the will is not completely inhibited, while, 
on the other hand, it is inhibited in the first lethargic stages 
of hypnosis just as in ordinary sleep. 

Sleep, dreams, and hypnosis are, accordingly, in all prob- 
ability, essentially the same in their psychophysical conditions. 
These conditions consist in the specially modified dispositions 
to sensational and volitional reactions, and can, therefore, 
like all such dispositions, be explained on their physiolog- 
ical side only by assuming changes in the activity of certain 
central regions. These changes have not yet been investigated 
directly. Still, we may assume from the psychological symp- 
toms that the physiological conditions consist as a rule, in 
the inhibition of activity in the regions connected with proc- 
esses of volition and attention, and in increased excitability 
of the sensory centres. 

9 a. It is then, strictly speaking, a physiological problem to 
formulate a theory of sleep, dreams, and hypnosis. Apart from, 

WxjNDT, Psycliology. 2. edit, 20 



306 ^U. Interconneetion of Psychical Compounds. 

the general assumption based on psychological symptoms, of an 
inhibition of activity in certain parts of the cerebral cortex, 
and increase in the activity of other parts, we can apply only 
one general neurological principle with any degree of proba- 
bility. This is the principle of compensation of functions^ ac- 
cording to which the inhibition of the activity of one region is 
always connected with an increase in the activity of the other 
interrelated areas. This interrelation may be either direct, neuro- 
dynamic^ or indirect, vasomotoric. The first is probably due to 
the fact that energy which accumulates in one region as the 
result of inhibition, is discharged through the connecting fibres 
into other central regions. The second is due to contraction 
of the capillaries as a result of inhibition and a compensating 
dilation of the blood-vessels in other regions. The increased 
blood supply due to this dilation is in turn attended by an 
increase in the activity of the region in question. Judging 
from the psychological symptoms, one of the essential differ- 
ences between dreams and hypnosis seems to consist in the 
fact that in dreams the central regions which are related to 
apperception are in a more or less completely inactive state, 
so that all stimulations flow, according to the principle of com- 
pensation, to the sensory centres. In hypnosis, on the other 
hand, it is possible for different regions within the appercep- 
tion centre itself to be so related that while certain of these 
regions are partially inhibited, others are correspondingly more 
open to excitation. This line of inference seems to be justified 
by the examination of certain states of partial hypnosis which 
may arise through an increased disposition on the part of a 
subject to become hypnotized, which increased disposition results 
from practice. In such states of partial hypnosis the subject 
may carry out in an automatic way complicated acts, all his 
other functions seeming to be in a waking state. Or he may 
show certain psychological activities of clearer discrimination, 
or strikingly exact recognition, or reproduction of certain par- 
ticular sensations and feelings to the exclusion of all other forms 
of activity. This last mentioned state of partial hypnosis in 
which attention is concentrated in a single direction is the only 
form of hypnosis which can possibly be thought of as having 
any direct psychological value. This state may be of some 



§ 18. Psychical States. 307 

value because of the introspection which it renders possible in 
response to experimentally prepared sensory stimulations. But 
even in this state the greatest possible care will be necessary 
to avoid one danger which will always be present, namely, the 
danger that deceptive suggestions from others or from one's self 
are interfering with the introspection. 

Dreams and hypnosis are often made the subjects of mystical 
and fanciful hypotheses, in some cases even by psychologists. 
We hear of increased mental activity in dreams and of in- 
fluence of mind on minds at a distance in dreams and hypnosis. 
Especially hypnotism has been used in this way, to support 
superstitious spiritualistic ideas. In connection with "animal 
magnetism", which may be completely explained by the theory 
of hypnosis and suggestion, and in connection with "somnam- 
bulism", there are a great many cases of self-deception and 
intentional humbug. In reality all that can stand the light of 
thorough examination in these phenomena is in general readily 
explicable on psychological and physiological grounds; what is 
not explicable in this way has always proved on closer exami- 
nation to be superstitious self-deception or intentional fraud. 

References. On Psychical Disturbances in general: Kraepelin, 
Psychiatric, 5th. ed., vol. I, 1896. Storking, Vorlesungen iiber Psycho- 
pathologie, 1900. P. Janet, Nevroses et idees fixes, vols. 1 and 2, 

1898. SoMMER, Lehrb. der psychopathol. Untersuchungsmethoden, 

1899. WuNDT, Grundztige der phys. Psych., vol. II, chap. 19, and 
Lectures on Hum. and Anim. Psych., lectures 21 and 22, On Sleep 
and Dreams: Purkinje, Wachen, Schlaf und Traum, Handworterb. d. 
Physiol., vol. Ill, Pt. 2. Radestock, Schlaf und Traum, 1879. Giessler, 
Aus den Tiefen des Traumlebens, 1890. Weygandt, Entstehung der 
Traume, 1893. Michelsen, Tiefe des Schlafes, Kraepelin's Psychol. 
Arbeiten, vol. 2. On Hypnosis: Bernheim, Die Suggestion, 1888. 
Forel, Der Hypnotismus, 2nd. ed., 1891, Lehmann, Die Hypnose, 
1890. 0. Yogt, Zeitschr. f. Hypnotismus, vols. 3—6. Wundt, Philos. 
Studien, vol. 8. Lipps, Sitzungsber. der Miinchener Akad., 1897, vol. 2, 
and Zeitschr. f. Hypnot., vol. 6. 



20* 



IV. PSYCHICAL DEVELOPMENTS. 



§ 19. PSYCHIOAL ATTEIBUTES OF ANIMALS. 

1. The animal kingdom exhibits a series of mental devel- 
opments which may be regarded as antecedents to the mental 
development of man, for the mental life of animals shows itself 
to be throughout, in its elements and in the general laws 
governing the combination of these elements, the same as 
the mental life of man. 

Even the lowest animals (protozoa and coelenterata) mani- 
fest vital phenomena that allow us to infer ideational and 
volitional processes. They seize their food, to all appearances 
spontaneously; they flee from pursuing enemies, etc. There 
are also to be found in the lowest stages of animal life 
traces of associations and reproductions and especially proc- 
esses of sensible cognition and recognition (p. 261). In the 
higher animals these function reach a more advanced stage of 
development only through the increase in the length of time 
through which the memory processes extend. Furthermore, 
from the fact that structure and development of the sense 
organs is similar in man and animals, we must draw the con- 
clusion that the character of the sense ideas is in general the 
same, the only difference being that in the lowest forms of life 
the sensory functions are limited to the general sense of touch, 
jast as they are in the case of the higher organisms in the 
first stages of their individual development (p. 51). 



§ 19. Psychical Attributes of Animals. 309 

In contrast with this uniformity of psychical elements 
and their simpler combinations, there are great differences in 
all the processes connected with the development of apper- 
ception. Passive apperception is never absent as the basis 
of the simple impulsive acts which are found everywhere, 
but active apperception in the form of voluntary attention 
to certain impressions and choice between different motives, 
probably never exists except in the higher animals. Even 
here it is limited to the ideas and associations aroused by 
immediate sensible impressions, so that we can find even in 
animals with the highest mental development certainly nothing 
more than the first beginnings of intellectual processes in 
the proper sense of the word, that is, of activities of imagi- 
nation and understanding. Indeed, it may be questioned 
whether even these first beginnings are here present. Con- 
nected with this fact is the fact that higher animals have 
no developed language, though they are able to give ex- 
pression to their emotions and even their ideas, when 
these ideas are connected with emotions, through various 
expressive movements which are frequently related to those 
of man. 

2. Though the development of animals is in general far 
behind that of man, in spite of the 'qualitative likeness of 
the fundamental psychical processes, still, in two ways it is 
often superior. First, animals reach psychical maturity much 
more rapidly., and secondly, certain single functions partic- 
ularly favoured by the special conditions under which the 
species lives, are often more highly developed. The fact of 
more rapid maturity is shown by the early age at which many 
animals (some immediately after birth) are able to receive 
relatively clear sense impressions and to execute purposive 
movements. To be sure, there are very great differences 
among higher animals in this respect. For example, the 



310 I^- Psychical Developments. 

chick just out of the shell begins to pick up grain^ while 
the pup is blind at birth, and is for a long time after birth 
clumsy in his movements. Yet, the development of the child 
seems to be the slowest and the most dependent on help 
and care from others. 

3. The special one-sided development of single functions 
in some animals is even more striking. These functions show 
themselves in certain impulsive acts regularly connected with 
the satisfaction of certain needs, either of alimentation, re- 
production, or protection, arid in the development of the 
sense perceptions arid associations that form the motives for 
such acts. Such specially developed impulses are called 
instincts. The assumption that instincts belong only to animal 
and not to human consciousness is, of course, entirely un- 
psychological, and contradictory to experience. The disposi- 
tion to manifest the [general animal impulses, namely, the 
alimentive impulses and sexual impulses, is just as much a 
connate attribute of man as of the animals. The only thing 
that is characteristic of animals is the special highly devel- 
oped form of the purposive acts by which many animals 
reach the ends aimed at. Different animals, however, are 
very different in tliis respect. There are numerous lower and 
higher animals whose acts resulting from connate instincts 
show as few striking characteristics as those of men. It is 
also noteworthy that domestication generally tends to do 
away with the instincts that animals had in their wild state^ 
and to develop new ones which may generally be regarded 
as modifications of the wild instincts. This is seen, for 
example, in the instincts of certain hunting dogs, especially 
those of bird-dogs and pointers. The relatively high devel- 
opment of certain special instincts in animals as compared 
with men, is simply a manifestation of the general unsym- 
metrical development of animals. The whole psychical life 



§ 19. Psychical Attributes of Animals. 311 

of animals consists almost entirely of the processes that are 
connected with the predominating instinct. 

4. In general, instincts may be regarded as impulsive 
acts that arise from particular sensations and feelings. The 
physiological sources of the sensations chiefly concerned in 
instincts are the alimentary and genital organs. All animal 
instincts may, accordingly, be reduced to alimentive and 
sexual instincts, though in connection with the latter, espe- 
cially in their more complex forms, there are always auxiliary 
protective and social impulses which may be regarded, from 
the character of their origin, as special modifications of the 
sexual impulse. Among these auxiliary forms must be clas- 
sified the impulses of many animals to build houses and nests, 
as is the case with beavers, birds, and numerous insects (for 
example, spiders, wasps, bees, ants), and also the instinct of 
animal marriage found chiefly among birds and appearing 
both in the monogamic and polygamic forms. Finally, the 
so-called "animal states", as those of the bees, of ants, and 
of termites, belong under this head. They are in reality not 
states, but sexual communities, in which the social impulse 
that unites the individuals, as well as the common protective 
impulse, are modifications of the reproduction impulse. 

In the case of all instincts the particular concrete impul- 
sive acts arise from certain sense stimuli partly external, 
partly internal. The acts themselves are to be classed as 
impulsive acts, or simple volitions, since they are preceded 
and accompanied by particular sensations and feelings which 
serve as simple motives. The complex, connate character 
of these acts can be explained only from general inherited 
attributes of the nervous system, as a result of which 
connate reflex mechanisms are immediately, without practice 
on the part of the individual, set in action by certain stimuH. 
The purposive character of these mechanisms must also 



312 IV^- Psychical Developments. 

be regarded as a product of general psycho-physical devel- 
opment. As further evidence of this we have the fact that 
instincts show not only various modifications in different in- 
dividuals, but they also show a certain degree of higher de- 
velopment through individual practice. In this way, the bird 
gradually learns to build its nest better; bees accommodate 
themselves to changing needs, instead of sending out new 
colonies they enlarge the hive if they have the necessary 
room. Even abnormal habits may be acquired by a single 
community of bees or ants ; bees, for example, may learn to 
rob a neighbouring hive instead of gathering the honey from 
the flowers, or ants may acquire the remarkable habit of 
making the members of another species slaves, or of domes- 
ticating plant-lice for the sake of their honey. The rise, 
growth, and transmission of these habits, as we can trace 
them, show clearly the way in which all complicated instincts 
may arise. An instinct never appears alone, but there are 
always simpler forms of the same instinct in related classes 
and species. Thus the hole that the wall-wasp bores in the 
wall in which to lay her eggs, is a primitive pattern of the 
ingenious hive of the honey-bee. Between these two extremes 
there is, as the natural transition stage, the hive of the 
ordinary wasp made of a few hexagonal cells constructed of 
cemented sticks and leaves. 

"We may, accordingly, explain the complex instincts as 
developed forms of originally simple impulses which have 
gradually differentiated more and more in the course of 
numberless generations, through the gradual accumulation of 
habits that have been acquired by individuals and then trans- 
mitted. Every single habitual act is to be regarded as a 
stage in this psychical development. The gradual passage 
of a habit into a connate disposition is to be explained 
as a psycho -physical process of practice through which 



§ 19. Psychical Attributes of Animals. 313 

complex volitional acts gradually pass into automatic move- 
ments following immediately and reflexly the appropriate 
impression. 

5. If we try to answer tlie general question of the genetic 
relation of man to the animals on the ground of a compari- 
son of their psychical attributes, it must be admitted, in 
view of the likeness of psychical elements and of their simplest 
and most general forms of combination, that it is possible 
that human consciousness has developed from a lower form 
of animal consciousness. This assumption is also rendered 
stronger by the fact that the animal kingdom presents a whole 
series of different stages of psychical development and that 
every human individual passes through an analogous devel- 
opment. The doctrine of psychical development thus confirms 
in general the results of the theory of physical evolution. 
Still we must not overlook the fact that between the psychical 
attributes of man and those of the animals, as expressed in 
the intellectual and affective processes resulting from apper- 
ceptive combinations, there are differences much broader 
than the differences in their physical characteristics. Then, 
too, the great stability of the psychical condition of animals, 
which condition undergoes little change even in domestica- 
tion, renders it exceedingly improbable that any of the present 
animal forms will develop in their psychical attributes, much 
beyond the limits that they have already reached. 

5 a. The attempts to define the relation of man and animals 
from a psychological point of view vary between two extremes. 
One of these is the predominating view of the old psychology 
that the higher "faculties of mind", especially "reason", are 
entirely wanting in animals, or that, as Descartes held, animals 
are mere reflex mechanisms without mind. The other is the 
wide -spread opinion of representatives of special animal psy- 
chology, that animals are essentially equal to man in all respects. 



314 I^- Psychical 

in ability to consider, to judge, to draw conclusions, in moral 
feelings, etc. "With the rejection of faculty-psychology the first 
of these views becomes untenable. The second rests on the 
tendency prevalent in popular psychology to interpret all objec- 
tive phenomena in terms of human thought, especially in terms 
of logical reflection. The closer analysis of so-called manifesta- 
tions of intelligence among animals shows, however, that they 
are in all cases fully explicable as simple sensible recognitions 
and associations, and that they lack the characteristics belonging 
to concepts proper and to logical operations. But associative 
processes pass without a break into apperceptive, and the be- 
ginnings of the latter, that is simple acts of active attention 
and choice, appear without any doubt in the case of higher 
animals, so that the difference is after all more one of the degree 
and complexity of the psychical processes than a difference in kind. 
Animal instincts presented a very great difficulty to the older 
forms of psychology, such as the faculty theory and the intellec- 
tualistic theories (§ 2). There the attempt to deduce these instincts 
from the conditions given in each individual case led to an im- 
probably high estimation of the psychical ability of the animal, 
especially when the instinct was more complex. As a result, 
the conclusion was often accepted that instincts are incomprehen- 
sible, or, what amounts to the same thing, due to connate ideas. 
This "enigma of the instincts" ceases to be an enigma when 
we come to look upon instincts, as we have done above, as 
special forms of impulsive action, and consider them as analogous 
to the simple impulsive acts of men and animals, for which we 
have a psychological explanation. This is especially true when 
we follow the reduction of what were originally complicated acts, 
to impulsive or reflex movements in the phenomena of habit. 
Such reduction can be easily observed in the case of man, as, 
for example, in the habituation to complex movements in learn- 
ing to play the piano (comp. p. 212 sq.). It is often argued 
against this theory of instinct that it is impossible to prove 
empirically the transmission of acquired individual variations 
which we have assumed; that, for example, there are no certain 
observations in proof of the transmission of mutilations, as was 
formerly so frequently asserted. Many biologists accept the 
view that all the properties of the organism arise through the 



§ 19. Psychical Attributes of Animals. 315 

selection resulting from the survival of the individual best ad- 
apted to natural conditions; that all such properties of the in- 
dividual are accordingly deducible from "natural selection", and 
that in this way alone changes can be produced in the germ 
and transmitted to descendants. Though it is admitted that an 
attribute acquired by a single individual, generally has no effect 
on the descendents, still, there is no apparent reason why habitual 
acts, which are indeed indirectly due to outer natural conditions, 
but depend primarily on the inner psycho-physical attributes of 
the organism, may not, just as well as the direct influences of 
natural selection, cause changes in the nature of the germ, at 
least, when the acts in question are repeated through many 
generations. Further evidence in favor of the view we have 
been defending is to be found in the fact that in some cases 
whole families inherit peculiar expressive movements or technical 
ability in some line. This does not exclude in any case the 
cooperation of natural influences, but is in full agreement with 
the facts of observation which show that these influences act in 
two ways: first, directly in the changes that natural selection 
brings about in the organism while the organism remains passive, 
and secondly, indirectly in the psycho-physical reactions which 
are caused by the outer influences, and which then in turn give 
rise to changes in the organism. If we neglect the latter fact, 
we not only lose an important means of accounting for the 
purposive character of organisms, but further, and more espe- 
cially, we render impossible a psychological explanation of the 
gradual development of volition and its retrogradation into pur- 
posive reflexes as we see those processes in a large number of 
connate expressive movements (§ 20, l). 

References. Schneider, Der thierische Wille, 1880. Romanes, 
Mental Evolution in Animal. Espinas, Die thierischen Ges ells chaf ten, 
1879. Lubbock, Ants, Bees and Wasps. Wasmann, Instinct und In- 
telligenz im Thierreich, 1897, and Die psychischen Fahigkeiten der 
Ameisen, Zoologica, vol. 26, 1899. Bethe, Pfliiger's Archiv f. Physiol., 
vol. 70 (the author seeks to reduce the instinctive acts of ants and 
bees to pure mechanical reflexes). Gross, (Engl, trans, by Baldwin) 
The Play of Animals. Wundt, Lectures on Hum. and Anim. Psych, 
lectures 23, 24, 27 and 28. 



316 I^' Psychical Developments. 

§ 20. PSYCHICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
CHILD. 

1. The fact that the psychical development of man is 
regularly slower than that of most animals is to he seen in 
the much more gradual maturing of the child's sense functions. 
The child, to be sure, reacts immediately after birth to all 
kinds of sense stimuli, most clearly to impressions of touch 
and taste, with the least certainty to those of sound. Still, 
it is impossible to doubt that the special forms of the reac- 
tion movements in all these cases are due to inherited re- 
flexes. This is especially true of the child's crying when 
affected by cold and tactual impressions, and of the mimetic 
reflexes when he tastes sweet, sour, or bitter substances. It 
is probable that all these impressions are accompanied by 
obscure sensations and feelings, yet the character of the 
movements can not be explained from the feelings, the 
symptoms of which they may be considered to be, but must 
be referred to connate central reflex tracts. 

Clearly conscious experiences begin to show themselves 
after the end of the first month, but they are, as the rapid 
change of moods shows, sensations and feelings of a very 
changeable character. This date of the first rise of experi- 
ence is fixed by the fact that we begin to observe symptoms, 
not only of unpleasurable feelings, but those of pleasurable 
feelings also in the child's laughter, and in lively rhythmical 
movements of his arms and legs after certain sense impres- 
sions. Even the reflexes are not completely developed at 
first — a fact which we can easily understand when we 
learn from anatomy that many of the connecting fibres 
between the cerebral centres do not develop until after birth. 
Thus the associative reflex-movements of the two eyes are 
wanting. To be sure, from the first, each of the eyes 



§20. Psychical Development of the Child. 317 

generally turns by itself towards a light. The movements 
of the two eyes are entirely irregular, and it is only in the 
course of the first three months that the normal coordina- 
tion of the movements of the two eyes towards a common 
fixation-point, begins to appear. Even then the developing 
regularity of movement is not to be regarded as a result 
of complete visual perceptions, quite the reverse, it is to 
be recognized that this regularity of movement is an external 
manifestation of the gradual functioning of a reflex-centre, 
which then renders complete perception possible. 

2. It is impossible to gain any adequate information 
about the qualitative relations of psychical elements in the 
child's consciousness, for the reason that we have no certain 
objective symptoms. It is probable that the number of 
different tonal sensations, perhaps also the number of color 
sensations, is very limited. The fact that children two years 
old not infrequently use the wrong names for colors ought 
not however, to be looked upon as unqualified evidence that 
they do not have the sensation in question. It is much more 
probable that lack of attention and a confusion of the names 
is the real explanation in such cases. 

Towards the end of the first year the differentiation of 
feelings and the related development of the various emotions 
take place and show themselves strikingly in the character- 
istic expressive movements that gradually arise. We now 
observe unpleasurable feelings and joy, and then in succes- 
sion, astonishment, expectation, anger, shame, envy, etc. Even 
in these cases the physiological dispositions for the combined 
movements which express the single emotions, depend upon 
inherited physiological attributes of the nervous system which 
generally do not begin to function until after the first few 
months. As further evidence of such a view of hereditary 
transmission, we have Dakwin's observation that not infre- 



318 ^^- Psychical Developments. 

quently special peculiarities in expressive movements show 
themselves in v^^hole families. 

3. The physical conditions for the rise of spacial ideas 
are connate in the form of inherited reflex connections which 
make a relatively rapid development of these ideas possible. 
But for the child the spacial perceptions seem at first to be 
much more incomplete than are such perceptions in the case 
of many animals. There are manifestations of pain when 
the skin is stimulated, but no clear symptoms of localization. 
Distinct grasping movements develop gradually from the 
aimless movements that are observed even in the first days, 
but they do not, as a rule, become certain and consciously 
purposive until aided by visual perceptions, after the twelfth 
week. The turning of the eye toward a source of light 
which is generally observed very early, is to be regarded as 
reflex. The gradual coordination of ocular movements is the 
result of these reflex adjustments. It is probable that along 
with these reflexes there are developed spacial ideas. We 
can not observe the first beginnings of these ideas, but only 
their gradual development from very crude beginnings. This 
is due to the fact that the whole development is a gradual, 
continuous process, and is from the first interconnected with 
its original physiological substratum. Even in the child the 
sense of sight shows itself to be decidedly more rapid in 
its development than the sense of touch, for the symptoms 
of visual localization are certainly observable earlier than are 
those of tactual localization, and the grasping movements, as 
mentioned above, do not reach their full development until 
aided by the sense of sight. The field of binocular vision 
is much later in its development than that of monocular 
vision. Monocular localization shows itself in the discrimi- 
nation of directions in space. The beginnings of the devel- 
opment of a field for binocular vision coincide with the first 



§ 20. Psychical Development of the Child. 319 

coordination of ocular movements and belong, accordingly, 
to the second half of the first year. The perception of size, 
of distance, and of various three-dimensional figures, remains 
for a long time very imperfect. Especially, distant objects 
are all thought to be near at hand^ so that they appear 
relatively small to the child. 

4. Temporal ideas develop along with the spacial ideas. 
The ability to form regular temporal ideas and the pleasure 
derived by the child from these ideas, show themselves in the 
first months in the movements of his limbs and especially 
in the tendency to accompany rhythms that are heard, with 
similar rhythmical inovements. Some children can imitate 
correctly, even before they can speak, the rhythmical melodies 
that they hear, in sounds and intonations. Still, the ideas 
of longer intervals are very imperfect, even at the end of 
the first year and later, so that a child gives very irregular 
judgments as to the duration of different periods and also 
as to the sequence of these periods. 

5. The development of associations and of simple apper- 
ceptive combinations goes hand in hand with the development 
of spacial and temporal ideas. Symptoms of sensible recog- 
nitions (p. 261) are observable from the very first days, in 
the rapidly acquired abiHty to find the mother's breast and 
in the obvious habituation to the objects and persons of the 
environment. Still, for a long time these associations cover 
only very short intervals of time, at first only hours, then 
days. Even in the third and fourth years children either 
forget entirely, or remember only imperfectly, persons who 
have been absent for a few weeks. 

The case with attention is similar. At first it is possible 
to concentrate attention upon a single object only for a 
very short time, and it is obvious that passive apperception 
which always follows the predominating stimulus, that is, the 



320 I^- Psychical Development 

stimulus which has. the strongest affective tone (p. 238), is the 
only form of apperception present. In the first weeks, how- 
ever, a lasting attention shows itself in the way in which 
the child fixates and follows objects for a longer time, 
especially if they are moving; and at the same time we 
observe the first trace of active apperception in the ability 
to turn voluntarily from one impression to another. From 
this point on, the ability becomes more and more fully de- 
veloped; though the attention, even in later childhood, fatigues 
more rapidly than in adults, and requires a greater variety 
of objects or a more frequent pause for rest. 

6. The development of self-consciousness keeps pace with 
the development of the associations and apperceptions. In 
judging of this development we must guard against accepting 
as signs of self-consciousness single symptoms, such as the 
child's discrimination of the parts of his body from objects 
of his environment, his use of the word "I", or even the 
recognition of his own image in the mirror. The adult 
savage who has never before seen his own reflected image, 
takes it for some other person. The use of the personal 
pronoun is due to the child's imitation of the examples of 
those about him. This imitation comes at very different 
times in the cases of different children, even when their in- 
tellectual development in other respects is the same. Such 
use of the first personal pronoun is, to be sure, a symptom 
of the presence of self- consciousness, but the first beginnings 
of self-consciousness may have preceded this discrimination 
in speech by a longer or a shorter period of time in differ- 
ent cases. Again, the discrimination of the body and its 
parts from other objects is a symptom of exactly the same 
kind. The recognition of the body is a process that regularly 
precedes the true recognition of the image in the mirror, 
but one is as little a criterion of the beginning of self-con- 



§20. Psychical Development of the Child. 321 

sciousness as the other. They both presuppose the existence 
of some degree of self-consciousness beforehand. Just as 
the developed self-consciousness is based upon a number of 
different conditions (p. 243), so in the same way, the self- 
consciousness of the child is from the first a product of 
several components, partly ideational in character, partly 
affective and volitional. Among the ideational processes, we 
have the discrimination of a constant group of ideas, among 
the affective and volitional processes, we have the develop- 
ment of certain interconnected processes of attention and 
certain volitional acts. The constant group of ideas does 
not necessarily include all parts of the body, as, for example, 
the legs, which are usually covered, and it may, as is more 
often the case, include external objects, as, for example, 
the clothes generally worn. The subjective affective and 
volitional components, and the relations that exist between 
these and the ideational components in external volitional 
acts, are the factors that exercise the greater influence. The 
influence of these subjective factors is shown most strikingly 
in the fact that strong feelings, especially those of pain, 
very often mark in an individual's memory the first moment 
to which the continuity of his self-consciousness reaches back. 
But there can be no doubt that a form of self-conscious- 
ness, even though less interconnected, exists even before this 
first clearly remembered moment, which generally comes in 
the third to the sixth year. Still, since the objective obser- 
vation of the child is not based at first on any sure criteria, 
it is impossible to determine the exact moment when self- 
consciousness begins. Probably the traces of it begin to 
appear in the first weeks; after this it continually becomes 
clearer under the constant influence of the conditions men- 
tioned^ and increases in temporal extent just as does con- 
sciousness in general. 

Wdndt, Psychology. 2. edit. 21 



322 IV^- Psychical Developments. 

7. The development of will is intimately connected with 
the development of self-consciousness. The development of 
will may be inferred partly from the development of atten- 
tion described above, partly from the rise and gradual per- 
fection of external volitional acts. The immediate relation 
of attention to will appears in the fact that symptoms of 
active attention and voluntary action come at exactly the 
same time. Yery many animals execute immediately after 
birth fairly perfect impulsive movements. These are ren- 
dered possible by inherited reflex mechanisms of a complex 
character. The new-born child, on the contrary^ does not 
show any traces of such impulsive acts. We observe, how- 
ever, in the first days the earliest beginnings of simple voli- 
tional acts of an impulsive character. These result from 
the reflexes caused by sensations of hunger and by the 
sense perceptions connected with appeasing hunger. The 
primitive volitional acts growing out of these reflexes are to 
be seen in the evident quest after the sources of nourish- 
ment. With the obvious growth of attention come the voli- 
tional acts connected with impressions of sight and hearing: 
the child purposely, no longer merely in a reflex way^ follows 
visual objects, and turns his head towards the noises that 
he hears. Much later come the movements of the outer 
muscles of the limbs and trunk. Especially the muscles of 
the limbs, show from the first lively movements ^ generally 
repeated time and time again. These movements are accom- 
panied by all possible feelings and emotions, and when the 
emotions become differentiated, the movements begin gradu- 
ally to exhibit certain differences characteristic of the quality 
of the emotions. The chief difference consists in the fact 
that rhythmical movements accompany pleasurable emotions, 
while arhythmical, and, as a rule, violent movements result 
when the emotions are unpleasurable. These expressive mpve- 



§ 20. Psychical Develojmient of the Child. 323 

ments, which must be looked upon as reflexes attended by 
feelings pass^ as occasion offers, and as soon as the attention 
begins to turn upon the surroundings, into ordinary voluntary 
expressive movements. Thus, the child shows through the 
different accompanying symptoms that he not only feels pain, 
annoyance, anger, etc., but also that he wishes to give expres- 
sion to these emotions. The first movements, however, in 
which an antecedent motive is to be recognized beyond a 
doubt, are the grasping movements which begin in the twelfth 
to the fourteenth week. At first, the foot takes part in these 
movements as well as the hand. We have here also the 
first clear symptoms of sense perception, as well as the first 
indications of the existence of a simple vohtional process 
made up of motive, decision, and act. Somewhat later 
intentional imitative movements are to be observed. Simple 
mimetic imitations, such as puckering the lips and frowning, 
come first, and then pantomimetic, such as doubling up the 
fist, beating time, etc. Very gradually, as a rule not until 
after the beginning of the second half of the first year, 
coinplex volitional acts develop from these simple ones. The 
oscillation of decision, the voluntary suppression of an in- 
tended act or one already begun, are clearly observed at 
this period. 

Learning to walk^ which usually begins in the last third 
of the first year, is an important factor in the development 
of voluntary acts in the proper sense of the term. The 
importance of this development is due to the fact that 
wa^lking to certain particular places furnishes the occasion 
for the rise of a number of conflicting motives. Learning 
to walk is itself to be regarded as a process in which the 
development of the will and the effect of inherited disposi- 
tions to certain particular combinations of movements are 
continually interacting upon each other. The first impulse 

21* 



324 ^^- Psychical Developments. 

for the movement comes from volitional motives; the pur- 
posive way in which the act is carried out, however, is pri- 
marily an effect of the central mechanism of coordination, 
which in turn is rendered continually more and more pur- 
posive as a result of the individual's practice directed by 
his will. 

8. The development of the child's ability to speak follows 
that of his other volitional acts. This, too, depends on the 
one hand, on the cooperation of inherited modifications in 
the central organ of the nervous system and depends on 
the other hand, on outside influences. The most important 
outside influences in this case are those that come from the 
speech of those about the child. In this respect the devel- 
opment of speech corresponds entirely with the development 
of the other expressive movements, among which it is, from 
its general psycho-physical character^ to be classed. The 
earliest articulations of the vocal organs appear as early as 
the second month, as reflex phenomena, especially accom- 
panying pleasurable feelings and emotions. After that they 
increase in variety and exhibit more and more the tendency 
to repetition (for example, ba-ba-ba, da-da-da-da, etc.). These 
expressive sounds differ from those of many animals only in 
their greater number and continually changing variety. They 
are produced on all possible occasions and without any in- 
tention of communicating anything, so that they are by no 
means to be classed as elements of speech. Through the 
influence of those about the child these sounds generally 
become elements of speech after the beginning of the second 
year. This result is brought about chiefly by certain imita- 
tive movements. The imitation here involved is a two-fold 
imitation of sounds. On the one hand, the child imitates 
adults, on the other, adults imitate the child. In fact, as 
a rule, it is the adults who begin the imitating ; they repeat 



§ 20. Psychical Development of the Child. 325 

the involuntary articulations of the child and attach a par- 
ticular meaning to them, as, for example, "pa-pa" for father, 
"ma-ma", for mother, etc. It is not until later, after the 
child has learned to use these sounds in a particular sense 
through intentional imitation, that he repeats other words 
of the adults' language also, and even then he modifies these 
borrowed words to fit the stock of sounds that he is able 
to articulate. 

Gestures are important as means by which adults, more 
instinctively than voluntarily, help the child to understand 
the words they use. G-estures are generally indicative gestures 
or gestures towards the objects; less frequently, and ordinarily 
only in the case of words meaning some activity such as 
strike, cut, walk^ sleep, etc., the gestures take the form of 
representative gestures. The child has a natural under- 
standing of the meaning of these gestures, while he has no 
such understanding of the meaning of words. Even the 
onomatopoetic words of child speech (such as bow-wow for 
dog, etc.) never become intelligible to the child until the 
objects have been frequently pointed out. The creator of 
these onomatopoetic words is not the child, it is rather the 
adult, who seeks instinctively to accommodate himself to the 
stage of the child's consciousness in this respect as well as 
in others. 

All this goes to show that the child's learning to speak 
is the result of a series of associations and apperceptions in 
the formation of which associations and apperceptions both 
the child and those about him take part. Mother or nurse 
voluntarily designates particular ideas by using certain words 
taken from the expressive sounds produced by the child, or 
by using onomatopoetic words made arbitrarily after the 
pattern of the first class. The child apperceives this com- 
bination of word and idea after it has been made intelligible 



326 ^^- Psychical DeDelopments. 

to him by means of gestures and he then associates the idea 
with his own imitative articulative movements. Following 
the pattern of these first apperceptions and associations the 
child now forms others, by imitating of his own accord more 
and more the words and verbal combinations that he acci- 
dentally hears adults using, and by making the appropriate as- 
sociations with their meanings. The whole process is thus the 
result of a psychical interaction between the child and those 
about him. The sounds are at first produced by the child 
alone, those about him take up these sounds and make 
use of them for purposes of speech. 

9. As a result of all the simpler processes of develop- 
ment thus far discussed there arise the complex functions 
of apperception J that is, the relating and comparing ac- 
tivities, and the activities of imagination and understand- 
ing which are made up of relating and comparing proc- 
esses (§ 17). 

Apperceptive combinations appear at first exclusively in 
the form of imagination^ that is^ in the combination, analysis, 
and relating of concrete sensible ideas. Thus, individual 
development corroborates what has been said in general about 
the genetic relation of these functions (p. 278). On the basis 
of the continually increasing association of immediate im- 
pressions with earlier ideas, there arises in the child, as soon 
as his active attention is aroused, a tendency to form imag- 
inative combinations voluntarily. The number of memory 
elements freely combining with the impression and added 
to it, furnishes us with a measure of the fertility of the in- 
dividual child's imagination. As soon as this combining 
activity of imagination has once begun to operate, it shows 
itself with an impulsive force which the child is unable to 
resist, for there is not as yet, as in the case of adults, any 
activity of the understanding to prescribe definite intellectual 



§20. Psychical Development of the Child. 327 

ends regulating and inhibiting the free sweep of the ideas 
of imagination. 

This unchecked relating and coupling of ideas in imagi- 
nation is connected with volitional impulses which aim to find 
for the ideas some starting points in immediate sense per- 
ception, however vague these starting points may be. This 
is what gives rise to the child's j^lay impulse. The earhest 
games of the child are those of pure imagination; while, on 
the contrary, the games of adults (cards, chess^ lotto, etc.) 
are almost as exclusively intellectual games. Only where 
aesthetical demands exert an influence, are the games of 
adults the productions of the imagination (drama, piano 
playing, etc.), but even here they are not wholly untrammeled 
like those of the child, but are regulated by the under- 
standing. When the play of a child takes its natural course, 
it shows at different periods of its development all the inter- 
mediate stages between the game of pure imagination and 
the game in which imagination and understanding are united. 
In the first years play consists in the production of rhyth- 
mical movements of the arms and legs, then the movements 
are carried over to external objects as well, with preference 
for such objects as give rise to auditory sensations, or such as 
have bright colors. In their origin these movements are ob- 
viously impulsive acts aroused by certain sensational stimuli 
and dependent for their purposive coordination on inherited 
traits of the central nervous organs. The rhythmical order of 
the movements and of the feelings and sound impressions that 
result from them, obviously arouse pleasurable feelings, and 
the arousal of such feelings very soon results in the voluntary 
repetition of the movements. After this, during the first years, 
play becomes gradually a voluntary imitation of the occupa- 
tions and scenes that the child sees about him. The range 
of imitation then widens and is no longer limited to what is 



328 ^y^' Psychical Developments. 

seen, but includes a free reproduction of what is heard in 
narratives. At the same time the interconnection between 
ideas and acts begins to follow a more fixed plan. This 
indicates the regulative influence of the activity of under- 
standing, which shows itself in the games of later childhood 
in prescribed rules. This development of games is often 
accelerated through the influence of those about the child 
and through artificial forms of play generally invented by 
adults and not always suited to the child's imagination. In 
all cases, however, this development is to be recognized as 
natural, and conditioned by the reciprocal interconnection of 
associative and apperceptive processes, since such a course 
of development corresponds with the general development 
of the intellectual functions. The way in which the processes 
of imagination are gradually curtailed and the functions of 
understanding more and more employed, renders it probable 
that the curtailing is due, not so much to a quantitative 
decrease of imagination, as to an obstruction of imagination 
through abstract thinking. "When this process of obstruction 
has once set in, the activity of imagination may itself through 
lack of use, and because of the greater exercise of abstract 
thought, begin to decrease. This view seems to be supported 
by the fact that savages usually have all through their lives 
an imaginative play impulse related to that of the child. 

10. From these primitive imaginative forms of thought 
the functions of understanding develop very gradually in 
the way already described (p. 294). Aggregate ideas which 
are presented in sense perception or are formed by the com- 
bining activity of imagination are divided into their conceptual 
components, that is, into objects and their attributes, into 
objects and their activities, or into the relations of different 
objects to one another. The decisive symptom of the rise 
of the functions of understanding is therefore the formation 



§ 20. Psychical Development of the Child. 329 

of concepts. On the other hand, actions that can be explained 
from the point of view of the observer by logical reflection, 
are by no means proofs of the existence of such reflection 
on the part of the actor, for such actions are very often 
obviously derived from associations, just as in the case of 
animals. In the same way there may be the first beginnings 
of speech without abstract thinking in any proper sense, 
since words refer originally only to concrete sensible im- 
pressions. Still, the more perfect use of language is not 
possible until ideas are conceptually analyzed, related, and 
transferred, even though the processes are in each case 
entirely concrete and sensible. The development of the 
functions of understanding and the development of speech, 
accordingly, go hand in hand, and the latter is an indis- 
pensable aid in retaining concepts and fixing the operations 
of thought. 

10 a. Child psychology often suffers from the same mistake 
that is made in animal psychology, namely, from the mistake 
of not interpreting observations objectively. The observations 
are filled out with subjective reflections. Thus, the earliest 
ideational combinations, which are in reality purely associative, 
are regarded as acts of logical reflection, and the earliest mimetic 
expressive movements, as, for example, those of a new-born 
child due to taste stimuli, are looked upon as reactions to feel- 
ings, while they are obviously at first nothing but connate re- 
flexes. These reflexes may, it is true, be accompanied by ob- 
scure concomitant feelings, but certainly such feelings can not 
be demonstrated with certainty. The ordinary view as to the 
development of volition and of speech, labors under a like mis- 
conception. Generally there is a tendency to consider the child's 
language, because of its peculiarities, as a creation of his own. 
Closer observation, however, shows that it is created by those 
about him, though in doing this adults use the sounds that the 
child himself produces, and conform as far as possible to the 
child's stage of consciousness. Thus it comes that some of the 



330 I^- Psychical Developments. 

very detailed and praise-worthy accounts of the mental develop- 
ment of the child in modern literature can serve merely as sources 
for objective facts. Their psychological deductions require cor- 
rection along the lines marked out above, because they stand 
on the basis of reflective popular psychology. The efforts which 
have frequently been made to employ experimental methods in 
the investigations of child psychology have attained a degree 
of success only when these methods have been used with children 
of fairly advanced age, for example, with school children. When 
thus applied, experiments have produced results which have 
pedagogical as well as psychological value. Such are the results 
in regard to the course and duration of attention, the relation 
between bodily fatigue and mental fatigue, etc. During the earlier 
periods of the child's life experimental methods are hardly ap- 
plicable at all. The results of experiments which have been 
tried on very young children must be regarded as purely chance 
results, wholly untrustworthy on account of the great number 
of sources of error. For these reasons it is an error to hold, 
as is sometimes held, that the mental life of adults can never 
be fully understood except through the analysis of the child's 
mind. The exact opposite is the true position to take. Since 
in the investigation of children and of savages, only objective 
symptoms are in general available, any psychological interpreta- 
tion of these symptoms is possible only on the basis of mature 
adult introspection which has been carried out under experi- 
mental conditions. For the same reasons, it is only the results 
of observations of children and savages which have been sub- 
jected to a similar psychological analysis, which furnish any 
proper basis for conclusions in regard to the nature of mental 
development in general. 

References. Kussmaul, Untersuchungen fiber das Seelenleben des 
neugebornen Menschen, 1859. Preyer (English trans, by H. W. Brown) 
The Mind of the Child. Sully, Studies of Childhood, 1896. Compayre, 
Die Entwicklung der Kindesseele, 1900. Egger, Development de I'in- 
telligence et du langage chez les enfants, 1879. Darwin, Expression 
of the Emotions. Ament, Entwicklung vom Sprechen und Denken 
beim Kinde, 1899. Wundt, Volkerpsychologie, vol. I, chap. 3 and 7 
and Lectures on Hum. and Anim. Psych., lecture 27. Gross, (English 
trans.) The Play of Man. 



§ 21. Development of Mental Communities. 331 

§ 21. DEVELOPMENT OF MENTAL COMMUNITIES. 

1. Just as the psychical development of the child is the 
resultant of his interaction with his environment, so matured 
consciousness stands continually in relation to the mental 
community in which it has a receptive and an active part. 
Among most animals such a community is entirely wanting. 
Animal marriage, animal states, and flocks, are only in- 
complete forerunners of mental communities, and they are 
generally limited to the attainment of certain single ends. 
The more lasting forms, that is animal marriage and the 
falsely named animal states (p. 311), are really sexual com- 
munities; the more transient forms such as flocks, for ex- 
ample flocks of migratory birds, are communities for pro- 
tection. In all these cases it is certain instincts that have 
grown more and more fixed through transmission, which 
hold the individuals together. The community, therefore, 
shows the same constancy as do instincts', and such a 
community is very little modified by the influences of in- 
dividuals. 

While animal communities are, thus, mere enlargements 
of the individual existence, aiming at certain physical vital 
ends, human developi]4ent seeks^ from the first, so to unite 
the individual with his mental environment that the whole 
community is capable of development, serving at once the 
satisfaction of the physical needs of life and the pursuit of 
the most various mental ends, while permitting at the same 
time great variations in these ends. As a result, the forms 
of human society are exceedingly variable. The more fully 
developed forms, however, enter into a continuous train of 
historical development which extends the mental ties con- 
necting individuals further and further beyond the bounds 
of immediate spacial and temporal proximity. The final 



332 ^^- Psychical Developments. 

result of this development is the formation of the notion of 
humanity as a great general mental community which is di- 
vided up according to the special conditions of life into single 
concrete communities, peoples, states, civilized societies of 
various kinds, races, and families. The mental community 
to which the individual belongs is, therefore, not merely a 
single union, it is rather a changing group of mental unions 
which are all interlaced in the most manifold ways and 
which become more and more numerous as development 
progresses. 

2. The problem of tracing these developments in their 
concrete forms or even in their general interconnection, be- 
longs to the history of civilization and to general history, 
not to psychology. Still, we must give some account here 
of the general psychical conditions of community life and 
the psychical processes arising from these conditions, which 
processes distinguish social from individual life. 

The condition which is a prime necessity of every mental 
community at its beginning, and a continually operative factor 
in its further development, is the function of speech. This 
is what makes the development of mental communities from 
individual existences psychologically possible. In its origin 
speech comes from the expressive movements of the individual, 
but as a result of its development it becomes the indispens- 
able form for all common mental contents. These common 
contents, or the mental processes which belong to the whole 
community, may be divided into two classes, which are merely 
interrelated components of social life, not distinct processes, 
any more than the processes of ideation and volition are 
distinct in individual experience. The first of these classes 
of common contents is the class of the common ideas. In 
this class we find especially the common feelings and emotions 
of fear and hope — these are the mythological ideas. The 



§ 21. Development of Mental Communities. 333 

second class consists of the common motives of volition, 
which correspond to the common ideas and their attending 
feelings and emotions — these are the Imvs of custom. 



A. SPEECH. 

3. "We obtain no information in regard to the general 
development of speech from the individual development of the 
child, because in the case of the child the larger part of 
the process depends on those about him rather than on the 
child himself (p. 324 sq.). Still, the fact that the child learns 
to speak at all, shows that he has psychical and physical 
traits favorable to the reception of language when it is com- 
municated. In fact, it may be assumed that these traits 
would, even if there were no communications from without, 
lead to the development of some kind of expressive movements 
accompanied by sounds, which sounds would form an in- 
complete language. This supposition is justified by the ob- 
servation of the deaf and dumb, especially deaf and dumb 
children who have grown up without any systematic educa- 
tion. In spite of this lack of education, an energetic mental 
intercourse may take place between them. In such cases, 
however, since the deaf and dumb can perceive only visual 
signs, the intercourse must depend on the development of a 
natural gesture language made up of a combination of sig- 
nificant expressive movements. Feelings are in general ex- 
pressed by mimetic movements, ideas by pantomimetic move- 
ments, either by pointing at the object with the finger or by 
drawing some kind of picture of the idea in the air, that 
is, by means of indicative or representative gestures (p. 109)//^ 
There may even be a combination of such signs with each 
other, thus leading to a kind of sentence structure by means 
of which wishes and questions are expressed, things are 



334 VI' Psychical Developments. 

described, and occurrences narrated. This natural gesture 
language can never go any further, however, than the com- 
munication of concrete sensible ideas and their interconnec- 
tions. Signs for abstract concepts are entirely wanting. 

4. The primitive development of articulate language can 
hardly be thought of except after the analogy of the rise 
of this natural gesture language. The only difference is that 
in this case the ability to hear, results in the addition of a 
third form of movements to the mimetic and pantomimetic 
movements. This third form consists in the articulatory move- 
ments, and since such articulatory movements are much more 
easily perceived, and capable of incomparably more various 
modifications, it must of necessity follow that they soon exceed 
the others in importance. But just as gestures owe their 
intelligibility to the immediate relation that exists between 
the character of the movement and its meaning, so here also 
we must presuppose a like relation between the original ar- 
ticulatory movement and its meaning. Then, too, it is not 
improbable that articulation was at first aided by accom- 
panying mimetic and pantomimetic movements. Evidence in 
support of this view is to be found in the unrestrained use 
of such gestures by savages, and in the important part 
which gestures play in the child's learning to speak. The 
development of articulate language is, accordingly, in all 
probability to be thought of as a process of differentiation, 
in which the articulatory movements have gradually gained 
the permanent ascendency over a number of different variable 
expressive movements which originally attended them. The 
articulation movements have, then, dispensed with these 
auxiliary movements as they themselves gained a sufficient 
degree of fixity. Psychologically the process may be divided 
into two acts. The first consists in the expressive move- 
ments of the individual member of the community. These 



§ 21. Development of Mental Communities. 335 

are impulsive volitional acts, among which the movements 
of the vocal organs gain the ascendency over the others in 
the effort of the individual to communicate with his fellows. 
The second consists in the subsequent associations between 
sound and idea, which gradually become more fixed, and 
spread from the localities where they originated through 
wider circles of society. 

5. From the first there are other physical and psychical 
conditions which take part in the formation of language 
and produce continual and unceasing modifications in its 
components. Such modifications may be divided into two 
classes, namely, modifications of sound and modifications of 
meaning. 

Modifications of sound have their physiological cause in 
the gradual changes that take place in the physical structure 
of the vocal organs. These changes seem to come partly 
from the general changes which the transition from a savage 
to a civilized condition produces in the whole psycho-physical 
organism, and partly from the special conditions which result 
from increased practice in the execution of articulatory move- 
ments. Many phenomena go to show that the gradually in- 
creasing rapidity of articulation is one of the facts of practice 
which is of especially great influence. Then, too, the words 
that are in any way analogous, act upon one another in a 
way which gives evidence of the direct psychological influence 
of association, especially of association between verbal ideas 
which are in any way related, either through sound only, 
or through likenesses in both sound and meaning (so-called 
analogous word constructions). 

As the change in sound modifies the outer form of words, 
so the change in meaning modifies the inner content. The 
original association between a word and the idea it expresses 
is modified by the substitution of another, different idea. 



336 I^- Psychical Developments. 

This process of substitution may be several times repeated 
with the same word. The change in the meaning of words 
depends, therefore, on a gradual modification of the asso- 
ciative and apperceptive conditions which determine the idea- 
tional complications that shall arise in the fixation-point of 
consciousness when a word is heard or spoken. It may, 
accordingly, be briefly defined as a shifting of the ideational 
component of the complications connected with articulate 
sounds (p. 259). It is due at times to association, at times 
to apperception. 

These changes in the sound and meaning of words operate 
together in bringing about the gradual disappearance of the 
originally necessary relation between sound and meaning, 
so that a word finally comes to be looked upon as a mere 
external sign of the idea. This process is so complete 
that even those verbal forms in which this relation seems 
to be still retained, that is, in the case of onomatopoetic 
words, we must recognize the forms themselves as for the 
most part relatively late products of a secondary assim- 
ilative process, which process seeks to reestablish the ori- 
ginally present, but now lost, affinity between sound and 
meaning. 

Another important consequence of this combined action 
of changes in sound and meaning, is to be found in the fact 
that many words gradually lose entirely their original con- 
crete sensible significance, and become signs of general con- 
cepts and means for the expression of the apperceptive 
relating and comparing functions and their products. In 
this way abstract thinking is developed. Such abstract thinking 
would be impossible without the change in meaning of words 
upon which it is based, and it is, therefore, a product of the 
psychical and psycho-physical interactions on which the pro- 
gressive development of language depends. 



§ 21. Development of Mental Communities. 337 

6. Just as the components of language, or words, are 
undergoing a continual modification in sound and meaning, 
so in the same way, though generally more slowly, changes 
are going on in the combinations of words into larger wholes 
that is, in sentences. No language can be thought of with- 
out some such syntactic order of its words. Sentences and 
words are, therefore, equally essential forms of thought. 
Indeed, the sentence is the earlier of the two, for the thought 
appears at first as a single whole and is later broken up 
into its components (p. 291). In the more incomplete stages 
of language the words of a sentence are, accordingly, only 
very uncertainly distinguished from each other. There is no 
universal rule even for the order of words, any more than 
there is for the relation of sound to meaning. The order 
that logic favors with a view to the relations of reciprocal 
logical dependence between concepts, has no psychological 
universality; it appears, in fact, to be a fairly late product 
of development, due in part to arbitrary convention, and 
approached only by the prose forms of some modern languages 
which are syntactically nearly fixed. The original principle 
followed in apperceptive combination of words is obviously 
this, the order of the words corresponds to the succession of 
ideas. As a result those parts of speech that arouse the 
feelings and attract the attention most intensely are placed 
first. Following this principle, certain regularities in the 
order of words are developed in any given community. In 
fact, such a regularity is to be observed even in the natural 
gesture language of the deaf and dumb. Still, it is easy to 
understand that the most various modifications in this respect 
may appear under special circumstances. In general, how- 
ever, the habits of association lead more and more to the 
fixing of particular syntactic forms, so that gradually a 
certain regularity begins to assert itself through a kind of 

WuNDT, Psychology. 2. edit. 22 



338 -^^- Psychical Developments. 

associative attraction exerted by the forms most commonly 
employed. 

Apart from the general laws presented in the discussion 
of apperceptive combinations, and there shown to arise from 
the general psychical functions of relating and comparing 
(p. 278), the detailed discussion of the characteristics of syn- 
tactic combinations and their gradual changes, must be left, 
in spite of their psychological importance, to social psychol- 
ogy, because such syntactic combinations depend so much 
on the specific dispositions and conditions of civilization in 
a given community. 

Eeferences. Steinthal, Einleitung in die Psychologie und 
Sprachwissenschaft, vol. I, 1871. Paul, Principien der Sprachen- 
geschichte, 3rd, ed,, 1898. Wundt, Volkerpsychologie, vol. I, (Die 
Sprache) 1900. 

B. MYTHS. 

7. The fundamental function which in its various forms of 
activity gives rise to all mythological ideas, is a characteristic 
kind of apperception belonging to all naive consciousness and 
suitably designated by the name ^personifying apperception. It 
consists in the complete determination of the apperceived ob- 
jects through the nature of the perceiving subject. The subject 
not only finds his own sensations, emotions, and voluntary 
movements reproduced in the objects, but even his momentary 
affective state is in each case especially influential in de- 
termining his view of the phenomena perceived, and in 
arousing ideas of the relations of these phenomena to his own 
existence. As a necessary result of such a view the pei^sonal 
attributes which the subject finds in himself are assigned to 
the object. The inner attributes, of feeling, emotion, etc., 
are never omitted. The outer attributes of voluntary action 
and other expressions like those of men, are generally as- 



§ 21. Development of Mental Communities. 339 

signed to objects only when there are actually perceived 
movements. Thus, the savage may attribute to stones, plants, 
and v^rorks of art, an inner capacity for sensations and 
feelings and for the resulting effects of these processes^ but 
he usually assumes immediate action only in the case of 
moving objects, such as clouds, heavenly bodies, winds, etc. 
In all these cases the personification is favored by associa- 
tive assimilations which readily reach the intensity of illusions 
of fancy (p. 299). 

8. Myth-making, or personifying, apperception is not to 
be regarded as a special form or even as a distinct sub-form 
of apperception. It is nothing but the natural inceptive stage 
of apperception in general. The child shows obvious traces 
of it, partly in the activities of his imagination in play (p. 251), 
partly in the fact that strong emotions, especially fear and 
fright; easily arouse illusions of fancy with an affective 
character analogous to that of the emotion. In the case of 
children; however, the manifestations of a tendency to form 
myths are early checked and soon entirely suppressed through 
the influences of environment and education. With savage, 
and partly civilized peoples it is different. There the sur- 
rounding influences present a whole mass of mythological 
ideas to the individual consciousness. These, too, originated 
in the minds of individuals^ and have gradually become fixed 
in some particular community, and through language have 
been transmitted from generation to generation and become 
gradually modified in the transition from savage to civilized 
conditions. 

9. The direction in which these modifications take place, 
is determined in general by the fact that the momentary 
affective state of the subject is the chief influence in settling 
the character of the myth-making apperception. In order 
to gain some notion of the way in which the affective state 

22* 



340 I^- PsyGhioal Developments. 

of the subject has , changed from the first beginnings of 
mental development to the present, we must appeal to the 
history of the development of mythological ideas, for other 
evidences are entirely wanting. It appears that in all cases 
the earliest mythological ideas referred to the personal fate 
in the immediate future^ and were determined, by the emo- 
tions aroused by the death of comrades and by the memory 
of these comrades, and were also determined in a high degree, 
by the memories of dreams. This is the source of so-called 
"animism", that is, all those forms of belief in which both 
the spirits of the dead and certain demons connected with 
certain objects, places or practical occupations (demons of 
the woods and fields, of agriculture and navigation) are 
thought of as taking the parts of rulers of fortune and 
as bringing either weal or woe into human life. "Fetishism" 
is a branch of animism, in which the attribute of ability to 
control fate is carried over to certain objects in the environ- 
ment, such as plants, stones, works of art, especially objects 
which arouse the feelings on account of their striking char- 
acter or on account of some accidental outer circumstance. 
The phenomena of animism and fetishism are not only the 
earliest, but also the most lasting, productions of myth-- 
making apperception. They continue, even after all others 
are suppressed, in the various forms of superstitions among 
civilized peoples, such aa belief in ghosts, enchantments, 
charms, etc. 

10. After consciousness reaches a more advanced stage, 
personifying apperception begins to deal with the greater 
natural phenomena which act upon human life both through 
their changes and through their direct influence, that is, with 
the clouds, rivers, winds, and greater heavenly bodies. The 
regularity of certain natural phenomena, such as the alter- 
nation of night and day, of winter and summer, the processes 



§ 21. Development of Mental Communities. 341 

in a thunderstorm, etc., gives occasion for tlie formation of 
poetical myths, in which a series of interconnected ideas are 
woven into one united whole. In this way the nature myth 
arises. The chief difference between nature myths and the 
earlier forms of belief in spirits and demons consists in the 
fact that nature myths deal with 'personal gods. These various 
gods are given a great variety of characteristics, and are 
gradually freed from any special connection with definite 
places, times, or activities. They come to be nothing more 
nor less than anthropomorphic personalities with superhuman 
power. They are worshiped as the governors of natural 
phenomena as well as human destinies. As the result of 
this development of more comprehensive ideas of the gods, 
the demons and minor deities gradually sink into the back- 
ground, or else they are so united with the ideas of the gods 
themselves that they come to be regarded as attributes of 
the deities or as special forms in which the gods appear. 
The process of combination and fusion of these ideas and 
feelings usually goes a step further than the creation of a 
number of personal gods. Some single one of these deities^ 
at first in an irregular and doubtful way, and then much 
more permanently, becomes superior to all the others. Thus 
a strong monotheistic tendency shows itself from a very early 
period in the nature myth^ which is essentially polytheistic in 
character. On the other hand, a tendency in the opposite 
direction, namely, in the direction of breaking up the ideas of 
the gods into a great number of personalities, may result from 
a fusion of the ideas of the gods with those of the earlier 
special deities and demons. In this way there arise certain 
local deities and tribal deities. These deities can then, be- 
cause of their personal character, easily be disassociated from 
the special conditions which gave rise to them, and they 
then become the bases for the various forms of hero myths. 



342 ^^' Psychical Developments. 

Traces of historical truth get themselves grafted into these 
personal myths or hero myths, and thus the tendency to 
make the deities more and more like men, which tendency 
showed itself to some extent even in the nature myth, goes 
even further. The hero myths thus challenge the poetical 
genius of the individual to its highest efforts and these myths 
become components of popular, and then of literary poetry. 
At the same time, however, the hero myth undergoes a 
change in meaning through the fading out of some of the 
features of the single mythical figures and the appearance 
of other new features. This change, in turn, makes possible 
a progressive inner change analogous to the change in words, 
by which the change in the myth is always accompanied. 
As the process goes on, single poets and thinkers gain an 
increasing influence. 

In this way there comes about finally, a division of the 
total original content of the myths into science and rehgion. 
This division is very materially assisted by philosophy which 
in its first stages is more than half mythical in its ideas. 
The original ideas of gods and heroes now give place more 
and more to ethical ideas of deity. This transition is in 
part due to the reflex influence of philosophy on religion. 
As in the case of the nature myth, so even at the later 
stage of developed ethical religion, there are tendencies to 
lapse back into the older forms because the old motives for 
the creation of these early forms still continue. Special 
deities, demons, and spirits push themselves into the fore- 
ground of consciousness, sometimes for longer periods of 
time, sometimes merely for the passing moment. Such revived 
beliefs sometimes constitute a sort of secondary addition or 
supplement to religion itself, sometimes when positively re- 
jected by religion they continue to exist independently in 
the form of superstitions. 



§ 22. Development of Mental Communities. 343 

References. Tylor, Researches in tlie Early History of Mankind. 
Fr. Schultze, Psychologie der Naturvolker, 1900. Wundt, (English 
trans.) Ethics, Sect. 1, chap. 2. Rohde, Psyche (Beliefs of the Greeks 
in regard to the Mind and Immortality), 1894. Usener, Gotter- 
namen, 1896. 

C. CUSTOMS. 

11. Customs appear as far back as we can trace them 
in two groups which may be described by the twofold classi- 
fication into rules of individual volition, and rules of social 
conduct. The first govern the conduct of the individual in 
his occupations and in his relations with others, the second 
determine the forms of community life in the clan, family, 
state, or other social group. Both individual and social laws 
of custom are, therefore, connected with community life. 
The former relate to the conduct of the individual in the 
community, the latter relate to the members of the com- 
munity in their common activities , in the activities which 
determine the particular character of their life together. 

The individual rules of conduct which have become customs 
are generally connected in their beginnings, which are indeed 
frequently obscure, with myths in a way corresponding directly 
to that in which outer volitional acts are related to inner 
motives. Wherever we can trace the origin of such customs 
with any degree of probability, we find that they are remnants 
or modifications of certain cult forms. Thus, the funeral 
feasts and burial ceremonies of civilized peoples point to a 
primitive ancestor-worship. Numerous feasts and ceremonies 
connected with particular days^ with the change of the 
seasons, the tillage of the fields, and the gathering of the 
harvest, all point back to certain demon cults, and nature 
myths. The custom of greeting, in its various forms, betrays 
its direct derivation from the ceremonies of prayer. 

In contrast with these demands on individual practice. 



344 IV. Psychical Developments. 

there are certain necessary demands arising out of the con- 
ditions of community life, and out of the particular ways in 
which the impulses of self preservation and tribal preser- 
vation show themselves; and as a result of these necessary 
demands, there grow up social laws of custom. Thus, it was 
the surrounding conditions under which a primitive people 
lived which determined the method of making clothing and 
dwellings, the mode of preparing food, and the particular 
forms of subdividing the community. Even the changes 
which have taken place in all these respects as the people 
have slowly passed from a savage to a civilized state, have 
all taken place in response to the requirements of practical 
advantage. Especially notable illustrations of this are to be 
found in the earliest kinds of community life and in the wider 
and narrower social units that have grown out of these early 
forms. Thus, the tribe in which men everywhere lived at 
first, was divided into smaller groups or subtribes under the 
force of external conditions of life^ and because of the in- 
crease in the number of individuals in the tribe. The smaller 
groups or subtribes usually continued organized after their 
separation from each other in a general protective league 
which gave the impulse for the formation of general families 
through the intercourse of individuals of different tribes. 
From these general families in turn, there arose^ as civiliza- 
tion progressed, the single family. The tribe itself gradu- 
ally underwent a change in character during this process of 
subdivision. As the interrelations between individuals, which 
arose at first out of temporary causes, began to be reduced 
to permanent rules, the tribe passed immediately into the 
first stages of state organization by becoming a confederation 
of tribes. From this confederation arose in much later times 
political states. These are usually the results of war alli- 
ances and represent therefore the divisions natural in war. 



§ 21. Development of Mental Communities. 345 

12. With customs, as with language and myths, the 
change in meaning has exercised a modifying influence on de- 
velopment. In individual customs there arise as a result of 
this change in meaning tivo chief kinds of transformation. 
In the first, the original mythical motive is lost and no new 
meaning whatever takes its place. The custom continues 
merely as a consequence of associative hahit, but loses its 
imperative character and becomes much weaker in its out- 
ward manifestations. In the second class of transformations, 
a moraUsocial purpose takes the place of the original mytho- 
religious motive. The two kinds of change may in any single 
case be most intimately united; and even when a custom 
does not serve any particular social end directly, as is the 
case, for example^ with certain rules of deportment, of 
etiquette, on the manner of dressing, eating, etc., still, the 
custom may serve some social end indirectly in that the ex- 
istence of some common rules for the members of a com- 
munity is favorable to their united life and therefore to 
their common mental social life. 

In social customs the change is in a direction opposite 
to that seen in individual customs. Social customs usually 
retain, more than individual customs, the old significance 
along with the new they acquire. The transformation of 
social customs thus consists always in an enlargement of the 
significance so that as a rule religio- mythical motives are 
sooner or later added to the original motives which are the 
necessities of social life. Thus^ the rules of action which at 
first grew up as the result of certain necessary impulses, 
come to be regarded as commands of the gods, or they are 
rendered sacred by some kind of religious ceremonial. For 
example, the common meals, the erection of common dwell- 
ing places, agreements and confederations, declarations of 
war and treaties of peace and marriage, are all combined 



346 I^' Psychical Developments. 

with certain mythical concepts or else they arouse the myth- 
making apperception to such an extent that new deities are 
created especially for the governing of these social customs. 
Finally, it is to he noted that the mythical notions which 
have attached to social customs may in time fade out. There 
then takes place a kind of retransformation in which the 
religious element of the custom either disappears, or remains 
merely as a formality due to hahit and unsupported hy 
recognized significance. 

The psychological changes in customs just pointed out; 
constitute the preparation for their differentiation into three 
spheres, namely into the classes of pwx custom^ of law, and 
of morality. The last two are to he regarded as special 
forms of custom aiming at certain social ends. The detailed 
investigation of these processes of development and differen- 
tiation is, however, a prohlem of social psychology, and the 
discussion of the rise of law and morality belong both to 
social psychology, and to general history, and ethics. 

Eeferences. LiPPERT, Kulturgeschichte der Menschheit, 2 vols., 
1887. ViERKANDT, Naturvolker und Kulturvolker, 1896. Spencer, 
Principles of Sociology, vols. 2 and 3. v. Ihering, Der Zweck im 
Recht, vol. I, Pt. 2, 1877—1883. Wundt, (English trans.) Ethics, 
Sect. I, chap. 3. Barth, Die Philosophic der Geschichte als Sociol- 
ogie, vol. 1, 1897. 



D. GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE DEVELOPMENTS STUDIED 
IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY. 

13. Speech, myths and customs constitute a series of 
closely related subjects which are of great importance to 
general psychology for the reason that the relatively per- 
manent character of speech, myths^ and customs renders it 
relatively easy to recognize clearly through them certain 
general psychical processes, and to carry out through them 



§ 21. Development of Mental Communities. 347 

certain psychological analyses. Such recognition of general 
processes and such analyses are much easier here than in 
the case of transient compounds of individual consciousness. 
Indeed, such transient compounds require as their necessary 
conditions preliminary social developments, especially if com- 
pounds are in any way connected with language and there- 
fore dependent upon the laws of social thought which have 
been crystalized in language. Thus, it was necessary in an 
earlier paragraph, when treating of the processes of apper- 
ceptive synthesis and analysis, to call attention to the effects 
of these processes as they appear in speech (p. 290). Just 
as the psychical processes of individual consciousness show 
themselves in language as there indicated, so also in the 
case of broader social developments, the psychical processes 
which underlie the observed phenomena are most clearly 
recognizable in the attributes and modifications of the ideas 
which are expressed in speech. The accompanying processes 
of affective excitation can be inferred only indirectly through 
an examination of the total series of facts and with the aid 
of certain known conditions. 

There are certain processes which are essential in char- 
acter and are constantly reappearing on the ideational side 
in all development of language, custom and myths. "We 
may point out three such processes which are closely related 
to each other. They may be called respectively, condensa- 
tion of ideas, obscuring of ideas, and finally, corru^ption of 
ideas. Ideas become condensed when a number of ideas 
which were originally separate are, in consequence of re- 
peated and strongly affective association, so united that they 
come to be bound together in apperception in a single whole. 
But since certain elements in the course of such a process 
of condensation are more clearly apperceived because of 
their more intense affective influence, it follows that other 



348 I^- Psychical Developments. 

elements not strong, in affective tone sink into obscurity and 
may at length disappear entirely out of the complex product. 
In this way, a corruption of the ideas may finally take place 
which will give as its final stage, especially when condensa- 
tion and obscuring have been repeated several times, and 
have effected different components each time, a product which 
is entirely different from the original ideas with which the 
processes started. Condensation, obscuring and corruption 
in their various forms are what bring about all the changes 
in the meaning of words and all the transformations in 
myths and customs. When either a word, a myth, or a 
custom, has been modified, the others may be indirectly 
affected also. Thus, when a word changes, it is very easy 
for the mythological ideas connected with it to undergo a 
modification. The change in the myth may then react upon 
the word. It is possible in cases in which other conditions 
are favorable, for words to give rise directly to mythological 
ideas which put content into the word furnished by language. 
On the other hand, the existence of a myth may lead to the 
formation of a name or word to fit. 

Throughout all these general social processes, it is the idea 
which is first noticed. Psychological analysis shows, however, 
that it is after all the affective processes and the volitional 
processes which are the determining factors in the original 
formation of the ideas and in their gradual transformation. 
Thus, we can think of the original incoherent sounds which 
must be recognized as the beginnings of speech only as simple 
impulsive actions which follow directly upon the reception of 
a strongly affective impression and which serve in some way 
to communicate this impression to the listener. The communi- 
cation may be through the sound alone, or through the aid 
of added gestures (p. 333). When the development of social 
thought has once begun, the mythological ideas show beyond 



§ 21, Development of Mental Communities. 349 

a doubt traces of the influences of the feelings. Personify- 
ing apperception which shows itself in the myth differs from 
mare highly developed consciousness in one characteristic 
more than in any other. In personifying apperception the 
subject refers not merely the formal attributes and the sen- 
sation content of the percept to the object, but he refers 
also his whole affective and volitional state to the object. 
For example, a hopeful subject finds in the object before 
him a protecting spirit, while the fearful subject finds in the 
same object a demon of injury. In the processes of nature, 
the savage sees a will which corresponds to his association 
of these processes with his own actions and corresponds also 
to the effect produced on his feelings. Even the three 
processes of condensing, obscuring and corrupting of ideas 
are to be looked upon as indications of changes in the 
a:iective state of the subject. These changes in affective 
state result at first in a change in the significance of myth 
and custom and then secondarily they react upon language 
also. 

14. In mental communities and especially in their devel- 
opment of language, myths and customs, we discover, thus, 
mental interconnections and interactions which differ in es- 
sential respects from the interconnection of the psychical 
compounds in an individual consciousness. And yet these 
social interconnections have just as much reality as the in- 
dividual consciousness itself. In this sense we may speak of 
the interconnection of the ideas and feelings of a social 
community as a collective consciousness^ and of the common 
volitional tendencies as a collective tvill. In doing this we 
are not to forget that these concepts do not mean some- 
thing that exists apart from the conscious and volitional 
processes of the individual, any more than the community 
tself is. something besides the union of individuals. Sincei 



350 ^^- PsyehiGol Developments, 

the social union, however, brings forth certain mental pro- 
ducts, for which only the germs are present in the individual, 
and since this union determines the development of the in- 
dividual from a very early period, it is just as much an 
object of psychological study as is the individual conscious- 
ness. For psychology must give an account of the interactions 
v/hich give rise to the products and attributes of collective 
consciousness and of the collective will. 

14 a. The facts arising from the existence of mental com- 
munities have only recently come within the pale of psycholog- 
ical investigation. These problems were formerly referred either 
to the special mental sciences (philology, history, jurispru- 
dence, etc.) or, if of a more general character, to philosophy, 
that is, to metaphysics. If psychology did touch upon them at 
all, it was dominated, as were the special sciences, by the re- 
flective method of popular psychology, which method tends to 
treat all mental products of communities, to as great an extent 
as possible, as voluntary inventions designed from the first for 
certain utilitarian ends. This view found its chief philosophical 
expression in the doctrine of a social contract, according to 
which a mental community is not something original and natural, 
but is derived from the voluntary union of a number of in- 
dividuals. This position is psychologically untenable, and com- 
pletely helpless in the presence of the problems of social psy- 
chology. As one of its after-effects we have even to-day the 
grossest misunderstandings of the concepts collective conscious- 
ness and collective will. Instead of regarding these simply as 
expressions for the actual agreement and interaction of in- 
dividuals in a community, some continue to suspect that there 
is behind these terms a mythological being of some kind, or 
at least a metaphysical substance. That such notions are utterly 
false requires no further proof after what has been said. It 
is obvious that these notions are themselves the results of the 
unjustifiable use of the concept substance, which concept has 
so long dominated psychology and led to the identification of 
substance and reality. Furthermore, the confusion of the con- 



§ 21. Development of Mental Communities. 351 

cepts substance and reality shows clearly how close is the true 
inner relation between popular spiritualism and materialism 
although such spiritualism is openly at war with materialism 
(compare § 2, p. 7). 

References. Lazarus and Steinthal, Zeitschr. f. Volkerpsychol- 
ogie u. Sprachwissenschaft, vol. I, 1860. Wundt, Volkerpsychologie, 
vol. I, Introduction. 



V. PSYCHICAL CAUSALITY 
AND ITS LAWS. 



§ 22. CONCEPT OF MIND. 

1. Every empirical science has, as its primary subject of 
treatment, certain particular facts of experience the nature 
and reciprocal relations of which it seeks to investigate. In 
dealing with such facts it is found to be necessary, if science 
is not to give up entirely the grouping of the facts under 
leading heads, to have general supplementary concepts which 
are not contained in experience itself, but are gained by a 
process of logical treatment of experience. The most general 
supplementary concept of this kind which has found its 
place in all the empirical sciences, is the concept of causality. 
It comes from the necessity of thought which prescribes that 
all our experiences shall be arranged according to reason 
and consequent, and that we shall remove, by means of 
secondary supplementary concepts and if need be by means 
of concepts of a hypothetical character, all contradictions 
standing in the way of the establishment of a consistent 
interconnection of experience in accordance with the principle 
of reason and consequent. In this sense we may regard all 
the supplementary concepts that serve for the interpretation 
of any sphere of experience, as applications of the general 
principle of causation. These concepts are legitimate in so 
far as they are required, or at least rendered probable, by 



§ 22. Concept of Mind. 353 

the causal principle; they are unwarranted as soon as they 
prove to be arbitrary fictions resulting from foreign motives, 
and contributing nothing to the interpretation of experience. 
2. The concept matte7' is a fundamental supplementary 
concept of natural science formulated under the principle 
stated. In its most general significance matter designates 
the permanent substratum assumed as existing in universal 
space, that is, the substratum of the activities to which we 
must attribute all natural phenomena. In this most general 
sense the concept matter is indispensable to every explana- 
tion of natural science. The attempt in recent times to raise 
energy to the position of a governing principle, does not 
succeed in doing away with the concept matter, but merely 
gives it a different content. This content, however, is given 
to the concept by means of a second supplementary concept, 
which relates to the causal activity of matter. The concept 
of matter that has been accepted in natural science up to 
the present time, is based upon the mechanical physics of 
G-alileo, and uses as its secondary supplementary concept 
the concept of force^ which is defined as. the product of the 
mass and the momentary acceleration. A physics of energy 
seeks to introduce everywhere instead of this concept force, 
the concept energy., which in the special form of mechanical 
energy is defined as half the product of the mass multipHed 
by the square of the velocity. Energy, however, must, just 
as well as force, have a position in objective space, and 
under certain particular conditions the points from which 
energy proceeds may, just as well as the point from which 
force proceeds, change their place in space, so that the 
concept of matter as a substratum contained in space, is 
retained in both cases. The only difference, and it is indeed 
an important one, is that when we use the concept force, 
we presuppose the reducibility of all natural phenomena to 

WuNDT, Psychology. 2. edit. 23 



354 V. Psychical Causality and its Laws. 

forms of mechanical motion, while when we use the concept 
of energy, we attribute to matter not only the property of 
motion without a change in the form of energy, but also 
the property of the transformability of qualitatively different 
forms of energy into one another without a change in the 
quantity of the energy. 

3. The concept of mind is a supplementary concept of 
psychology, in the same way that the concept matter is a 
supplementary concept of natural science. It too is indis- 
pensable in so far as we need a concept which shall express 
in a comprehensive way the totaHty of psychical experiences 
in an individual consciousness. The content of the concept, 
however, is in this case also entirely dependent on the sec- 
ondary concepts which give a more detailed definition of 
psychical causality. In the definition of this content psy- 
chology shared at first the fortune of the natural sciences. 
Both the concept of mind and that of matter arose primarily, 
not so much from the need of explaining experience as from 
the effort to reach a fanciful doctrine of the general inter- 
connection of all things. But while the natural sciences have 
long since outgrown this mythological stage of speculative 
definition, and make use of some of the single ideas that 
originated at that time, only for the purpose of gaining def- 
inite starting points for a strict definition of their concepts, 
psychology has continued under the control of the mytho- 
logical, metaphysical concept of mind down to most modern 
times, and still rem.ains, in part at least, under its control. 
The concept mind is not used as a general supplementary 
concept which serves primarily to gather together the psychical 
facts and only secondarily to give a causal interpretation of 
them, but it is employed as a means of satisfying so far as 
possible the need of a general universal system, which system 
includes both nature and individual existence. 



§ 22. Concept of Mind. 355 

4. The concept of a mind substance in its various forms, 
is rooted in this mythological and metaphysical need. In 
the development of this concept there have not been wanting 
efforts to meet as far as possible, from the metaphysical 
position, the demand for a psychological causal explanation, 
but such efforts have in all cases been afterthoughts; and 
it is perfectly obvious that psychological experience alone, 
independent of all foreign metaphysical motives, would never 
have led to a concept of mind substance. This concept has 
beyond a doubt exercised a harmful influence on the scientific 
treatment of experience. The view, for example, that all 
the contents of psychical experience are ideas, and that 
these ideas are more or less permanent objects, would hardly 
be comprehensible without such presuppositions. That this 
concept is really foreign to psychology, is further attested by 
the close relation in which it stands to the concept of material 
substance. Mind substance is regarded either as identical 
with material substance_, or else as distinct in nature, but still 
reducible in its most general formal characteristics to one of 
the particular forms of material elements, namely to the atom. 

5. Two forms of the concept mind substance may be 
distinguished, corresponding to the two types of metaphysical 
psychology pointed out above (§2, p. 7). The one is 
materialistic and regards psychical processes as the activities 
of matter or of certain material complexes, such as the 
brain elements. The other is spiritualistic and looks upon 
psychical processes as states and changes in an unextended 
and therefore indivisible and permanent being of a specific- 
ally spiritual nature. In this case matter is thought of as 
made up of similar atoms of a lower order (monistic, or 
monadological spiritualism), or the mind atom is regarded 
as specifically different from matter proper (dualistic spirit- 
ualism) see table p. 18). 

23* 



356 ^- Psychical Causality and its Laivs. 

In both its materialistic and spiritualistic forms, the con- 
cept mind substance does nothing for the interpretation of 
psychological experience. Materialism does away with psy- 
chology entirely and puts in its place an imaginary brain 
physiology of the future, or when it tries to give positive 
theories, falls into doubtful and unreHable hypotheses of 
cerebral physiology. In thus giving up psychology in any 
proper sense, this doctrine gives up entirely the attempt to 
furnish any practical basis for the mental sciences. Spiritualism 
allows psychology as such to continue, but in such psychol- 
ogy actual experience is entirely subordinated to arbitrary 
metaphysical hypotheses, through which the unprejudiced 
observation of psychical processes is obstructed. This appears 
as a rule in the incorrect statement of the problem of psy- 
chology, with which the metaphysical theories start. Such 
theories regard inner and outer experience as totally heter- 
ogeneous, though in some external way interacting, spheres. 

6. It has been shown (§ 1, p. 3) that the phases of ex- 
perience dealt with in the natural sciences and in psychology 
are nothing but phases of one experience regarded from 
different points of view : in the natural sciences experience is 
treated as an interconnection of objective phenomena and, 
in consequence of the abstraction from the knowing subject, 
as mediate experience; in psychology experience is treated as 
immediate and underived. 

When this relation is once understood, the concept of a 
mind substance immediately gives place to the concept of the 
actuality of mind as a basis for the comprehension of psy- 
chical processes. Since the psychological treatment of ex- 
perience is supplementary to that of the natural sciences, 
in that it deals with the immediate reality of experience, 
it follows that there is no place in psychology for hypo- 
thetical supplementary concepts such as are necessary in 



§ 22. Concept of Mind. 357 

the natural sciences because of the presupposition in the 
natural sciences of an object independent of the subject. 
The concept of the actuality of mind, accordingly, does not 
require any hypothetical determinants to define its par- 
ticular contents, as does the concept of matter, but quite 
to the contrary, the concept of actuality excludes such 
hypothetical elements from the first, by defining the nature 
of mind as the immediate reality of the processes themselves. 
Still, since one important component of these processes, 
namely the totality of ideational objects, is at the same time, 
the subject of consideration in the natural sciences, it ne- 
cessarily follows that substance and actuality are concepts 
that refer to one and the same general experience, with the 
difference that in each case experience is looked at from a 
different point of view. If we abstract from the knowing 
subject in our treatment of the world of experience, that 
world appears as a manifold of interacting substances; if, 
on the contrary, we regard the world of experience as the 
total content of the experience of the subject including the 
subject itself, then the world appears as a manifold of inter- 
related occurrences. In the first case, phenomena are looked 
upon as outer phenomena^ in the sense that they would take 
place just the same, even if the knowing subject were not 
there at all, so that we may call the form of experience 
dealt with in the natural sciences outer experience. In the 
second case, on the contrary, all the contents of experience 
are regarded as belonging directly to the knowing subject, 
so that we may call the psychological attitude that of 
inner experience. In this sense outer and inner experi- 
ence are identical with mediate and immediate, or with ob- 
jective and subjective forms of experience. All these terms 
serve to designate, not different spheres of experience, but 
different supplementary points of view in the consideration 



358 V'. Psychical Causality and its Laivs. 

of an experience which is presented to us as an absolute 
unity. 

7. That the method of treating experience employed in 
natural science should have reached its maturity before that 
employed in psychology, is easily comprehensible in view of 
the practical interests connected with the discovery of regular 
natural phenomena thought of as independent of the subject. 
It was, furthermore, almost unavoidable that this priority 
of the natural sciences should, for a long time, lead to a 
confusion of the two points of view. This did really occur 
as we see by the different psychological substance concepts. 
When the reform came in the fundamental position of psy- 
chology, and the characteristics and problems of this science 
were sought, not in the specifically distinct nature of its 
sphere, but in its method of considering all the contents 
presented to us in experience in their immediate reality, un- 
modified by any hypothetical supplementary concepts — 
when this reform came it did not originate in psychology 
itself, but in the single mejital sciences. The view of mental 
processes based upon the concept of actuality, was familiar 
in these mental sciences long before it was accepted in 
psychology. This inadmissible difference between the fun- 
damental position of psychology and the mental sciences 
is what has kept psychology until the present time, from 
fulfilling its mission as a foundation for all the mental 
sciences. 

8. When the concept of actuality is adopted, one of the 
questions on which metaphysical systems of psychology have 
been long divided is immediately disposed of. This is the 
question of the relation of body and mind. So long as 
body and mind are both regarded as substances, this relation 
must remain an enigma in whatever way the two concepts of 
substance may be defined. If they are like substances, then 



§ 22. Concept of Mind. 359 

the different contents of experience as dealt witli in the 
natural sciences and in psychology can no longer be under- 
stood, and there is no alternative but to deny the indepen- 
dence of one of these forms of knowledge. If they are 
unlike substances, their connection is a continual miracle. 
If we start with the theory of the actuality of mind, we 
recognize the immediate reality of the phenomena in psy- 
chological experience. Our physiological concept of the bodily 
organism, on the other hand, is nothing but a part of this ex- 
perience, which we gain, just as we do all the other empirical 
contents of the natural sciences, by assuming the existence 
of an object independent of the knowing subject. Certain 
components of mediate experience may correspond to certain 
components of immediate experience, without there being 
any necessity for this reason of reducing the one component 
to the other or of deriving one from the other. In fact, 
such a derivation is absolutely impossible because of the 
totally different points of view adopted in the two cases. 
Still, the fact that we have here, not different objects of 
experience^ but different points of view in looking at a uni- 
tary experience, renders necessary the existence at every 
point, of relations between the two. At the same time it 
must be remembered that there is an infinite number of 
objects which can be approached only mediately, through 
the method of the natural sciences: here belong all those 
phenomena which we are not obliged to regard as physio- 
logical substrata of psychical processes. On the other hand, 
there is just as large a number of important facts which 
are presented only immediately, or in psychological experi- 
ence: these are all those contents of our subjective con- 
sciousness which do not have the character of ideational 
objects, that is, are not directly referred to external objects. 
This includes our whole world of feeling so long as this 



360 V- Psychical Causality and its Laivs. 

world is considered entirely from the point of view of its 
subjective significance. 

9. As a result of this relation, it follows that there must 
be a necessary relation between all the facts that belong at 
the same time to both kinds of experience, that is, to the 
mediate experience of the natural sciences and to the im- 
mediate experience of psychology, for these two kinds of 
experience are nothing but phases of a single experience 
which is merely regarded in the two cases from different 
points of view. Since certain facts belong to both spheres, 
there must be an elementary process on the physical side, 
corresponding to every such process on the psychical side. 
This general principle is known as the principle of psycho- 
physical parallelism. It has an empirico- psychological sig- 
nificance and is thus totally different from certain meta- 
physical principles which have sometimes been designated by 
the same name, but which have in reality an entirely dif- 
ferent meaning. These metaphysical principles are all based 
on the hypothesis of a psychical substance. They all seek 
to solve the problem of the interrelation of body and mind, 
either by assuming two real substances with attributes 
which are different, but parallel in their changes, or by as- 
suming one substance with two distinct attributes which 
correspond in their modifications. In both these cases the 
metaphysical principle of parallelism is based on the as- 
sumption that every physical process has a corresponding 
psychical process and vice versa; or it is based on the 
assumption that the mental world is a mirroring of the 
bodily world, or that the bodily world is an objective real- 
ization of the mental. This assumption is, however, en- 
tirely indemonstrable and leads in its psychological appli- 
cation to an intellectualism which is contradictory to all 
experience. The psychological principle, on the other hand, 



§ 22. Concept of Mind. 361 

as above formulated ^ starts with the assumption that there 
is only one experience, which, however, as soon as it be- 
comes the subject of scientific analysis, is, in some of its 
components, open to two different kinds of scientific treat- 
ment: to a mediate form of treatment, which investigates 
ideated objects in their objective relations to one another, 
and to an immediate form, which investigates the same 
objects in their directly known character, and in their rela- 
tions to all the other contents of the experience of the 
knowing subject. So far as there are objects to which both 
these forms of treatment are applicable, the psychological 
principle of parallelism requires relation at every point be- 
tween the processes on the two sides. This requirement is 
justified by the fact that both forms of analysis are in these 
two cases really analyses of one and the same content of 
experience. On the other hand, from the very nature of 
the case, the psychological principle of parallelism can 7iot 
apply to those contents of experience which are objects of 
natural- scientific analysis alone ^ or to those which go to 
make up the specific character of psychological experience. 
Among the latter we must include the characteristic com- 
hinations and relations of psychical elements and compounds. 
To be sure, there are combinations of physical processes 
running parallel to the psychical processes, in so far at least 
as a direct or indirect causal relation must exist between 
the physical processes the regular coexistence or succession 
of which is indicated by a psychical interconnection, but the 
characteristic content of the psychical combination can, of 
course, in no way be a part of the causal relation between 
the physical processes. Thus, for expample, the elements 
that enter into a spacial or temporal idea, stand in a regular 
relation of coexistence and succession in their physiological 
substrata; or the ideational elements that make up a process 



362 V- Psychical Causality and its Laios. 

in which psychical contents are related or compared, have 
corresponding combinations of physiological excitation of 
some kind or other, which are repeated whenever these 
psychical processes take place. But the physiological proc- 
esses can not contain anything of that which goes to form 
the specific nature of spacial and temporal ideas, or anything 
of that which goes to form the relating and comparing 
processes, because natural science purposely abstracts from 
all that is here concerned. Then, too, there are two con- 
cepts that result from the psychical combinations, which, 
together with their related affective elements, lie entirely 
outside the sphere of experience to which the principle of 
parallelism applies. These are the concepts of value and 
end. The forms of combination which we see in processes 
of fusion or in associative and apperceptive processes, as well 
as the values that they possess in the whole interconnection 
of psychical development, can only be understood through 
psychological analysis, in the same way that objective phe- 
nomena, such as those of weight, sound, light, heat, etc., or 
the processes of the nervous system, can be approached only 
through physical and physiological analysis, that is, through 
analysis which makes use of the supplementary substance- 
concepts of natural science. 

10. Thus, the principle of psycho-physical parallelism in 
the incontrovertible empirico-jpsychological significance above 
attributed to it, leads necessarily to the recognition of an 
independent psychical causality^ which is related at all points 
to physical causality and can never come into contradiction 
with it, but is just as different from this physical causality 
as the point of view adopted in psychology, or that of im- 
mediate, subjective experience, is different from the point of 
view taken in the natural sciences, or that of mediate, ob- 
jective experience due to abstraction. And just as the nature 



§ 22. Concept of Mind. 363 

of physical causality can be revealed to us only in the fun- 
damental laivs of nature., so the only way in which we can 
account for the characteristics of psychical causality is to 
abstract certain fundamental laivs of psychical phenomena 
from the totality of psychical processes. We may distinguish 
tivo classes of such laws. The laws of one class show them- 
selves primarily in the processes which condition the rise 
and immediate interaction of the psychical compounds; we 
call these the psychological laivs of relation. Those of the 
the second class are derived laws. They consist in the 
complex effects which are produced by combinations of the 
laws of relation within more extensive series of psychical 
facts; these we call the psychological laivs of development. 
In order to understand the real value of these laws one 
must bear in mind the fact that their significance depends, 
just as does the significance of natural-scientific laws, not 
on their mere abstract form, but on the degree in which 
they can be applied to particular cases. Thus, the principle 
of inertia would seem to be, if considered merely in its 
abstract form, a hazy proposition. Its value comes out only 
in particular mechanical and physical applications. 

Eeferences. Yolkmann, Lehrbucli der Psycliologie, vol. I, Sect. 1. 
(This presents the substance concept of the Herbartian School, to- 
gether with an historical review of the development of this concept.) 
LoTZE, Medicin. Psychol., chap. 1. (This presents a substance concept 
which shows some tendencies toward the theory of actuality.) Theory 
of Actuality: Paulsen, (English trans.) Introduction to Philosophy. 
WuNDT, Ueber psychische Causalitat und das Princip des psycho- 
physischen Parallelismus , Philos. Studien, vol. 10, and Ueber die 
Definition der Psycbologie, Philos. Studien, vol. 12, and Grundziige 
der phys. Psych., vol. II, chaps. 23 and 24, and Lectures on Hum. 
and Anim. Psych., lecture 30. 



364 V. Psyehical Causality and its Laivs. 



§ 23. PSYCHOLOaiCAL LAWS OF RELATION. 

1. There are three general psychological laws of relation. 
We designate them as the laws of psychical resultants^ of 
^psychical relations^ and of psychical contrasts. 

2. The law of psychical resultants finds its expression in 
the fact that every psychical compound shows attributes 
which may indeed be understood from the attributes of its 
elements after these elements have once been presented, but 
which are by no means to be looked upon as the mere sum 
of the attributes of these elements. A compound clang is 
more in its ideational and affective attributes than merely a 
sum of single tones. In spacial and temporal ideas the 
spacial and temporal arrangement is conditioned, to be sure, 
in a perfectly regular way by the combination of elements 
which make up the idea, but still the arrangement itself can 
by no means be regarded as a property of the sensational 
elements themselves. The nativistic theories that assume this, 
implicate themselves in contradictions that cannot be solved ; 
and besides, in so far as they admit subsequent changes in 
the original space perceptions and time perceptions, they 
are ultimately driven to the assumption of the rise, to some 
extent at least, of new attributes. Finally, in the apper- 
ceptive functions and in the activities of imagination and 
understanding, this law finds expression in a clearly rec- 
ognized form. ISTot only do the elements united by apper- 
ceptive synthesis gain, in the aggregate idea which results 
from their combination, a new significance which they did 
not have in their isolated state, but what is of still greater 
importance, the aggregate idea itself is a new psychical 
content made possible, to be sure, by the elements, but by 
no means contained in these elements. This appears most 



§ 23. Psychological Laivs of Relation. 365 

strikingly in the more complex productions of apperceptive 
synthesis, as, for example, in a work of art or a train of 
logical thought. 

3. The law of psychical resultants thus expresses a prin- 
ciple which we may designate, in view of its results, as the 
principle of creative synthesis. This principle has long been 
recognized in the case of higher mental creations, but it has 
not been generally applied to the other psychical processes. 
In fact, through an unjustifiable confusion with the laws of 
physical causality, it has even been completely reversed. A 
similar confusion is responsible for the notion that there is 
a contradiction between the principle of creative synthesis 
in the mental world and the general laws of the natural 
world, especially the law of the conservation of energy. 
Such a contradiction is impossible from the outset because 
the points of view of judgment, and therefore of measure- 
ments wherever such are made, are different in the two 
cases, and must be different, since natural science and psy- 
chology deal, not with different contents of experience, but 
with one and the same content viewed from different sides 
(§ 1, p. 3). Physical measurements have to do with objective 
masses., forces^ and energies. These are supplementary con- 
cepts which we are obliged to use in judging objective ex- 
perience; and their general laws, derived as they are from 
experience, must not be contradicted by any single case of 
experience. Psychical measurements, which are concerned 
with the comparison of psychical components and their re- 
sultants, have to do with subjective values and ends. The 
subjective value of the psychical combination may be greater 
than the value of its components; its purpose may be dif- 
ferent and higher than theirs, without any change in the 
masses, forces, and energies concerned. The muscular move- 
ments of an external voKtional act, the physical processes 



366 V- Psychical Causality and its Latvs. 

which accompany sense perception, association, and apper- 
ception, all follow invariably the principle of the conser- 
vation of energy. But the mental values and ends which 
these energies represent may be very different in quan- 
tity even while the quantity of these energies remains the 
same. 

4. The differences pointed out show that physical measure- 
ment deals with quantitative values, that is, with quantities 
that admit of a variation in value only in the one relation 
of the quantity of the phenomena measured. Psychical 
measurement, on the other hand, deals in the last instance 
in every case with qualitative values^ that is, values that vary 
in degree only in respect to their quahtative character. The 
ability to produce purely quantitative effects, which we des- 
ignate as physical energy is, accordingly, to be clearly dis- 
tinguished from the ability to produce qualitative effects, or 
the ability to produce values, which we designate as psychical 
energy. 

On this basis we can not only reconcile the increase of 
psychical energy with the constancy of psychical energy as 
accepted in the natural sciences, but we find also in the two 
facts reciprocally supplementary standards for the judgment 
of our total experience. The increase of psychical energy 
is not seen in its right light until it is recognized as the 
reserve, subjective side of physical constancy. The increase 
of psychical energy, being as it is indefinite, since the standard 
may be very different under different conditions, holds only 
under the conditioii that the psychical processes are continuous. 
As the psychological correlate of this increase we have the 
fact which forces itself upon us in experience, that psychical 
values disappear. 

5. The laiv of psychical relations supplements the law of 
resultants ; it refers not to the relation of the components of 



§ 23. Psychological Latos of Relation. 367 

a psychical interconnectioii to the value of the whole^ but 
rather to the reciprocal relations of the psychical components 
within a compound. The law of resultants thus holds for 
the synthetic processes of consciousness, the law of relations 
for the analytic. Every resolution of a conscious content 
into its single members is an act of relating analysis. Such 
a resolution takes place in the successive apperception of 
the parts of a whole which whole is ideated at first only in 
a general way, a process which is to be seen in sense per- 
eptions and associations, and in clearly recognized form in 
the division of aggregate ideas. In the same way, every 
apperception is an analytic process the two phases of which 
are the emphasizing of a single content, and the marking 
off of this one content from all others. The first of these 
two partial processes is what produces clearness^ the second 
is what produces distinctness of apperception (p. 228, 4). The 
most complete expression of this law is to be found in the 
processes of apperceptive analysis and in the simple relating 
and comparing functions upon which such analysis is based 
(p. 278 and 292). In comparison more especially, we see 
the essential import of the law of relations in the prin- 
ciple that every single psychical content receives its sig- 
nificance from the relations in which it stands to other 
psychical contents. When these relations are quantitative^ 
this principle takes the form of a principle of relative quan- 
titative comparison such as is expressed in Weber's laiv 
(p. 283). 

6. The third law, the law of psychical contrasts is, in 
turn^ supplementary to the law of relations. It refers, like 
the law of relations, to the relations of psychical contents 
to one another. It is itself based on the fundamental di- 
vision of the immediate contents of experience into objective- 
and subjective components, a division which is due to the 



368 1^' Psychical Causality and its Laws. 

very conditions of' psychical development. Under subjective 
components are included all the elements and combinations 
of elements which^ like the feelings and emotions, are essential 
constituents of volitional processes. These subjective com- 
ponents are all arranged in groups made up of opposite 
qualities corresponding to the chief affective dimensions of 
pleasurable and unpleasurable feelings, exciting and depress- 
ing feelings, and straining and relaxing feelings (p. 92). 
These opposites obey in their succession the general law 
of intensification through conti^ast. In its concrete appli- 
cation, this law is always determined in part by special 
temporal conditions, for every subjective state requires a 
certain period for its development; and if, when it has once 
reached its maximum, it continues for a long time, it loses 
its abihty to arouse the contrast effect. This fact is con- 
nected with another fact, namely that there is a certain 
medium, though greatly varying, rate of psychical proc- 
esses most favorable for the intensity of all feehngs and 
emotions. 

This law of contrast has its origin in the attributes of 
the subjective contents of experience, but is secondarily 
applied also to ideas and their elements, for ideas are always 
accompanied by more or less emphatic feelings due either 
to the ideational content or to the character of the spacial 
and temporal combinations involved. Thus the principle 
of intensification through contrast finds its broader appli- 
cation most clearly in the case of certain sensations, such 
as those of sight, and in the case of spacial and temporal 
ideas. 

7. The law of contrast stands in close relation to the 
two preceding laws. On the one hand, it may be regarded 
as the application of the general law of relations to the 
special case in which the related psychical contents range 



§ 24. Psychological Laivs of Development. 369 

between opposites. On the other hand, the fact that under 
suitable circumstances antithetical psychical processes may 
intensify each other, while falling under the law of contrast, 
is at the same time a special application of the principle of 
creative synthesis. 

References. Wundt, Ueber psychische Causalitat, Philos. Studien, 
vol. 10, and Logik, vol. II, Pt. 2, Sect. 4, chap. 2, § 4, and System 
der Philosophie, 2nd. ed., Sect. 6. 



§ 24. PSYCHOLOGICAL LAWS OF DEVELOPMENT. 

1. "We have as many psychological laws of development 
as we had laws of relation, and the former may be regarded 
as the application of the latter to more comprehensive psy- 
chical interconnections. We designate the laws of develop- 
ment as laws first of mental growth., second of heterogony of 
e7ids, and third of development toward opposites. 

2. The law of mental growth is as little applicable to 
all contents of psychical experience as is any other psycholog- 
ical law of development. It holds only under the limiting 
condition which appHes to the law of resultants, the appli- 
cation of which it is, namely the condition of the con- 
tinuity of the processes (p. 366). But since the circumstances 
that tend to prevent the reahzation of this condition, are, 
of course, much more frequent when the mental develop- 
ments concerned include a greater number of psychical 
syntheses, than in the case of the single syntheses themselves, 
it foUows that the law of mental growth can be demonstrated 
only for certain developments taking place under normal 
conditions, and even here only within certain hmits. Within 
these Hmits, however, the more comprehensive developments, 
as, for example, the mental development of the normal in- 
dividual and the development of mental communities, are 

Wundt, Psychology. 2. edit. 24 



370 v. Psychical Causality and its Laws. 

obviously tlie best exemplifications of the fundamental law 
of resultants, wbicli law lies at the basis of this devel- 
opment. 

3. The law of hete7vgony of ends is most closely con- 
nected with the law of relations, but it is also based on the 
law of resultants, which latter is always to be taken into 
consideration when dealing with the larger interconnections 
of psychical development. In fact, we may regard this law 
of heterogony of ends as a principle of development which- 
controls the changes arising, as results of successive creative 
syntheses, in the relations between the single partial contents 
of psychical compounds. The resultants arising from united 
psychical processes include contents which were not present 
in the components, and these new contents may in turn 
enter into relation with the old components, thus changing 
again the relations between these old components and con- 
sequently changing the new resultants which arise. This 
principle of continually changing relations is most strikingly 
illustrated when an idea of ends is formed on the basis of 
the given relations. In such cases the relation of the single 
factors to one another is regarded as an interconnection of 
means, which interconnection has for its end the product aris- 
ing from the interconnection. The relation between the actual 
effects in such a case and the ideated ends, is such that sec- 
ondary effects always arise which were not thought of in the 
first ideas of end. These new effects enter into new series 
of motives, and thus modify the earlier ends or add new ends 
to the earlier ones. 

The principle of heterogony of ends in its broadest sense 
dominates all psychical processes. In the special teleological 
coloring which has given it its name, however, it is to be 
found primarily in the sphere of volitional processes^ for here 
the ideas of end together with their affective motives are 



§ 24. Psychological Laivs of Development. 371 

of the chief importance. Of the various spheres of applied 
psychology, it is therefore especially ethics for which this 
law is of great importance. 

4. The law of development towm^ds opposites is an appli- 
cation of the law of intensification through contrast, to more 
comprehensive interconnections which form in themselves series 
of developments. In such series of developments there is a 
constant play of contrasting feelings in accordance with the 
fundamental law of contrasts. First, certain feelings and 
impulses of small intensity begin to arise. Through contrast 
with the predominating feelings this rising group increases 
in intensity until finally it gains the complete ascendency. 
This ascendency is retained for a time and then from this 
point on the same alternation may be once or even several 
times repeated. But generally the principles of mental growth 
and heterogony of ends operate in the case of such an os- 
cillation, so that succeeding phases though they are like cor- 
responding antecedent phases in their general affective direc- 
tion, yet differ essentially in their special components. 

The law of development towards opposites shows itself 
in the mental development of the individual, partly in a 
purely individual way within shorter periods of time, and 
partly in certain universal regularities in the relation of 
various periods of life. It has long been recognized that 
the predominating temperaments of different periods of life 
present certain contrasts. Thus, the light, sanguine ex- 
citability of childhood, which is seldom more than super- 
ficial, is followed by the slower but more retentive tempera- 
ment of youth with its frequent touch of melancholy. Then 
comes manhood with its mature character, generally quick 
and active in decision and execution, and last of all, old 
age with its leaning toward contemplative quiet. Even more 
than in the individual does this principle of antithesis find 

24* 



372 V. Psychical Causality and its Laws. 

expression in the alternation of mental tendencies whicli appear 
in social and historical life, and in the reactions of these 
mental tendencies on civilization and customs and on social 
and political development. As the principle of heterogony 
of ends applied chiefly to the domain of moral life, so this 
principle of development tov^ards opposites finds its chief 
significance in the more general sphere of historical life. 

References. Compare § 23, page 369. 



GLOSSARY, 



Accord 


chord. 


Affect 


emotion. 


angeboren 


connate. 


Anschaulich 


perceptual (p. 5). 


Anschaung 


perception. 


Raum- 


space p. 


Zeit- 


time p. 


Apperception 


apperception. 


-function 


apperceptive function. 


personificirende 


personifying. 


-verbindung 


apperceptive combination. 


Assimilation 


assimilation. 


Association 


association. 


Aehnlichkeits- 


by similarity. 


Beriilirungs- 


by contiguity. 


Gleicbheits- 


by identity. 


reibweise 


serial. 


Auffassung 


perception, apperception (see Per- 


. 


ception], or looser forms of 




expression as view, recogni- 




tion, etc. 


Aufmerksamkeit 


attention. 


Aufrechtsehen 


erect vision. 


Bedingung 


condition. 


Begleiterscheinung 


concomit.a,Tit or accompanying 




phenomenon. 


Begriff 


concept, (sometimes in looser 




sense) definition. 


Actualitats- der Seele 


concept of the actuality of mind. 


AUgemein- 


general c. 


Hulfs- 


supplementary c. 



374 



Glossary. 



Begriff Werth- 

Zweck- 
begrifflich. 
Beobaclitung 

Selbst- 
Beweggrund 
Bewegung 

Ausdrucks- 

mimische 

pantomimische 
Bewusstsein 

Gesammt- 

Selbst- 
Beziehung 



c. of value. 

c. of end. 

conceptual. 

observation. 

introspection. 

reason for action. 

movement. 

expressive m. 

mimetic m. 

pantomimetic m. 

consciousness. 

collective c. 

self-c. 

relation. 



Complication 
Contrast 

Farben- 

Licbt- 

Rand- 



complication. 
contrast, 
color c. 
ligbt c. 
marginal c. 



Dauer 

Nach- 
Deutlicbkeit 
Doppelbilder 
Druck 

-punkt 



duration. 

persistence. 

distinctness. 

double images. 

pressure. 

p. -spot. 



Eigenschaft 

Eindtuck 

Elemente 

Empfindlichkeit 

Empfindung 

Druck- 

Farben- 

farblose 

Helligkeits- 

Geruchs- 

Geschmacks- 

Haupt- 

Haut- 

Kalte- 



attribute or property. 

impression. 

elements. 

sensitivity. 

sensation. 

s. of pressure or pressure s. 

color s. or s. of chromatic ligbt. 

acbromatic s. or s. of achromatic 

light. 
s. of brightness. 
s. of smell. 
s. of taste, 
principal s. 
cutaneous s. 
s. of cold. 



375 



Empfindung Licht- 

Schall- 

Sclimerz- 

Ton- 

Warme- 
Entscheidung 
EnscMiessung 
Entstehung 
Entwickelung 

regressive 
Erfalirung 

mittelbare 

unmittelbare 
Erinnerungsbild 
Erinnerungsvorgang 
Erkennung 



light s. or s. of light. 

s. of sound or sound ! 

pain s. or s. of pain. 

tonal s. or tone s. 

s. of heat. 

resolution. 

decision. 

rise. 

development. 

retrogradation. 

experience. 

mediate. 

immediate. 

memory image. 

memory process. 

cognition. 



Farben 

Erganzungs- 

-ton 

Gegen- 

Grund- 
Fixationslinie 
Fixationspunkt 



colors. 

complementary c. 

c. tone. 

opposite c. 

fundamental c. 

line of fixation. 

fixation-point or point of fixation. 



Oebilde 
Gedachtniss 
Gefallen 
Gefiihle 

allmahlich ansteigend( 

Anfangs- 

Begiffs- 

Bekanntheits- 

beruhigende 

Contrast- 

deprimirende 

End- 

Erinnerungs- 

Erkennungs- 

Erleiden (G. des) 

excitirende 

Form- 

-ton 



compound. 

memory. 

agreeable feeling. 

feelings. 

gradually arising. 

inceptive f. 

conceptual f. 

f. of familiarity. 

quieting f. 

contrast f. 

depressing f. 

terminal f. 

f. of remembering. 

f. of cognition. 

f. of passive receptivity. 

exciting f. 

f. of form. 

aflFective tone. 



376 



Gefiihle Gemein- 




common f. 


losende 




relaxing f. 


Lust- 




pleasurable f. 


rhythmisclie 




f. of rhytbm. 


sinnliclie 




sense-f. 


spannende 




straining f. 


Thatigkeits- 




f. of activity. 


Total- 




total f. 


Unlust- 




unpleasurable f. 


zusammengesetzte 




composite f. 


Geisteserzeugniss 




mental product. 


Geisteswissenscliaft 




mental science. 


geistig 




mental. 


Gemeinschaft 




community. 


Gemiitlisbewegung 




affective process. 


Gemiithslage oder 


Gemiithszu- 


affective state. 


stand 






Gerausch 




noise. 


Geschelien 




phenomena. 


Gesetz 




law. 


Beziehungs- 




1. of relation. 


G. d. Contraste 




1. of contrasts. 


G. d. Relatione!! 




1. of relations. 


G. d. Resultante 




1. of. resultants. 


G. d. Entwicklung 


in Gegen- 


1. of development towE 


satzen 




posites. 


G. d. Heterogonie der Zwecke 


1. of beterogony of ends, 


G. d. geistigen Wachstliums 


1. of mental growth. 


Gesichtswinkel 




visual angle. 


Grossenbestimmung 




measurement. 


Handlung 




act, action. 


Helligkeit 




brightness. 


Hemmung 




inhibition. 


Illusion 




illusion. 


pbantastische 




i. of fancy. 


Indifferenzzone 




indifference-zone. 


Inhalt 




content. 


Klang 




clang. 


Einzel- 




single cl. 


-farbe 




clang-color. 



op- 



Glossary. 



311 



Klang Zusammen- 


compound cl. 


Klarheit 


clearness. 


Localisationscliarfe 


keenness of localization. 


Localzeichen 


local signs. 


Methode 


method. 


AbzaUungs- 


calculation m. 


Ausdrucks- 


expression m. 


Eindrucks- 


impression m. 


Einstellungs- 


adjustment m. 


der Minimalanderung 


m. of minimal changes. 


d. minimalen Unterschiede 


m. of minimal differences. 


d. mittleren FeMer 


of average error. 


Missfallen 


disagreeable feeling. 


Ifaclibild 


after image. 


Nahrungsinstinct 


alimentive instinct. 


Orientation 


orientation, or location in rela- 




tion to. 


■linie 


line of orientation. 


-punkt 


point of orientation. 


Perception 


apprehension. 


Phantasie 


imagination. 


Punkt 


point or spot. 


Druck- 


pressure-sp. 


Kalte- 


cold-sp. 


Warme- 


heat-sp. 


Raum 


space. 


Reaction 


reaction. 


zusammengesetzte 


compound r. 


RecM 


law. 


Reiz 


stimulus. 


Richtung 


direction, or (figuratively) theory, 




form of. 


Sattigung 


saturation. 


Schema 


scheme. 


Schmerz 


pain. 


Schopferische Synthese 


creative synthesis. 



378 



Glossary. 



Schwebungen 
Schwelle 

Raum- 

Reiz- 
Seele 
Sehfeld 
Sells cMrfe 
Sinn 
Sitte 
Spraclie 

Geberden 

Laut- 
Suggestion 
System 

gleiclaformiges 

mannigfaltiges 



beats. 

threshold. 

space t. 

stimulus t. 

mind. 

field of vision. 

keenness of vision. 

sense. 

custom, 

speech or language. 

gesture 1. 

articulate 1. 

suggestion, 

system. 

homogeneous s. 

complex s. 



Tiefe 
Tone 

Differenz- 

Grund- 

Ober- 

Stoss- 
Tonempfindung 
Tonhohe 

-linie 

-scala 

-stosse 
Trieb 

-feder 

-handlung 

Spiel- 



depth or third dimension. 

tones. 

difference-t, 

fundamental t, 

overtones. 

beat t. 

tonal sensation or sensation of t. 

pitch. 

tonal line. 

tonal scale. 

tonal beats. 

impulse. 

impelling feeling. 

impulsive act. 

play impulse. 



Umfang 
Urtheil 



scope, 
judgment. 



Verbindung 

Vergleichung 

Verbal tniss 

Verschmelzung 

Verstand 

Volkerpsychologie 

Vorgang 



combination. 

comparison. 

relation or proportion. 

fusion. 

understanding. 

social psychology. 

process. 



379 



Vorstellung 


idea. 


Gelior- 


auditory i. 


Gesammt- 


aggregate i. i) 


Gesichts- 


visual i. 


raumliche 


spacial i. 


Raum- 


space i. 


zeitliche 


temporal i. 


Zeit- 


time i. 


Wahrnehmung 


sense-perception. 


Wesen 


nature. 


Wiedererkennung 


recognition. 


sinnliclae 


sensible r. 


Wille 


will. 


Gesammt- 


collective w. 


Wahl- (z. B. Vorgang) 


selective (process), 


Willens- ( „ „ ) 


volitional (p.) 


WiUkur- ( „ „ ) 


voluntary (p.) 


Zeitarten 


temporal modes. 


Zeitstufen 


t. stages. 


Zeitzeichen 


t. signs. 


Zusammenlaang 


interconnection. 


Zustande 


states. 


Zweckmassig 


purposive. 



1) For this translation I am indebted to Prof. Titcbener. 







INDEX. 




page 


page 


A. 




Aesthetics .... 30 


Abnormalities 




Affective dimen- 


apperception . 


302 


sions 94 


association . . 


302 


- processes 102, 174 


consciousness . 


301 


- states, unity of 184 


elements of con- 




- tone 85 


sciousness . . 


298 


After-images. . . 77 


feelings .... 


300 


Aggregate ideas . 291 


ideational com- 




discursive divi- 


pounds .... 


299 


sion of. . . .295 


volitions . . . 


300 


Agreement, per- 


Abstract thought 


336 


ception of 280, 294 


Abstraction, psy- 




Alkaline sensations 60 


chical ... 15, 32 


Allen 71 


Accentuation . . 


166 


Alphabet, blind- . 19 


Accomodation, 




Anaesthesia . . . 298 


movements of. 


153 


Analysis, function 


Achromatic light 




of 277 


seijsations . . 


62 


- psychological 32 


Acquired charac- 




Angle of vision . 130 


teristics . . . 


314 


Animal 


Acts 




marriage . . . 311 


impulsive . . . 


205 


psychology . . 30 


selective . . . 


206 


psychoses . . . 308 


voluntary . . . 


206 


states 311 


Activity 




Animism .... 340 


feeling of . 207, 


238 


Aphasia 225 


mental .... 


30 


Apperception 229, 276 


subjects of psy- 




abnormalities . 302 


chology . . . 


17 


active 238 


Actuality, concept 




animals .... 309 


of 


356 


centre 226 



page 

Apperception child 319 
complex func- 
tions of . . . 290 
myth-making . 339 
passive .... 238 
personifying . . 338 
synthesis . . . 290 
volition .... 242 
Apprehension . . 229 
Aristotle ... 18, 245 
Arousing feeling. 92 
Articulations . . 110 
- development of 334 
Assimilations . . 251 
auditory. . . . 252 
intensive feel- 
ings 252 

spacial ideas . 253 

visual 254 

Associations . . . 245 
abnormalities . 302 

child 319 

contiguity. 246, 270 
contrast .... 270 
of ideas .... 14 
laws of .... 246 
mediate .... 263 

serial 261 

similarity . 246, 270 
simultaneous . 248 
successive. 260, 248 
theory of . . . 14 



Index. 



381 



page 


page 


page 


Asthenic emotions 191 


Causality psychical 31 


Color system, re- 


Atom 355 


Chemical senses 46, 76 


presentations of 66, 


Attention . . 229,296 


Child 


75 


child 319 


development. . 316 


theories .... 81 


scope of. . . . 231 


psychology. 30, 329 


-tone 65 


volition .... 239 


mistakes of . 329 


triangle .... 75 


voluntary . . . 240 


Choice . . . 206, 219 


Combinations 


Auditory nerve, as 


Chromatic light 


apperceptive. . 296 


receiving organ 45,65 


sensations . . 62 


demonstration of 29 


Automatic move- 


Chronometric ap- 


intensive affec- 


ment 211 


paratus .... 220 


tive 174 




Civilization, 


laws of ... . 29 


B. 


growth of . . 344 


Combination-tones 108 


Basalar membrane 44, 


Clang 105 


Comfort, sensible 176 


57 


color 105 


Communities, 


Beats ...... 109 


compound . . . 107 


mental .... 331 


- tonal .... 109 


single 105 


Community ... 27 


Berkeley .... 19 


Clearness .... 228 


- customs . . . 344 


Bitter sensations. 60 


comparison . • 281 


Comparing func- 


Black 62 


Cochlea. ... 44, 55 


tion. . . . 277, 279 


Blind-alphabet. . 119 


Cognition 


Complementary 


Blindness, tactual 


feeling of . . . 265 


colors . . . 74,80 


space in . . . 118 


sensible. . 261, 264 


Complete reac- 


Blind spot. ... 140 


Cold, sensations of 52 


tions 217 


Body, position of 125 


Cold-spots .... 54 


Complications 248, 268 


relation to 


Collective conscious- 


Compounds psy- 


mind 358 


ness 349 


chical . 29,31,100 


Braille 119 


- will 349 


analysis of . . 101 


Brentano .... 20 


Color 


classification. . 102 


Brightness. ... 66 


-blindness ... 80 


extensive . . . 102 


chromatic ... 68 


circle . . . . 64, 75 


intensive . . . 102 


color 65 


complementary 74 


various degrees 


pure 63 


contrast .... 78 


of 30 




fundamental 


Concepts .... 296 


C, 


qualities ... 70 


child 329 


Cardiac innerva- 


induction ... 78 


classes of . . . 296 


tions 98 


mixing . . . 70,79 


general .... 296 


Catalepsy, hy- 


names 71 


hypothetical in 


pnotic .... 304 


opposite. ... 64 


science .... 5 


Causality 


principal ... 70 


scientific ... 352 


concept .... 352 


saturation ... 65 


supplementary . 362 


laws of ... . 31 


sensations ... 63 


Conceptual ... 6 



382 



Index. 



page 

Condensation of 
ideas 347 

Cones, retinal . . 83 

Consciousness 
abnormalities . 301 
collective . . . 349 
defined .... 223 
field of .... 236 
fixation-point . 229 
grades of . . . 227 
physiological 
conditions . . 224 
processes classi- 
fied 244 

scope of . 231, 234 

-self 242 

threshold ... 229 

Consonants . . . 110 

Content, objective 3, 17 

Content of imme- 
diate experience 17 

Content of mediate 
experience . . 17 

Contiguity 
association . . 246 
combinations . 269 

Contrast 288 

affective. ... 289 
association by . 246 

color 78 

-feeling .... 177 
marginal ... 79 
psychical . . . 367 

Convergence, opt- 
ical 135 

Coordination of 
eyes, child's . 318 

Corruption of ideas 347 

Cortex and con- 
sciousness . . 225 

Corti, arches of . 44 

Cortical centres . 225 



Creative synthesis 365 


Customs .... 


. 343 


meaning of 


. 344 


laws of. . . 


27, 333 


religious char- 


acter of . 


. 345 


D. 




Dance .... 


. 162 


Darwin . . . 


. 307 


Decision . . 


. 207 


Deduction . . 


. 297 


Democrates . 


. 19 


Depression . 


. 300 


Descartes . . . 


19, 313 


Development 




animals . . 


. . 309 


auditory organ. 44 


child . . . 


. . 316 


community 


. . 331 


laws of . . 


. 369 


senses . . . 


. . 43 


speech . . 


. . 333 


words . . . 


. . 335 


Developments, 




psychical . 


. 30,31 


Diderot . . . 


. . 19 


Difference thresh- 


old ... . 


. . 283 


Difference-tone 


s . 108 


Differences ma- 


ximal . . 


. . 37 


Dimensions, three 


of space . 


. . 114 


- of systems 


of 


quality . . 


. . 36 


Disagreements, per- 


ception of 280, 294 


Discomfort, sen- 


sible . . . 


. . 176 


Discord . . . 


. . 184 


Disparate qualities 39 



page 

Dispositions, psy- 
chical 228 

Dissonance, pure. 109 
Distance, absolute 

visual .... 145 
Distance-sense of 

blind 124 

Distinctness . . . 228 
Dizziness .... 125 
Double images. . 149 
Doubt, feeling of. 207 

Dreams 303 

Dualism . . 7,19,355 

E. 

Ear 44 

Ego 242 

Elementary, defi- 
nition of . . . 33 
Elementary proc- 
esses in associa- 
tion 247 

Elements 
abnormalities . 298 
affective .... 33 
child's mind . . 316 
predominating 
in fusion . . . 104 
psychical . . 32, 101 
reproduced 257,260 
sensational . 32, 37 
unconscious . . 227 
Emotions .... 186 
abnormalities . 300 
asthenic .... 191 
classification. . 195 
expressive mo- 
vements ... 1^^ 
formal attributes 193 
gradually rising 199 
history of 
theories of . . 192 



Index. 



383 



Emotions incep- 
tive feelings in 188 
intensification 
through, sense- 
feelings . . . 191 
intensity. . . . 198 
intermittent . . 199 
irruptive . . . 198 
mode of occur- 
rence 198 

names 197 

objective . . . 197 
physical condi- 
tions . . . 188, 193 
pulse . . . . .190 
quality .... 199 
respiration. . . 190 
rhythm and . . 183 
sthenic .... 191 

strong 198 

subjective . . . 197 
termin al f e elings 

in 188 

weak 198 

Empirical sciences 6 
Empiristic theory 125 
End-organs ... 43 
Ends, subjective . 365 
Energy 

concept .... 353 

physical .... 366 

psychical . . . 366 
Ethical ideas, 

origin of . . . 342 
Ethics. ..... 30 

Etiquette .... 345 

Exaltation. ... 300 

Experience 
immediate 3, 15, 16, 
356 

inner 1, 16 

mediate 3, 15, 16, 356 



Experience objects 

of 3 

outer 2, 8 

Experiment ... 23 
in psychology . 26 
Expression method 96 
Expressive move- 
ments .... 212 
classification of 189 
Extensive com- 
pounds .... 102 



Factors in fusions 249 

- objective . . 16 

- subjective . . 16 
Faculties .... 19 
Faculty -psychol- 
ogy 12 

Familiarity, feel- 
ing of ... . 262 
Fancy, illusions of 299 

Fechner 285 

Fechner's law . . 286 
Feeling 
activity .... 207 
aesthetic . . . 179 
affective series. 91 
agreeable . . . 179 
arousing. ... 92 
child's .... 317 

clang 181 

cognition . . . 265 

color 181 

common .... 176 
component . . 175 
composite . . . 173 
conceptual. . . 296 
conditions for 
rise of .... 180 
contrast of . . 289 
decision .... 207 



Feeling depressing 92 



disagreeable . . 


179 


doubt .... 


207 


effects on myths 


339 


ego 


242 


exciting .... 


92 


expectation . . 


161 


extensive . . . 


180 


familiarity . . . 


262 


form 


182 


fusions of . . . 


252 


impelling . . 


204 


inceptive . . 


188 


indifference- 




zone . . . .89,90 


influence on ap 




perception . 


237 


intensive . . 


180 


interlacing of 


175 


maximal . . . 


35 


minimal . . . 


35 


names of . . 


90 


partial . . . 


175 


physiological 




processes . . { 


)5,97 


pleasurable . 3^ 


), 92, 




177 


qualities . . . 


92 


receptivity . 


237 


relation to sen 




sations . . . ^ 


H,87 


relaxation . . 


92 


remembering 


269 


resolution . . 


207 


resultant . . 


175 


rhythm . . . 


182 


simple. . . . c 


53,84 


smell .... 


178 


sources of . . 


. 40 


strain .... 


. 92 


subduing . . 


92 


systems of. . 


39 



384 



Index. 



reeling taste . . 178 

term 40 

terminal. . . . 188 
tickling .... 177 
total .... 84, 175 
unpleasurable92, 177 
Fetishism .... 340 
Field of conscious- 
ness 236 

Field of vision. . 128 
Fineness of locali- 
zation .... 129 
Fixation lines . . 148 
Fixation-point, 

inner . . 170, 229 
- visual .... 131 
Flow of time . . 158 
Force, concept of 353 
Form, feelings of 182 
Forms of psychol- 
ogy, table . , 18 
Formula 
Fechner's ... 285 
Weber's Law . 285 

Fortlage 19 

Frontal brain . . 226 

Fusion . 10.3,247,248 

classification of 

forms .... 249 

conditions of . 110 

spacial .... 253 

Fusion theories of 

space .... 126 
Fusion theories of 
visual space . 155 



G. 



71 



Geiger .... 
General sense- 
organ .... 43 
Genetictheoryl26,173 
Gestures .... 333 



page 

Gestures child's . 325 
Gods, in myths . 341 

Goethe 91 

Golden section . 182 
Grades of con- 
sciousness . . 227 

Grey 62 

Growth, mental . 369 

H. 

Hallucinations . . 299 
Harmony .... 182 
Hartley . . . 20,245 
Head, as organ of 

orientation . . 125 
Heat sensations 61, 52 
Heat-spots. ... 53 
Helmholtz50, 111, 185 
Helvetius .... 19 
Herbart 19, 20, 173, 248 
Hering's hypothe- 
sis 81 

Hermann .... 112 
Hero myth ... 341 
Heterogony of 

ends 370 

Historical sum- 
mary 18 

Hobbes 19 

Holbach 19 

Humanity, con- 
cept of . . . . 332 
Hume .... 20,245 
Hyperaesthesia . 298 
Hypnosis . . 303,304 
Hypotheses, meta- 
physical .... 11 
Hypothesis, reson- 
ance ... 58, 111 

I. 

Ideas 102 

abnormalities . 299 



Ideas, aggregate . 291 
associations of 14, 
245 
common .... 332 
conceptual. . . 295 
condensation . 347 
corruption of . 347 
expressions of . 190 
extensive . . . 113 
flight of .... 261 
of imagination. 291 
intensive . . . 103 
memory . . 265, 274 
of movement . 123 
mythological . 332 
nature of . . . 14 
obscuring of. . 347 
of orientation . 125 
of position . . 125 
spacial .... 113 
temporal . . . 156 
term. . . . 40,245 
of third dimen- 
sion 148 

words . 252, 268, 296 

Identity, combina- 
tions through. 269 

Illusions 

associative. . . 255 
constant optical 135 
direction . . . 136 
direction of ver- 
ticals 136 

fancy 299 

geometrical 138, 255 

length 136 

tactual .... 137 

time 164 

variable optical 137 

Images 

distorted visual 132 
double .... 149 



index. 



385 



page 

Images memory . 265 

Imagination 277, 292, 

296 

active 293 

child's 325 

ideas of .... 291 
passive .... 293 
Immediate experi- 
ence ..... 3 
Immortality ... 7 
Impression method 96 

Impulse 205 

Impulsive acts. . 311 
Indiflerence-inter- 

val 273 

Indifference-zone 38, 90 
Induction .... 297 
Induction, color 
and light ... 78 

Instincts 310 

alimentive . . . 311 

sexual 311 

Intensity .... 34 
comparison of . 281 

light 63 

pressure .... 53 

tones 59 

Intensive com- 
pounds .... 102 
Interaction ... 10 
Interconnection of 
psychical com- 
pounds .... 31 
Interpretation 

empirical ... 8 

natural scientific 5 

psychological . 5 

Intervals, tonal . 58 

Introspection, 

pure . . . .10,20 
Irradiation. ... 79 



page 
J. 

James 193 

Joint sensations . 52 
Judgment .... 295 

E. 

Kant 19,192 

Keenness of vision 131 
Knowledge, theory 
of ..... . 17 

Konig 112 



Labyrinth, audi- 
tory 55 

La Mettrie ... 19 

Lange 193 

Language, gesture 333 

Law 346 

of contrasts . . 367 
of creative syn- 
thesis .... 365 
of development 
toward oppos- 

ites 371 

of growth, men- 
tal 369 

of heterogony . 370 
of relations . . 366 
of relative 
magnitudes . . 283 
of resultants. . 364 
Weber's .... 283 
Laws 

of association . 246 
of combination 29 
of custom . . . 333 
of development 369 
of nature . . . 363 
of psychical phe- 
nomena ... 31 
of relation . . . 364 



WuNDT, Psychology. 2. edit. 





page 


Leibniz 


19 


intensity . . . 


73 


sensations . . . 


62 


sensations, phy- 




siological proc- 




esses . . . . 72, 80 


vibrations . . . 


72 


Limbs, regular mo- 




vements . . . 


160 


Line of orienta- 




tion 


144 


Line of regard. . 


131 


Lines of fixation . 


148 


Lipps 


185 


Local signs . . . 


116 


complex, of vi- 




sion 


143 


of depth. . 148,151 


visual 


141 


Localization, brain 




functions . . . 


225 


- fineness of. . 


129 


- of touch stim- 




uli 


116 


Location of visual 




objects .... 


125 


Locke ...... 


19 


Logical division . 


295 


forms 


295 


Lotze 


19 


M. 




Magnetism, animal 307 


Magnitude, psy- 




chical .... 


281 


Man and animals 


313 


Marching .... 


162 


Marginal contrasts 


79 


Materialism . . . 


355 


mechanical . . 


8 


psycho-physical 


8 


25 





386 



Index. 



46 

3 

5 

267 

263 

44 



page 

Matter 7 

concept of. . . 353 
Meanings , modi- 
fications of . . 335 
Measurement 
physical. . 281,366 
psychical . 281, 282, 
366 
Mechanical senses 
Mediate experi 
ence .... 
knowledge . . 
memory . . . 
recognition . 
Membrane, basilar 
illemories, mediate 267 

Memory 296 

idea. . . . 265,274 

image 265 

processes . . . 265 

term 272 

time 272 

verbal. .... 275 

Mental sciences 1, 3, 

10, 17, 350, 356 

Merkel 285 

Metalic, sensations 

of 60 

Meta-morphosia. . 132 
Metaphysics ... 6 

Meters 166 

Method 

calculation , 
experimental 
expression . . . 
impression. . . 
minimal differ- 
ences. .... 
right and wrong 

cases 

Methods 

empirical . . . 



. 287 
10,24 
. 96 
. 96 

283 

287 



page 
Methods experi- 
mental .... 28 
of measurement 283 
psycho-physical 286 
Metrical ideas . . 162 
Mimetic move- 
ments .... 189 
Mind 
concept of. . . 354 
problem of . . 6 
relation to body 358 
science of . . . 1 
-substance 1, 7, 355 
-substance, ma- 
terialistic. . . 355 
-substance, spi- 
ritualistic. . . 355 
Minimal differ- 
ences, method 

of 283 

Modes, temporal . 158 
Monadology ... 7 
Monism .... 7, 355 
Monotheistic ten- 
dency in myths 341 

Moods 174 

Morality 346 

Motives 204 

intellectual . . 209 
common .... 333 
Movements 
idea of pure . . 123 
accommodation 153 
arhythmical . . 159 
automatic . . . 211 
convergence . . 146 
expressive . . . 198 
mimetic .... 189 
ocular .... 133 
pantomimetic . 190 
rhythmical . . 159 
tactual .... 120 





page 


Miiller, Johannes . 


50 


Muscle sensations 


52 


Muscles, ocular 133, 135 


Myth, hero . . . 


341 


nature 


341 


Mythological ideas 


27, 




332 


Myths 


338 


N. 




Names 




colors 


71 


elements . . . 


32 


emotions . . . 


187 


feelings .... 


34 


sensations . . . 


34 


Nativistic theory 


125, 


154, 


173 


Natural selection 


315 


Natural sciences . 


2.3 


Nature Myths . . 


341 


Noise . . 55, 106, 


109 



0. 

Objects .... 11, 40 
concept of. 240, 243 
methods of in- 
vestigating . . 24 
of nature ... 24 
Obscuring of ideas 347 
Observation ... 23 
psychological . 25 

pure 26 

Odors , neutraliz- 
ing 60 

Onomatopoetic 

words . . 324, 336 
Opposites, devel- 
opment toward 371 
Orientation 
ideas of .... 125 
line of .... 144 



Index. 



m 



Orientation, organ 
of . . . 
point of . 
Otoliths . . 
Outer world 
Overtones . 



page 

125 
144 
46 
243 
105 



P. 

Pain 51,52 

Pantomimetic mo- 
vements .... 190 
Parallax, binocular 152 
Parallelism, prin- 
ciple of . . 49,360 
Passions. .... 192 
Pedagogy .... 30 
Perceptual. ... 6 
Personality, psy- 
chical .... 30 
Perspective, visual 154 
Philosophy ... 18 
Photochemical 

processes . 76, 79 

Pitch 56 

Plato 19 

Play 327 

Pleasurable feel- 
ings .... 92,93 
Poetry, origin . . 342 
Point of orienta- 
tion 144 

of regard . . . 131 
Practice, effects of 228 
Preexistence ... 7 
Pressure, sensa- 
tions of . . . 51 
Pressure-spots . . 53 
Principal tone . . 105 
Principle of paral- 
lelism ... 49, 360 
Problem of psy- 
chology ... 1 



page 
Processes .... 15 
affective. ... 174 
conscious . . . 244 
memory .... 265 
methods of in- 
vestigating . . 24 
natural .... 24 
volitional . . . 201 
Products, mental. 27 
Psychical elements 31 
Psychical proc- 
esses, classific- 
ation 12 

Psychological laws 362 
Psychology 
association- . . 245 

child 329 

definition , em- 
pirical .... 1 
definition, meta- 
physical ... 1 
descriptive . . 12 
empirical . . . 6, 8 
experimental 11, 27 
explanatory . . 12 
faculty- .... 12 
forms of, table. 18 
foundation of 
mental sciences 17 
historical devel- 
opment of . . 18 
immediate ex- 
perience ... 9 
individual ... 26 
inner experi- 
ence 10 

inner sense . . 1, 9 
intellectualisticl3,14 
materialistic . . 7 
metaphysical . 6 
physiological . 28 
popular .... 14 



page 



Psychology, 


pro- 


paedeutic 




science . . . 


. 18 


relation to other 


disciplines . 


. 17 


social . 11, 


27, 345 


spiritualistic 


. 7 


supplementary 


science . . , 


. 17 


voluntaristic . 


13,15 


Psycho -physical 


and psychical. 200 


Psycho -physical 


law .... 


. 286 


Psycho -physical 


parallelism 


. 363 


Pulse .... 


96, 190 


Purkinje's phe- 


nomenon . 


, ,67 


<i. 




Qualities . . . 


. 35 


affective . . 


37,92 


olfactory . 


. 59 


sensational 


. 37 


Oualitv . . . 


. 34 


comparison 


. 281 


opposite. . 


. 37 


R. 




Reaction 




experiments 


. 220 


times . . 


. 216 


Reactions . 




. 96 


complete 




. 217 


complex . . 




. 219 


early . . 




. 218 


mistaken 




. . 218 


muscular 




. 217 


sensorial 




. . 217 


shortened 




. . 217 


Reading . . 




. . 259 


25* 







388 



Index. 



page 

Reality 6 

immediate ... 16 
Reason, moving . 204 
Recognition 
mediate .... 263 
sensible .... 261 
References 
abnormalities of 
consciousness . 307 
apperception. . 244 
apperceptive 
functions . . . 298 
associations . . 278 
brain functions 226 
common feel- 
ings 179 

composite feel- 
ings 185 

concept of mind 363 
contrasts . . . 290 
customs .... 346 
development of 
animals. . . . 315 
development of 

child 330 

development of 
communities . 338, 
351 
elements ... 41 
emotions . . . 200 
emotions , phy- 
sical conditions 195 
feelings .... 95 
feelings, phy- 
sical conditions 99 
general sense . 54 
historical and 
general. ... 21 
intensive ideas 113 
laws of develop- 
ment 372 

laws of relation 369 



page 
References light 
sensations . . 72, 83 
methods of psy- 
chology ... 28 

myths 343 

reaction time ex- 
periments . . 222 
scope of atten- 
tion and con- 
sciousness . . 236 
pure sensations 50 

sound 59 

space, touch. . 127 
space, visual . 155 
taste and smell 62 

time 173 

volition .... 215 
Weber's law. . 287 
Reflex processes . 212 
Regard, line and 

point of . . . 131 
Relating function 277, 
279 
Relations, law of 366 
Relativity, law of 
(see Weber's 
Law) 
Relaxing feeling . 92 

Religion 342 

Remembering, 

feeling of. . . 269 
Reproduction of 

ideas 245 

Resolution. ... 207 
Resonance hypo- 
thesis ... 58, 111 
Resonators for 

sound analysis 56 
Respiration . . . 190 
Resultants, law of 364 
Resultants, psy- 
chical .... 364 



page 
Retina, centre and 

periphery . . 83 
Retinal processes 79 
Retrogradation of 

volition . . . 211 
Rhythm of atten- 
tion 233 

auditory .... 162 

and emotions . 186 

Rods, retinal . . 83 

S. 
Saline sensations 60 
Saturation of 

colors .... 65 
Scale, tonal ... 58 
Schopenhauer. 20,214 
Sciences 
experimental . 24 
mental (see men- 
tal sciences) 
natural (see na- 
tural sciences) 
Scope of attention 231 
of consciousness 231, 
234 
Selective acts . . 206 
Self consciousness 242 

child's 320 

Self-knowledge . 4 
Semicircular 

canals . . 125,127 

Sensations .... 32 

achromatic light 62 

alkaline .... 60 

bitter 60 

brightness ... 63 
chromatic 
brightness . . 68 
chromatic light 62 

cold 61 

color ..... 63 



Index. 



389 



page 

Sensations, com- 
mon 51 



of 



general sense 
heat. . 
joint . 
light . 
maximal 
metallic 
minimal 
muscle 
noise . 
pain. . 
persistence 
pressure 
pure . 
rise of 
saline . 
skin. . 
smell . 
sound . 
sour. . 
sweet . 
taste . 
temperat 
tendons 
term . 
tonal . 
touch . 



ure 



. 51 

. 61 

. 52 

. 62 

. 35 

. 60 

. 35 

. 52 

. 55 

. 51 

. 77 

. 51 
41,42 

. 42 

. 60 

. 52 

. 59 

. 55 

. 60 

. 60 

. 60 

. 53 

. 52 

. 40 
55, 56 

. 51 



Sense, chemical 46, 61 
distance of blind 124 
inner . . 1, 2, 9, 15 



-feelings . . . 

-functions, 

child's . . . 

mechanical . 
Sensitivity 

brightness . . 

pressures . . 

tones . . . . 

Sentences . . . 

Series, associa- 

tional . . . 



84 

316 

46 

63 

53 

59 

337 

261 



Series feelings . . 96 
- reactions . . 97 
Shortened reac- 
tions 217 

Similarity, associa- 
tion . . . 246,270 
Skin sensations . 52 

Sleep 305 

Sleep-walking . . 303 
Smell sensations . 59 
Social conduct. . 343 

laws 343 

psychology . 30, 345 
Somnambulism . 304 
Sound, modifica- 
tions of in 
words .... 335 
Sound 

sensations ... 55 
vibrations ... 57 
Sour sensations . . 60 
Space, source of. 115 
subjective rela- 
tions 122 

theories of . . 125 
Spacial fusion and 

movement . . 120 
Spacial ideas . . 113 

child's 318 

visual 128 

Speaking .... 259 
Specific energy . 47 
historical sum- 
mary 50 

Specific forms of 
experience . . 33 

Speech 332 

centre 225 

child's 324 

development . . 333 

Spencer 20 

Spinoza 192 



page 
Spiritualism . . . 355 
Squinting .... 133 
Stages, temporal. 159 
States, psychical. 298 
States, animal . . 311 
States, develop- 
ment of . . . 344 
Stereoscope . . . 152 
Sthenic emotions . 191 
Stimuli , various 

forms .... 42 
Strain, feeling of. 92 
Stumpf . . . 111,185 
Subduing feeling 92 
Subject .... 11,40 
concept of. 240,243 
experiencing. . 3 
Suggestion , . . 304 
posthypnotic. . 304 
Summation-tones. 108 
Sweet sensations. 60 
Symmetry .... 182 
Sympathetic vi- 
brations ... 57 
Synergy of optical 

movements . . 133 

Synthesis .... 277 

apperceptive. . 290 

creative .... 365 

System 

brightness , re- 
presentation of 68 
light, represen- 
tation of . . . 69 
characteristics 

of 35 

complex .... 36 
of elements . . 35 
homogeneous . 35 

T. 

Table of forms of 
psychology . . 18 



JUL 



25 
/2< 



1903 



390 

page 

Tachisto scope . . 231 

Tactual sensations 172 
Tactual space in 

blindness . . . 118 

Talent 297 

Taste sensations . 60 
Tastes, neutraliz- 
ing 61 

Temperature sen- 
sations .... 53 
Temporal ideas, 
child's .... 319 
sources .... 156 
theory of . . . 168 
Temporal percep- 
tion 170 

Temporal signs . 171 

Tendon sensations 52 

Tetens 19 

Theories 

color vision . . 81 

space 125 

visual space 140, 150 
Threshold 

consciousness . 229 

difference-. . . 283 

tactual .... 117 
Time 
favorable forfeel- 

ings 164 

ideas of ... . 156 
ideas and affec- 
tive elements. 160 
ideas and sensa- 
tional content 160 
memory .... 272 
memory, indif- 
ference interval 273 
rhythm .... 159 
Tonal sensations 55, 56 
Tone, affective . . '84 
Tone, principal . 105 



/ 

Index. 

page 

Tones , combina- 
tions of . . . 108 
fundamental . . 56 
highest . . . . ' 58 
intervals ... 58 

lowest 58 

summation- . . 108 

Touch 

analytic .... 119 
sensations ... 51 

space 116 

space threshold 117 
synthetic . . . 119 

Transformation of 
stimuli .... 44 

. ^• 
Unconscious proc- 
esses .... 223 
Unconsciousness 

concept of . . 227 

Understanding. . 277, 

292, 294, 296 

child's 328 

Unity of affective 

states .... 184 
Unpleasurable 

feeling ... 92, 94 

T. 

Values, subjective 365 

Vinci, Leonardo da 70 

Vision 
angle of. ... 130 
centre of . . . 130 

direct 131 

erect 150 

field of .... 129 
indirect .... 131 
peripheral . . . 141 

depth 147 

estimation of 
distances . 134, 139 

Visual purple . . 82 






Volitions 

abnormalities . 300 
apperception. . 242 
attention . . . 239 
complete . . . 208 
complex .... 206 
direction of . . 241 
energy of . . . 241 
experiments on 215 
external. ... 202 
internal . . 202, 209 
primitive form. 202 
simple .... 205 

sleep 305 

theories of. . . 213 
typical of mental 

life 15 

Volitional acts. . 201 
Volitional proc- 
esses 201 

Voluntarism 

metaphysical . 20 

psychological . 20 

Vorstellung . . . 245 

Vowels 110 

W. 

Walking, child's . 323 

Weber 283 

Weber's law . 53, 283 
Whispers .... 110 

White 62 

Will, child's ... 322 
collective . . . 349 

Wolff 19 

Words 

development of 335 
ideas of 252, 268, 296 
order in sent- 
ences 337 

Y. 

Young - Helmholtz 
hypothesis . . 81 



Printed "by Breitkopf and Hartel, Leipzig. 



